This event coincided with the arrival of Captain 1st Rank von Essen, newly appointed head of the 1st Mine Division, to the port of Emperor Alexander III. Soon an order was received to promote him to rear admiral.

All ready-made destroyers were concentrated in the port. The division included: four destroyers of the "Border Guard" type, which made up the Special Purpose half-division (the admiral raised his flag on the "Border Guard"); 1st Division – four destroyers of the “Volunteer” type and four “Vsadnik” type; 2nd Division - eight destroyers of the "Ukraine" type; 3rd Division - eight destroyers of the "Mechanical Engineer Dmitriev" type and 4th Division of eight destroyers of the "Light" ("French") type. But many of them were still being completed in Riga and Helsingfors, and stern guns were installed on the 4th division, and it was stationed in the Neva. The admiral made every effort to quickly assemble the entire division, which he managed to achieve by the spring of 1907.

In essence, then it was the only combat unit of the Baltic Fleet, which over time could carry out serious combat service and become the core of the reviving Baltic Fleet.

In addition to the Mine Division, there was also a detachment of ships designed to sail with the ship's midshipmen. It consisted of the battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Slava” and the cruiser “Bogatyr” and went on overseas voyages in the winter. All other large ships were either under repair or being completed. As I indicated above, the work proceeded very slowly, due to the lack of money from the Naval Ministry.

It was impossible to find a more suitable officer for the post of head of the Mine Division than Admiral Essen. Not to mention his military service during the Japanese War and extensive experience in commanding ships, he had exceptional organizational skills, and he would undoubtedly have developed into an outstanding naval commander. In addition, he enjoyed great fame and authority among the personnel, was loved by officers and commands, and his personality was charming.

At the Mine Division he was to lay a solid foundation for the future naval power of the Baltic Sea. Create a cadre of brilliant commanders and officers. Develop an organization for the maritime theater of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. In a word, to prepare everything for the moment when new ships enter service. Now we can say that Admiral Essen coped with these tasks brilliantly - from a core of 36 destroyers in 1906, by 1915 he had two brigades of battleships, 2 brigades of cruisers, 2 mine divisions, a submarine detachment, etc. ., etc. But even then no one doubted that he would cope with the difficult task of reviving the fleet. Young officers were especially happy about the appointment of Admiral Essen, seeing in him the dashing commander of the Novik cruiser during the Japanese War.

Almost from the first day of the admiral’s arrival, vigorous organizational work began on all the destroyers of the division. First of all, the admiral had to face the issue of properly staffing the destroyers with officers and crews, and this caused a large number of movements and an influx of new officers and crews from ships that were under repair. In general, there was a great shortage of officers.

In particular, I was transferred to the destroyer “Volunteer”. This appointment pleased me extremely, since I found myself on a ship of higher combat qualities, and, in addition, it was pleasant to leave under the command of Vecheslov.

It was already late autumn (late September) of 1906; there was nothing to think about sailing this year. And even before sailing, it was necessary to organize the division, put it in combat condition, train the crews and force the officers to get used to their ships.

At Volunteer I immediately felt great. The commander was captain 2nd rank A.G. Pokrovsky, senior officer A.V. Dombrovsky, then Lieutenant V.V. Vitgeft, midshipman L.B. Zayonchkovsky (my corps comrades) and the ship's mechanic, Staff Captain Khomentovsky. The entire cast was extremely nice, and somehow we immediately became friends and got along.

The commander was extremely proud of his ship and strived for it to be the best of all the destroyers in the division. This desire of his for the ship to be “the best” immediately affected the entire personnel, and we all tried to ensure that everything was really better for us than for others. It was not easy, since other destroyers were striving for the same thing, but the tone given by the commander played a big role, and our “Volunteer” was soon singled out by the admiral himself.

The destroyers were supposed to spend the coming winter “in reserve,” that is, to stand in the port with a full complement of officers and crew and in such readiness of all mechanisms as to be able to go to sea in the shortest possible time (approximately a week). In former times, not only destroyers, but also all large ships of the Baltic Fleet “finished company” for the winter, that is, officers and crews were written off as crews were available and some of the mechanisms were dismantled. In the spring, the ships “started a campaign” - they armed themselves; officers and crews returned to them. This order has been established since the old days, when ships were wooden and, of course, it would have been impossible to spend harsh winters on them. This would be detrimental to the health of the crews.

But since then everything has completely changed: the ships became iron, the first steam heating appeared, and in general it was already possible to create such hygienic living conditions for the crew so that they would not suffer from the winter cold. However, the authorities of the pre-Tsushima period did not consider it necessary to change the old order, and ships continued to be disarmed in the fall and armed in the spring. Since the ships were on campaign for four months a year (from mid-May to mid-September), it follows that the fleet would not have been able to defend the shores of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland for eight months if war had suddenly broken out. But few people thought about this in those days. “Ending the campaign” for eight months was considered saving money, and little thought was given to the combat readiness of the ships.

Thus, the fact that the division would spend the winter in reserve, and that the full officers and crews would live on their ships all year round, was an innovation and seemed very risky to officers imbued with the Dotsushima spirit. We, young officers, on the contrary, terribly welcomed this measure, since we really did not like life on the shore and serving in crews.

But, of course, on the destroyers we had to think carefully about how to protect the premises from the cold. Although the sides inside were protected with small cork or cork sheets, they still sweated a lot. The entrance hatches had to be lined with boards, otherwise cold air would rush in when they were opened. To save coal, steam for steam heating was taken from the shore. In severe frosts, there were often cases where water pipes froze, and sometimes even steam heating pipes. Electricity was also taken from the shore.

In general, life gradually got better, and everyone felt not bad at all, even in the most severe frosts. There were no more diseases than if we lived on the shore, but we had to very strictly monitor the sanitary condition of the interior and do “general cleaning” once a week. It was especially difficult with warm clothes, which took up a lot of space, and there was extremely little of it.

In any case, the very first winter proved that there was no need to transfer teams ashore for the winter, and militarily this was a great advantage. Subsequently, the crews were even destroyed, leaving only one crew, the 1st Baltic in Kronstadt and the 2nd Baltic in St. Petersburg, for detachments of recruits and for the temporary accommodation of sailors who were transferred elsewhere. In addition, the 1st Baltic Crew kept records of all officers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

To avoid confusion, we will restore the chronology of the formation of mine forces in the Baltic after the Russo-Japanese War.

Initially, in February 1906, the mine cruisers that entered service, built with voluntary donations from the population, were included in the Practical Defense Detachment of the Baltic Sea coast under the command of the retinue of Rear Admiral Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. Soon after the Grand Duke fled from the fleet, by order of the chief commander of the fleet and ports and the head of the naval defense of the Baltic Sea, Vice Admiral K.P. Nikonov dated September 28, 1906, all mine cruisers from the Practical Detachment were consolidated into a separate Detachment of Mine Cruisers under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.O. von Essen. In October 1906, destroyers were added to the detachment, and it became known as the 1st detachment of mine ships of the Baltic Sea, while being directly subordinate to the main commander of the fleet.

Initially, it included the mine cruisers: “Ukraine”, “Kazanets”, “Moskvityanin”, “Volunteer”, “Finn”, “Okhotnik”, “Emir of Bukhara”, “Amurets”, “Ussuriets”, “Zabaikalets”, “ Border Guard", "Siberian Shooter", "General Kondratenko", "Horseman", "Gaydamak", "Guarding", "Terrible", "Don Cossack", "Trukhmenets"; destroyers “Vidny”, “Thundering”, “Combat”, “Mechanical Engineer Zverev”, “Mechanical Engineer Dmitriev”, “Stormy”, “Attentive”, “Impressive”, “Hardy”, “Vigilant”; transport "Angara".

By order of the Naval Department of December 8, 1907, the 1st detachment of mine ships was renamed the Division of Destroyers from April 1, 1908. It consisted of four divisions of eight destroyers each (according to the 1907 classification, mine cruisers were also called destroyers), three destroyers at the disposal of the division commander, as well as auxiliary vessels. Until November 24, 1908, the division was commanded by N.O. von Essen, then captain 1st rank His Serene Highness Prince A.A. Liven.

On March 12, 1909, the Baltic Sea destroyer division was renamed the 1st Mine Division; until October 11, 1911, it was headed by A.A. Liven.

By the already mentioned order of the chief commander of the fleet and ports and the head of the naval defense of the Baltic Sea, Vice Admiral K.P. Nikonov dated September 28, 1906, part of the older destroyers was consolidated into a Destroyer Detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.V. Knyazev to protect the skerry area (since October 1906 - the 2nd detachment of mine ships of the Baltic Sea). From April 1, 1908, the detachment was called the Destroyer Division, which, in turn, was renamed the 2nd Mine Division on March 12, 1909.

In April 1915, the 1st and 2nd Mine Divisions were united into the Mine Division.

BRIGADES

CRUISERS

BRIGADE OF CRUISERS OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES

1917-1921

• 1st cruiser brigade of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1918.
• Brigade of cruisers of the Baltic Fleet. 1918-1919.
• Brigade of cruisers of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1920-1921.

F. r-100, 31 storage units, 1916-1921

SHIPS OF THE BATTLE

BRIGADE OF LITTLE SHIPS OF THE BALTIC FLEET

Petrograd. Kronstadt. 1920-1921

F. r-304, 47 items, 1920-1921

TORPEDO BOATS

TORPEDO BOAT BRIGADE OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

1933-...

F. r-1960, 597 items, 1925-1940

Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The fund contains: orders of the brigade commander; flagship historical and log books; materials from the political department.

2nd brigade of torpedo boats of the Red Banner baltic fleet

19??-19??

F. r-2147, 20 units, 1940

TRAWLING AND BAGGING

MSWLEENING AND MEANING BRIGADE OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

1918-1939

• A detachment of minesweepers of the Baltic Sea. 1918.
• Head of mine sweeping in the Baltic Sea. 1918.
• Head of trawling protection affairs of the Baltic Sea. 1918-1920.
• Baltic Sea trawling division. 1920-1922.
• Baltic Sea trawling squad. 1922-1923.
• Baltic Sea trawling and barrage squad. 1923-1924.
• Trawling and barrage brigade of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1924-1939.

F. r-40, 606 items, 1917-1940

Laying minefields in the Petrograd area, trawling fairways and certain areas in the Gulf of Finland; participation in the Ice Transit of ships and vessels from Helsingfors to Kronstadt in the spring of 1918. The fund contains: orders for the brigade and divisions; states; reports, summaries, dispatches, reports on the conduct of mine sweeping operations, deployment, re-equipment, navigation of ships.

DIVISIONS

GUNNER BOATS

GUNNBOAT DIVISION OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

1939-1940

F. r-1890, 7 units of storage, 1939-1940

Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The fund preserved: orders of the division commander; materials on the disbandment of the division.

GUARD SHIPS

1st DIVISION OF GUARD SHIPS FOR PROTECTING THE WATER REGION OF THE RED BANNARY BALTIC FLEET

193?-...

F. r-1895, 11 items, 1938-1940

Participation in hostilities during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The fund contains: a report on the combat activities of the patrol ship Purga, materials from the patrol ships Burya, Snow, Cloud.

7 DIVISION OF GUARD VESSELS OF THE BALTIC SEA

1917-19??

F. r-1621, 3 units of storage, 1917-1918

The fund has preserved: journals of incoming and outgoing papers of the head of the division.

minesweepers

1st DIVISION OF MINESWEEPERS FOR PROTECTION OF THE WATER REGION OF THE RED BANNARY BALTIC FLEET

1939-19??

F. r-1911, 8 units of storage, 1939-1940

Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The fund contains: reports on military operations.

UNITS

LARGE SHIPS

1st and 2nd DETACHMENTS OF LARGE SHIPS OF THE BALTIC SEA NAVAL FORCES

United Fund. 1919-1920

• 1 detachment of large ships of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1919-1920.
• 2 detachment of large ships of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1919-1920.

F. r-97, 71 items, 1919-1920

Participation in the civil war of 1918-1920. The fund contains: plans for measuring the depths of the mouth of the Neva River (1919); information about the condition of the detachment's ships, repair work and preparation of ships for long-term storage, sending sailors to the land front and to suppress the counter-revolutionary rebellion at the Krasnaya Gorka fort, preparing ships for sending to the Caspian Sea and transferring guns and ammunition of battleships to the Onega military flotilla.

LIGHT FORCES

LIGHT FORCES DETACHMENT OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

1939-1940

F. r-929, 95 units, 1939-1940

Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, escorting transport ships, performing patrol duty. The fund contains: materials for personnel.

ICEBREAKING AND RESCUE

ICEBREAKING AND RESCUE FORCE OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES

Petrograd. 1918-1922

F. r-113, 115 units, 1918-1922

Rescue and escort of ships and fleet auxiliary vessels; transportation of goods. The fund contains: orders for the detachment; squad annual reports; orders from the icebreaker commander Kuivasto.

MINE FIGHTER BOATS

MINE FIGHTER BOAT SQUAD AND BASE LOVAT MARINE FORCES OF THE BALTIC SEA

1920-1922

• A squad of mine destroyer boats. Nizhny Novgorod. 1920-1921.
• A detachment of mine destroyer boats and the Lovat base of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1921-1922.

F. r-106, 17 units, 1916-1922

SECURITY OF SHIPS

VESSEL SECURITY TEAM OF PETROGRAD DISTRICT

1918-19??

F. r-1616, 1 unit of storage, 1918-1919

The fund has preserved: materials on personnel.

FLOATING PRODUCTS

FLOATING BARACKS No. 1 OF THE BALTIC FLEET

Kronstadt. 19??-19??

F. r-648, 14 units, 1917-1918

PRACTICAL

PRACTICAL DETAIL OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES

1929-1930

F. r-883, 8 units, 1929-1930

Training of personnel. Voyage of the battleship Paris Commune and the cruiser Profintern from Kronstadt to Sevastopol through the Baltic and North Seas, the Bay of Biscay, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. The collection contains: the flagship historical magazine; squad orders.

VESSELS

HEAD OF THE ACTIVE BALTIC SEA VESSEL TEAM

Petrograd-Kronstadt. 1919-1920

F. r-109, 181 items, 1919-1920

Defense of Kronstadt and Petrograd during the civil war of 1918-1920. The fund contains: the flagship historical journal of the detachment headquarters; reports from ship commanders; materials on the training and dispatch of sailors to the land front.

A SQUAD OF VESSELS OF THE BALTIC FLEET IN LONG-TERM STORAGE IN PETROGRAD

Petrograd. 1919-1922

F. r-110, 16 units, 1919-1922

Transfer of battleships to long-term storage; organization of storage of ships delivered to the port. The fund contains: orders for the detachment.

FINNISH-LADOGA DETACHMENT OF BORDER SECURITY VESSELS OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES

1922-192?

F. r-1711, 3 units of storage, 1922-1923

The fund preserved: orders from the head of the detachment; minutes of party meetings.

TRANSPORT AND YACHT

TRANSPORT AND YACHT SQUAD OF THE BALTIC SEA

Petrograd. 1919-19??

F. r-377, 6 units, 1919-1921

Providing storage for yachts; carrying out guard duty by crews. The fund contains: orders of the chief of the 1st brigade of large ships of the Baltic Sea.

TRAINING SHIPS

TRAINING SHIPS OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

192?-19??

F. r-851, 664 items, 1922-1940

Organization of practical voyages for cadets of naval educational institutions, participation in foreign campaigns; retraining of specialists from private and junior command staff of the reserve. The fund contains: orders of the detachment commander; plans, reports, correspondence about voyages, maneuvers, and foreign campaigns of the detachment.

SKERRY

Skerry troop of the baltic sea

1917-19??

F. r-1617, 5 items, 1917-1918

The fund preserved: orders of the head of the 3rd division of patrol vessels; minutes of the committee and general meetings of the team of the 5th division of patrol boats.

Skerry Detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet

Transund. 1940-...

• Skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Kronstadt. 1940.
• Skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Oranienbaum. 1940.
• Skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Transund. 1940-...

F. r-2072, 6 units of storage, 1940-1941

The fund contains: orders for the detachment.

CONNECTIONS

SHIPS OF THE BATTLE

FORMATIONS OF THE BALTIC SHIPS OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

United Fund. 1917-1939

• 1st brigade of battleships of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1919.
• 2nd brigade of battleships of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1919.
• 1 semi-brigade of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1921-1922.
• Semi-brigade of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1925-1926.
• Brigade of battleships of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1926.
• Division of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1926-1931.
• Brigade of battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1931-1935.
• Brigade of battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1936-1939.
• Division of patrol ships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1930-1935.
• Division of patrol ships of brigades of battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1935-1939.

F. r-852, 492 items, 1917-1939

Participation in the October armed uprising in Petrograd, in the suppression of the Kerensky-Krasnov rebellion of 1917, the civil war of 1918-1920, the ice passage of ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to Kronstadt in the spring of 1918. The fund contains: materials on the withdrawal of ships from Helsingfors in Kronstadt, defense of Fort Ino; the beginning of peace negotiations with Germany; information about the condition, modernization and repair of equipment on ships; flagship historical and radiotelegraph magazines.

SUBMARINE FORCE

SUBMARINE FORCES OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

United Fund. 1918-1941

• Headquarters of the Baltic Sea submarine division. 1918-1922.
• Headquarters of a separate submarine division of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1922-1924.
• Headquarters of the submarine brigade of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1924-1934.
• Headquarters of the 1st submarine division. 1919-1922, 1924-1934.
• Headquarters of the 2nd submarine division. 1919-1922, 1924-1934.
• Headquarters of the submarine training division. 1933-1934.

F. r-107, 1728 items, 1918-1940

DESTROYERS

DESTROYER FORMATIONS OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET

United Fund. 1917-1939

• Mine division of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1917-1922.
• Separately floating division. 1922-1924.
• Brigade of destroyers of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1924-1935.
• A brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1935-1939.
• 1st brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1939.
• 2nd brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1939.
• A brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1939.

F. r-103, 955 items, 1917-1940

Participation in the October armed uprising in Petrograd in 1917, the Ice transition of ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet from Revel and Helsingfors to Kronstadt and Petrograd in the spring of 1918; sending a detachment of ships to the Volga along the Mariinsky system in August 1918. The fund contains: materials on combat training, personnel; flagship historical magazines.

TRANSPORT FLEETIES

TRANSPORT FLEET OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES

Petrograd. 1920-1921

F. r-112, 16 storage units, 1920 1921

SQUADRONS

SQUADRON OF THE RED BANNARY BALTIC FLEET

1939-...

F. r-1135, 372 items, 1939-1944

Participation in hostilities during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The collection contains: the flagship historical magazine; materials on personnel.

Forces and means to defend the position

Defense equipment

The defenses of the Moonsund position consisted of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga, minefields, batteries, a ground garrison, engineering preparation of the islands, naval aviation and communications posts.
The commander of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga during the 1917 operation was Admiral Bakhirev; in the order to him from the Commander of the Fleet, dated July 20 / August 2, 1917, No. 1004 op., it was stated: “In the event of the start of the German fleet’s operation on the Gulf of Riga, I instruct you to assume overall command of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga and the Moonsund position for unification their actions, as was previously assumed" 1.

His appointment is adm. Bakhirev explains as follows: “Circumstances could require reinforcement of the forces of the Gulf of Riga by other parts of the fleet, and there could have been friction between the newly arrived flagships and the head of the Mine Division, who was constantly in the gulf, who was always a junior admiral in the fleet (first there was Adm. Razvodov, then Adm. Stark).
Meanwhile, when the enemy appeared, everything had to be led by a person who had already become familiar with the state of affairs in the bay. I was the senior flagship in the active fleet, and therefore, I believe, the choice of the authorities settled on me.”
The Commander of the Naval Forces, in addition to the ships in the gulf, was operationally subordinate to the Rogekul base and the Tserel batteries. The head of the Moonsund position, despite the above instructions, apparently remained directly subordinate to the Fleet Commander. Due to the difficulty, due to a lack of command personnel, to form a special headquarters for the Commander of the Naval Forces, during his stay in the gulf, the headquarters of the Mine Division was directly subordinate to him, located on the Libava transport, which was parked in the roadstead in Kuyvasta on a barrel connected by telephone to a skid and shore 2.

Gulf of Riga Maritime Force (See Appendix I)

The Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga included the battleships "Citizen" and "Slava". It was not possible to reinforce them with other battleships, since work on deepening the Moonsund Canal was stopped in 1917; in the previous year, the depth in it was only brought to 26.5 feet, although much more was expected; meanwhile lin. It was not considered possible for the ships “Andrey Pervozvanny” and “Respublika” to reduce their draft to pass through this canal.
The experience of unloading these ships was carried out in August 1916 and did not give a positive result. Their value in Moonsund would have been enormous, since the range of their 12" artillery with heavy shells reached 135 cables, 3 while on the Slava the range was increased only to 115 cables, and on the Citizen it remained the same - only 88 cables 4 .
Of the cruisers, at the beginning of the operation, only one Bayan was in Moonsund. Already during the German offensive, Admiral Makarov (October 4) and Diana (October 16) arrived. Admiral Bakhirev, assuming that the enemy had a trawled channel along the southern shore of the Irbensky Strait and in view of the possibility of light cruisers and destroyers breaking through the strait, worked hard to send relatively high-speed cruisers “Bogatyr” and “Oleg” with strong rapid-fire artillery to the Gulf of Riga, but he was denied this 5.

The mine division, led by its commander, spent all navigation time, starting in 1915, in Moonsund, but some of the destroyers were constantly detached to carry out various assignments in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia; in addition, constant service at sea necessitated the overhaul of vehicles, various corrections, and sometimes larger repairs, which also diverted some of the destroyers to Revel and Helsingfors; smaller works were performed in Rogeküll. By the beginning of the operation in Moonsund, they were under the command of the head of the Mine Division, Adm. Stark up to ten "Novikov" (XI, XII and XIII divisions) and eleven destroyers of the old coal type (IV, V and VI divisions). In the next few days, two more “Noviks” (“Gabriel” and “Captain Izylmetev”) and two old destroyers approached. In addition, there were several small destroyers of the Patrol Vessel Division.
At the beginning of the operation there were only three submarines - the British “S 26”, “S 27” and “S 32”. Before that, there were our “A G” type boats that had recently entered into service, but “thanks to the lack of experience of the personnel and, probably, the imperfection of the mechanisms, they often failed” 6 . Regarding the English submarines, the commander of the Gulf Naval Forces says: “The most serviceable part were the English submarines “C”, about which I can only speak with the greatest praise: all orders were carried out by them accurately, not only resignedly, but also with. with a complete desire to bring military benefit" 7. At the request of Adm. Bakhirev faulty boats, when possible, were replaced by others. So, one day a “Leopard” was sent, which, despite its large size, brilliantly carried out the assignment given to it to monitor the entrance to the Western Dvina. “Cougar” sent another time on September 7 as a result; malfunction refused to go to work given to him.
There were also gunboats “Khivinets”, “Brave” and “Threatening” in the Gulf of Riga; minelayers "Amur", "Volga" and "Pripyat"; minesweepers, patrol vessels, motor ships, patrol boats, transports and various auxiliary vessels.
The divisions of trawling and patrol vessels, whose winter repairs were greatly delayed, due to the large work in the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, could devote only a small part of their part to the Gulf of Riga; Meanwhile, the need for these ships, especially after the appearance of enemy submarines in the bay and the fall of Riga, greatly increased. Transports to Mento, Arensburg and Pernov could no longer be sent without an escort, and therefore the available patrol ships were only occupied with this matter and were distracted from their direct duties. Admiral Bakhirev several times asked the Fleet Commander to increase the number of small ships, and in a usogram dated September 22 / October 5, he indicated that only two patrol ships remained for the needs of the bay.
He made the same requests regarding minesweepers; even on September 28/October 11, on the eve of the appearance of the Germans, he reported that he had only one minesweeper left, the Minrep, and the last Russian submarine was out of action.
As for the condition in which our ships were, the condition of the machines on large ships was relatively satisfactory; the destroyers and small ships were so worn out that, with very few exceptions, they required constant bulkheads and repairs in Rogeküle and even in Reval and Helsingfors after short campaigns and even stops in Arensburg and Kuivast.
In general, in a technical sense, the ships of the Gulf of Riga, like the entire Russian fleet in 1917, due to poorly completed repairs and the almost absence of constant, correct monitoring of the equipment by the command staff, were in much worse condition than in previous years. Admiral Bakhirev gives several examples characterizing the state of the material part. Thus, on September 8, destroyers, twice attacked by seaplanes, could not open fire from their air cannons; The destroyer of the patrol division, placed at night at the milestone to indicate its location, could not open the searchlight. When is October 17 for the final destruction of the line. the ship "Glory" several Whitehead mines were fired at it, only one exploded. The investigation showed that the explosion of the others did not occur due to careless storage of mines and lack of care for them.
The gunboat "Khivinets", which had been stationed in Helsingfors all the time and not disturbed by anyone, arrived in the Gulf of Riga with so many hours (up to 800) of boiler operation that it immediately began to ask for its temporary decommissioning. There were many similar cases with mechanisms and boilers. Often work that had previously been carried out by ship's means and the duration of which was determined by hours, was now transferred to workshops and time was wasted on the passage from Kuivast to Rogekul and back. “The cadre of experienced conductors and long-term servicemen were destroyed, and in general young people tried to oust the old people from the ships.”
“The ships, based on Moonsund since the spring, thanks to the efforts of the former division chief, Rear Adm. Razvozov in the military sense, i.e. shooting, artillery and mines, laying mines, barrages, etc., one might say, were trained satisfactorily; Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the ships that arrived at the end of summer” 8.
A port was built in Rogeküle as a necessary base for ships in the Gulf of Riga. It was connected by railway through Gapsal to Revel; dredging work was carried out in it, piers were erected to protect the harbor and form a large berthing line; there were some workshops and warehouses.

Minefields

The most significant means for protecting the position both from a breakthrough and against various actions of the enemy fleet were minefields placed both in the straits and on the approaches to them and in the internal waters of the position itself, renewed annually starting in the spring and strengthened throughout all summer.
The most important of the barriers was considered to be the barrier of the Irben Strait, for which a huge amount of money and effort was spent.
This barrier included two positions: Irbenskaya and Domesnesskaya. The northern limit of the first limited the maneuvering space, the so-called “maneuvering bag”. The Domesnes position, which consisted of four lines of barriers in the direction of Domesnes - Bank Vost. Kalkgrund, with a total depth of five miles, closed it on the east. Both positions, for the most part, were covered by the range of the 12" guns of the Tserel battery.
Regarding this barrier, Admiral Bakhirev writes in his report: “In the Irben Strait itself, a minefield had long been placed and maintained, which could not at all be considered a mine position: 1) the southern shore of the strait belonged to the enemy and was strongly fortified; 2) the large area of ​​the field made it possible for the enemy to carry out sweeping work all the time, and we could not catch the moment when he really intended to force the passage; Moreover, thanks to this field, we were deprived of the opportunity to constantly monitor enemy minesweepers; 3) the enemy could carry out these minesweepers completely without the support of his fleet; 4) during a breakthrough, the enemy, thanks to the structure of our position, is always protected from our attacks by destroyers and submarines, since he was protected by our barriers placed parallel to the shore (this was, in my opinion, a huge mistake); 5) the enemy had the opportunity to make a trawled fairway along its very shore and monitor its good condition; 6) we did not have the opportunity to send our destroyers and submarines from the Gulf of Riga unexpectedly to the enemy to W. at sea and, therefore; 7) this field deprived us of the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance in the Baltic Sea from the Gulf of Riga.
Thus, in the Irbensky passage we did not have a mine position, there was only a minefield covered and covered with mines: the enemy trawled, we added more mines. Nevertheless, the situation forced us to continue this positional struggle.”9
A minefield was also placed before the entrance to Moonsund from the south, both to protect against the enemy’s breakthrough to Kuivast, and to make it difficult for his fleet to maneuver in the event of a battle with our batteries and ships that had retreated to Kuivast. A passage was left for our ships on the sides of this fence.
A barrier was also erected from the sea at the approaches to Soelosund; the strait itself remained unobstructed to allow our destroyers unimpeded access to the sea. It was supposed to be blocked with both mines and the sinking of a steamer in it, only in case of an immediate threat from the enemy 10.

Batteries

Of the batteries built on the islands of the position, the first place in importance was occupied by the battery on Cape Tserel (No. 43) of four 12" guns of 50 calibers, on unitary tower installations, behind concrete parapets. It was entrusted with the protection of the Irbensky passage and its barriers from enemy trawling, as well as assistance to our ships in their fight against the breaking through enemy fleet. A little north of it, on the same Svorbe peninsula, near the village of Karust, there was a battery (No. 40) of four 120 m/m guns of 50 cal., removed from armored gunboats of the Amur flotilla, and at Cape Mento - a battery (No. 41) of four 130 m/m guns of 50 cal.
The approach to Soelosund from the sea was protected by batteries: on the northeastern shore of the island. Ezel, on capes Khundva and Ninnast (No. 45 and 46), - each of four 6" guns of 45 cal., and on the southwestern tip of the island. Dago, near the village of Cerro (No. 34), of four 120 m/m guns of 50 calibers. The former were apparently also responsible for preventing the landing in the most convenient, and therefore most threatened, place, namely in Taggalaht Bay; however, brought to the outer capes, they were the first to be exposed to naval artillery fire, which is why they could not fulfill this role. They would probably have carried it out more successfully if they had been located in the depths of Taggalaht and Mustelgam bays.
Further north, on the northeastern and northern side of the island. Dago, to defend the approaches to the Forward position and protect its left flank, as well as to assist the fleet in the event of a battle, there were batteries: on Dagerort, near the village. Germust (No. 47, of four 6" in 45 cal.), on the Simperness peninsula (No. 39 of four 12" in 52 cal.) at the Takhkona lighthouse, and a little to the east (No. 38 of four 6" in 50 cal.) The latter at the same time covered the approach from the north to Moonsund, for which battery No. 30 also served at the north-western tip of the island of Worms of four 6" 45 cal., and to the northeast, before the entrance to Nukke-Worms strait, on Cape Dirgamn - No. 37, out of four 6" in 50 cal.
The southern entrance to Moonsund was defended by two batteries to the southeast. extremities o. Moon near the village Howl: No. 36 of five 10" 45 cal. guns and No. 32 of four 6" 45 cal. guns, and the Cape Verder battery No. 33 of four 6" 45 cal. guns.
To combat enemy aircraft, aerial batteries were installed on the shore in the most critical and decoy places on the shore; In addition to most of the batteries with large guns, they defended the air stations in Kilkonda and Arensburg, as well as the Rogekul base.
All permanent batteries were manned by naval teams. In addition, the Moonsund position was armed with several batteries and ground field artillery.
Without going into details about the condition of the batteries, we will refer to the review of a land researcher of the Moonsund operation: “Engineering work on all batteries was not completely completed, the parapets remained unfinished, the batteries did not have camouflage, and range finders were not equipped” 11. At battery No. 36 (10" on Moon Island), only two guns were mounted on concrete bases, the rest were on wooden bases.
In particular, regarding the Tserelsky battery adm. Bakhirev writes:
“To protect the Tserelsky pass itself, a 12" Tserelsky battery was installed, which, due to the lack of cover (work began only in the fall), could not be considered complete, and to protect it and partly the approaches to Arensburg - several small and anti-airplane batteries on the Svorbe Peninsula .
The installation of new batteries at Svorb proposed by Captain 1st Rank Knüpfer was not carried out due to lack of funds and excessive demands made by the teams for the work. After the attack on September 17 (30) by enemy airplanes and the explosion of the 12" magazine, 7 officers and 114 sailors of various specialties were out of action. Not all specialists (and even then late) were replaced, and none of the officers: there was no one to replace them" 12 .

Position assignments for ground forces

According to the campaign plan for 1917, the defense of the islands was entrusted to the ground forces in accordance with the following guidelines to the commander of the Moonsund position.
1. Prevent the passage of enemy ships using the fairways lying within the fire range of the position batteries into the internal waters of Moonsund.
2. Unconditionally ensure that the battery positions, hydroelectric stations, communications posts and other structures of military significance located on the outer shores of the islands are protected from possible enemy attempts to land a small assault force or otherwise destroy or capture them.
3. Timely detect the approach of the enemy fleet to the position, take preventive measures against a possible landing and, if one has begun, liquidate it with all available forces and means.
At the same time, recognizing the island of Ezel as having the greatest strategic importance for the position, the head of the latter was assigned the following tasks:
1. Preventing the enemy from landing on the islands of Ezel and Dago.
2. The most stubborn retention of the Svorbe Peninsula.
3. Vigorous defense of the islands of Ezel and Dago in order to keep the Moonsund island region in our hands.
4. In the event of the loss of the islands of Ezel and Dago - the most stubborn defense of the islands of Worms and Moon and preventing landings on the mainland within the borders of the Moonsund region.

In particular, the Svorbe Peninsula must be defended especially stubbornly, keeping in mind that with its retention. The issue of preventing the enemy from breaking through the Irben Strait is related. Therefore, even in the event of the withdrawal of units defending other sections of the coast, the Svorbsky fortified area must be held. In this case, the delivery of everything necessary for the garrison should be organized by sea and its defense will be supported by our naval forces 13.

Chief of a fortified position

The control of all ground forces and means of the position was concentrated in the hands of its commander (which at the time described was Rear Admiral D. A. Sveshnikov), subordinate directly to the Fleet Commander. The chief of his staff, located in Arensburg, was an officer of the ground General Staff.
Being at the head of the land defense of an admiral, under whose command there was not a single vessel of the active fleet, but almost exclusively ground forces and coastal batteries manned by sailors, was considered inappropriate by some of the land forces. Sent in April 1917 to the Moonsund fortified position, Lieutenant Colonel Gen. headquarters Shcherbakov wrote in his report:
“In view of the fact that the admiral has to command exclusively ground forces, I would consider appointing a ground commander as the head of Moonzitsyi. This is not only my personal opinion, but also the voice of all the military commanders with whom I had to talk. The question was often asked: “Do we really not have capable generals who would command the ground forces, and there is a need to appoint a sailor who does not know our service and does not understand us as direct commander?” 14
Further, in the same report, the undesirability of leaving the existing subordination of the head of the position to the Fleet Commander is expressed, for whom “it is difficult to direct the actions on Moonsition at a time when he may have to go to sea and fight.
It is most desirable to subordinate the chief of Moonzitsiya to the Commander of the Army and consider Moonzizia to be the advanced position of the ground front.”
Regarding the above opinion, the head of the naval department of the headquarters of the Northern Front, cap. 1st Rank Altvater states in his review that all the tasks of the position arise from those general combat missions assigned to the fleet, and, therefore, the entire strategic significance of the Moonsund fortified position is entirely purely naval; the implementation of all general and specific tasks assigned to the Moonsund position is in direct connection with the operations of the Fleet, completely dependent on them.
“Based on the foregoing, it is completely understandable why the position is headed, and in fact should always be, by a naval officer.”
Cap. 1st Rank Altvater also does not agree with the withdrawal of Lieutenant Colonel. Shcherbakov that the head of the position should be subordinate to the Commander of the 1st Army.
“From the above-mentioned strategic importance of the Moonsund position, which is necessary only for the fleet to successfully carry out its combat missions, it is clear that the Moonsund position is an integral and inseparable part of the fleet, connected with it by the commonality of operations and goals and having no connection with the Commander of the 1st Army much more than with the Chief of the Dvina Military District.
The question of correct and rational management of the Moonsund position, in my opinion, comes down to the fact that on the island of Ezel, where almost all ground forces are concentrated, there should be a ground commander subordinate to the Chief of the Moonsund position, and the latter should not be on the island of Ezel (in Arensburg), as it exists now, but in Gapsala, which is the natural base of the entire position.
Under this condition, the troops will be subordinated directly to the ground commander located on Ezel, the defense of which from the landing is a ground task, but not a general task in relation to all the tasks assigned to the Moonsund position, but a private one, why, in turn, this commander should be subordinate to the chief of the Moonsund position - to the naval officer located in Gapsala and managing the position, and not to the commander of the troops of the island of Ezel, as this involuntarily happens if he is on this island.
The ground commander on Ezel Island should be the commander of the 107th Infantry. division which forms the garrison of Ezel.
I consider it necessary to add that this particular solution to this issue has already been made by the Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet and at present the Chief of the Moonsund position with his Headquarters is being relocated to the city of Gapsal, and on the island of Ezel - the Chief of its garrison and defense - remains the Chief of the 107th Infantry . division with its Headquarters" 15.
The latter, however, was not confirmed, since Admiral Sveshnikov and his staff continued to be in Arensburg and hastily moved to Gapsal in the midst of the operation itself (Altvater’s review is dated May 25), when Gen. Henrichson.
I dwell on this controversy in some detail, since it is a typical example of the traditional dispute for power between landmen and sailors.

But both the leadership of combat operations and the preparation for them, in addition to the profession of a commander, are no less influenced by his personal qualities. The available materials do not provide enough data to evaluate the activities of the head of the position, adm. Sveshnikov in neither one nor the other area. There is, however, a very negative, but one-sided characterization of him in a private letter from his former chief of staff, Colonel Vasiliev, 16 who claims that the position, as long as it is headed by the adm. Sveshnikov does not represent any resistance force. This letter (dated 10/23 August 1917), written with great passion and in harsh terms, in any case indicates the existence of a feud between the commander of the position and the chief of his staff, a feud that entailed the replacement of the latter shortly before the start of the operation.
The sudden appointment at the very beginning of the operation of General Henrikhson to lead the fighting at the Moonsund position, with adm. subordinate to him. Sveshnikov, however, indicates a lack of trust on the part of the top authorities in the latter’s ability to lead the defense of the position.

Land garrison of the islands

The position's island garrison consisted of units of the 107th and subsequently the 118th Infantry Divisions, a small number of cavalry, field artillery and engineering troops. According to the combat schedule, by September 23 (October 6) there were only 15 battalions, 5 squadrons, 140 machine guns and 60 small guns in the area of ​​the Moonsund fortified position.
Since the main task of the ground forces was to prevent the enemy from landing and, in the event of a landing, spreading it deep into the shore, then on the island. Ezel, as the most threatened, concentrated most of the garrison, distributed along sections of the coast with a reserve in Arensburg: infantry regiments - 425th Kargopolsky, 426th Povenetsky and 472nd Masalsky, 3 companies of the Guards crew, 3 hundred border guards, several batteries and about two companies of sappers. On about. Dago was one of the 427th infantry. Pudozh regiment, one field battery, one hundred border guards and a platoon of sappers. Gapsal was the base of the entire position. On the coast of the entire region there was another infantry regiment - the 470th Dankovsky and one hundred border guards.
Adm. Bakhirev points out that “the garrison on the islands also could not be considered strong enough, and the Fleet Commander, in response to the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front to strengthen the garrison of Pernov and its region, separating units from the fortress of Peter the Great and the Moonsund position, responded to him with a usogram on August 30 (September 12 ), that the separation of units is impossible, since the fortress and position require not only the abandonment of all units, but also their strengthening, that, in addition, the units are not staffed, and some have not completed their formation” 17.
The strengthening of the garrison, and at a feverish pace, began already at the height of hostilities and brought almost no benefit.

Engineering training

As for the ground positions on the islands, by the spring of 1917, “engineering preparations consisted of trenches being built on some sections of the coast.” At the same time, a whole network of resistance nodes was designed both directly in the areas of possible landing and in the rear. But in the spring, construction of the designed positions had not yet begun. Based on the recall of the above-mentioned report, sub. Shcherbakova: “In general, the engineering preparation of Moonzitsiya is reduced to zero, since even completed trenches are only suitable for shooting from the knee and have neither dugouts nor shelters” 18.

And in the future, the construction of positions was apparently not carried out intensively enough, judging by the above-mentioned letter from the chief of staff of the position dated August 10/23: “The positions under construction are almost not moving. It’s a shame to say that over the whole summer 5-6 trenches were dug on Svorba.” And by the beginning of the operation, “all the work on Ezel and Dago was not even half finished. Most of the trenches were brought to the “knee-high” profile, wire barriers were not erected in many places, and shelling was not cleared away” 19 .

Naval aviation had four air stations on Ezel: at Kilkond - 2 detachments, 12 aircraft; at Cape Tsörel - 2 detachments, 12 devices; in Arensburg - 1 detachment, 6 devices and on the floor. Werder - 1 squad, 6 units 20. Kilkond served as the base for all. The forward position of the base, ahead of the ground defense line, made it completely defenseless in the event of an enemy landing in the bay. Taggalaht, and in fact she had to be abandoned with all the workshops and large supplies of gasoline at the very beginning of the operation.
On Dago there were air stations at Takhkona and at Hohenholm on Dagerort; their base was in Gapsala.
The commander of the Gulf of Riga Naval Forces regarding aviation in his report says: “The aircraft, despite having several excellent pilots, were inferior in technical qualities to the German ones, which also prevailed in quantity. The number of fighters was not enough. The devices often deteriorated, and their repair was delayed. A few days before the Germans landed on Ezel, precisely on September 26 (October 9), I had to inform the Fleet Commander by letter No. 188 that, due to a malfunction of the hydroplanes, the pilots on Svorb could not fly out to recognize the enemy ships that had appeared and ask about sending serviceable ones, taking them from places where they are less needed. The bay, chosen by someone for hydroplanes in the Kuyvast roadstead, turned out to be suitable for lifting them only in calm weather and when there is no swell. At the very beginning of the existence of the base (post?), one of the two available devices, while trying to fly, broke down.”

Communication service

Moving on to the communication service, I will also limit myself to the review of Adm. Bakhireva.
“The communications service posts, one of the most serviceable and orderly parts of the Gulf of Riga, were located in Arensburg and from Tserel along the western points of the islands of Ezel and Dago. There were none on the southern coast of Ezel, and when enemy submarines appeared in the Gulf of Riga, we ourselves had to establish a post on Kyubosar, for which signalmen from large ships were appointed [my order on August 26 (Sept. 9)], and On September 7 (20), the post opened its operations. Around the same time, the communications service equipped the Weiland post.
Head of Communications Service Capt. 1st Rank Novopashenny met our needs, and our requests were fulfilled by him, if the opportunity presented itself. In fact, we could not carry out reconnaissance, but we were still sufficiently aware of the enemy’s movements and possible intentions from his telegrams.
It’s just a pity that the latter, for the reasons stated below, were not always received on time.”

Morale of the Moonsund defenders

Having listed in a cursory review the means available for the defense of the Moonsund position, I did not touch upon their description of the main factor in the conduct of any
military operations, namely the morale of the troops. I considered it necessary to highlight it especially, both in view of its extremely important significance, and in order to study it simultaneously for different types of service, both on ships and on the land route, since the actions of both sailors and landmen were extremely closely related and equally influenced the outcome of the entire operation; in addition, the main reasons that influenced the spirit of the troops were common to them.
The moral state of the Russian armed forces, which in 1917 experienced a revolution that had engulfed a huge empire on the armed fronts of a war that had already lasted three years, was inevitably subjected to the deepest shocks. In particular, with regard to the Moonsund operation, for an objective assessment of the moral state of the armed forces defending the position, it is necessary to remember that this operation took place in the seventh month of the revolution, when the authority of the Provisional Government among the population and among the troops had completely fallen; when the collective will of the working people demanded that the Soviets seize power; when the aggravated class and national contradictions in the population of the former Russian Empire, in some places turning into a civil war, inevitably revealed the same irreconcilable contradictions in the composition of the Russian armed forces, primarily between the command and non-command personnel. Before the Moonsund operation, Russia and its armed forces had already painfully experienced such events as the unsuccessful July offensive on the southwestern front, the Kornilov speech, the fall of Riga...
The following reviews from the commanders who led the actions of our armed forces during the Moonsund operation should be considered not only as painting a factual picture of the moral state of the units subordinate to them, but also as reflecting the mood and attitude towards the events of themselves and the bulk of the command staff. Among these reviews,
Undoubtedly, the greatest interest is the review of the main head of the naval defense of the Moonsund position during the operation, adm. Bakhirev, who we place in the first place.

Feedback from Adm. Bakhireva. Team

What is most difficult is that when developing plans for the operation and when executing them, we had to take into account the moral element, which could not be considered equal in strength to the enemy: experience with our army has already shown how unreliable we are in this sense.
“The team, under the influence of agitation, did not trust the officers; with constant proximity to the enemy, the result was excessive nervousness, which in dangerous moments turned into confusion, and in difficult moments it even turned into panic (the case with “Thunder” Oct. 1 (14), with “Slava” Oct. 4 (17). What had not been noticed before, on campaigns in warm and clear weather, far from the enemy and in places where the presence of obstacles is difficult to assume, many people wore kapok vests. During the stay in Arensburg, few people went to bed. Concern for their safety went so far that the XI Division Esq. destroyers when stationed at the Arensburg roadstead, where, it seems, there was little to be afraid of, he demanded boats for his protection and even outfitted a delegation to search for suitable longboats. The main concern of “Slava” upon her arrival at the Kuivast roadstead was constant inquiries about the depth in the Moonsund Canal.
Discipline, one might say, was absent, and the team had a consciousness of complete irresponsibility and confidence that it could do anything with its superiors.
The ship committees wanted to interfere in everything, in the purely military part, and even demanded their presence when typing and parsing operational telegrams. On some ships such control was carried out and even secret packages were opened. When the Germans turned their attention to the Gulf of Riga, enemy agents and their henchmen, of course, carried out more intensive propaganda among the teams. Incredible rumors were spread about the situation inside the country, on the fronts, and they indicated the exact amount for which Riga was sold by the generals. If we take the point of view of the team that believed these nonsense rumors, the demand for control becomes easily explained. But the whole point is that when it was implemented, the secret would no longer remain a secret and, most importantly, dark forces with hands unclean from German money would attach themselves to this matter. On the same basis, I had previously reported to the Fleet Commander about the inadmissibility of greeting and encouraging radio telegrams sent by ships to each other, transmitted in code. (It is remarkable that in these telegrams the ships that could not pass through Moonsund were most wanted to die in the Gulf of Riga.) I fought against operational control with all possible measures and finally achieved that it was destroyed on those ships where it already existed.
Politics spread with all its might: almost daily gatherings of delegates from ships, eternal negotiations by semaphore and clottic lights, frequent rallies on the shore, general meetings on ships only distracted people from the matter, which was not particularly controversial, and kept the already nervous the teams are in an even more tense state.
Some destroyer commanders, in order to at least slightly direct the minds of people to real military affairs, asked to move for a few days closer to the enemy, to Svorbe or to Arensburg, where there were more raids by enemy airplanes.
Yuzograms and telephone messages of a political and administrative nature (from various committees) were transmitted in the first place; purely operational ones were delayed, so I had to ask several times, both verbally and verbally, for orders from the Fleet Commander to stop this disorder.”
“On August 30 (Sept. 12), the general meeting of trusted delegates of the naval and fortress forces of the Gulf of Riga demanded that I establish operational control, and when I did not agree to this, it addressed this demand to the Fleet Commander by telephone, and in the conversation indicated , that the general meeting of teams finds it justified not to trust me before taking elective control (unfortunately, I learned about the distrust expressed to me much later). After this, the Fleet Commander had a conversation with them and with me, asking to settle the matter.”
There are indications from other sources regarding the harassment of the operational control institution. 26 Sep. At the Headquarters of the Fleet Commander, a resolution was received from the commands of the Gulf of Riga Naval Forces, which expressed the demand for the formation of a special committee under the commander of the Gulf Naval Forces, to control all units, combat espionage, etc.
The resolution was brought by a delegation that told the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Tsentrobalt) that if it is not given a satisfactory answer, it will leave with nothing, and control will be introduced in any case and counteraction could lead to excesses. According to the cited source: “Ts. K.B.F. understands that control over the operational unit is very dangerous from a military point of view, but is powerless to insist on this. It seems that he will turn to the Central Fleet in Petrograd.”

Further there:
“The commander of the “Threatening” writes that he refuses responsibility for the ship, because he has complete control over it” 21.
I return to the adm.'s report. Bakhireva:
“On September 3 (16), on the Slava, in the ship’s punishment cell, the crew arrested the senior engineer. mechanic captain 2nd rank Dzhelepov for refusing to sign her resolutions regarding the events taking place at that time. On
the next day I had to send him on a destroyer to Helsingfors on the Krechet, at the disposal of the Fleet Commander's Headquarters. Commander of "Glory" cap. 1st Rank Antonov, shortly before the battle, reported to me that he was not at all confident in his team and that during any operation it was possible that the team would decide not to go to the appointed place and, if its wishes were not fulfilled, would bandage him and the officers.
On September 20 (October 3), the “Winner” returning from duty from Arensburg, under the braid pennant of the head of the XI Division Esq. destroyers cap. 2nd rank Pilsudski, entered the Kuyvast roadstead at great speed, rocked the transport "Libava" with the "Novik" standing at its side and cut off the mooring lines of some minesweepers and patrol vessels that were at the pier. At the request of K.-a. Stark, who more than once demanded a reduction in the move in raids, I announced my displeasure to the “Winner” for the big move. At this, the “Winner” raised a signal: “The fleet has been notified, the head of the mine division is suffering from pitching.” Most of the ships in the roadstead rehearsed this signal. I sent a usogram on September 21st. (4 Oct.) No. 157 r. To the Fleet Commander with a reasoned request to remove me from the post of Commander of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga. A more detailed report on this was sent by express, and a detailed report from K.-A was also presented. Stark. The matter dragged on until the Germans landed on Ezel on September 29th. (Oct. 12), when, of course, there was no time to resolve these disputes.
The decline in discipline among the crews was expressed in many seemingly trifles that are of enormous importance in the life of ships: the watch service fell, people needed for battle went on vacation and on countless political and economic business trips; and so on.
Despite all this, I was sure, and now it seems to me that I was right then, that a good half of the ship’s crews who had been in the Gulf of Riga since early spring sincerely wanted to repel the enemy and defend the gulf from
taking over the enemy. At the naval batteries, people were very concerned about the possibility of a timely retreat, and the servants of the Moon batteries even demanded tugboats at their exclusive disposal for this purpose. With the ground forces located on the islands, the situation was apparently worse.”

Officers

“The general state of affairs, of course, could not help but affect the officers: eternal misunderstandings and friction with the command, mutual distrust gave rise to nervousness; Frequent disobedience, little desire to do anything and hopelessness for improvement took away the energy of the officers.
Rarely, it is true, but still there were conversations among the officers that, anyway, nothing could be done with such a team and there was no hope for military success. Some officers and even commanders had to leave their ships due to nervous breakdown. The commander of the "Glory", politically the most restless ship, Capt. 1st rank Antonov, during the parking in Moondzund, became nervous and often fell ill; According to my report to the Fleet Commander and after a joint discussion with him, it was nevertheless decided not to replace him, since it was difficult to find someone willing to command the Slava, and the ship’s crew would not accept just any commander.
In quantitative terms, the warships were tolerably equipped with officers; but on ships, especially large ones, there was a significant percentage of completely inexperienced young midshipmen, who, moreover, took a shortened course in school or midshipman classes. There were also wartime midshipmen. There were cases where officers were promoted who, in peacetime, did not leave the service of their own free will and were rehired during the war.
On the Khivinets, just before the start of the German operation, there was neither a commander nor a senior officer, and a very young lieutenant Afanasyev took command. The commander, due to his relationship with General Kornilov, had to leave the “Brave” (although he was replaced by a worthy senior officer, Senior Lieutenant Rennenkampf). Some ships had commanders chosen by the teams. The experience with elected commanders in the navy turned out to be unsuccessful: for the most part, not the best candidates were chosen, but often because of their flexible character; and the elections themselves did not always take place without the initiative and help of those elected themselves. In defense of some of the selected commanders of the Gulf of Riga ships known to me (“Okhotnik”, “Thunder” and some others), I must say that in their previous positions they were excellent officers, some would have made excellent captains, but their big drawback is the failure to complete all the necessary steps service and little experience in naval affairs for the command, which was reflected in especially difficult moments” 22.
This state of affairs, of course, could not but affect the highest command in the Gulf of Riga. In this regard, the usogram of Adm. is very indicative. Bakhireva, sent by him to the Fleet Commander after the above incident with the “Winner”; in this usogram the admiral reports:

“Cases of non-compliance with orders have occurred more than once during my short stay in the Gulf of Riga. Admiral Stark reported to me that he was no longer able to remain in the position of namindiv, asked for his dismissal and has now submitted a report. For my part, I also ask to be released from command of the Riga forces, since, despite strong nerves, constant friction and vain efforts to maintain order prevent me from devoting all my abilities to the defense of the bay, force me to waste my strength in vain, and I begin to lose hope of success.
Therefore, I consider myself unsuitable for the responsible position of commander of the Riga forces at such an important time and consider it a moral duty to ask to be replaced by a more suitable and popular flagship among the team, who can be appointed at this time from another part of the fleet. Anticipating your objections, I inform you that thanks to the above, at the right time I may not be up to the task, and then a late replacement may not improve matters. I read this usogram to Admiral Stark, and he said that the reasons prompting him to ask for dismissal were the same as mine." 23
The mood of some of the teams sent to defend the Gulf of Riga can also be judged by the following resolution of the Lin team. cor. “Glory”, issued by her upon receiving news of the appointment of their ship to the Gulf Naval Forces:
“The entire crew of the battleship “Slava” recognizes the assignment of our glorious ship, together with us, to the Gulf of Riga as unfair, due to the fact that “Slava” and the entire crew defended the Riga waters for 16 months, which is known not only to the Baltic Fleet, but also all of Free Russia, and now finds it fair that one of the ships, the “Republic” or “St. Andrew the First-Called,” should go to the Gulf of Riga to fulfill its sacred duty to the Free Motherland, since they can also pass through the canal.
In addition, the entire crew of the “Glory” never refuses, even if at any moment the assignment comes, to go into battle, which will be carried out to the extent of the strength and to the extent of the combat power of our glorious ship, but only outside the Gulf of Riga...
And also the entire crew of “Slava” is ready to go to the Gulf of Riga, but only when one of the above-mentioned ships is there to defend, and if it needs combat assistance, then our valiant ship will go and show its combat capability, as it has already shown during the 16-month defense of the Riga coast, although they consider our ship to be weaker than others and therefore send us a second time to the Gulf of Riga. No! we will not allow this to make us and our ship weaker than others; We are confident that here too we will be able to demonstrate the valor of our ship and we will stand, and if necessary, we will die for the freedom of Russia.”
“Slava”’s protest, however, was not successful, and she had to submit, but at the same time she set her own conditions:
“We, the whole lean team. cor. “Slava”, although we consider our assignment to the Gulf of Riga unfair, but, taking into account the situation of the present moment, we go to fulfill our sacred duty to the Free Motherland and obey the will of the Central Committee and the Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, as well as our comrades, who, Seeing an unfair decision, they confirm that “Slava” should go to the Gulf of Riga, and do not realize that they are going against their conscience and even committing violence.
But we, in fulfilling your resolution, also demand in turn:

1) We are going to the Gulf of Riga only until the end of the 1917 navigation, but not for the winter anchorage.
2) All sick people on our team who are on long-term vacations to recover their health should be excluded from the team lists and urgently replaced with healthy ones.
3) Immediately carry out a medical examination of the entire Slavskaya crew and replace all those recognized as unable to perform ship service with healthy ones.
4) Immediately replenish the team’s combat kit.
5) Leave is at the discretion of the team, and we require white letter A forms for travel.
6) We also demand that the monthly salary and all the necessary allowances that our comrades from the port of Helsingfors enjoy should not be diminished, but that we should receive at the rate of 266 marks for 100 rubles and pay in Finnish marks.
7) We ask, whenever possible, to deliver fresh water to power the boilers.”

This resolution was followed by the response of the Fleet Commander:

“To the commander of Slava.”
Congratulate the team for their duty-conscious attitude. Wintering is not expected. Prepare for the hike by July 1st.
Verderevsky" 24.

Disintegration in the ground forces

The land garrison also presented a gloomy picture. The same conditions that destroyed the combat resistance of our army on all fronts also affected the troops intended to defend the Moonsund position. Everywhere in the reviews of military commanders we encounter the most hopeless assessment of the moral state of the units - even more hopeless than in the fleet, where the ships still united to some extent their personnel, who still retained at least the habit of the previous organization.
A characteristic picture is painted by the following description of the journey of one of the regiments, sent back in the spring from Revel to strengthen the Ezel garrison.
The 472nd Mosal Infantry Regiment was sent by rail in five echelons. Even in Revel, according to officers, before the regiment boarded the carriages, private individuals entered the barracks, apparently distributing alcohol. Therefore, already when boarding the trains there were a lot of drunks and “there was no order when boarding.” Several soldiers took seats in the officers' carriages; on the way, some fired live ammunition from the windows upward.
Upon arrival at the Schloss-Lode manor, which belonged to Count Buxhoeveden, the lead train was located in the main house, in which there were three locked rooms. Someone said that weapons, bombs, copper and other items prepared for the Dems were stored in these rooms, and that the same thing happened in all the baronial estates. The soldiers broke down the doors and, indeed, in one of the rooms they found 2-3 Arisaka rifles and a lot of live ammunition. The news of this immediately spread throughout the entire train, causing a general explosion of anger towards the Germans, and the soldiers began to destroy the estate, destroying and damaging furniture, household items and livestock. The brutality reached the point that, for example, chickens were not slaughtered, but torn into pieces, pigs were not stabbed or shot, but were slashed with bayonets, knives, etc. True, many of the soldiers were indignant at the riot of their comrades, but were afraid to touch drunken people, and exhortations led to nothing but anger and threats. The efforts of the officers to calm the soldiers also led nowhere; they were not listened to at all, although “there were no cases of deliberate insult or anything directed against the officers, with the exception of isolated cases due to competition (?) between units of the regiment.”
The following echelons, having learned about the atrocities of the lead one, continued its work; The first echelon passed through the town of Leal safely, but the second one defeated it. The soldiers destroyed not only the baronial manor, but also broke into the houses of Estonians, took away property, which they immediately sold to local residents, took away horses or exchanged the worst for the best. They captured several horses and some of the food that belonged to the cruiser Admiral Makarov. A team was sent from the cruiser to protect against the destruction of property and curb passions.
The sailors influenced the soldiers with exhortations and threats of being shot with machine guns, and the echelons approached Werder in “relative order.”

The brigade commander, Gen., who inspected the regiment on the march. Martynov provides data on its composition. In 10 companies and in all commands there were 50 officers and 2086 soldiers, of which 1200 bayonets. He considered the command staff unsatisfactory, because there was only one regular officer, who temporarily commanded the regiment. Battalions and companies were commanded by warrant officers. Paying them due tribute “with full heartfelt desire and great effort to bring benefit,” gene. Martynov, at the same time, could not help but admit their lack of positive knowledge, life, service and combat experience, which circumstances could not but influence the general situation.
In August they reported from Gapsal: “The garrison is in great excitement and is going to plunder the city. The commandant calls committees for an emergency meeting” 25.
With the sending of troops to reinforce the garrison of Moonzitsiya, things generally went wrong, even during the operation itself, when the demoralized units on Ezel, offering almost no resistance to the landing Germans, uncontrollably retreated in front of them. Even the Cossack 25th regiment with a horse battery refused to go from Helsingfors to Revel by transport, probably not trusting either the sea or the sailors, and had to be sent by rail through Petrograd. With the infantry regiments it was even worse.
First echelon of the 471st Infantry. The Kozelsky regiment, having arrived in Gapsal, refused to get out of the cars, and its third echelon, already boarded the train in Kegel, did not want to go to Gapsal at all and “became disgraceful.” Battalion 470th Inf. The Dankovsky regiment, placed on transports in Gapsala, refused to go and went home. Measures were taken to stop the outrage: all local democratic organizations were involved to explain to the troops the inadmissibility and criminality of such actions; the front commissar sent telegrams to both the regiment and the Revel Council about the expulsion of the deputies to Kegel; The commander-in-chief of the Northern Front ordered the units to be informed that failure to comply with combat orders would lead to their disbandment and the bringing of the instigators to a military revolutionary court. In addition to the telegrams, the commissioner of the front commissar Fridman was specially sent to Gapsal, reporting: “Sending reinforcements to Moon is not going entirely smoothly: yesterday I was fiddling with the echelons of the Kozelsky regiment, now there is a complication with the battalion of the Dankovsky regiment.
At least we could hold out with such troops on Moon.”
As a result, representatives of Tsentroflot, Tsentrobalt, etc. managed to influence the regimental committee, which vouched for the regiment’s execution of the military orders of its superiors unquestioningly; representatives of the regiment asked to assure the Fleet Commander of their complete readiness to die for their homeland and help out their comrades. A telegram was sent to the echelons: “We propose to immediately come to the rescue of our revolutionary troops on Ezel and obey combat orders, which are controlled by representatives of the Central Fleet and the Central Balt.”
Such was the moral element in the troops defending the Moonsund position.

1 Archive of M.I.K. Report on the actions of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga in 1917, p. 1.
2 The commander of a large formation of various forces, who is entrusted with a responsible and complex combat mission, without a headquarters and using the headquarters of one of the formations subordinate to him is a phenomenon completely unacceptable in organizational terms. As we will see later, this lack of headquarters for the Chief of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga significantly affected the course of events of the Moonsund operation. (Ed.)
3 About 25 kilometers.
4 We cannot agree with the author regarding the impossibility of strengthening the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga. ships "Andrew the First-Called" and "Paul"; They should have been allocated from the main forces for this theater back in 1916, when the landing operation in the Gulf of Riga was planned. Together with the 12 Tserel batteries, they would represent a formidable force for the defense of the Irben Strait. In an extreme case, when the German fleet nevertheless broke through into the Gulf of Riga, they could take refuge in Kuivaste, based on which they could continue to fight the enemy in the Gulf of Riga for possession of it. (Ed.)
5 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, p. 6.
6 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, p. 7.
7 Ibid.
8 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, p. 15.
9 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, pp. 3-4.
10 The experience of the Moonsund operation showed how wrong this calculation was. The enemy appeared at the western entrance to Soelosund at dawn and, keeping the strait under their fire, secured it from the barrier. (Ed.)
11 Military Historical Commission. F. N. Vasiliev. Moonsund operation 1917
12 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, p. 3.
13 Campaign Plan for 1917, A. Defense Plan. Part IV. Archive of M.I.K. Case No. 7498, p. 95:
14 Campaign Plan for 1917, A. Defense Plan. Part IV. Archive of M.I.K. Case No. 8047, p. 101.
15 Archive of M.I.K. Case No. 8047 p. 93.
16 Archive of M.I.K. Case No. 8047, p. 337.
17 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, p. 5.
18 Archive of M.I.K. Case No. 8047, p. 107.
19 Vasiliev O. N. Moonsund operation of 1917.
20 Vasiliev O. N. Moonsund operation of 1917.
21 Archive M.I.K. Rengarten I.I. World War Diary, pp. 463 and 464.
22 Report on the actions of M.S.R. hall, pp. 16-21.
23 Report on the actions of M.S.R. Hall, Appendix III.
24 Archive of M.I.K. Case No. 12801, pp. 142, 143 and 108.
25 Rengarten. World War Diary, page 436.

Russian fleet

Chapter III.

The current state of the Russian Navy.

The Supreme Control of the Russian Imperial Fleet belongs to the Sovereign Emperor as the Supreme Leader.

At the head of the Maritime Ministry and all naval forces is the Minister of the Navy.

At the head of the naval forces of the Baltic and Black Seas are naval commanders, and at the head of the Siberian flotilla is the commander of this flotilla, with rights equal to the commanders of the naval forces.

The commander is the chief naval commander of a given sea and all squadrons, detachments and vessels of the active fleet, 1st and 2nd reserves, surveillance and communications equipment, as well as the main commanders and port commanders are subordinate to him in all, with the exception of economic and administrative, relations and management port personnel. Commanders of naval forces, in comparison with military-land commanders, correspond to commanders of troops of military districts.

The regulations on the commanders of the HIGHEST naval forces were approved on May 9, 1911 and announced by order of the naval department on May 27, 1911 No. 150.

Naval forces of the Baltic Sea.

BUT. von Essen, participant in the war of 1904-1905, in Port Arthur, holder of the Order of St. George, 4th class, former combat commander of the cruiser Novik and the battleship Sevastopol.

Active fleet.

The active fleet consists of: a brigade of battleships, a brigade of cruisers, two mine divisions, a detachment of minelayers and a brigade of submarines.

Brigade of battleships: "Andrew the First-Called"(1906) "Emperor Paul I"(1907), "Tsesarevich".(1901) and "Glory"(1903); attached to the brigade - an armored cruiser " Rurik"(1906).

From a photograph by A.D. Dalmatova.

Battleship "Andrey Pervozvanny".

The same type of “Emperor Paul I”; differs in that it has a red stripe on the pipe in the middle of it.

Cruiser brigade: « Thunderous"(1899), "Admiral Makarov"(1907), "Pallada"(1906)

1st Mine Division consists of divisions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 8-9 destroyers each, and one special-purpose division of 4 destroyers; In total, the division has 37 destroyers and three auxiliary transports.

Cruiser "Admiral Makarov".

(The cruiser had this appearance until the fall of 1911; currently it has two masts. The Pallada and Bayan are of the same type; these cruisers differ from each other in the different arrangement of blue stripes on the pipes).

2nd Mine Division consists of three divisions: 5th, 6th and 7th, 8-9 destroyers in each, and two special-purpose destroyers; There are a total of 10 squadrons in the division. destroyers, 17 destroyers and 7 auxiliary transports.

A detailed list of destroyers and surface boats is included in Appendix 1.

Detachment of minelayers: "Amur", "Yenisei", "Volga", "Ladoga", "Onega" And "Narova".

Submarine brigade consists of two divisions. In total, the brigade has 11 submarines and two auxiliary vessels.

Auxiliary court The active fleet consists of two transports "Anadyr" And "Riga".

1st reserve

Cruisers "Russia", "Aurora", "Oleg", "Bogatyr" and gunboat "Khivinets".

2nd reserve.

Second reserve vessels are part of training detachments.

Artillery training squad: battleship "Emperor Alexander II", training ship "Peter the Great" and two ship messengers.

Mine training squad: training ship "Dvina" and transport "Nikolai."

Combined reserve detachment of destroyers from 2 squadrons. destroyers, 11 torpedo boats and 1 torpedo boat.

Naval Corps training detachment: training ships "Warrior", "Loyal" and gunboat "Brave".

Diving training squad- from two submarines.

Special purpose vessels: 5 gunboats and 2 training ships.

Naval forces of the Black Sea.

The commander of the naval forces is Vice Admiral A.A. Eberhard(former Chief of the Naval General Staff).

Active fleet.

Black Sea detachment.

Brigade of battleships: "St. Eustathius"(1906), "John Chrysostom"(1906), "Panteleimon"(1900) and "Rostislav"(1896). With a brigade cruiser "Cahul"(1902).

Black Sea mine division consists of a cruiser "Memory of Mercury"(1903), 3 destroyer divisions and a submarine division; in total there are 13 squadrons in the division. destroyers, 4 destroyers and 4 submarines.

Layers "Prut" and "Danube".

Auxiliary vessel- two transports: "Kronstadt" And "Dnieper".

1st reserve

Battleships "St. George the Victorious" And "Three Saints" .

Gunboats: "Donetsk", "Terets", "Ural", "Kubanets" And "Zaporozhets".

2nd reserve.

Training detachment of the Black Sea Fleet: battleship "Sinop", one transport and one messenger ship.

Black Sea reserve destroyer division consists of 10 numbered destroyers.

Siberian flotilla.

Active fleet.

Consists of two cruisers, a mine brigade and a submarine division.

Cruisers: "Askold"(1900) and "Pearl"(1903).

Mine brigade consists of two divisions: in total there are 9 squadrons in the brigade. destroyers and 11 destroyers.

Submarine division consists of 12 submarines.

1st reserve

Gunboat "Manjur", 7 numbered destroyers and 7 transports.

Caspian flotilla.

Active fleet: gunboats "Kars" And "Ardagan".

Amur River Flotilla.

Active fleet. Consists of 10 river gunboats (with two 75 mm guns and four machine guns each). The construction ends with the construction of 5 river 4-tower armored gunboats (with 2 6 inch guns, 4 120 mm guns and 7 machine guns each) and 10 messenger ships.

In the summer of 1911, the Dreadnought-class battleships were launched: Sevastopol, Poltava, Petropavlovsk and Gangut. They will be finally ready for sailing in two years.

Destroyers with a displacement of 335 tons or more are called destroyers, and destroyers with a displacement of less than 335 are called destroyers.

The combined operation of the German naval and ground forces "Albion" is associated with Moonsund (the strait separating the Moonsund archipelago from the mainland coast of Estonia). For Russia, the Moonsund operation of September 29 – October 7, 1917 was the last military operation during the Great War.

In operational terms, for the Germans, the Moonsund operation was an amphibious assault operation to capture the islands of the archipelago. The strategic goal of the operation was to capture the Gulf of Riga, the most important promising bridgehead. In addition, having captured the islands, the Germans deprived the Russian command of the opportunity to use their aviation in the Gulf of Riga (the airfields were mainly on the island of Ezel) and protected the coastal flank of their 8th Army from any surprises.

The German fleet was so much stronger than the Russian Baltic Fleet that no operational and tactical art of the latter could balance its chances in an open battle at sea. Based on the balance of forces, the Russian naval command based its war plan in the Baltic theater of operations on the concept of defending the most dangerous operational directions for Russia using positional warfare. The narrow Gulf of Finland and the entrances to the Gulf of Riga and Bothnia made it possible to block them with mine and artillery positions. By themselves, these positions could not prevent the breakthrough of the enemy fleet, but they constrained the enemy’s maneuvering and allowed the Russian naval forces to act on the flank of the enemy breaking through the minefields.

By the spring of 1916, the following were created: 1) Central mine and artillery position on the Nargen-Porkallaudd line; 2) A forward mine-artillery position, which consisted of a minefield between Gangeudd and Cape Takhona (the northern tip of Dago Island - its flanks were to be protected by batteries on Russare Island, south of Cape Gangeudd) and on the island. Dago (near Cape Takhona); 3) Abo-Oland fortified position (closed the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia) and 4) Moonsund fortified position (along with minefields in the Irbe Strait, it protected the entrance to the Gulf of Riga).

The advanced position allowed the forward deployment of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to the west. A special place in the defense system was occupied by the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga, which included, in addition to the outdated battleship Slava, several cruisers and almost the entire Mine Division of the Baltic Fleet. The main operational task of this group was to defend the entrance to the Gulf of Riga through the Irbe Strait - the northern flank of the minefield was secured by the Moonsund position, and the southern flank rested on the coast of the Gulf of Riga captured and fortified by the Germans.

Capturing the coast of the Gulf of Riga is one of the most important tasks of the German forces during the fighting in the Baltic states in the summer of 1915. It was then that the Irbe operation of the German fleet was carried out. But the breakthrough of the German fleet into the Gulf of Riga did not achieve the main goal - the destruction of Russian naval forces in the gulf. The main goal of the Irben operation - maintaining dominance in the gulf to assist the troops of the coastal flank of the German Neman Army - was also not achieved. However, the enemy owned the coast as a base for the deployment of subsequent military operations.

The entire set of mine and artillery positions created by the Russian command by the summer of 1916 in the Baltic theater of operations constituted a single powerful fortified system, the center of which was the Forward Position (with the main forces of the Baltic Fleet deployed on it), with the flanks in the form of the positions of the Irbe Strait and Olandsgaf (behind which there should have been auxiliary units of the fleet). The central and rear positions ensured the stability of the defensive system and guaranteed the reliability of the protection of the sea approaches to Petrograd.

The combat stability of the system of Russian mine and artillery positions largely depended on the competent and active maneuvering of the naval forces of the fleet. The weakest links of the system were the flank positions - Irbenskaya and Olandsgafskaya: they had only one flank each, adjacent to their coastal fortifications (the other flank of the Olandsgafskaya position overlooked Swedish territorial waters, and the southern flank of the Irbenskaya position abutted the Courland coast, occupied and fortified by German troops ). Under the cover of coastal batteries, German ships could move freely along the Courland coast - only in 1917, after the installation of a 305-mm battery on Cape Tserel, which covered the entire width of the Irben Strait with its fire, the work of German minesweepers on the fairway along this coast was difficult.

The Moonsund fortified position was an important element in the Russian defense system in the Baltic - it formed an intermediate link between the Irben and Forward positions. Possession of Moonsund ensured communications in the Gulf of Riga, made it possible to successfully defend the Irbene Strait, as well as assist the flank of the Northern Front, and ensured freedom of maneuver in the Baltic theater of operations.

The main vulnerability of the Moonsund position is its accessibility to enemy landings (almost the entire coastline was favorable for landing), which the enemy did not fail to take advantage of in the 1917 campaign. The islands of Ezel and Dago, the entrances to Tagalaht and Leo bays, and Soelosund were not sufficiently protected. The most vulnerable point of the archipelago was Soelosund - the strait separating the largest (Dago and Ezel) islands and leading from the Baltic Sea into Moonsund. On the island of Ezel, just before the entrance to the strait, there were two largest bays - Tagalakht and Mustelgam - convenient for a large fleet.

Accordingly, the main burden of the defense of the islands lay on their garrison, which was insufficient both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and by the autumn of 1917, it had also decomposed morally and psychologically. Deployed behind the mine and artillery positions, the Russian fleet was a serious combat force, capable of going to sea at any moment and attacking both the enemy troops making a sea crossing and the landing troops. But, on the one hand, its combat effectiveness was also undermined by revolutionary events, and on the other, having, thanks to the Kiel Canal, the opportunity to transfer ships of any class to the Baltic, the Germans concentrated large forces and assets from the High Seas Fleet at the beginning of the Moonsund operation.

Map of the area of ​​the Moonsund operation.

The Germans involved in the operation more than 300 ships, 102 aircraft (94 were based at the St. Helena air base and nearby airfields, plus 8 seaplanes in the 16th air squadron), up to 25,000 landing troops (control of the 23rd reserve corps, 42nd and 77th I infantry divisions, 2nd scooter brigade) with 40 guns, 80 mortars, 220 machine guns [Chishwitz A. von. Capture of the Baltic Islands by Germany in 1917. M., 1937. P. 28-29]. The landing party was accepted onto transports in the city of Libau.

The group operated: the battlecruiser Moltke, 10 newest battleships (3rd and 4th squadrons - battleships Bayern, König, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz, Markgraf; Friedrich der Grosse ", "König Albert", "Kaiserin", "Prince Regent Luitpold", "Kaiser"), 9 light cruisers (2nd and 6th reconnaissance groups - "Königsberg", "Karlsruhe", "Nuremberg", " Frankfurt", "Danzig", "Kolberg", "Strasburg", "Augsburg"; "Emden" was the flagship of the destroyer force), over 100 destroyers and destroyers, 6 submarines (Kurland flotilla) and more than 100 auxiliary vessels (transports , minesweepers, motor boats, etc.). The naval “Special Operations Detachment” was commanded by Vice Admiral E. Schmidt, and the landing corps was commanded by General von Katen.

2. E. Schmidt

3. von Katen

4. German battleship-dreadnought Prinz Regent Luitpold

5. 280-mm guns of the battlecruiser Moltke.

The naval forces of the Gulf of Riga included: 2 obsolete battleships (Citizen and Slava), 3 old cruisers (Admiral Makarov, Bayan, Diana), 12 new destroyers (Novik type) and 14 old destroyers: 4th (“General Kondratenko”, “Border Guard”), 5th (“Vsadnik”, “Amurets”, “Finn”, “Moskvityanin”, “Emir of Bukhara”), 6th (“Guarding”, “Don Cossack”, “Zabaikalets”, “Army”, “Ukraine”, “Turkmen Stavropol”, “Terrible”), 11th (“Winner”, “Zabiyaka”, “Thunder”), 12th (“Desna” ", "Samson", "Lieutenant Ilyin", "Captain Izylmetyev"), 13th ("Avtroil", "Konstantin", "Izyaslav", "Gabriel") destroyer divisions, the destroyer "Novik", 3 English submarines ( S-26, S-27, S-32), 3 gunboats (“Khivinets”, “Brave”, “Threatening”), auxiliary vessels (about 100). During the operation, reinforcements arrived, including several destroyers.

6. Battleship "Slava" in the parking lot

Accordingly, the Germans, having concentrated forces that were many times superior to the Russians both quantitatively and qualitatively, guaranteed an unconditionally successful outcome of the operation for themselves. The enemy's superiority was overwhelming.

For the Russian side, the situation was aggravated by a number of unfavorable circumstances. The first is technical. So, if on the large ships of the Gulf of Riga Naval Forces the condition of the mechanisms was relatively satisfactory, then the destroyers and smaller ships were so “torn” that their material part required constant bulkheads and repairs. The Gulf of Riga forces, like the entire fleet in 1917, due to poorly completed repair work and the almost complete lack of constant monitoring of the equipment by the command staff, were in much worse condition than before.

When characterizing the Russian defensive positions, it should be noted that the rare minefields placed on the approaches to Soelosund and near the bays could not serve as a serious obstacle for the enemy. In fact, there was no full-fledged mine position in the Irben Strait. The bulk of the coastal batteries were not camouflaged, and the largest seaplane station was located close to Tagalakht Bay - under possible enemy attack.

There were 39 coastal batteries (caliber 47-305 mm), but half of them were anti-aircraft. The personnel of the batteries was about 1.5 thousand people [Pukhov A.S. Battle of Moonsund. L., 1957. P. 40].

The main defense force of the Irben Strait is 305-mm battery No. 43 at Cape Tserel. But the battery had a limited field of fire, and from long distances it was impossible to inflict serious damage on the enemy with four guns. The battery was very vulnerable to fire from the sea, in particular from Leo Bay.

7. 305-mm gun of battery No. 43 at Cape Tserel.

8. Dislocation of Russian batteries on the Moonsund Islands.

Naval aviation (4 bus stations) consisted of 36 aircraft [Kosinsky A. M. Moonsund operation of the Baltic Fleet of 1917. L., 1928. P. 41].

The second unfavorable circumstance is moral and political. The morale of the islands' garrisons (parts of the 107th and 118th infantry divisions, border guards, sappers - 15 battalions and 5 squadrons) was left imprinted by the general decomposition and decline in discipline in the Russian army (after the revolutionary events of February 1917 and the spring-summer " deepening the revolution"), distrust of officers, interference of committees in all aspects of military operations.

The condition of the fleet personnel was also not the best. There were often cases of non-execution of orders, including combat orders.

Added to all the negative factors was the fact that the people in the units were already tired and demoralized by air raids before the active enemy operation began. So, on September 5, another raid on the Tserel battery led to a fire and explosion of the cellars. Colonel K.V. Loman, Lieutenant Colonel Maklyutin and about 120 other artillerymen and infantrymen were killed.

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