Mine division. Chapter II

Russian Empire and RKKF.

In the Baltic Fleet in 1908, the 1st mine division consisting of 37 destroyers and the 2nd mine division consisting of 10 destroyers and 16 destroyers were formed. In 1916, during the First World War, both of these divisions were combined into one. In 1922, the mine division of the Baltic Fleet was disbanded. In the Black Sea Fleet, a mine division consisting of 1 cruiser, 17 destroyers and destroyers and 4 submarines was formed in 1911. In 1914 it was reorganized into a mine brigade. In 1920-1921, a mine division consisting of 10 destroyers and 5 destroyers existed as part of the Volga-Caspian Military Flotilla, then it was reorganized into a separate division of destroyers of the Naval Forces of the Caspian Sea.

In the 1940s, destroyer divisions were created in the Navy of the USSR Armed Forces as formations of light fleet forces.

Notes

1. // Military Encyclopedia: [in 18 volumes] / ed. V. F. Novitsky [and others]. - St. Petersburg. ; [M.]: Type. t-va I. D. Sytin, 1911-1915.
2. Mine Division // Military Encyclopedia / I. D. Sergeev. - Moscow: Military Publishing House, 2001. - T. 5. - P. 139. - ISBN 5-203-1876-6.

Veselago 1st Mikhail Gerasimovich (11/07/1843-09/20/1929), retired admiral (08/28/1909).

Shafrov Alexander Alekseevich (01/29/1879 – until December 1945), mechanical engineer, captain 2nd rank (04/14/1913).

Svetlik Pavel Aloizievich (11/20/1880-04/17/1966), captain of the 2nd rank “for excellent zealous service and special labor caused by the circumstances of the war” (01/01/1915).

Compass deviation, deviation of the moving compass system from a position that fixes the direction to the Earth’s magnetic pole (for a magnetic compass) or to the geographic pole (for a gyrocompass). The deviation of the magnetic compass is eliminated with the help of auxiliary magnets that create a system of compensating magnetic fields.

Gerasimov Alexander Mikhailovich (11/14/1861-03/02/1931), vice admiral for distinction (04/29/1913).

Kurosh 1st Alexander Parfenovich (03/30/1862–1919?), vice admiral for distinction (07/30/1916) retired (12/07/1917).

De Livron Alexander Karlovich (02/21/1886-07/18/1906), midshipman (05/21/1905).

Shchensnovich Eduard Nikolaevich (12/25/1852-12/20/1910), vice admiral (08/28/1909).

Von Schultz Max Konstantinovich (08/30/1870-01/17/1917), captain 1st rank for distinction (12/06/1911).

Yazykov Dmitry Mikhailovich (05/29/1857-?), captain of the 1st rank. Graduated from the Naval School (1879). He commanded the steamship Krasnovodsk in the Caspian Sea (1901–1904). Dismissed from service and promoted to captain of the 1st rank (05/29/1908), in connection with the First World War he was again appointed to serve as captain of the 1st rank (03/16/1915), served in the Black Sea Fleet.

A capstan is a special winch used on ships for selecting anchor chains and performing other heavy work on pulling cables and chains. Spiers have several classifications, including by the nature of the force that sets them in motion. In this case we are talking about a manual pin.

Ramps are wooden levers used to rotate the spire manually.

Paner is the position of the selected anchor when the anchor chain (or anchor rope) is already in a vertical position, but the anchor has not yet left the ground.

Von Barleven Arvid Konstantinovich (06/07/1884-?), senior lieutenant (01/01/1915).

Romanov Alexander Mikhailovich, Grand Duke (04/01/1866-02/26/1933), admiral (12/06/1915).

Such an “exotic” ministry did not exist. After fleeing the fleet, the Grand Duke continued to chair the Special Committee for Strengthening the Fleet using voluntary donations (from February 6, 1904), within the framework of which, from 1910, he was involved in organizing aviation.

Posokhov Sergei Andreevich (10/15/1866-02/02/1935), rear admiral for distinction (07/30/1916) retired (10/06/1917).

In connection with the revolutionary movement in the Baltic states and the lack of troops to protect estates from pogroms, at the end of November 1905, a decision was made to form battalions from naval crews. 1st and 2nd battalions under the command of Captain 2nd Rank O.O. Richter and captain 1st rank Baron V.N. Fersen (who is also the head of a detachment of naval guard battalions in Estland) left Kronstadt on December 19 and 24, 1905. Having divided into companies, and sometimes into smaller detachments, they began to capture the “ringleaders”. The decisiveness of the actions of the sailors, who, by order of the military authorities, shot local residents, often without trial, earned high praise from Emperor Nicholas II, who wrote in a letter to his mother on December 29 that they “... acted excellently; many gangs are destroyed, houses and their property are burned. Terror must be responded to with terror. Now Witte himself understands this.” The style of action of the personnel can be seen in the lines of the report of Captain 2nd Rank O.O. Richter: “It must be said that the execution also affects the team, and it becomes wild, bloodthirsty, and has to be restrained. I was very glad that the team realized that they were dealing with a brutal, vengeful people, and, of course, did not wait until they were hit, but shot at everyone.” It is significant that these battalions were staffed primarily by sailors of the 14th naval crew, which almost mutinied a month before (we recall that the former commander of the cruiser "Varyag", captain 1st rank V.F. Rudnev, was dismissed for allowing unrest in the crew ). Fragments of reports from the commanders of these battalions were published: From the notebook of an archivist. Naval punitive battalions in the Baltic region / Publ. A. Drezen // Red Archive. 1930. No. 1 (30). pp. 165–169.

3rd security battalion (actually a half-battalion) under the command of captain 2nd rank P.A. On Green 1st, in late December, the icebreaker Ermak was delivered to the island. Ezel. After the “pacification” (judging by the telegrams, almost bloodless) of the local residents, by February 3, personnel were transferred to Riga to patrol the streets.

At the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, further formation of battalions continued; on January 7 and 8, the 4th and 5th battalions of Kronstadters (commanders - captains of the 2nd rank Protopopov and G.P. Pekarsky) departed from Oranienbaum. They were stationed in Livonia on the Riga-Dvinsk railway line, where they were part of the Vilna flying detachment. 6th battalion captain 2nd rank V.I. Galanin did not finish his formation; there was no longer any need to send him.

The 1st and 2nd battalions (the 2nd battalion was commanded by Captain 2nd Rank V.F. Ponomarev from January 27) were withdrawn from the Estonian province on March 12 and 15, the 4th and 5th from Livonia on April 7. In total, 1,868 lower ranks operated in five battalions in the Baltics.

Reviews about the activities of the battalions were, naturally, the most contradictory. The civil authorities did not skimp on praise for their determination and discipline; some local residents wrote grateful letters to the Minister of the Navy, saying that they felt behind the sailors, “like behind a stone wall.” On the other hand, even in the meager reports of battalion commanders we find information about the harshness of actions and not always sober behavior of lower ranks. And here is a fragment from the diary entry of Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkina on November 1, 1918: “Dark people are terrible everywhere. Or rather, dark people, since cruelties, refined only in form, are committed by seemingly more intelligent, but in fact also dark gentlemen. I remember how Tipolt (midshipman N.A. Tipolt served in the 4th battalion. - Note ed.) told me about the death sentences handed down during punitive expeditions in the Baltic region by dead drunk judges, which he had to carry out.”

Nikonov Konstantin Petrovich (04/14/1844-?), admiral (10/13/1908) retired (10/01/1908).

The mentioned scandal in the Libau circus occurred on October 13, 1905. About the previous adventures of A.M. Veselago is given an idea by an encrypted telegram from the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve to the Minister of Maritime A.A. Birilev dated October 2, 1905: “Lieutenant Veselago, drunk, sitting in the theater stalls, urinated and, then leaving the theater, committed a series of outrages. The court of mediators, having opened a case on this matter, recently ordered Lieutenant Veselago to resign, which he refused to do. The case should go to the court of flag officers and captains, which at the moment could not be convened due to the illness of Admiral Jessen and the absence of some commanders. I hope to do this next week.<…>Greve." At that time, the father’s intercession turned out to be effective, and on October 4, 1905, a response telegram signed by the acting was sent to Vladivostok. Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Rear Admiral A.A. Virenius: “The Minister wishes you to send Lieutenant Veselago to St. Petersburg without carrying out the court sentence” (RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 4. D. 1305. L. 143, 143 vol.). This story is indicative as an example of the authorities’ disdainful attitude towards the opinion of the fleet personnel, expressed in the decision of the court of mediators.

Vecheslov 1st Vladimir Stepanovich (01/09/1876–1934), captain 1st rank for distinction (04/06/1914)

To avoid confusion, we will restore the chronology of the formation of mine forces in the Baltic after the Russo-Japanese War.

Initially, in February 1906, the mine cruisers that entered service, built with voluntary donations from the population, were included in the Practical Defense Detachment of the Baltic Sea coast under the command of the retinue of Rear Admiral Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. Soon after the Grand Duke fled from the fleet, by order of the chief commander of the fleet and ports and the head of the naval defense of the Baltic Sea, Vice Admiral K.P. Nikonov dated September 28, 1906, all mine cruisers from the Practical Detachment were consolidated into a separate Detachment of Mine Cruisers under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.O. von Essen. In October 1906, destroyers were added to the detachment, and it became known as the 1st detachment of mine ships of the Baltic Sea, while being directly subordinate to the main commander of the fleet.

Initially, it included the mine cruisers: “Ukraine”, “Kazanets”, “Moskvityanin”, “Volunteer”, “Finn”, “Okhotnik”, “Emir of Bukhara”, “Amurets”, “Ussuriets”, “Zabaikalets”, “ Border Guard", "Siberian Shooter", "General Kondratenko", "Horseman", "Gaydamak", "Guarding", "Terrible", "Don Cossack", "Trukhmenets"; destroyers “Vidny”, “Thundering”, “Combat”, “Mechanical Engineer Zverev”, “Mechanical Engineer Dmitriev”, “Stormy”, “Attentive”, “Impressive”, “Hardy”, “Vigilant”; transport "Angara".

By order of the Naval Department of December 8, 1907, the 1st detachment of mine ships was renamed the Division of Destroyers from April 1, 1908. It consisted of four divisions of eight destroyers each (according to the 1907 classification, mine cruisers were also called destroyers), three destroyers at the disposal of the division commander, as well as auxiliary vessels. Until November 24, 1908, the division was commanded by N.O. von Essen, then captain 1st rank His Serene Highness Prince A.A. Liven.

On March 12, 1909, the Baltic Sea destroyer division was renamed the 1st Mine Division; until October 11, 1911, it was headed by A.A. Liven.

By the already mentioned order of the chief commander of the fleet and ports and the head of the naval defense of the Baltic Sea, Vice Admiral K.P. Nikonov dated September 28, 1906, part of the older destroyers was consolidated into a Destroyer Detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.V. Knyazev to protect the skerry area (since October 1906 - the 2nd detachment of mine ships of the Baltic Sea). From April 1, 1908, the detachment was called the Destroyer Division, which, in turn, was renamed the 2nd Mine Division on March 12, 1909.

In April 1915, the 1st and 2nd Mine Divisions were united into the Mine Division.

The common name is something like “Finn”.

After the Russo-Japanese War, to improve the training of students of the Naval Corps, the intermediate rank of “ship midshipman” was introduced, awarded after passing exams for the corps science course; the first officer rank - midshipman - was henceforth given to graduates only after sailing abroad and examination by a commission of naval officers. A separate detachment of ships assigned to sail with the ship's midshipmen, formed in May 1906, was supposed to provide high-quality shipboard practice. Other tasks were also solved in parallel - the practice of students of the school of combatant quartermasters, improving the combat training of the best warships of the fleet, as well as “demonstration of the flag” in ports of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. Initially, the detachment included the squadron battleships (from 1907 – battleships) “Tsesarevich” and “Slava”, as well as the 1st rank cruiser “Bogatyr”. By order of the Naval Department of December 8, 1907, the detachment was renamed “Baltic”; it existed until the fall of 1911. In addition to the indicated ships, at various times it also included the cruisers “Oleg”, “Admiral Makarov” and “Rurik” "

The mine cruiser (from 09/27/1907 - destroyer) "Volunteer" belonged to four ships of the "Finn" class, built with voluntary donations according to the design of the company "Schihau" (Germany) at the shipyard of the "Putilov Plant Society" in St. Petersburg. Laid down in 1904, launched on 05/29/1905, entered service in June 1906. Participated in the First World War, died in a mine in the Irben Strait on 08/08/1916.

Displacement 570 tons, length – 72.49 m, width – 8.18 m, during testing it reached a speed of 25.9 knots. The initial armament consisted of 2 - 75 mm, 6 - 57 mm guns, 4 machine guns, as well as 3 - 450 mm torpedo tubes; winter 1909/1910 artillery was replaced with 2 – 102 mm guns.

Pokrovsky Andrey Georgievich (Egorovich) (08/14/1862–1944), vice admiral for distinction (04/10/1916).

Dombrovsky 1st Alexey Vladimirovich (01/07/1882-04/24/1954), captain 1st rank (07/28/1917).

Zayonchkovsky Leonid Brunovich (05.10.1883-?), senior lieutenant (seniority from 06.12.1915).

Khomentovsky Georgy Mikhailovich (04/08/1880-?), mechanical engineer, captain 2nd rank (04/14/1913).

Other important negative aspects of the system indicated by the author were: 1) frequent changes of personnel, since the crew commander could assign completely different officers and sailors who were not familiar with the ship to the next summer voyage; 2) a long stay of personnel on shore without engaging in actual work had a negative impact on discipline.

Maksimov Andrey Semenovich (07/07/1866–1951), vice admiral for distinction (04/10/1916).

Here is an entry from the diary of Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkina (Helsingfors, April 3, 1919): “Then Lyatsky told how, on Kerensky’s instructions, he had a meeting with Admiral Maximov, what an amazing impression this fleet commander, who could not speak Russian, made on him. (At the same time, I remembered that a Chukhon doorman approached the group at the table: “Who is Admiral Maksimov here?” “I am Admiral Maksimov!” was Andrei Semenovich’s answer.).”

Butakov 1st Alexander Grigorievich (06/25/1861-03/01/1917), rear admiral for distinction (12/06/1913).

Butakov Grigory Ivanovich (09/27/1820-05/31/1882), admiral (1878), adjutant general (1869).

Banov Nikolai Nikolaevich (03/05/1859-?), retired rear admiral (10/04/1910).

Storre Ivan Aleksandrovich (05/27/1862-?), retired vice admiral (12/02/1915).

Teshe Lev Karlovich (06/17/1863-?), retired rear admiral (06/08/1917).

Vinogradsky Ilya Alexandrovich (02/23/1867-01/23/1910), captain of the 1st rank for distinction (12/28/1909).

Maydel 1st Christian Gvidovich, baron (04/13/1869-?), captain 2nd rank (12/06/1905).

Kartsov Viktor Andreevich (01/31/1868-05/02/1936), vice admiral (12/06/1916).

Balkashin Nikolai Nikolaevich (09/30/1866-12/13/1907), captain of the 2nd rank for distinction (01/01/1904).

Chukhnin Grigory Pavlovich (01/23/1848-06/29/1906), vice admiral (04/06/1903).

The information is not true, see the biography of A.G. Pokrovsky.

The issue of basing on the port of Emperor Alexander III (Libavu) was by no means clear-cut. On one side of the scale lay the opportunity to train personnel on voyages across the Baltic in the cold stormy months, on the other was the fear of being trapped in the event of war with Germany. Thus, in a report addressed to the Chief of the Main Naval Staff dated December 15, 1906, N.O. von Essen confirmed his thoughts expressed earlier, on October 10 of the same year, in a letter to the Minister of the Navy. From his point of view, Libau could not serve as a support base for the mine fleet due to the fact that the fortress, located 70 versts from the border with Germany, had almost no protection from the rear, and therefore could be cut off already on the third day of hostilities. “The defense of the fortress from the sea is imperfect both due to the location of naval batteries and due to the insufficient number of strong guns<…>, why, when an enemy squadron approaches Libau, mine ships must immediately leave the port so as not to be cut off from the sea and then shot in the outport or basin and canal. I’ll say it stronger - the mine fleet with the beginning of hostilities will have to leave the port of Emperor Alexander III, so as not to return there later” (RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 3564. L. 13).

The author probably had in mind the story of the steamship John Grafton. This ship was hired by the Social Revolutionaries with Japanese money and was on its way to Finland with a cargo of weapons. 08/26/1905 sat on rocks near Jacobstadt (Gulf of Bothnia) and was blown up by the crew.

The author's memory failed. The “Volunteer” was cruising in Moonsund in October 1906. The voyages of mine cruisers to supervise smuggling were stopped by decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in early December 1906 (RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 3539. L. 173).

In 1907, "Volunteer" began the campaign on March 19, 1907, made a number of short training trips to sea, after which it was again in the armed reserve from March 26 to May 10.

Ples between the islands of Dago (Hiiumaa) and Ezel (Saaremaa).

The Baltic customs cruising flotilla was established in 1868. About its activities and the ships that were part of it, see: Ryagin S.K. Russian maritime border guards // Gangut. Sat. articles. Vol. 4. St. Petersburg, 1992. pp. 70–80; Moshkov F. Russian Maritime Border Guard: from Peter I to the present day. St. Petersburg, 2003, pp. 13–39.

At that time, the head of the Vindava commercial port was retired captain 1st rank (10/17/1905) Vasily Gustavovich Wevel von Kruger (07/21/1854-?). He graduated from the Naval School (1875), and from 1875 served on commercial ships.

Although rarely, warships still visited Vindava. Thus, “Volunteer” visited this port on March 23–24, 1907 as part of a detachment of mine cruisers (RGAVMF. F. 870. Op. 1. D. 35691. L. 14 vol.).

Nowadays the Lieutenant Schmidt Bridge.

The presence of desalination plants on ships was necessary, since if sea water was used in steam boilers, salt scale quickly rendered them inoperable. In the case of using exclusively fresh water obtained from the shore, the ship’s operating area was significantly reduced.

It should be noted that the detachment really managed to change the attitude of many residents of the capital towards the fleet.

Judging by the logbook, the Volunteer, together with other ships, moved to Kronstadt on May 28, and a day later returned to St. Petersburg, where it was from May 30 to June 5, after which it proceeded to Biork, and from there to Moonsund (RGAVMF. F. 870. Op. 1. D. 35691. L. 19 vol., 20).

The Volunteer's artillery armament at that time consisted of two 75 mm and six 57 mm guns. In the winter of 1909/10. instead of the indicated weapons, the former mine cruisers were equipped with two 102-mm cannons with a barrel length of 60 calibers. 120-mm guns (albeit with a barrel length of 45 calibers) were available only on the Black Sea mine cruisers of the Lieutenant Shestakov class.

Treknais Voldemar Andreevich (02/26/1877-?), court councilor (11/25/1908).

Zort August Augustovich (1861-?), actual state councilor (12/06/1911).

We are talking about Lydia Khrisanfovna Zort, nee Mosolova, the daughter of an actual state councilor.

Hungerburg, Hungerburg (“Hungry City” – him.) - a village at the mouth of the river. Narova. Known since the 16th century. At the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries. - a dacha place and resort for St. Petersburg residents. In 1922 it was renamed Narva-Jõesuu (Ust-Narva). In the manuscript G.K. The count is mistakenly called Gungenburg.

We are talking about the gunner of the mine cruiser “Volunteer” Adam Vishkar, who drowned on June 30, 1907 (RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 2. D. 966. L. 68).

The Model 1904 Whitehead self-propelled mine was the first 450 mm torpedo adopted by the Russian fleet.

Balk Sergei Zakharovich (04/04/1866-27/02/1913), captain 1st rank (06/12/1910).

Smirnov 3rd Mikhail Ivanovich (06/18/1880–1940), rear admiral (11/20/1918).

The review, which took place on August 27, 1907 near Biorca, involved 20 mine cruisers and destroyers. Maneuvering at a speed of about 17 knots, they carried out 10 lane changes within an hour.

The review also had another positive effect, extremely important in the atmosphere of Essen’s struggle for the money and coal necessary for the detachment’s voyage. Here is a telegram from the Emperor to the Minister of Naval Affairs, Adjutant General I.M. Dikov (yacht “Standart”, August 28, 1907): “Today I inspected nineteen mine ships of Rear Admiral Essen’s detachment and was present at the evolutions and maneuvers and was quite pleased with the result of the diligent and friendly work of the detachment personnel. I wish the detachment to continue the campaign for two weeks to complete the entire assigned training program. I am sending you a benevolent order for inspection through my flag captain. Nikolai" (RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 3656. L. 393).

Interestingly, the next day the imperial yacht “Standard” flew onto the rocks. N.O. was appointed chairman of the commission to investigate this incident. von Essen.

End of free trial.

Admiral Nikolai Ottovich Essen always stood out for his exceptional personal courage, adhered to the most daring tactical decisions, and showed himself to be a fearless and skillful naval commander. He repeatedly took responsibility for the most important decisions and always stood for the active use of the fleet and its weapons, in particular mines, and was an opponent of passive forms of warfare. He was convinced that “the fleet exists only for war, and therefore everything that is not related to combat training should be discarded as not only unnecessary, but also harmful.”

Naval school and service on ships of the Russian fleet

Nikolai Ottovich von Essen was born in St. Petersburg on December 11, 1860 in the family of a prominent statesman. His father, Otto Vasilyevich, was an example of loyalty to his cause and duty for his son. The Essen family had almost two centuries of maritime traditions and gave the fleet seven Knights of St. George. - Admiral Essen is the pride of the Russian fleet.

Nikolai Essen, who had great abilities and enviable diligence in studying science, stood out noticeably among his classmates with his deep knowledge of the general scientific and special disciplines studied at the school. With particular enthusiasm, he studied higher mathematics, mechanics, weapons, maritime practice and some other disciplines directly related to the theory of the ship and the use of combat weapons of the armored fleet. With great benefit, he conducted training practice on ships of the Baltic Fleet, during which cadets and midshipmen consolidated their theoretical knowledge and gained practical experience in the use of weapons and control of the ship. - (The most detailed story about N.O. Essen)

Since 1902 - commander of the newest cruiser of the 2nd rank "Novik", captain 2nd rank N.O. von Essen. Having accepted the ship at a shipyard in Germany, N.O. Essen transferred it to Port Arthur as part of the Pacific Ocean squadron.

Participation in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905

Golden saber with the inscription "For bravery." - von Essen Nikolai Ottovich

Novik's bold steps against the backdrop of the first failures were noticeable. For the battle on January 27, 1904 near Port Arthur N.O. Essen was awarded the Golden St. George Saber with the inscription “For Bravery,” and 12 Novik crew members received St. George Crosses. At the request of the squadron commander S.O. Makarov, on March 16, 1904, captain 2nd rank Essen was assigned to command the squadron battleship Sevastopol. -

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol" in Kronstadt. September 1900

Beginning in August 1904, the military activities of N.O. Essen, as the commander of the squadron battleship "Sevastopol", was most closely associated with the defense of Port Arthur, and above all with artillery support for the defenders of the fortress. He was usually entrusted with the most important and difficult tasks associated with the destruction of the most active enemy batteries that systematically fired at the fortress.

The death of Makarov made a demoralizing impression on most of the flagships and officers of the Pacific Fleet. Fear of mines and the desire to remain in the fortress, which was soon besieged by the Japanese, became the predominant “tactical techniques” of the Arthurian commanders. At meetings of flag officers and captains with Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft in May-June, all the commanders of large ships, except Essen, almost unanimously spoke out against going to sea and fighting the Japanese fleet, which puzzled even the admiral himself, who also considered it impossible to defeat the Japanese in a naval battle. - Tsushima - Personnel of the Russian Fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Reflecting a night attack by Japanese destroyers on the squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

For six nights, the Sevastopol, together with the gunboat Brave, fought off more than 30 Japanese destroyers, sank 2 of them, and inflicted heavy damage on five. - Red gaoliang. Anton Utkin. - Around the World No. 2 (2773) February 2005

When the destruction of the ships of the squadron began on December 19, 1904, "Sevastopol", the only one of all, through the efforts of its commander, was towed to a deep place and scuttled, which did not allow the Japanese to raise and use it... the main thing that N.O. Essen took out from This campaign is a rich experience of observing and reflecting on a lost war.

Command of the Baltic Fleet

BUT. Essen understood perfectly well that success in preparing the fleet for war depends primarily on the degree of training of the personnel and their attitude towards service, i.e. fulfilling his military duty. Acquaintance N.O. Essen with the personnel of the fleet, and primarily with the officers, showed that the morale of many of them was at a low level. Under the influence of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the war with Japan, they lost faith in their weapons and began to become disillusioned with naval service. Decadent moods appeared among some of the officer corps, and military discipline noticeably deteriorated.

Head of the Active Baltic Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral N.O. von Essen with a group of officers on board the gunboat Beaver on the tenth anniversary of the capture of the Taku forts. Revel, June 4, 1910. - Gunboats of the Baltic Fleet “Gilyak”, “Koreets”, “Beaver”, “Sivuch”. - Gangut No. 34-35.

To rectify the situation, it was necessary, first of all, to change the existing system of training and education of personnel in the fleet. It was from this N.O. Essen began his naval leadership activities in the Baltic, first as commander of the 1st Mine Division, and then of the fleet, and achieved exceptionally high results. Within two years, he turned the mine division into the best formation of the fleet, for which he received gratitude from the tsar, who, observing the division’s training, highly appreciated its combat training.
Mine division, thanks to N.O. Essen, became a real school for training and education of officers of the Baltic Fleet, and above all for ship commanders, whom Nikolai Ottovich, like all outstanding naval commanders of the Russian fleet, considered as a decisive link that ensured success in combat training of personnel on the ship and the success of the ship in battle. Many officers, having gone through a good Essen school in a mine division, later received assignments to large ships: battleships and cruisers, and transferred to them the principles of combat training used in a mine division.
In the system of combat training of ships and fleet formations, Admiral N.O. Essen adhered to his teacher’s two famous mottos: “At sea means home” and “Remember the war.” Having turned these mottos of S. O. Makarov into the principles of combat training, Nikolai Ottovich instituted a rule first in the mine division, and then throughout the entire Baltic Fleet - to sail as much as possible in order to practice combat missions at sea, and to spend less time at the base. - Nikolai Ottovich Essen. - Russian Imperial Navy / "InfoArt". Preparation of materials: Alexander and Dmitry Loparev.

Participation in the First World War

On the night of July 30-31, 1914, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral N.O. Essen telegraphed the Minister of the Navy: “Please inform me about the political situation. If I do not receive an answer tonight, I will put up a barrage in the morning” (Fleet in the First World War, vol. 1, p. 90).
On the morning of July 31, by order of Essen, a mine-laying detachment consisting of the ships Ladoga, Narova, Amur and Yenisei began laying mines in the area of ​​the main mine-artillery position. To cover the minelayers, a brigade of battleships and a brigade of cruisers, which included the destroyer Novik, were deployed. So he entered the war.
By the fall of 1914, having become convinced that the German fleet was not yet going to make a breakthrough to the eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and preferring not to risk its main forces, the Essen headquarters developed a new operation plan, which, along with defensive actions, also included offensive ones. The plan, in particular, envisaged the laying of active minefields in the southern and southeastern parts of the Baltic Sea, as well as the destruction of enemy merchant ships and observation posts (TsGA Navy, f. 479, op. 1, d. 970, l. 27). - Yu.G. Stepanov, I.F. Tsvetkov “Destroyer Novik”. Leningrad; Shipbuilding, 1981.

Tsvetkov I.F. Admiral N.O. von Essen - Commander of the Baltic Fleet on the eve and during the First World War // Germans in Russia: People and Fates: Collection. Art. St. Petersburg, 1998.

Starting from August 1, the Baltic squadron led by the armored cruiser Rurik, on which Admiral N.O. Essen held her flag, concentrated on the central position, maneuvering behind the minefield. Meanwhile, cruisers and destroyers took turns (cruisers during the day and destroyers at night) on patrol duty at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland in order to warn the fleet commander in time about the appearance of the enemy.

Admiral N.O. Essen with officers on board the destroyer "Border Guard". -

His high intelligence, military talent and great organizational skills provided invaluable services to the Russian fleet, and his fatherly and fair attitude towards his subordinates inspired deep love for him among all the fleet personnel. They worked for him and with him, not out of fear, but out of conscience... - Count G.K. On the Novik. Baltic fleet in war and revolution. - St. Petersburg: Gangut, 1997.

Destroyer "Novik".

Admiral Nikolai Ottovich Essen, the youngest full admiral in the history of Russia, the most talented student and follower of S.O. Makarov, the last in a number of outstanding naval commanders of the Russian fleet.

Devoting himself entirely to the cause, Essen cared little about his health and still tried to act energetically. On May 1, he left on a destroyer for Revel and, having caught a serious cold in the cold Baltic wind, finally fell ill with lobar pneumonia. On the third day, doctors in Reval recognized the situation as dangerous, and on May 7 (20), 1915, N.O. Essen died.
Von Essen's favorite destroyer "Border Guard", accompanied by an honor guard of St. George's cavaliers, on May 9 (22), 1915, delivered the coffin with the body of the commander of the Baltic Fleet to Petrograd, to the Embankment of England. With a huge crowd of people and troops, the coffin was loaded onto a gun carriage, and six horses, behind which a huge funeral procession lined up, delivered the admiral’s body to the Church of the Savior on the Waters, and then to the Novodevichy cemetery.

Destroyer "Border Guard" with the body of N.O. Essena leaves Revel, May 1915. - Domestic ships of the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars

The original monument at the grave of Admiral Essen at the Novodevichy cemetery has not survived. The red granite tombstone with an enamel photograph was restored by the Naval Academy in 1960 for the centenary of the naval commander's birth. - von ESSEN Nikolai Ottovich (1860-1915)

Naval Minister Admiral I. Grigorovich then vowed to name the best of the new ships after Essen. But, alas, he did not keep his oath. - Essen Nikolai Ottovich. - Slavic world

Three frigates of Project 11356 for the Russian Navy, the first of which is planned to be laid down at the Yantar Shipyard (Kaliningrad) in January 2011, will be named after the Tsarist admirals. This was reported by a source in the defense industry.
The first to be laid down is the frigate Admiral Grigorovich, followed by Admiral Essen and Admiral Kolchak. However, the names have not yet been finalized, the source noted.

About the admiral's foresight

Admiral N.O. Essen prepared the fleet for war on air. - Gangut: Collection of articles: Issue 46. (edited by Kuznetsov L.A.)

Compiled by Nakhimovets, graduated in 1953, captain 1st rank N.A. Veryuzhsky.

Veryuzhsky Nikolay Aleksandrovich (VNA), Gorlov Oleg Aleksandrovich (OAS), Maksimov Valentin Vladimirovich (MVV), KSV.
198188. St. Petersburg, st. Marshala Govorova, building 11/3, apt. 70. Karasev Sergey Vladimirovich, archivist. [email protected]

The combined operation of the German naval and ground forces "Albion" is associated with Moonsund (the strait separating the Moonsund archipelago from the mainland coast of Estonia). For Russia, the Moonsund operation of September 29 – October 7, 1917 was the last military operation during the Great War.

In operational terms, for the Germans, the Moonsund operation was an amphibious assault operation to capture the islands of the archipelago. The strategic goal of the operation was to capture the Gulf of Riga, the most important promising bridgehead. In addition, having captured the islands, the Germans deprived the Russian command of the opportunity to use their aviation in the Gulf of Riga (the airfields were mainly on the island of Ezel) and protected the coastal flank of their 8th Army from any surprises.

The German fleet was so much stronger than the Russian Baltic Fleet that no operational and tactical art of the latter could balance its chances in an open battle at sea. Based on the balance of forces, the Russian naval command based its war plan in the Baltic theater of operations on the concept of defending the most dangerous operational directions for Russia using positional warfare. The narrow Gulf of Finland and the entrances to the Gulf of Riga and Bothnia made it possible to block them with mine and artillery positions. By themselves, these positions could not prevent the breakthrough of the enemy fleet, but they constrained the enemy’s maneuvering and allowed the Russian naval forces to act on the flank of the enemy breaking through the minefields.

By the spring of 1916, the following were created: 1) Central mine and artillery position on the Nargen-Porkallaudd line; 2) A forward mine-artillery position, which consisted of a minefield between Gangeudd and Cape Takhona (the northern tip of Dago Island - its flanks were to be protected by batteries on Russare Island, south of Cape Gangeudd) and on the island. Dago (near Cape Takhona); 3) Abo-Oland fortified position (closed the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia) and 4) Moonsund fortified position (along with minefields in the Irben Strait, it protected the entrance to the Gulf of Riga).

The advanced position allowed the forward deployment of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to the west. A special place in the defense system was occupied by the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga, which included, in addition to the outdated battleship Slava, several cruisers and almost the entire Mine Division of the Baltic Fleet. The main operational task of this group was to defend the entrance to the Gulf of Riga through the Irbe Strait - the northern flank of the minefield was secured by the Moonsund position, and the southern flank rested on the coast of the Gulf of Riga captured and fortified by the Germans.

Capturing the coast of the Gulf of Riga is one of the most important tasks of the German forces during the fighting in the Baltic states in the summer of 1915. It was then that the Irbe operation of the German fleet was carried out. But the breakthrough of the German fleet into the Gulf of Riga did not achieve the main goal - the destruction of Russian naval forces in the gulf. The main goal of the Irben operation - maintaining dominance in the gulf to assist the troops of the coastal flank of the German Neman Army - was also not achieved. However, the enemy owned the coast as a base for the deployment of subsequent military operations.

The entire set of mine and artillery positions created by the Russian command by the summer of 1916 in the Baltic theater of operations constituted a single powerful fortified system, the center of which was the Forward Position (with the main forces of the Baltic Fleet deployed on it), with the flanks in the form of the positions of the Irbe Strait and Olandsgaf (behind which there should have been auxiliary units of the fleet). The central and rear positions ensured the stability of the defensive system and guaranteed the reliability of the protection of the sea approaches to Petrograd.

The combat stability of the system of Russian mine and artillery positions largely depended on the competent and active maneuvering of the naval forces of the fleet. The weakest links of the system were the flank positions - Irbenskaya and Olandsgafskaya: they had only one flank, adjacent to their coastal fortifications (the other flank of the Olandsgafskaya position overlooked Swedish territorial waters, and the southern flank of the Irbenskaya position abutted the Courland coast, occupied and fortified by German troops ). Under the cover of coastal batteries, German ships could move freely along the Courland coast - only in 1917, after the installation of a 305-mm battery on Cape Tserel, which covered the entire width of the Irben Strait with its fire, the work of German minesweepers on the fairway along this coast was difficult.

The Moonsund fortified position was an important element in the Russian defense system in the Baltic - it formed an intermediate link between the Irben and Forward positions. Possession of Moonsund ensured communications in the Gulf of Riga, made it possible to successfully defend the Irbene Strait, as well as assist the flank of the Northern Front, and ensured freedom of maneuver in the Baltic theater of operations.

The main vulnerability of the Moonsund position is its accessibility to enemy landings (almost the entire coastline was favorable for landing), which the enemy did not fail to take advantage of in the 1917 campaign. The islands of Ezel and Dago, the entrances to Tagalaht and Leo bays, and Soelosund were not sufficiently protected. The most vulnerable point of the archipelago was Soelosund - the strait separating the largest (Dago and Ezel) islands and leading from the Baltic Sea into Moonsund. On the island of Ezel, just before the entrance to the strait, there were two largest bays - Tagalakht and Mustelgam - convenient for a large fleet.

Accordingly, the main burden of the defense of the islands lay on their garrison, which was insufficient both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and by the autumn of 1917, it had also decomposed morally and psychologically. Deployed behind the mine and artillery positions, the Russian fleet was a serious combat force, capable of going to sea at any moment and attacking both the enemy troops making a sea crossing and the landing troops. But, on the one hand, its combat effectiveness was also undermined by revolutionary events, and on the other, having, thanks to the Kiel Canal, the opportunity to transfer ships of any class to the Baltic, the Germans concentrated large forces and assets from the High Seas Fleet at the beginning of the Moonsund operation.

Map of the area of ​​the Moonsund operation.

The Germans involved in the operation more than 300 ships, 102 aircraft (94 were based at the St. Helena air base and nearby airfields, plus 8 seaplanes in the 16th air squadron), up to 25,000 landing troops (control of the 23rd reserve corps, 42nd and 77th I infantry divisions, 2nd scooter brigade) with 40 guns, 80 mortars, 220 machine guns [Chishwitz A. von. Capture of the Baltic Islands by Germany in 1917. M., 1937. P. 28-29]. The landing party was accepted onto transports in the city of Libau.

The group operated: the battlecruiser Moltke, 10 newest battleships (3rd and 4th squadrons - battleships Bayern, König, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz, Markgraf; Friedrich der Grosse ", "König Albert", "Kaiserin", "Prince Regent Luitpold", "Kaiser"), 9 light cruisers (2nd and 6th reconnaissance groups - "Königsberg", "Karlsruhe", "Nuremberg", " Frankfurt", "Danzig", "Kolberg", "Strasburg", "Augsburg"; "Emden" was the flagship of the destroyer force), over 100 destroyers and destroyers, 6 submarines (Kurland flotilla) and more than 100 auxiliary vessels (transports , minesweepers, motor boats, etc.). The naval “Special Operations Detachment” was commanded by Vice Admiral E. Schmidt, and the landing corps was commanded by General von Katen.

2. E. Schmidt

3. von Katen

4. German battleship-dreadnought Prinz Regent Luitpold

5. 280-mm guns of the battlecruiser Moltke.

The naval forces of the Gulf of Riga included: 2 obsolete battleships (Citizen and Slava), 3 old cruisers (Admiral Makarov, Bayan, Diana), 12 new destroyers (Novik type) and 14 old destroyers: 4th (“General Kondratenko”, “Border Guard”), 5th (“Vsadnik”, “Amurets”, “Finn”, “Moskvityanin”, “Emir of Bukhara”), 6th (“Guarding”, “Don Cossack”, “Zabaikalets”, “Army”, “Ukraine”, “Turkmen Stavropol”, “Terrible”), 11th (“Winner”, “Zabiyaka”, “Thunder”), 12th (“Desna” ", "Samson", "Lieutenant Ilyin", "Captain Izylmetyev"), 13th ("Avtroil", "Konstantin", "Izyaslav", "Gabriel") destroyer divisions, the destroyer "Novik", 3 English submarines ( S-26, S-27, S-32), 3 gunboats (“Khivinets”, “Brave”, “Threatening”), auxiliary vessels (about 100). During the operation, reinforcements arrived, including several destroyers.

6. Battleship "Slava" in the parking lot

Accordingly, the Germans, having concentrated forces that were many times superior to the Russians both quantitatively and qualitatively, guaranteed an unconditionally successful outcome of the operation for themselves. The enemy's superiority was overwhelming.

For the Russian side, the situation was aggravated by a number of unfavorable circumstances. The first is technical. So, if on the large ships of the Gulf of Riga Naval Forces the condition of the mechanisms was relatively satisfactory, then the destroyers and smaller ships were so “torn” that their material part required constant bulkheads and repairs. The Gulf of Riga forces, like the entire fleet in 1917, due to poorly completed repair work and the almost complete lack of constant monitoring of the equipment by the command staff, were in much worse condition than before.

When characterizing the Russian defensive positions, it should be noted that the rare minefields placed on the approaches to Soelosund and near the bays could not serve as a serious obstacle for the enemy. In fact, there was no full-fledged mine position in the Irben Strait. The bulk of the coastal batteries were not camouflaged, and the largest seaplane station was located close to Tagalakht Bay - under possible enemy attack.

There were 39 coastal batteries (caliber 47-305 mm), but half of them were anti-aircraft. The personnel of the batteries was about 1.5 thousand people [Pukhov A.S. Battle of Moonsund. L., 1957. P. 40].

The main defense force of the Irben Strait is 305-mm battery No. 43 at Cape Tserel. But the battery had a limited field of fire, and from long distances it was impossible to inflict serious damage on the enemy with four guns. The battery was very vulnerable to fire from the sea, in particular from Leo Bay.

7. 305-mm gun of battery No. 43 at Cape Tserel.

8. Dislocation of Russian batteries on the Moonsund Islands.

Naval aviation (4 bus stations) consisted of 36 aircraft [Kosinsky A. M. Moonsund operation of the Baltic Fleet of 1917. L., 1928. P. 41].

The second unfavorable circumstance is moral and political. The morale of the islands' garrisons (parts of the 107th and 118th infantry divisions, border guards, sappers - 15 battalions and 5 squadrons) was left imprinted by the general decomposition and decline in discipline in the Russian army (after the revolutionary events of February 1917 and the spring-summer " deepening the revolution"), distrust of officers, interference of committees in all aspects of military operations.

The condition of the fleet personnel was also not the best. There were often cases of non-execution of orders, including combat orders.

Added to all the negative factors was the fact that the people in the units were already tired and demoralized by air raids before the active enemy operation began. So, on September 5, another raid on the Tserel battery led to a fire and explosion of the cellars. Colonel K.V. Loman, Lieutenant Colonel Maklyutin and about 120 other artillerymen and infantrymen were killed.

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As mentioned earlier, the plan for a future war was developed and prepared at the Naval General Staff based on the expected actions of the enemy. The plan was based on a series of defensive measures designed, during the first two weeks from the beginning of the war, to prevent the enemy from advancing deep into the Gulf of Finland east of the Revel - Porkala-Udd line, in order to ensure the completion of the mobilization of the troops of the Guards Corps and the St. Petersburg Military District and to enable ground forces concentrate to repel the landing.

One of the most effective measures of that time was to create a “Central Mine Position” at the specified line and, in the event of an enemy attempt to force it, to conduct the battle with all the naval forces available there. Any deviation from this plan had to be agreed upon by the Conference, chaired by the sovereign himself. The Chief of the Naval General Staff, Rusin, notified the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral von Essen, about this in a telegram dated July 12, 1914.

Explaining the need for preventive laying of mines, Rusin pointed out: “... the laying of the main minefield should be carried out by special order of the sovereign. Now have everything in full readiness and keep a watchful eye on the enemy.” If we look at the statistics of mine laying, we notice the fact that during the entire war the ships of the Baltic Fleet laid 38,932 mines. 69 enemy ships were blown up by mines, including 48 that sank.

Events in the world in the summer of 1914 developed at lightning speed. On July 13, 1914, Admiral Essen again received a telegram from St. Petersburg from Rusin, informing him that this day was being declared the first day of the “preparatory period for war.” From this moment until the very beginning of the war, the Essen headquarters worked in emergency mode to carry out defensive measures. It became absolutely clear that war could break out any day, and until this happened, it was necessary to quickly regroup forces in the Baltic and eliminate existing shortcomings. The commander of the Baltic Fleet was greatly concerned about the Naval General Staff’s delay in making a final decision on the issue of installing mines at the “Central Positions.”

On the other hand, Essen had confidence in Rusyn, who was doing everything possible to ensure that he was allowed to begin mining even before the German fleet was dangerously close to the Russian shores. Accordingly, mines had to be placed before the official announcement of mobilization.

Although this work was familiar to the Baltic Mine Division due to previously conducted training mine laying, it, of course, did not belong to the category of easy ones. As is known, for greater efficiency, mines had to be placed in eight lines with a depth of 4.9 m at mine intervals of 45.7–85.7 m.

On July 15, 1914, his flag captain, Captain 1st Rank Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak, entered Admiral Essen’s cabin and delivered a telegram from Admiral Rusin to the chief: “The Austrians declared war on Serbia and mobilized 8 corps of their army.” After thinking for a minute, von Essen said with alarm: “Now soon”...

The commander of the Baltic Fleet turned out to be right. The next morning, July 16, 1914 (old style), a new telegram arrived at his headquarters: “The Minister of the Navy ordered the disbandment of training detachments. Probably today the mobilization of the fleet of the Kyiv, Odessa, Kazan and Moscow districts will be announced.”

At 14:50 on the same day, von Essen telegraphed to St. Petersburg. “I consider it necessary to erect a barrier now. I'm afraid I'll be late." Another hour later, the radio of the Naval General Staff reported that, according to Russian military agents, the German fleet was heading from Kiel to Danzig. There was no longer any time to delay. After reading this report, Admiral von Essen, addressing his officers, said:

Let me be replaced later, but I will put up a barrier,” and ordered his radio order to be prepared for the fleet. Then he suddenly thought about it and canceled his order. A disciplined military man defeated the ardent patriot in him... After all, the laying of mines should occur only by order of the sovereign. He could not disobey him at such a time. Instead of issuing the appropriate order, von Essen sent one of the flag officers to St. Petersburg, to the Naval General Staff, for an explanation of the current situation, but immediately, after that, he sent a telegram to the Minister of the Navy Grigorovich: “Please inform me about the political situation. If I don’t get an answer tonight, I’ll put up barriers in the morning.”

At one o'clock in the morning, a telegram from the commander of the Baltic Fleet was brought to the Chief of the Naval General Staff. Rusin quickly read it and ordered to urgently call his assistants to him - Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Konstantinovich Pilkin and Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Mikhailovich Altfatter. When both of them appeared on the threshold of Rusin’s office, he immediately announced to them:

We all need to report to the Minister of the Navy. Perhaps he will be able to persuade the sovereign to allow the construction of a minefield. There's not a minute to waste!

Soon the officers arrived at the apartment of the Minister of Naval Affairs, Admiral Ivan Konstantinovich Grigorovich. He got up, got dressed, and went out, but, having learned from those who had arrived about the reason for the night visit, he hesitated, and then firmly refused to disturb the sovereign at such a late hour.

Do you understand, Ivan Aleksandrovich, - said Grigorovich, turning to Rusin, - that laying mines can be considered by the Triple Alliance as a hostile act and an open aggressive action, unjustified by the political situation?

But we have confirmed information about the transfer of the German fleet to Danzig,” Rusin objected to him.

The Minister of the Navy remained adamant. The Chief of the Naval General Staff had no choice but to bow and leave along with his flag officers. Having walked with them along the sleeping street just a few steps, thoughtfully, Rusin said:

There is, perhaps, one more way to draw the sovereign’s attention to the urgency of our request... So, gentlemen, you now go to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and I will go to my place and wait for news from you, so that upon receipt of it I will immediately send a telegram to the commander of the fleet . God knows, perhaps the Grand Duke will not refuse to point out to the sovereign the complexity of the situation, or even take responsibility for ordering the laying of mines. One way or another, he is the commander of the troops of the St. Petersburg Military District!

The admiral returned to headquarters, and Altfatter and Pilkin went to the Grand Duke’s Palace on Petrovskaya Embankment, recently rebuilt by the architect A. S. Khrenov.

The long-absent flag officers brought disappointing news from the palace. Rising from bed, the Grand Duke listened attentively to their report, but also categorically refused to disturb the sovereign and interfere in “naval affairs” himself. After hearing this news, Admiral Rusin thought about it.

Well,” he said after a long pause, “war is undoubtedly on the threshold.” And we will do the following. Go, gentlemen, now to the apartment of General Yanushkevich, because he, as the chief of the ground General Staff, according to the regulations on the field command of troops, with the declaration of war, becomes the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Explain everything to him and get back with an answer as soon as possible.

Pilkin and Altfatter departed, and Rusin, left alone, recalled that it had previously been agreed between him and Essen that upon receipt of the command to lay mines, a telegram with one word would be sent to the commander - “Lightning.” Having received it, von Essen immediately gets down to business, and the minelayers go to sea. No one knows about this word, only the two of them... “This is useful in that case,” he remembered the words of von Essen, “if the enemy penetrates our codes...” Time seemed to drag on incredibly slowly. The Admiral looked at his watch. Four o'clock in the morning. In half an hour, von Essen will send his minelayers out to sea. At all costs, it is necessary to cover up his actions, because for violating the orders of the sovereign emperor, he will not escape removal from office. And the commander of the Baltic Fleet is not only a necessary person in the conditions of an impending war, but in terms of the totality of his qualities and skills, he is practically irreplaceable. Tearing off the form of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Rusin wrote on it in large handwriting: “To the Comflot - urgently. “Lightning”, and called the officer on duty.

Please try to send it urgently. Out of line. And quickly... - and the transmitted text of the telegram rushed to the Essen headquarters.

Meanwhile, the flag officers sent to Yanushkevich had not yet appeared. The minutes of the night dragged on languidly. The very silence of the night was oppressive. But then there was a knock on the door, and the long-awaited messengers appeared on the threshold. Their faces were shining.

Rusin rose from the table with relief.

“I sincerely thank you, gentlemen, and I won’t delay you any longer,” Rusin addressed the flag officers. A stone fell from my soul. The role of the shore is completed. Now it's up to the fleet!

At four o'clock in the morning, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, von Essen, was woken up - at his own request. First of all, he inquired whether the telegram had arrived from the Naval General Staff. The flag radiotelegraph officer responded in the negative. Without hesitating for even a minute, von Essen gave the order to transmit by radio to the head of the minelayer detachment, Rear Admiral Vasily Aleksandrovich Kanin, and the head of the 4th destroyer division, Captain 1st Rank P.V. Viltken, just one conditional word: “Buki.” The Slavic name for the letter “B” in the code of naval signals meant: if the vehicles are stopped, the order is “All of a sudden, weigh anchor” or “Give a move,” and if not, “Big move.” Kanin and Wiltken knew that in this case the order from Buki meant lifting the anchor and leaving the ships to lay mines.

At 4:18 a.m., the radiotelegraph officer again entered the admiral’s cabin, reporting that he had just received from the Chief of the Naval General Staff an urgent radio with a strange code that could not be deciphered.

What a word? - von Essen asked the officer.

“Lightning,” your Excellency,” came the answer; The admiral sighed with relief in response.

Soon von Essen received an official radio telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which read: “I authorize the installation of the main minefield.” Meanwhile, the destroyers and minelayers had been at sea for a long time.

At 6:54 a.m., a telegram signed by von Essen was sent to the naval forces of the Baltic Fleet from the commander’s headquarters: “I am starting to lay the main minefield.” By this time, four minelayers in front line formation had already approached the place where this staging began.

At 6:55 a.m., the first mine rolled down the rails through the open “mine port” into the sea, plopping heavily into the water, raising a column of spray. The minelayer officers stood with stopwatches in their hands, carefully watching the non-stop rotating arrows. At 10:30 a.m. the minelayers laid the last mine. In three and a half hours, two thousand one hundred and twenty-four mines were installed in eight lines! The mine-laying operation was covered by ships cruising on the Pakerort meridian, with destroyers on patrol. At 11:30 am, von Essen gave a radio telegram to the Naval General Staff about the completion of the installation of barriers. The admiral reported that during the operation not a single mine surfaced, and 11 of those delivered exploded.

...A little later that day, at the highest reception, Admiral Grigorovich had the opportunity to report this to the sovereign. The sovereign, even and calm as usual, upon hearing about the mines deployed in the Baltic, changed in a moment. He turned sharply to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who was present at the reception, and asked indignantly:

Did you order this?

The Grand Duke did not have time to open his mouth when the voice of General Yanushkevich was heard:

Your Majesty, it was I who gave this order.

Hearing this, the sovereign again assumed his usual expression and, without any hint of displeasure, almost indifferently said, addressing the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief:

Oh, it’s you... - that’s where the conversation ended.

In the evening, at 20:00, a message was received at von Essen’s headquarters that Germany had declared war on Russia.

...In total, in 1914, 3,440 mines were deployed in the area of ​​the “Central Mine Position” and in the skerries area. In October, after the death of the cruiser Pallada, mines from the engineering department were placed on wires in the Surop Passage. After the German minelayer Deutschland laid mines at von Essen's headquarters on August 4, 1914, it was concluded that the enemy did not have an immediate goal of penetrating deep into the Gulf of Finland and landing troops, as previously assumed. Nevertheless, the commander of the Baltic Fleet ordered the transition to mine-laying operations in the middle and mainly in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. The minefields placed in the southern part of the Baltic Sea turned out to be very effective, because they were located on the most important communication routes of the German fleet and on key fairways.

And already on November 17, 1914, the armored cruiser Friedrich Karl hit two mines near Memel and sank. The Elbing steamer, sent to help him from Memel, also hit a minefield and also sank.

From the beginning of 1915, the Baltic Fleet began laying mines in the northern part of the future “Forward Position” - a new defensive line, in the Dago-Gange region. German cruisers repeatedly approached this area, which created the impression that an offensive operation was being prepared. However, due to a lack of mines at the Forward Position, no more minefields were placed.

In 1915, minefields were installed in the areas of the Gulf of Riga and Moonsund. A completely new line of defense was equipped in 1916.

On January 25, 1915, near Arkona, the German cruiser Augsburg hit one barrier, and the cruiser Gazelle hit another. And although both cruisers were able to be saved, the Gazelle was so damaged that it was declared beyond repair.

In our story about the great mine war against the Germans, we cannot fail to mention the operation on August 27, 1915 to block the Irben Strait, which connects the Gulf of Riga and the Baltic Sea and is located between the Estonian island of Saaremaa and the Latvian mainland coast, called “Irbenka” by sailors.

Its command of the Baltic Fleet was entrusted to four Okhotnik-class destroyers, four destroyers of the 1st Division and the destroyer Novik. Particular importance was attached to ensuring the operation, since the laying of mines was caused by the German offensive in Courland and their occupation of Libau and Vindava.

Under these conditions, the Gulf of Riga acquired the significance of a flank area of ​​the land front of Russian troops. The entrance to this bay was virtually defenseless, and the only means that could at least to some extent delay the penetration of German fleet ships into the Gulf of Riga was the installation of the Irbene barrier.

To achieve this goal, the fleet command allocated the battleships Sevastopol and Gangut, as well as the cruisers Oleg and Bogatyr and 4 destroyers. This operation was the only mine laying in the Irben Strait, for which even battleships were used!

According to the plan of the operation, the simultaneous flooding of steamships and ships in the Gulf of Riga was planned, but due to increased wind this part of the operation was postponed. But the ships completed part of the operation to lay the minefield in full. In total, the destroyers dropped 310 mines into the sea. The operation was successful, and the enemy never appeared here.

Later, the minefield was defended by the battleship Slava, gunboats and destroyers. In the summer of 1916, the German destroyer “149” was blown up at the barrier near Memel.

Based on the effective deployment of minefields, the command of the Baltic Fleet considered it necessary to ask Headquarters for permission to mine the entire Abo-Oland region from the Gange to the coast of Sweden...