Part Three In the Volunteer Army Chapter 1 Moving to Yekaterinodar Having made a decision to send a cart to the Kuban, dad suggested to our neighbor, Professor Filippov, to do it together. They immediately agreed and decided that they had to go all the way to Yekaterinodar, so that

Gogol to P.A. Pletnev, between November 19 (December 1) and December 2 (14), 1844 Between November 19 (December 1) and December 2 (14), 1844 Frankfurt Your letter I received. Thank you for your sincerity, reproaches and opinions about me. I will not make excuses, I have already said this in advance, and it is impossible. First of all,

Part three OPERATION "BEAR"

The 29th Army's offensive on Rzhev January 8–23, 1942 At the beginning of 1942, the Red Army command, inspired by the tremendous success of the counteroffensive near Moscow, planned to complete the defeat of Army Group Center in the western direction. A large-scale

Rzhev-Sychevsk strategic offensive operation or operation Mars (November 25 - December 20, 1942) - military operations of the Kalininsky (commander - Colonel General M.A.Purkaev) and Western (commander - Colonel General I.S.Konev) fronts in order to defeat the German 9th Army (commander - Colonel-General V. Model, headquarters-Sychevka) Army Group "Center", defended in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. The operation was led by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov.

Parties plans

The idea of \u200b\u200bthe Soviet operation "Mars" arose at the end of September 1942 as a continuation of the first Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30 - September 30) and consisted in defeating the 9th German army, which formed the basis of the Army Group Center, in the Rzhev region , Sychevka, Olenino, Bely. This was planned to be achieved through several simultaneous breakthroughs in those sectors of the front where no major offensives had been carried out before: between the Osuga and Gzhat rivers by the forces of the 20th armies, in the Molody Tud area - by the forces of the 39th army, in the valley of the Luchesa river - by the forces of 22 Army, south of the city of Bely - by forces of the 41st Army. In the last three sectors, the density of the German defense was 20-40 km per infantry division, which made it quite easy to overcome. In the sector of the 20th Army, the defense was much denser - 2 divisions (including 1 tank) on a 15 km front. If the first stage was successful, the 5th and 33rd armies were to be connected to the operation (they were opposed by the 3rd TA of the Germans) in the direction of Gzhatsk, Vyazma.

Subsequently, after the failure of the first stage, the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commander of the Western and Kalinin Fronts No. 170700 of December 8, 1942 set the following tasks for the development of the offensive:

That is, it was supposed to reach the line on which, in September 1941, the armies of the Reserve Front were stationed in the rear of the Western Front.

At the same time, another operation was being prepared on the right wing of the Kalinin Front - the offensive of the 3rd Shock Army on Velikiye Luki and Nevel in order to cut the Leningrad-Vitebsk railway in the Novosokolniki area (see Velikie Luki operation).

According to some sources, information about the operation was partially disclosed to the leadership of the Wehrmacht as part of the strategic radio game "Monastery" in order to divert significant forces from Stalingrad, where at the same time the operation to encircle the 6th Army General F. Paulus began).

The continuation of Operation Mars was supposed to be the offensive operation Jupiter, planned by the Soviet command, during which it was planned, upon reaching the goals of Mars, to defeat the central part of the German Army Group Center in the Vyazma region.

The operation was not carried out due to the fact that Operation Mars, which ended in failure, did not achieve its goals, so that the matter did not reach Jupiter.

Forces of the parties

the USSR

In November 1942, the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, as well as the Moscow defense zone, consisted of 156 calculated divisions - 1.89 million people, 24,682 machine guns and mortars, 3,375 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,170 aircraft.

They were opposed by almost all the troops of Army Group Center (except for five divisions on its extreme right flank), and 2 divisions of Army Group North (93rd and 218th Infantry Divisions) - 72 divisions in total (excluding 9 security and field training in the rear), of which 10 are tank and 6 motorized, in which there were about 600 combat-ready tanks and 150-200 assault guns.

Only two Soviet fronts engaged seven armies out of seventeen in the offensive: the 41st, 22nd, 39th, 30th, 31st, 20th and 29th.

At the first stage of the operation, forces equal in size to 33.5 Soviet divisions participated in the directions of the main strikes. There were 7-8 Germans in the first line against them. To support the first stage of the operation, four mobile corps were involved: 1st and 3rd mechanized, 6th tank and 2nd guards cavalry; in the future, the 5th Panzer Corps (as part of the 33rd Army) was to join.

The 5th and 33rd armies did not conduct offensive operations at the end of November and December 1942, but on November 19 they received a directive from the headquarters of the Western Front to destroy the enemy's Gzhat grouping. On November 25, the 5th and 33rd armies were assigned the date of the transition to the offensive - December 1. The planned offensive of these two armies did not take place only as a result of the failure of the first stage of the operation.

At the same time, the calculations excluded the troops of the right wing of the Kalinin Front, which participated in the encirclement of Velikiye Luki, which can be considered as carrying out a private operation within the framework of the general offensive of the Western and Kalinin Fronts.

Third Reich

72 divisions of Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal G. von Kluge), together with reserves, had about 1.68 million men and up to 3,500 tanks.

The 9th Army of Colonel General V. Model, which took the main blow of the Soviet troops, had in its composition:

• 6th Army Corps (2nd Airfield, 7th Airborne and 197th Infantry Divisions).
• 41st Panzer Corps (330th and 205th Infantry Divisions, Regiment of 328th Infantry Division).
• 23rd Army Corps (246th, 86th, 110th, 253rd and 206th Infantry Divisions, Regiment of 87th Infantry Division and Regiment of 10th Motorized Division).
• 27th Army Corps (95, 72, 256, 129, 6th and 251st Infantry Divisions, two regiments of the 87th Infantry Division).
• 39th Panzer Corps (337, 102nd and 78th Infantry, 5th Panzer Division).

In addition, the 9th Army headquarters subordinated two motorized divisions (14th and "Great Germany"), 1st and 9th tank divisions, a tank battalion of the 11th tank division (37 tanks) and the 1st cavalry division.

At the base of the salient were the reserves of Army Group Center - 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, which in a critical situation could be quickly transferred to the threatened direction.

Operations by the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts began on November 25, 1942, in three directions at once.

Two armies of the Western Front (20th Major General N.I. Kiryukhin and 31st Major General V.S. Polenov) attacked the eastern face of the Rzhevsky ledge south of Zubtsov, on a 40-kilometer stretch along the Vazuz and Osuga rivers (in the German 39th Panzer Corps, General of Panzer Forces Hans-Jürgen von Arnim). The offensive of the 31st Army immediately stalled, but the 20th Army, supported by the 6th Panzer Army (commander-in-chief, Colonel P.M. Arman) and the 2nd Guards Cavalry (commanded by Major General V.V. Kryukov) corps, continued to conduct offensive operations.

At the same time, the 22nd Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.A.Yushkevich) and the 41st Army (commanded by Major General G.F. Tarasov) of the Kalinin Front delivered a counterstrike from the western face of the ledge. The 41st Army, supported by the 1st Mechanized Corps of Major General M.D. Solomatin, attacked in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Bely in the zone of the German 41st Panzer Corps, General of Panzer Forces J. Harpe.

The Soviet 22nd Army advanced in the Luchesa Valley with the support of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, Major General M.E. Katukov.

The 39th Army of the Kalinin Front (commanded by Major General A.I. Zygin), delivering an auxiliary blow, crossed the Molodoy Tud River in the zone of the German 23rd Corps (commanded by General K. Gilpert) and occupied Urd.

German counterstrikes

German troops managed to stop the Soviet offensive. North of Sychevka on November 29 - December 5, the troops of the 20th Army, the 6th Panzer Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were defeated.

Part of the troops of the Soviet 41st Army of the Kalinin Front, which attacked in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Bely, ended up in the "cauldron", in the creation of which the transferred units of the German 30th Army Corps of General M. Fretter-Pico took part. By December 8, they were completely surrounded and later managed to escape from the ring, only losing almost all of their equipment.

The 22nd and 39th armies also could not break out into the operational space, they were counterattacked and stopped.

On December 8, GK Zhukov succeeded in resuming Operation Mars, and on December 11, a new offensive by Soviet troops began.

However, a new blow from the 20th Army, now headed by Lieutenant General M.S.Khozin and receiving support from the 5th Panzer Corps (Major General K.A. Semenchenko), as well as the recreated 6th Panzer Corps (headed by Colonel I.I. Yushchuk), again ended in failure.

The 39th Army of A.I. Zygin and the 30th Army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, which were fighting in the previously secondary sectors, resumed their offensive north of Rzhev, but their attacks were drowned.

The new blow of the 22nd army of V.A.Yushkevich ended in failure (it was soon replaced by Major General M.D.Seleznev).

December 20, when GK Zhukov made the decision to stop the Soviet attacks, is considered the end of Operation Mars.

Echo operations included the attempts of the Germans to eliminate the breakthrough of the 22nd Army in the Luchesa Valley on the 23rd, 30th and 31st December 1942, which were unsuccessful (on January 1, 1943, the commander of the German 9th Army V. Model ordered an end to the attacks).

The elimination of the Soviet troops, which were surrounded in the areas of breakthroughs, continued until the end of December.

Operation results

The offensive of the Western and Kalinin Fronts failed. Territorial acquisitions were very modest (breakthroughs in the Luchesa valley and northwest of Rzhev).

At the same time, the depletion of the 9th Army of Army Group Center was of great importance. The battle swallowed up all the reserves of the Army Group, which could have been used to release the encircled 6th Army of F. Paulus in the Stalingrad area.

MA Gareev expresses the opinion that since the operations "Mars" and "Uranus" were carried out within the framework of a single strategic plan and the main strategic task in the operation "Mars" was to divert enemy forces to ensure the success of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, then " there is no compelling reason to consider Operation Mars a failure or “the biggest defeat of Marshal Zhukov,” as D. Glantz and other authors write about it". Moreover, Gareev cites information that the Soviet high command deliberately "leaked" information about the preparation of an offensive near Rzhev in order to divert the enemy's attention from the main directions of attacks. Pavel Sudoplatov also claims that the Germans were specially warned about the offensive near Rzhev in the framework of the radio game "Monastery" and were waiting for the offensive of the unsuspecting Zhukov.

Disinformation has sometimes been of strategic importance. So, on November 4, 1942, "Heine" - "Max" reported that the Red Army would strike the Germans on November 15 not near Stalingrad, but in the North Caucasus and near Rzhev. The Germans were waiting for a blow near Rzhev and repelled it. But the encirclement of Paulus' group at Stalingrad was a complete surprise for them.

The argumentation of the opponents of this point of view is based, among other things, on the fact that more forces were involved in Operation Mars than in Operation Uranus.

Unaware of this radio game, Zhukov paid a dear price - in the offensive near Rzhev, thousands and thousands of our soldiers who were under his command died. In his memoirs, he admits that the outcome of this offensive operation was unsatisfactory. But he never found out that the Germans had been warned about our offensive in the Rzhev direction, so they threw so many troops there.

A. V. Isaev points out that in addition to influencing events in other sectors of the Soviet-German front in November-December 1942, Operation Mars influenced the course of the 1943 campaign. In the winter of 1943, V. Model's 9th Army left the Rzhevsky ledge (Operation Buffalo, German Buffel).

Troops of the 9th German Army filled the front of the newly formed Oryol salient, the southern side of which was also the northern side of the Kursk Bulge. According to the German plans for the summer campaign of 1943, the 9th Army was supposed to attack Kursk from the north, towards the troops of the 4th Panzer Army of G. Gotha. However, the losses suffered by the divisions of the 9th Army during the second Rzhev-Sychev battle were not replenished by the spring - summer of 1943.

Moreover, the state of the 9th Army forced V. Model, whose authority, after repelling several major offensives near Rzhev in the summer and autumn of 1942, rose sharply in the eyes of the Fuehrer, to insist on postponing Operation Citadel for two months. But even then, the troops of the 9th Army were not able to fully recover. This was one of the reasons why the offensive on the northern side of the Kursk Bulge quickly fizzled out.

Losses

According to official Soviet data, the irrecoverable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 70,373 people, sanitary losses - 145,301 (a total of 215,674 people, or 8295 people per day).

The losses of the 9th German Army in October - December 1942 amounted to 53,500 people, of which up to 80% (that is, 40 - 45 thousand people) - in Operation Mars.

The second Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation is one of the bloodiest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, but it was it that brought success to the Battle of Stalingrad.

Fierce battles along the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge lasted 14 months. During this time, according to preliminary estimates, more than a million Soviet soldiers died. Many historians avoid the term "Battle of Rzhev", since it is difficult to call it a battle, it is rather a collection of separate operations, the intervals between which were several months.

The Rzhev-Vyazemskaya strategic offensive operation was carried out from January 8 to April 20, 1942, in development of the successful Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. The story goes that it was Stalin's personal order. He believed that the success of the defense of Moscow should be developed by an attack in order to defeat the enemy, Marshals Zhukov and Konev were against it - they understood that the soldiers were exhausted by the December battles, they needed rest. But the Supreme Commander insisted on his own.

The operation was carried out in difficult weather conditions with relative equality of the sides. However, the Germans had some superiority in artillery and tanks. To prevent defeat, the Nazis pulled up forces from Western Europe.

The Rzhev-Sychevsk operation was supposed to eliminate the Rzhev salient, the closest deployment of the Third Reich troops to Moscow. In the summer, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's main line of defense. In response, the German command transferred reserves to the front. A battle with a superior enemy exhausted the offensive forces of the Red Army.

In November 1942, the military leadership of the USSR made an attempt to re-attack Rzhev and Sychevka. The operation was called Mars. The troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts managed to break through the enemy's defenses, but failed to gain a foothold in enemy territory. The Red Army suffered heavy losses and retreated to its original lines. Operation Uranus was launched in Stalingrad almost simultaneously with Mars. Many historians believe that the success of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad was due to the fact that the German troops, which were supposed to go to the city on the Volga, could not break through Rzhev. Operation Mars claimed the lives of more than 100,000 people.

As a result of the Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation, which was carried out in March 1943, the front line was moved 160 kilometers away from Moscow.

The term “Rzhevskaya meat grinder” has become popular among the people. He cruelly, but very accurately embodies the events taking place.

“In the course of the battles of Rzhev, many“ valleys of death ”and“ groves of death ”appeared. It is difficult for anyone who has not been there to imagine what a stinking mess under the summer sun is, consisting of thousands of human bodies covered with worms. Summer, heat, calm, and ahead - this is the "valley of death". It is clearly visible and shot by the Germans. There is no way to pass or bypass it: a telephone cable is laid along it - it is interrupted, and it must be quickly connected by all means ”, - recalled the participant of the battle Pyotr Mikhin in his memoirs “Gunners, Stalin gave the order! We died to win. "

Those bloody events are deeply rooted in the memory of the participants in the Battle of Rzhev. Among them was Vyacheslav Kondratyev. For many years he was tormented by memories of the war, and he decided to write about it - this is how the story "Sashka" was born. The prototype of the protagonist was the soldier Alexander Kapustin, who at the age of 17 received the medal "For Courage". Another real participant in the war, Yevgeny Ilyich Prigozhin, became the prototype for company commander Yevgeny Prigozhin from the story "Atone for with Blood."

The protagonist of Alexander Tvardovsky's poem "I was killed near Rzhev" also had a real prototype. The history of its creation deserves attention. The soldier Brosalov's mother received a funeral. It said that her son was killed on September 25, 1942 and buried on the eastern outskirts of the village of Bershevo, Kalinin region. But, as it turned out later, fate decreed otherwise. The soldier turned out to be alive, he was wounded on the battlefield, and he lay covered with clay for two days. The soldier was found and sent to the Moscow hospital named after Burdenko. This story was told to Tvardovsky by the mother of the "revived" soldier, and then the poet promised to write a poem about Rzhev, especially since he himself was at the front as a war correspondent.

Approved project of the Memorial to the Unknown Soldier near Rzhev.

It was the first line of Tvardovsky's poem that it was decided to name the Memorial to the Unknown Soldier near Rzhev. The creation of the monument was initiated by a group of veterans of the Great Patriotic War. Their aspiration was supported by the Ministry of Culture of Russia and the Russian Military Historical Society. Of the 19 finalist projects, the work of Andrey Korobtsov from Belgorod was recognized as the best. The monument should appear in 2020, and a memorial stone at the site of the future monument will be laid in the near future.

Due to failures in the south in the spring and early summer of 1942, the Soviet command had to abandon a major offensive operation in the central sector of the front. But since the preparatory measures had already been carried out, the forces of the two central fronts carried out an offensive operation with the aim of pinning down the enemy's forces in the central sector, preventing him from transferring reserves to the south. This operation was also supposed to prevent the offensive of the forces of Army Group Center in the Toropets and Sukhinichesky axes, which were already mentioned above. Specifically, in the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 16, the task was set to cut off the upper, northeastern corner of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, "to seize the cities of Rzhev and Zubtsov, to go out and firmly gain a foothold on the Volga and Vazuz rivers, providing tete-de-pones in the Rzhev region and Zubtsov. " It was supposed to capture Rzhev in the first two days of the offensive.According to D. Glantz, in parallel, in August 1942 near Zhizdra, an offensive was carried out by forces of the 16th, 61st and the newly created 3rd Tank Army, but it was "forgotten" by Russian historiography .62

In the historical literature, the operation was called the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, its chronological framework was determined from July 30 to August 23, 1942 (Scheme No. 14). Four armies were involved in the operation: the 30th and 29th armies of the KF (commander - colonel general), 31st and 20th armies of the ZF (commander - general of the army). They were supported by the 3rd (KF) and 1st (ZF) air armies. The ZF played the main role. Three days after the start of the operation, it was planned to connect the 5th, and then 33rd armies of the ZF. 63 According to the definitions of military science, an operation carried out in a strategic direction by forces of 2-3 fronts can be classified as strategic (see Chapter 1). The beginning of the operation was planned for the KF on July 28, for the ZF - on July 31.

Before the offensive, the 20th, 30th, 31st armies received a total of sixteen rifle divisions from the reserves of the Headquarters and from other sectors of the front, fourteen tank brigades, a rifle corps, sapper, artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft, and other units. Great superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment was achieved. According to official Soviet data, more than a twofold superiority over the enemy in men, artillery and tanks was achieved in the offensive zones of the shock groupings of the Western and Kalinin Fronts. So, only in the zone of the 31st army of the ZF the superiority over the enemy in manpower was 3: 1, in artillery 2.3: 1. There was almost threefold superiority in terms of “active fighters” in the breakthrough sector and in the 30th Army of the KF, although in tanks the superiority was only double. In the areas of the breakthrough, in particular at the KF, a significant density of fire was achieved: up to 115-140 barrels per one kilometer of the front. 64

The literature notes a successful set of measures to achieve surprise in the preparation of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation. However, in the last decade, allegations have appeared that a German agent who worked in the secretariat of the GKO (GKO?) Informed the German command about the impending operation at the KF. But information about this operation came to the command of the Wehrmacht from various sources. So, in F. Halder's diary it was written: June 10 - “... On the front of the 9th Army, obviously, the enemy is dispersed in front of the northern sector of the front. Apparently, the Russians are pulling together new forces in the Staritsa area ", June 11 -" ... In front of the northern sector of the 9th Army, the situation is unclear (movement on the railways: apparently, an accumulation of tanks). In front of its northeastern sector of the front, the position is unclear (strengthening of the artillery grouping) ", July 26 -" The regrouping of the enemy, including in front of the front of the 9th Army, suggests that new attacks are being prepared. " 65 In any event, the Soviet offensive in the central sector of the front was not a surprise to the German forces.

On July 30, with a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the KF began the offensive. The commander of the front artillery, Colonel-General, recalled: “The power of the fire strike was so great that the German artillery, after some hesitant attempts to respond with fire, fell silent. The first two positions of the enemy's main line of defense were destroyed, the troops that occupied them were almost completely destroyed. " By the end of the day, the German defense was broken through by units of the 30th Army at a front of 9 km and to a depth of 6-7 km, my army was unable to break through the German defenses.

On the morning of July 30, heavy rains began, which poured for several weeks. The roads were messed up, small rivers, of which there are many in these places, turned into wide and stormy rivers. He conveyed the impressions of those days: “Those who attacked then in the lowlands and swamps near Rzhev will hardly forget these days. Water pours down in streams from above, instantly filling freshly dug trenches ... Legs bogged down in the black liquid mess so firmly that it intercepts tarpaulin boots like ticks ... The mud was our main enemy ... ”67 Under these conditions, units of the 30th Army were drawn into in fierce battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Polunino north of Rzhev and the offensive halted.

The offensive of the ZF due to muddy roads began only on August 4 (Scheme No. 15). As a result, the gap between the beginning of the operation of the two fronts increased to five days. As in the KF, the offensive of the ZF began with a powerful artillery preparation, as a result of which more than 80% of the enemy's firepower was disabled. On both sides of the village of Pogoreloe Gorodische, the German defense was broken through and mobile army groups rushed into the breakthroughs - the 31st to Zubtsov, the 20th to Sychevka. By the evening of August 6, the breakthrough was expanded to 30 km along the front and 25 km in depth. The troops reached the approaches to the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers. 68

Paying tribute to the heroism and dedication of Soviet soldiers, it is worth recalling here the measures taken to carry out the famous Order No. 000. In the order of the ZF troops from 01.01.01, the front command was ordered to begin the formation of barrage detachments and penal companies. Later in his report on the operation he wrote: “To prevent the lag of individual units and to fight cowards and alarmists, each separate attacking battalion of the first echelon was followed on a tank by commanders specially appointed by the Military Councils of the armies. As a result of all the measures taken, the forces of the 31st and 20th armies successfully broke through the enemy's defenses. " 69

To this we can add the appearance of the Supreme Command Headquarters directive based on the results of the actions of the aviation of the two fronts in the first four to five days of the operation. Of the 400 fighters allocated for the operation, “in the complete absence of enemy aircraft on the first day of the battle and with triple superiority over the enemy in the following days,” 140 aircraft were out of order: 51 fighters - combat losses, 89 - for technical reasons. The headquarters saw here "the presence of obvious sabotage, selfishness on the part of some part of the flight personnel, which ... seeks to evade the battle." It was proposed to create penalty squadrons and penalty infantry companies from such flight personnel. 70

The success of the operation can be attributed to the refusal of the command of the central German army group to conduct operations on Kirov and Sukhinichi in the originally planned version, 77 as well as the liberation of a significant territory of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions. The operation is considered incomplete, since Rzhev again failed to free, and the Rzhev ledge - to liquidate. considered the reason for this lack of strength and resources. In his memoirs, he wrote: "If we had one or two armies at our disposal, it would be possible, in cooperation with the Kalinin Front ... not only to defeat the Rzhev grouping, but the entire Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of German troops ..." 78 Here he is disingenuous : it was already mentioned above about the superiority of the Soviet troops and means for the beginning of the operation, in addition, since August 5, General Zhukov himself commanded all operations in the Rzhev area, and therefore the troops of the KF. It is difficult to agree with this opinion. Here, rather, one can see the methods of G.K Zhukov's combat operations: head-on to the enemy with massive forces.

The reasons for the failures of the Soviet troops must be sought in the inept use of these forces and means, although, of course, climatic conditions played a role in the failures. It has already been said how, for example, mobile groups at the Polar Division were ill-conceived and what this led to. Later, following the results of the operation, the General Staff recommended to the Chief of Staff of the Polar Division "... to report to the front commander about the inexpediency of using improvised tank groups in the future." 79

Another reason for the ineffective leadership of the troops was the inability or unwillingness of the commanders of the highest and middle level to apply maneuver, bypass, flexibility in managing their units, to take responsibility, blindly following orders from above. Units led by such commanders beat at one point for weeks and months, losing people and not achieving success. Proof of this can be found in the battles for the village of Polunino, when units of the advancing division here tried to take it, attacking from the north, for almost ten days. When a new divisional commander was appointed, who personally studied other ways of approaching the village, she was liberated in a fierce, but only two-hour battle, attacking from the south and from the north. Later, at a meeting with the front commander, they tried to criticize this divisional commander for the misuse of tanks. The neighboring division stormed the village of Galakhovo south of Polunino from 5 to 26 August daily... 80 As a result, the remains of Bole-Soviet soldiers lie in a mass grave in the village of Polunino, and a man lies on Moskovskaya Gora in the town of Zubtsovo.

Indeed, the total losses of our troops were very large: the KF and ZF lost 193,683 people in the operation. The losses of the 30th Army were especially significant: from 30.7 to 2 people, in total in August - 82,441 people (according to other sources - 83,075 people), of which 19096 people were killed. This is despite the fact that by the beginning of the operation, together with various service services, the 30th Army numbered people, and in twenty days in August it received another 11333 people. The 30th Army also lost 251 tanks in August. 81

Participants in the battles near Rzhev recalled the terrible pictures of those August days. Former commander of a mortar platoon of the 114th separate infantry battalion: “... I had to go through the whole war, but I never saw so many of our killed soldiers. The whole clearing (4 km deep and 6 km wide) was strewn with the corpses of those killed ... ”Writer A. Tsvetkov wrote in his front notes that when their tank brigade was transferred to the area of \u200b\u200bDeshevki village (north of Rzhev and Polunino village), then getting out of the cars and looking around, the tankers were horrified: the whole area was covered with the corpses of soldiers. There were so many corpses that it was as if someone had cut them down and brought them here like grass. “Our sappers got the most of all. The platoon commander Tarakanov, sighing heavily, says: “Thousands of them here, corpses ... They fought without mercy, to the death. It looks like it came to hand-to-hand combat ... A terrible picture, I never made it like this when I was born ... ”82

So, the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, according to Russian historiography, ended on August 23: "by August 23, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet troops were exhausted and they went on the defensive," "at the end of August 1942, after the completion of the offensive of our troops on the Rzhev-Sychev direction ... the opposing sides did not conduct active hostilities ”. 83 These statements are not true. Until the beginning of October around Rzhev and west of Zubtsov, fierce battles continued with active offensive operations by Soviet troops. In the reports of all the armies participating in the operation, this operation is dated August-September 1942. German sources attribute the end of the summer battle for Rzhev to mid-October. 84

Part of the troops from the KF and ZF were certainly transferred to the south, but the armies participating in the operation did not go over to the defensive, but continued the offensive with no less force than until August 23. The documents of the armies did not reveal orders to go over to the defensive.

On the KF, after regrouping, already at 5.30 am on September 24, after artillery preparation and an air strike, units of the 30th armies were resumed to the north and east of Rzhev, and units of the 29th armies to the south. In the "Journal of Combat Operations of the KF for August 1942" on August 23, it was written: "Commander 30 decided to go on the offensive ... with the task, in cooperation with the 29th Army, to destroy the enemy's Rzhev grouping and capture Rzhev." General H. Grossmann, the commander of the 6th Infantry Division, which defended Rzhev, wrote: "While the Eastern Front reached the Caucasus in the south and the German military flag was fluttering on Elbrus, August 24 was the day of a big battle at Rzhev." 85

At the ZF of the 31st Army, on August 22, it was ordered to prepare for the offensive. All regimental commanders were warned that “they are responsible for the success of the offensive,” which will begin after the artillery preparation at 5.45 am on 24 September. The 20th Army also continued the offensive. 86

F. Halder wrote on that day in his diary: “Serious blows on the positions ... of the 9th Army, where in some areas a slight withdrawal of our troops was again noted. Despite the arrival of the 72nd Division, the situation remains tense. In the western sector, an offensive in the Beloye area was reflected. " 87

On August 25-26, units of the 30th Army reached the Volga 5-6 km west of Rzhev, on August 29 they crossed the Volga and created a bridgehead on its right bank. All these days, the artillery of the KF fired at, and the aviation bombed Rzhev. H. Grossmann writes: “Day after day the struggle for Rzhev ... After four weeks it is no longer possible to recognize a single house or street. As in the First World War on the Somme, the crater landscape emerged on the site of the city. ” On August 30, F. Halder wrote: “The 9th Army has a new aggravation of the situation in the Zubtsov area and north of Rzhev. It is allowed to use the “Great Germany” division. 88

Due to the fact that he was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, on August 26, Colonel-General was appointed as the commander of the ZF, and Colonel-General was appointed for the CF.

In the combat orders of the 30th Army for the end of August and the beginning of September, the phrases “30 A continues to develop their success in capturing the city of Rzhev” constantly appear. But there is no success: the city cannot be taken. By the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of 01.01.01, “in order to quickly defeat the enemy's Rzhev grouping, capture the city of Rzhev and ease the control of troops,” the 29th and 30th armies of the KF are transferred to the ZF. 89

In the report of the new commander of the ZF troops to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on September 5, it is said that during the offensive, “the infantry was exhausted, there were few shells ... It is advisable to temporarily suspend the operation, accumulate shells, put the troops in order, repair tanks and aircraft and reorganize the strike 29- 1st and 31st armies from the southeast and 30th army from the northwest. Close the ring south of Rzhev ”. The ZF commander asks to reinforce the front “by the beginning of the Rzhev operation” with aviation, to allocate M-30 and M-20 RS for the 30th and 31st armies and replenishment. It is proposed to suspend the Gzhatsk operation until the end of the operation to capture Rzhev. 90

On September 9, units of the 30th Army, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation at 7:00, again "went over to the assault on Rzhev." On September 14, “after the artillery attack, army units went on the offensive ... By 16.30, having burst into a brick [industrial] factory, they seized the first line of the trench ... which is northeast of Rzhev”. 29th Army “at dawn on 8.9.42. in cooperation with 31 A goes on a decisive offensive ... with the task of seizing the southern part of the city of Rzhev. " On the same days, the 31st army carried out decisive attacks in order to subsequently, together with the 30th army, surround Rzhev from the south. At the beginning of September, the 20th Army tried to break through the enemy's front, strike "bypassing Gzhatsk from the north-west and west", so that "in the future, in cooperation with 5 and 33 A, by a mobile group attack on Gzhatsk from the west, destroy the enemy's Gzhatsk grouping." ... 91

Throughout September, the listed armies are now the ZF fought fierce battles. From the letters of the colonel, the commander of a tank brigade: September 4 - “Here on the Western Front, beating off the bogs from the Nazis, we are fighting for Stalingrad, for Baku oil, for the security of Moscow and the conquest of Berlin ... Since August 4, my brigade has been continuously in battles may still fight ”, September 23 -“ I have been in continuous battles for many days ”, October 14 -“ ... And in the days of the so-called temporary lull, I fought the most difficult battles that I ever had to fight ”. A German military doctor from the 161st Infantry Division, which fought in the Zubtsov area, in several letters home with horror recalled September 9, when Russian troops (31st Army) had been advancing all day - from early morning until late evening. F. Halder writes on September 24 about the landing of a Russian landing of 300-400 paratroopers in the area southwest of Sychevka with the aim of organizing a major sabotage against the Vyazma-Sychevka railway. It is interesting that this record is almost completely true: on the night of September 23 and 24, on the “route of the enemy's supply in the Rzhev, Bely, Yartsevo, Vyazma, Gzhatsk, Sychek area ...” three partisan detachments and six sabotage groups with a total number of 240 people "with the aim of" providing assistance to the Red Army units operating against the enemy's Rzhev grouping. " 92

On September 21, after artillery preparation at 10.00, a new assault on Rzhev by units of the 30th Army began. At the same time, ten city blocks were occupied (scheme No. 16). Fierce street fighting broke out. They went for every block, for every house. On September 24-25, German troops attempted to counter-attack the Soviet units from the city blocks. Due to the intensity of the fighting, these days were especially remembered by our and German soldiers. “On September 25, the Germans launched a counteroffensive ... On this day, an extremely fierce battle unfolded on both sides, I did not see such battles until the end of the war even on such directions as Orsha, Smolensk, Minsk and East Prussia,” recalled from the 215th Rifle Division 30- th army. “On September 24, the protracted struggle in the northeastern outskirts of Rzhev reached a new critical point ... Of all the days of the struggle for Rzhev, this one was the most severe. He demanded huge losses of people, especially officers and non-commissioned officers and weapons. But the enemy losses were even greater ... The fighting impulse of the enemy was amazing that day ... The military units operating in the place of the breakthrough lost their strength and were so drained of blood that the division was ordered to change ... "- recalled the veteran of the German 6- th pd. 93

In terms of intensity, ferocity, methods of conduct, and losses, the August-September battles in the Rzhev region were compared to the battles in Stalingrad by the newspapers of both sides in those days. I. Ehrenburg, who was in Rzhev in September, wrote later in his memoirs, using front-line reports: “I did not manage to visit Stalingrad ... But I will not forget Rzhev. Maybe there were offensives that cost more human lives, but it seems that there was no other, so sad - battles went on for weeks for five or six broken trees, for the wall of a broken house and a tiny hillock ... Ours occupied the airfield, and the military town was in the hands of the Germans ... In the headquarters there were maps with squares of the city, but sometimes there was no trace of the streets ... Several times I heard German songs, individual words - the enemies were swarming in the same trenches ... "German war correspondent Yu. Schuddekopf In October, in his article “Zasov Rzhev,” he wrote: “The German offensive in the East of the Volga reached two places: at the walls of Stalingrad and at Rzhev ... What is unfolding at Stalingrad ... has been happening on a smaller scale at Rzhev for almost a year. Almost a day a year ago, German troops reached the Volga for the first time ... Since then, three big battles have been fought for a piece of land in the upper reaches of the Volga - and the fourth, the most fierce, has been going on for more than two months. " 94

It should be noted that units of the 39th Army of the KF were also offensive. So, at the end of September, they completely cleared the northern bank of the river. Volga from parts of the German 87th Infantry Division. Interestingly, the Supreme Command Headquarters, approving the plan of this operation on September 19, proposed to call it in the correspondence “Venus”. 95 The period of fascination with the names of the planets has begun!

In late September - early October, the German command repeated the counterattacks, but the Germans failed to return the northeastern quarters of Rzhev.

By the beginning of October, the fighting dies down, the Soviet armies go on the defensive: 31st - 16 September, 29th - 25 September, 30th - 1 October. In the ZF Combat Log for September 1942, when summing up the results of the month, it was written that the main forces of the front fought “stubborn and protracted battles for a month” for Rzhev, and also that all the armies of the front went on the defensive. Thus, the end of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation should be dated not August 23, but the end of September 1942, which means that the front losses in the operation, taken into account only on August 23, will be greater. 96

Having started as a strategic one, the operation ended as a front-line one. Its ultimate goal was again not achieved: Rzhev, Sychevka remained with the Germans. Success is minimal: part of the territory of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions was liberated, including the town of Zubtsov, the settlement of Karmanovo, and the northeastern quarters of Rzhev.

The report of the German 9th Field Army on the results of the summer battle for Rzhev ended with the words: “The front of the German army stands firmly on its cornerstones - Rzhev and Sychevka. "Rzhevsky warrior" has become a concept at the front and at home. More than 2000 tanks, more than 600 aircraft and almost 1/4 million killed were lost by the enemy. " 97

The Germans do not provide specific figures for their losses in this operation, although sometimes intermediate data are found. So, in the appendices to H. Grossmann's book on the history of the 6th Infantry Division, it is indicated that the division lost 3294 men on August 1-22. The book on the history of the 18th Grenadier Regiment of this division says that in the August-September battles in the Rzhev region, the regiment lost all the veterans who came to Russia in 1941. At times it came to the point that even “construction duties that worked ... in the East ”, which was not until the summer of 1942 on the fronts of the Second World War. The Germans explained this by "the special conditions of the war in Russia." 98

The losses of the Soviet troops were enormous. Thus, the losses of only the 30th army of the KF in August and September were 99,820 people. Combat losses of 4 armies in September - more than 50 thousand people. Together with the officially named losses in the operation - 193,683 people. and the losses of the 30th and 29th armies in 7 days of August - more than 250 thousand people. (losses for 7 days of August of the 20th and 31st armies are not taken into account). 99

The reasons for these losses have already been discussed above. Here you can add the views of the direct participants in those battles. So, veteran of the 52nd Rifle Division of the 30th Army Kh. A Shakirzhanov: “Why did we get every step near Rzhev at the cost of a lot of blood? Is it because we fought badly? No and no, we had a high morale, but we lacked a lot: weapons, ammunition, and experience. Affected by the lack of qualified officer personnel, the illiterate solution of a number of tactical issues near Rzhev by the high command. Who was the main commander at the beginning of the war? They are directors of schools, enterprises and factories. " , svzzist from the 215th Rifle Division of the 30th Army believes that “the choice of the offensive site - Rzhev - is the most unfortunate one on the entire Kaliniinsky front. An attack on the city across the Volga, on its high bank ..., and even with the technical means that we had during the offensive, could not have any chance of success and led to unnecessary losses ... Isn't our high command found a better place to attack ...? " 100

These battles did not bring great success to the Soviet troops, but they diverted significant German forces, did not allow the German command to transfer them to the south. In addition, according to G.K Zhukov, “the active actions of our troops in the summer and autumn of 1942 in the western direction against the German Army Group Center, according to the calculations of the Headquarters, should have disorientated the enemy, create the impression that it was here, and not somewhere else we are preparing a winter operation. ” 101

In fact, already in September-October, the Soviet command was developing a new offensive operation in the region of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, codenamed “Mars”.

In mid-November 1942, according to the traditional periodization, the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 and the first period of the Great Patriotic War ended. This was the period when the Red Army conducted mainly defensive actions. At the same time, in the central strategic direction, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Rzhev-Skovyazemsky ledge, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts in 1942 carried out a number of large offensive operations, albeit incomplete. From July 1942, hostilities in the center unfolded in parallel with the Stalingrad defensive operation. But if in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front the Wehrmacht troops were advancing, then in the center the German troops, with the exception of operations to clear their rear and minor operations on the flanks of their central grouping, were forced to conduct an active defense. This strategy was imposed on them by the actions of the Soviet troops. It can be said that in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, despite the failures in general, the strategic initiative remained with the Red Army.

The actions of the Soviet troops pinned down significant enemy forces here, turning them off from active offensive operations. To hold positions in the center of the Eastern Front, the German command repeatedly transferred reserves and troops here from other sectors of the front, including from Europe. Thus, the armies of the Western and Kalinin Fronts helped the defense of Stalingrad, the Caucasus, the actions of our troops on other fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Rzhev-Sychevskaya strategic offensive operation (Operation Mars) - combat operations of the Kalininsky (Colonel-General M.A.Purkaev) and Western (Colonel-General I.S.Konev) fronts from November 25 to December 20, 1942 in order to defeat the German 9th Army (Colonel-General V. Model, headquarters - Sychevka) of Army Group "Center", defended in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. The operation was led by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov.

Operations by the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts began on November 25 in three directions at once.

Two armies of the Western Front (20th Major General N.I. Kiryukhin and 31st Major General V.S. Polenov) attacked the eastern front of the Rzhev salient south of Zubtsov, on a 40-kilometer stretch along the Vazuz and Osug rivers (in the German 39th Panzer Corps, General of Panzer Forces Hans-Jürgen von Arnim). The offensive of the 31st Army immediately stalled, but the 20th Army, supported by the 6th Panzer Army (acting commander, Colonel P.M. Arman) and the 2nd Guards. cavalry (Major General V.V. Kryukov) corps, continued to conduct offensive operations.

Simultaneously, the 22nd and 41st armies of the Kalinin Front struck a counter blow from the western face of the ledge. The 41st Army (Major General G.F. Tarasov), supported by the 1st Mechanized Corps of Major General M.D. Solomatin, attacked in the Bely area in the zone of the German 41st Panzer Corps of General J. Garpe.

The Soviet 22nd Army (Lieutenant General V.A.Yushkevich) advanced in the Luchesa Valley with the support of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, Major General M.E. Katukov.

The 39th Army of the Kalinin Front (Major General A.I. Zygin), inflicting an auxiliary blow, crossed the Molodoy Tud River in the zone of the German 23rd Corps (General K. Gilpert) and occupied Urd.

German troops managed to stop the Soviet offensive. North of Sychevka, November 29-December 5, the troops of the 20th Army, the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards. cavalry corps were defeated.
Part of the troops of the Soviet 41st Army of the Kalinin Front, which attacked in the Bely area, ended up in the "cauldron", in the creation of which the transferred units of the German 30th Army Corps of General Fretter Pico took part. By December 8, they were completely surrounded and later managed to break out of the ring only after losing almost all of their equipment.
The 22nd and 39th armies also could not break out into the operational space, they were counterattacked and stopped.

On December 8, Zhukov achieved the resumption of Operation Mars, and on December 11, a new offensive by Soviet troops began.
However, a new blow from the 20th Army, now headed by Lieutenant General M.S.Khozin and receiving support from the 5th Panzer Corps (Major General K.A. Semenchenko), as well as the recreated 6th Panzer Corps (headed by Colonel I.I. Yushchuk), again ended in failure.
The 39th Army of A.I. Zygin and the 30th Army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, which were fighting in the previously secondary sectors, resumed their offensive north of Rzhev, but their attacks were drowned.
The new blow of the 22nd army of V.A.Yushkevich ended in failure (it was soon replaced by Major General M.D.Seleznev).
December 20, when Zhukov decided to stop the Soviet attacks, is considered the end of Operation Mars.
Echo operations included attempts by the Germans to eliminate the breakthrough of the 22nd Army in the Luchesa Valley on December 23, 30 and 31, 1942, which were unsuccessful (on January 1, 1943, the commander of the German 9th Army V. Model ordered an end to the attacks).
The elimination of the Soviet troops, which were surrounded in the areas of breakthroughs, continued until the end of December.

The offensive of the Western and Kalinin Fronts failed. Territorial acquisitions were very modest (breakthroughs in the Luchesa valley and northwest of Rzhev).
Troops of the 9th German Army filled the front of the newly formed Oryol salient, the southern side of which was also the northern side of the Kursk Bulge. According to the German plans for the 1943 summer campaign, the 9th Army was supposed to attack Kursk from the north, towards the troops of the 4th Panzer Army of G. Gotha. However, the losses suffered by the divisions of the 9th Army during the second Rzhev-Sychev battle were not replenished by the spring - summer of 1943.
Moreover, the state of the 9th Army forced V. Model, whose authority, after repelling several major offensives near Rzhev in the summer and autumn of 1942, rose sharply in the eyes of the Fuehrer, to insist on postponing Operation Citadel for two months. But even then, the troops of the 9th Army were not able to fully recover. This was one of the reasons why the offensive on the northern side of the Kursk Bulge quickly fizzled out.

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