Even Soviet patriots underestimate the greatness and might of the USSR. Soviet space is too tough for them

The policy of "perestroika" announced by Gorbachev at the April 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the implementation of which was supposed to give the USSR greater dynamism of development ("acceleration"), as well as some liberalism in the political system, provided the communist ideology was preserved, was absolutely correctly understood by the West as the beginning of the disintegration process The Soviet Union and the entire world communist system, primarily the Warsaw Pact Organization. Naturally, "perestroika" was greeted with a bang in the West.

Numerous voyages of the Soviet leader around the world began with various kinds of peace initiatives that poured out like a horn of plenty. The "Peace Initiatives" were perceived by the West as an acknowledgment of the weakness of the Soviet political system. The most powerful military potential in the world, accumulated by the labor of all generations of Soviet people, was stupidly reduced to enthusiastic applause from the West. The 1987 INF Treaty became a shining example of Gorbachev's policy. Of course, it was necessary to reduce the exorbitantly inflated military machines of the USSR and the USA, but this had to be done with strict consideration of its own interests, primarily for the future. The momentary mediocre policy on the INF Treaty in the style of “if tomorrow is war”, as if the West is not today, then tomorrow will unleash a war in Europe, perfectly illustrates the complete incompetence of Gorbachev and his associates in assessing the strategic position in the world. "Perestroika" struck the army with such force that it has not yet been able to recover.

Take 1989. This is the last year of Gorbachev-style "perestroika", which was followed by the strongest erosion of communist ideology, in fact, its collapse, and as a result, the already uncontrollable centrifugal tendencies within the country, which began with the Baltic republics. Therefore, the year 1989 can be considered the last more or less "full" year of the existence of the USSR. The end of the 1980s was the beginning of the decline of the Soviet superpower. The economy is almost completely collapsed, the political system is on fire, the rationing system is rampant in the country, the army is trying to fend off the attacks of the democratic "perestroika" press, which blames the country's armed forces for all mortal sins, from Afghanistan to hazing. One after another, the country's strategic positions are surrendered, the Berlin Wall is crumbling, the GDR joins the FRG (Gorbachev is the best German of the year), Eastern Europe is experiencing a season of "velvet revolutions", the flow of parcels with "humanitarian aid" to the USSR from all over the world, including and pieces of chocolates with tooth marks from well-fed Western children. The country, perhaps, has not experienced such humiliation since the conclusion of the Brest Peace in 1918, concluded by the Bolsheviks in order to preserve their own positions in the torn civil war Russia. But the Soviet Army was still trying to preserve at least the semblance of combat effectiveness, which it succeeded more and more difficultly.

If we take the technical arsenal of the Armed Forces, then a more or less tolerant situation was observed here due to the huge stocks of weapons and military equipment accumulated over the decades. The powerful defense potential was still afloat, despite a sharp reduction in military orders from the state and the idleness of huge production capacities for this reason. Arms design bureaus tried to bring new types of weapons and equipment to the required condition, sometimes on the basis of only sheer enthusiasm. What was the Soviet military machine of the late 1980s? In December 1988, at the UN General Assembly in New York, it was announced that the Soviet armed forces would be reduced by 500 thousand people, as well as by 10 thousand tanks and 8.5 thousand artillery systems in the period 1989-90. On April 7, 1989 in London, Gorbachev announced that the number of Soviet armed forces as of January 7, 1989 was 4,258 thousand people, including 1,596 thousand in the ground forces, 437.5 thousand in the Navy, the rest in the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Force, operational and material support forces. These figures did not include the border troops of the KGB and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which, according to American data, amount to approximately 430 thousand people. It soon became known that the USSR was spending 74.3 billion rubles on military expenditures, of which more than 32 billion was spent on the purchase of weapons and military equipment (previously, the USSR recognized defense spending at about 17 billion rubles). However, Gorbachev's figures do not fully reflect the true level of military spending, the vast majority of which went under completely different items (in this case, the study of methods for determining the true Soviet defense spending is not pursued).

The most powerful component of the country's defense was still a powerful strategic triad - strategic missile forces, strategic missile submarines of the Navy and long-range strategic aviation of the Air Force. The country retained a powerful complex for the development and production of nuclear weapons. Quantitatively, the triad in 1989 consisted of 1,390 ICBM launchers, of which 812 were equipped with MIRVs (the total number of warheads was more than 6,000), 926 SLBMs for 61 SNRs (about 3,000 warheads, of which 2,500 were equipped with MIRVs) and 162 heavy strategic bomber, of which 72 are carriers of the long-range KR Kh-55 (approximately 1000 nuclear weapons). Thus, the total strategic potential consisted of about 10 thousand nuclear warheads, which ensured approximate equality with the United States in the field of strategic offensive weapons.

The 1980s, thanks to the huge backlog of work in the previous decade, became a time of a huge qualitative breakthrough in the technical equipment of strategic forces. Back in 1981, the ICBM fleet reached its highest ceiling of 1,398 missiles with 6,420 nuclear warheads, of which 308 are the most powerful ICBMs in the world, the RS-20 (SS-18 Satan - "Satan"), each equipped with 10 individually guided warheads with a capacity of 500 kt ... The next stage in the development of the Strategic Missile Forces was the development and adoption of mobile systems of strategic missiles - the RS-22 railway (combat railway combat systems, or abbreviated BZHRK, 1987) and the RS-12M "Topol" (RT-2PM) ground-based on powerful semi-axle transport and launchers on the MAZ-547V chassis (1985). At the end of the 1980s, there were already more than 50 launchers for RS-22 missiles, similar in combat characteristics to the American MX, and more than 250 launchers for RS-12M missiles. RS-22 in several missile bases had a conventional stationary base on highly protected silo launchers, "Topol" at that time were located only on mobile launchers. The fleet of mobile ICBMs is the most modern component of the Strategic Missile Forces and until now has no analogues in the world.

In the 1980s, the naval component of the strategic forces developed intensively. Since 1980, project 941 "Shark" project 941 nuclear submarines (heavy RPK SN), known in the West as "Typhoons", have been commissioned. The boat is 170 m long and 25 m wide and has an underwater displacement of 44,500 tons, which is a record figure in the world (the largest American SSBNs have an underwater displacement of 18,700 tons). Since 1996, the last representatives of the Project 667 - 667BDRM Dolphin SSBN series (NATO code - Delta-4) have been introduced into the fleet's combat composition. In 1989, the Navy had six Sharks and four Dolphins, which were a worthy response to eight American Ohio.

The Strategic Air Force also underwent a qualitative update, although not on such a scale. The main combat aircraft of long-range aviation continued to be the Tu-95 heavy turboprop bomber, the fleet of which, in 1984, began to be replenished with a new modification of the Tu-95MS, equipped, depending on the type of configuration, with 6 or 12 long-range missile launchers X-55 - analogues of the American AGM-86В "Tomahawk". But, undoubtedly, in the 80s the biggest event for the long-range air force was the adoption of the newest heavy strategic missile carriers of the Tu-160 type with variable wing geometry, which became the largest combat aircraft in the entire history of world aviation. Its maximum take-off weight, which is 275 tons, significantly exceeds the mass of the American counterpart B-1B - 180 tons, the mass of the combat load is 45 and 22 tons, respectively. New aircraft began to enter the Air Force in 1987 and went to re-equip a heavy bomber aviation regiment based in Prilukakh (Ukraine). The original plan for the procurement of 100 Tu-160s in connection with the "perestroika" that had surged into the country already in the mid-1980s began to seem unrealistic. At the end of the 80s, the number of aircraft of this type, both experimental and combat, hardly exceeded 10-15 units, but the creation of the Tu-160 itself indicated that the Soviet Union had reached a new qualitative level of development of its military aircraft industry.

The American triad also underwent significant qualitative changes. In 1982, the ground component was armed with 1,053 ICBM launchers, of which 450 Minuteman-2 (nine squadrons), 550 Minuteman-3 (11) and 53 Titan-2 (six). The combat use of strategic offensive forces is carried out by decision of the US President, which is communicated to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (KNS) - the highest command and control body of the country's armed forces. The latter from its main command center (OKTs KNSh is located in the underground part of the Pentagon) or from a spare (ZKTs is located in the foothills of the Blue Mountains, 90-95 km from Washington) or from an air command post based on the president's decision and a general operational plan of use armed forces gives the command of the US Air Force SAC on the combat use of ICBMs and strategic aviation. The SAC command post is located in the underground part of the SAC headquarters building at Offut Air Force Base (Nebraska). It has an autonomous life support system and operates around the clock. The SAC air command center is deployed on special aircraft EC-135, which are based at Offut airbase and alternately (one by one) are on duty in the air, having a task force on board. In peacetime, it is headed by the general on duty.

In the creation and development of the US Air Force SAC control system, the main principles were considered: high efficiency, stability, reliability, flexibility and secrecy of control. The ICBM fleet in the 80s was replenished with new MX missiles (Peasekeeper - "Guardian of the World"), the development of which in the 70s caused great concern in the USSR, especially the project of their deployment on mobile launchers plying in underground railway tunnels. This type of basing was ruled out by the US Congress as being extremely expensive and technically difficult, and as not meeting the cost / effectiveness criterion. As a result, new missiles were placed in highly protected silo launchers, which previously housed Minuteman-3 ICBMs. After revision, these mines could withstand the explosion of a nuclear warhead in the immediate vicinity of the launcher.

The Navy was replenished with 8 Ohio-class SSBNs. In total, the American fleet had 40 nuclear submarines with 672 SLBM launchers, 640 of which were equipped with MIRVs. The number of warheads in the naval component of the triad reached 5,780, or 55% of the entire nuclear arsenal of the American strategic forces. The Air Force received all 100 of the newest B-1B bombers (deliveries were carried out in 1984-88). The strategic aviation fleet consisted of 588 aircraft in total, of which 161 were carriers of AGM-86В long-range cruise missiles. The main SAC aircraft remained the B-52 (there were about 260 B-52s in combat units, the rest were mothballed, but in accordance with the methodology for calculating the SALT-1 and SALT-2 Treaties, they were recognized as combat-ready - it is not clear why the Americans agreed to consider them combat-ready aircraft from which equipment and units were removed for spare parts).

In relations between the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States, as we see, the status quo was preserved thanks to the settlement of their quantitative and qualitative parameters by ceilings mutually agreed upon in the negotiations on arms limitation. The preservation of the combat capabilities of the strategic systems of the USSR and the United States was ensured by powerful nuclear complexes of both countries, which include design bureaus and laboratories for the development of nuclear weapons, plants for the production of weapons-grade plutonium and nuclear charges, mines and open-pit mines for the extraction of uranium ore (mining production plants), and naturally, nuclear test sites. Let us briefly consider the structure of the domestic nuclear complex of this period.

The development of nuclear weapons, as has been repeatedly noted, was carried out by the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (formerly LIPAN, better known as the I. Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Energy), located in Chelyabinsk-70, and the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics (former OKB-11 Yu.B. Khariton ), currently transformed into a federal nuclear center in Arzamas-16. Uranium enrichment facilities were located in Angarsk, Krasnoyarsk and Sverdlovsk (Verkh-Neyvinsk). The production of weapons-grade plutonium was carried out by the Mayak chemical plant in Chelyabinsk-40 and Chelyabinsk-65 (it included five industrial reactors), the Siberian chemical plant near Tomsk (two reactors) and the Krasnoyarsk mining and chemical plant, also known as Atomgrad (three reactors). The mining of uranium raw materials was assigned to the Caspian Mining and Metallurgical Combine on the Mangyshlak Peninsula in Western Kazakhstan, and the Zabaikalsky Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheltye Vody near Krivoy Rog in Ukraine. The nuclear test sites in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) and on Novaya Zemlya (White Sea), which came under the merciless fire of protests from pacifists and environmentalists around the world, have survived the last days.

Other components of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and air defense, navy and others), referred to in the language of the military as general-purpose forces, also underwent significant technical modernization with new weapons and military equipment systems, the development of which began in the 70s or even earlier (as as a rule, these are weapons and equipment of the third or fourth generation, depending on the type of weapon). A huge backlog of promising developments and a powerful defense industry, despite the very sensitive blows of Gorbachev's policy and all kinds of peace initiatives in general, perhaps, by inertia, continued to meet the needs of the army and navy for weapons, spare parts and other materiel, but their volumes, of course , could not be compared with the shaft that the defense industry provided in more prosperous times. As you know, the most noticeable "perestroika" hit the moral climate in the army and its social position in society, which are generally known.

The ground forces are the most numerous type of armed forces of any state with an army (with the exception of the United States, where since the beginning of the 90s the navy has become the most numerous type of armed forces, ahead of the ground forces). The Soviet ground forces consisted of several arms, the main of which were motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions, units of army aviation and military air defense. It has already been emphasized that the 80s were the time when a new generation of highly effective military equipment and weapons was adopted. In particular, these are the main battle tanks of the T-80B, T-64B and T-72B types, BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BMD-2 and BMD-3 airborne combat vehicles, new self-propelled artillery systems 2S5, 2S7, 2S9, 2S19, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) "Smerch", armored personnel carriers BTR-80 and others.

The combat capabilities of the military air defense have sharply increased due to the arrival of such systems as the Buk air defense missile system, the S-300V in anti-aircraft and anti-missile versions, the Igla portable air defense missile systems, the 2K22 Tunguska anti-aircraft missile and cannon systems, modern means of detecting and targeting air targets means of destruction.

The air force and air defense forces of the country also switched to equipment and weapons of a new generation. In 1989, they included more than 500 MiG-29 fighters, about 200 Su-27, more than 200 MiG-31, about 250 Su-25 attack aircraft, and more than 800 Su-24 front-line bombers. Since 1984, the air defense aviation has received new A-50 long-range radar detection and control aircraft, developed on the basis of the Il-76 transport aircraft. The ground-based air defense component has been enhanced by the massive influx of new S-300P and PM air defense systems, capable of shooting down low-flying cruise missiles and high-altitude high-speed targets. According to American data, in 1989, about 1,500 S-300 launchers were already on alert.

The general-purpose forces of the Navy have replenished such powerful warships as Project 1141 heavy nuclear cruisers "Kirov" (three units), missile cruisers of Project 1164 "Slava" (three), a new generation BOD of the Udaloy type and destroyers of the "Sovremenny" type. The submarine fleet continued to gain power - nuclear submarines of such types as "Antey", "Granit", "Bars", "Shchuka-B", which had very high tactical and technical characteristics, were put into operation. But the main event of the late 80s for the Soviet fleet was the sea trials of the first aircraft carrier in the history of the Russian fleet - heavy aircraft carrier (TAVKR) pr. 1143.5 "Tbilisi" (now "Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Nikolai Kuznetsov"). In 1989, on the deck of this aircraft carrier, the first in the history of the Soviet Navy, takeoffs and landings of naval variants of the MiG-29 (MiG-29K) and Su-27 (Su-33) fighters, the Su-25 (Su-25UTG) attack aircraft were made. The successful development of the TAVKR deck by naval pilots opened a new page in the history of the Russian fleet.

The defense industry at the end of the 1980s was the most powerful sector of Soviet machine building (it accounted for 60% of the physical volume of production). More than 35 million people worked at the military-industrial complex. This gigantic "iceberg" ("MIC Archipelago") was hidden from the people by all kinds of "mailboxes" (closed cities). The arms industry structurally consisted of such powerful industries as general (space) and medium mechanical engineering (nuclear), aviation, shipbuilding, instrument making, armored, artillery and small arms, ammunition and others. The "whales" of the space industry were such giants as the Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant No. 586 (its other names are Yuzhmash, or NPO Yuzhnoye) in Dnepropetrovsk (Ukraine), which, in addition to launch vehicles for spacecraft, also produced ICBMs, the plant. Khrunichev and the Tushinsky machine plant in Moscow and a number of others, equipped with first-class technological equipment and highly qualified personnel. A powerful blow to space engineering was the curtailment of the Energia-Buran program, the implementation of which was initially aimed at almost the entire space complex (we will talk about this below).

At the end of the 1980s, the aviation industry reached a leading position in the world in terms of its technological level. The production of the world's best MiG-29 fighters was carried out by the Moscow Aviation Production Association (MAPO) im. Dementieva (production of single combat vehicles MiG-29A and C) and the Gorky aircraft plant (production of two-seat combat training aircraft MiG-29UB). The latter also produced MiG-31 interceptors. Serial production of the Su-27 was established at the Komsomolsk-on Amur APO im. Gagarin (single for the Air Force and the Navy), and the Irkutsk APO (two-seat combat training Su-27UB). Su-25 attack aircraft were assembled at the Tbilisi Aviation Plant, front-line Su-24 bombers at the Novosibirsk APO named after I. Chkalov. Dozens of years a year the Tashkent APO produced heavy transport aircraft Il-76. The Rostov and Arsenyevsky Helicopter Plants were preparing for the release of the new generation Mi-28 and Ka-50 combat helicopters, respectively.

Shipbuilding in the USSR was traditionally concentrated in such cities as Severodvinsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Gorky (production of nuclear and diesel boats), Nikolaev - aircraft carriers and missile cruisers, Leningrad - nuclear cruisers, BODs, destroyers, nuclear boats of some types, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and others. The largest of them were the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (PO "Sevmash"), the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant and the plant named after I. 61 communards in Nikolaev, the Amur shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and the shipyard named after Zhdanov ("Severnaya Verf") in Leningrad. In the 80s, the shipbuilding industry reached the peak of its development and could annually provide the construction of one TAVKR of the "Tbilisi" type, 4-5 nuclear submarines, 4-5 destroyers and BODs, annually hand over to the fleet up to 30 warships of various classes. Wide cooperation and integration of the industry's factories and related enterprises was achieved. For example, almost 2000 enterprises and organizations of 20 industries were involved in the construction of the TAVKR "Tbilisi".

The development of modern weapons has reached the highest level. For the first time, the USSR created systems that, in terms of their combat capabilities and level of technological excellence, not only corresponded to the latest achievements of science and technology in the world, but also began to outstrip the level of weapons development in the West. The design bureaus had the best scientific and engineering personnel in the country, which ensured such a high level of domestic military technologies. The creation of strategic missiles in the 1980s was carried out by the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering (MIT), which created such types of weapons as the RS-12M Topol ICBM, RS-22, and RSM-52 SLBM for heavy RPK SN of the Akula type. Design Bureau of the Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant. Yangel developed modifications of the world's most powerful ICBMs, the RS-20. KB im. Makeeva was engaged in the development of liquid-fueled SLBMs.

The development of operational-tactical and tactical missiles of a new generation for the ground forces was carried out by the Kolomenskoye Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering (Oka and Tochka complexes), guided air-to-air missiles were the field of application of the Vympel ICB forces, the Novator OKB developed mobile SAM for ground forces, MKB "Fakel" specialized in creating air defense systems for the country's air defense forces, and a number of others. The development of aircraft of the 80s was carried out by such world-famous organizations as the OKB im. A. Tupolev (now ANTK named after A. Tupolev), who created such aircraft as Tu-160 and Tu-22M3, them. Mikoyan (OKB "MiG" named after A. Mikoyan) - fighters MiG-29 and MiG-31, named after Sukhoi (AH "Sukhoi") - Su-27 and Su-25, them. Yakovlev - Yak-141, named after Antonov - An-72, An-74, An-124 "Ruslan", An-225 "Mriya" and a number of others. The highest level of Soviet combat aircraft was convincingly demonstrated at the aircraft exhibitions in Farnborough (1988) and Le Bourget (1989).

The Soviet tank building continued to remain at the forefront. Design bureaus for the development of modern tanks were located in Leningrad (Design Bureau of the Kirov Plant - T-80), Nizhniy Tagil (T-72), Kharkov (T-64). The development and production of BMPs was carried out by the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, which in the 80s was awarded the Order of the Red Star for great production successes (it produced up to 2000 BMPs per year). The creation of other types of ground weapons also met the highest international standards. The design of surface ships was mainly entrusted to the Severnoye and Nevsky design bureaus (Leningrad), and nuclear submarines - to such organizations as TsKB-18 "Rubin", SKB-143 "Malachite", TsKB-112 "Lazurit". On the whole, the level of Soviet naval weapons was also raised to a very high level. "Perestroika" did not manage to undermine the start of the rise of domestic military technologies.

Despite the lag behind the West in such areas as the development of modern electronic equipment, especially digital, communication and control systems, the Soviet military-industrial complex successfully compensated for the weaknesses of its developments with better productivity of technical solutions and a higher degree of consideration of real combat conditions in which these systems had to be applied. And the lag in detection, communication and control systems was not as great as they tried to imagine in the West.

In order not to be considered unfounded, it is enough to cite the following facts. The USSR did not lag behind in the accuracy of the guidance of its strategic missiles (the technological level of domestic MIRVs was at the level of American ones). The MiG-31 became the world's first combat aircraft equipped with an electronically controlled phased array radar, which is currently equipped only with the newest American bomber B-2B Spirit (production aircraft are shown). In air defense systems, the Soviet air defense systems S-300P, S-300V, Tor and Buk were almost a head superior to their Western opponents or had no analogues in the world at all. Soviet diesel and nuclear submarines of the latest projects for such a factor as the level of noise for the first time did not yield to American submarines.

An experienced reader will probably remember the scandal around the Japanese company Toshiba, which sold to the USSR high-precision grinding machines for precise processing of large workpieces, which, according to the United States, were used precisely in the processing of propellers of new types of Soviet submarines, including seven-bladed submarines, which sharply reduced the level of their noise. "Perestroika", fortunately, was not able to completely destroy the domestic military-industrial complex - so soundly it was created over the past decades. But it struck at the latest developments in the military-industrial complex of the second half of the 80s, as a result of which the scientific and technical level of our armaments is currently actually holding on to the backlog of the 70s. But military technology, like any other branch of technology, is constantly being improved. What is now quite modern and meets the latest requirements due to continuous modernization, tomorrow will exhaust its constructive resource and become obsolete. Whole military programs have been ruined that are strategic in nature to ensure the state's defense capability. A striking example of this is the failure of the development of a fifth generation fighter, but more on that later.

Soviet military power

From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received 29637 field guns, 52407 mortars, and the total number of guns and mortars, taking into account tank guns - 92578. The military artillery of the border districts was mainly equipped with guns up to standard standards. On the eve of the war, the Red Army had 60 howitzer and 14 cannon regiments of the RGK. But the artillery of the High Command's reserve was not enough.

In the spring of 1941, the formation of 10 anti-tank artillery brigades began, but by June it was not possible to fully staff them. In addition, the artillery traction of poor cross-country ability did not allow the batteries to maneuver off-road, especially in the spring-autumn period with muddy roads. And yet, anti-tank artillery inflicted significant losses on the Nazis in the first months of the war, which led in part to the fact that the German offensive drowned near Moscow.

It should be noted that Marshal G.I.Kulik, whose opinion Stalin listened to, was himself mistaken in choosing the most effective type of guns, which affected their small production or even led to their discontinuation. Here is what Marshal G.K. Zhukov writes about such mistakes: “So, for example, according to his“ authoritative ”proposal, 45- and 76.2-mm guns were discontinued before the war. During the war, it was necessary with great difficulties to re-organize the production of these guns at the Leningrad factories. 152-mm howitzer, which passed all the tests, showed excellent qualities, according to the conclusion of G. I. Kulik, was not put into service. The situation was no better with mortar armament, which during the war showed high combat quality in all types of combat. After the war with Finland, this deficiency was eliminated. "

It is unforgivable for short-sighted, conservative experts and Kulik himself that by the beginning of the war they did not appreciate such a powerful and most modern jet weapon at that time as the BM-13 (which later became the famous Katyushas). But in July 1941, the Katyusha "With the first volleys they sent the fascists to flight in the sector of the front, where they were used. Only in June, when the enemy had already attacked, the Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the urgent serial production of salvage Katyushas. We must pay tribute to the industrialists who carried out this order-order: already 15 days after the start of the war, the troops received the first batches of these rocket mortars.

As for the actual field mortars, they were also lacking due to delays in the organization of production. But our mortars were superior in quality to the German ones. Their production was established just before the war itself - with caliber 82 mm and 120 mm.

The assessment of the state of the engineering troops, communications, railways and highways was extremely unsatisfactory. The entire economy, as evidenced by statistics, archival reports and the opinion of military experts of that time, was badly neglected in our country. For example, the commission of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in mid-1940 noted that the number of engineering troops in peacetime would not be able to ensure the normal deployment of formations in a combat situation. But on the eve of the war, the staffs of engineering units were increased, new units were formed, their training improved, the units began to prepare for military operations. However, according to experts, they managed to do little, they realized too late.

The road network in Western Ukraine and Belarus was also in poor condition. Many bridges could not withstand medium tanks and artillery, and country roads for many hundreds of kilometers required major repairs. And this shortcoming during the German strike turned to our advantage. As they say, every cloud has a silver lining: this collapse on highways and small bridges created difficulties in the advance of the Germans, delayed their equipment in some sectors of the front.

With regard to railways, Zhukov's deputy NF Vatutin made a report to the People's Commissar Timoshenko, in which it was noted: “… The border railway areas are not well suited for mass unloading of troops. This is evidenced by the following figures.

The German railways going to the Lithuanian border have a capacity of 220 trains per day, while our Lithuanian railway, which goes to the borders of East Prussia, has only 84. The situation is no better on the territory of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine: here we have almost half the number of railway lines than the enemy ... ".

In 1940, a seven-year (!) Plan for the reconstruction of the western railways was developed. And the war did not wait for 7 years - it began a year later, in June 1941. And there was no mobilization plan for railway transport at all, which is confirmed by Zhukov's information: "We already knew that there was no mobilization plan for the country's railways developed and approved by the government in the event of war in the People's Commissariat of communications at that time."

Zhukov, Timoshenko, the commander of the Western military district DG Pavlov had previously reported this to Stalin, but he really took this important issue of the future war seriously only from February 1941. The scale of work in this area was so enormous - taking into account the western territories - that nothing significant could be done in the remaining months. It was necessary to build new highways - 2,360 kilometers, new unpaved tracks for tractors, tractors, armored vehicles - 650 kilometers, overhaul 570 kilometers of existing highways, restore dozens of medium and small bridges, build new railways - 819 kilometers, reconstruct about 500 kilometers available paths.

But let us note that the Germans also had a hard time moving along our western roads, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the "blitzkrieg". This was noted in their reports by Hitler's generals in the first weeks of the war, But it was a dry summer. The Germans did not yet know the real Russian thaw on highways and dirt roads.

In the report of G.K. Zhukov to the People's Commissar Timoshenko on this issue dated January 29, 1941, the second paragraph contains clear documentary confirmation that Stalin nevertheless gradually "swayed", began to be disappointed in the reliability of the Soviet-German pact (although he did not lose all illusions about the future the success of negotiations with Hitler) and gave the go-ahead for preparations for war. This point of Zhukov's report convinces us that the enemy's attack was not so sudden (however, when you expect danger and it finally comes, it always seems psychologically sudden. Auth.). Judge for yourself:

"... It is necessary to bring the western theater of military operations into a truly defensive state by creating a number of defensive zones at a depth of 200-300 kilometers, building anti-tank ditches, gaps, swamping dams, escarpments, and field defenses."

To carry out such voluminous work, Zhukov rightly considered it inexpedient to detach a significant number of soldiers from combat training. And further in the report, in our opinion, he makes an unexpected conclusion and, as a conclusion, proposes it to Tymoshenko (and Stalin) for approval:

“… Considering that any delay can cost unnecessary sacrifices, I am making a proposal: instead of taking vacations for vacations, I am making a proposal: to involve students in the tenth grade and all students of higher educational institutions in an organized way for defensive and road construction, creating platoons, companies, battalions from them under the command of commanders from military units ... Organize transportation and meals for students free of charge at the expense of the state (Red Army rations). "

This quote convincingly testifies that part of the command, including Zhukov, saw the formidable danger of fascism and realized that in order to repulse it was necessary to mobilize in advance all the labor reserves of the western territories of the USSR. And Zhukov decided to attract schoolchildren and students to defensive work due to the shortage of the labor population in these regions. It was caused by mass evictions during the period of collectivization and subsequent destructive repressions.

It was also impossible to tear off the workers of important industrial enterprises, as this would lead to a decline in production on the eve of the war. Forcing them to work on Sundays also meant exhausting the workers physically. Only the youth reserve remained - schoolchildren and students. There was simply no other way out, however, this plan of Zhukov remained on paper, because the fateful June 22 was already near. And yet, with the beginning of the war, huge forces of the country's labor army, which was quickly created, were pulled together to build defensive fortifications on the main directions of the Hitlerite offensive.

Now about the means of communication. At the beginning of 1941, the chief of the RKKA signal troops, Major General NI Gapich, reported to the General Staff "about the lack of modern communications equipment and about the lack of sufficient mobilization and inviolable communications equipment." In fact, the General Staff's radio communications were provided with radio stations of the PAT type only by 39%, radio stations of the RAF type and 11 replacing them - AK - by 60%, and by charging units - by 45%. The Western Border District had only 27% of the total radio stations needed. Kiev district - 30%, Baltic - 52%. This was the case with wired communication.

It was a mistake, without proper analysis, it was believed that in the event of war, the formations would be provided with local communications from the People's Commissariat of Communications. The war showed that the local nodes were not ready to fulfill this task, which caused disorganization in the troops, interrupted the interaction of units of different types and led to a disorderly retreat and defeat in many sectors of the gigantic front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Most commanders, as it turned out in a combat situation, did not know how to manage troops well in a rapidly changing operational situation. The old conservative commanders avoided using radio communications and, by force of habit, preferred wired, telephone communications, which were constantly out of order during enemy shelling and bombing.

What came of this in the first days and weeks of the war - we know very well from the mass of memoirs and memoirs, documentaries written after the war. On this occasion, Zhukov, in his "Memoirs and Reflections" writes: "I. V. Stalin did not sufficiently assess the role of radio communication in modern mobile warfare, and the leading military personnel failed to prove to him in time the need to organize mass production of army radio equipment. " As for the underground cable network required to serve the operational and strategic agencies, there was none at all!

Nevertheless, the People's Commissariat of Communications at the end of 1940 - beginning of 1941 carried out certain small works, as far as possible. But this could no longer solve the set global strategic task.

Stalin thoroughly took up the air force in 1939, which saved our aviation from a complete defeat, when (according to new data) at the airfields in the first hours of the war we lost up to 1,800 bombed planes.

In 1939, the State Defense Committee decided to build 9 new aircraft factories and 7 aircraft engines. The next year, 7 more factories from other industries began to re-equip for the production of aircraft products. These enterprises were equipped with the most modern equipment for those requirements. Compared with 1939, the aircraft industry in 1940 increased by 70%, aircraft engine enterprises and instrument-making plants were built in parallel.

From January 1 to June 22, 1941, the army received 17,745 combat aircraft, of which 3,710 were of a new type. From this period, a breakthrough began in the Soviet aircraft industry, repeated every 10 years. TsAGI was completely reconstructed, creating new design bureaus. Such talented designers as S. V. Ilyushin, A. I. Mikoyan, S. A. Lavochkin, V. M. Petlyakov, A. S. Yakovlev created the Yak-1 and MiG-3 fighters. LaGG-3, Il-2 attack aircraft, Pb-2 dive bomber - only about 20 types of new aircraft for various and mixed purposes.

It is good that at that time aviation was to some extent Stalin's hobby, and therefore many capable young designers were released from prisons. But, unfortunately, by the beginning of the war, our aviation was dominated by machines of the old design, significantly inferior to German aircraft in terms of flight technical data, and were inferior in the most important indicators - in speed and flight ceiling. These advantages of Hitler's aircraft industry cost us dearly until 1943, when our retrained aces on new machines seized the airspace and snatched the operational-tactical initiative from the Nazis. But this victory came at the cost of tremendous exertion of thousands and thousands of plant builders, experienced workers, aircraft designers. And on the eve of the war, 75-80 percent of the total number of our aircraft were inferior in many respects to the same type of German aircraft. By June 22, only 21 percent of the units were re-equipped.

Each regiment consisted of 4-5 squadrons, which made it possible to ensure better interaction in battle between different types of aviation and aviation itself with ground forces. We had 45 percent of the total number of bomber regiments, 42 percent of fighters, and 13 percent of reconnaissance and others. At the end of 1940, an important decree "On the reorganization of the aviation forces of the Red Army" was adopted, according to which it was planned to form 106 regiments, expand and strengthen the military educational institutions of the Air Force, and re-equip formations with the latest high-speed aircraft. By the end of May 1941, 9 such regiments were almost fully equipped. Airbased areas became the rear services of the air forces of armies, districts, and the front. The transition to a new, more flexible organization of the rear of the Air Force was planned to be completed in June 1941. Completed already during the war.

In April 1941, the formation of 5 airborne corps began. By June 1, they were manned, but there was not enough military equipment. Therefore, at the beginning of the war, the main burden fell on the old air brigades.

In general, the war found the Soviet Air Force in the stage of extensive reorganization, transition to a new materiel and retraining of flight personnel. Then only 15% of the flight personnel were ready for night flights. But after a year and a half our aviation appeared before the enemy in a completely different, renewed and powerful form.

At the beginning of 1941, the responsibility of the chiefs of the air defense was increased. But, nevertheless, the German ace managed to sit down in Moscow at the Dynamo stadium, as already mentioned. But the air defense control was also centralized throughout the country: this happened only during the war years, or rather, it began in November 1941. By June, the air defense forces were provided with medium-caliber guns by 85 percent, small-caliber guns by 70 percent. But 40 percent of fighters were missing, and those that were available could not compete with the latest German models. The units had only 70 percent of anti-aircraft guns and machine guns of the required number.

Barrage balloons and searchlights were also half-completed. Air defense units in the western border regions and in Moscow and Leningrad were better equipped. In the western districts, anti-aircraft guns were 90–95 percent of the norm, since they were better supplied than other units. There were also new means of detecting and observing the air enemy.

Up to a third of the RUS-2 radar installations were concentrated in the Leningrad and Moscow zones. Fighter corps began to form to defend the two capitals, and they played a huge role in ensuring that these cities received minimal destruction from the bombing.

However, in general, by the beginning of the war, the air defense system was not ready to properly resist a technically equipped and prepared enemy.

Before the war, the Navy had its own People's Commissariat, which was guided by general operational and mobilization plans developed by the General Staff. Before the collision with the Nazis, our fleet had 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 7 leaders, 249 destroyers, 211 submarines, 279 torpedo boats, over 1000 coastal defense guns. However, the weak point of all fleets was air defense and mine and torpedo weapons. In general, the exercises and training of interactions with the ground forces were carried out at a fairly good level. At the same time, it was planned to conduct independent operations by the surface fleet far in the open seas, in a long autonomous voyage, while there were no real forces or opportunities for this.

In 1940, the construction of various types of warships intensified. For 11 months, a total of 100 destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and torpedo boats, distinguished by their high combat qualities, were launched. In addition, 270 more ships of all classes were built at the country's shipyards, new naval bases were created. At the same time, in 1939, the Defense Committee stopped the construction of extremely expensive battleships and heavy cruisers, which require a large consumption of metal and the diversion from other, no less important, work of a significant number of engineers and workers in the shipbuilding industry.

A serious miscalculation of Stalin and the People's Commissariat of the Navy was the underestimation of the Northern Fleet, which, as it turned out, played a serious role in the war, but was not really prepared. All were decided by the heroism and endurance of the sailors, the tireless work of the ship repairmen of Murmansk and the bases of the White Sea.

These are the forces with which, with many miscalculations, the USSR met the Hitler invasion. Those authors who assert that the army, aviation and navy could only quantitatively detain the fascists and their equipment in the first year of the war are absolutely wrong. Weak equipment, obsolete mass equipment explains our retreat to Moscow, a series of defeats until the end of 1942. The ego is only partly true. From reliable statistical archival data, it can be concluded that the USSR army was just technically re-equipped and was not completely backward. General comparative data also show that despite the existence of the Soviet-German pact and diplomatic equivalents between Moscow and Berlin, the USSR (although not at the same pace, with a delay) was preparing for war. So, from 1939 to 1941, the Armed Forces of the Soviets increased by 2.8 times, 125 new divisions were formed, and by January 1, 1941, there were more than 4.2 million people under arms in all branches of the armed forces. In addition, OSOAVIAKHIM was involved in mass defense work. By January 1, 1941, the ranks of this organization consisted of 13 million people, mostly young people. Every year, tens of thousands of young men and women acquired specialties in three hundred aero and automobile clubs, aviation schools and glider clubs. All egos were cadres with specialties necessary in war.

To train career officers, more than 200 schools were working, graduating specialists from all branches of the military. However, such a broad system of personnel training, unfortunately, was introduced too late: Hitler did not allow Stalin to modernize and completely reorganize the Armed Forces. In Germany, he did it earlier - and rushed to the USSR. If our people were essentially fighting for their freedom and independence of the state, then in the person of Stalinism and Hitlerism, two irreconcilable predatory systems clashed, although both, in their own way, professed a socialist doctrine.

In his analytical memoirs, Marshal Zhukov gives a correct assessment of the preparation of the Red Army, it is difficult to disagree with an objective researcher. In particular, Zhukov emphasizes that in a number of cases the method of training troops and officers did not meet the requirements of modern warfare, that little attention was paid to the development of defensive tactics, that they were criminally neglected, mainly hoping to wage a war on the enemy's territory until it was completely defeated. This was the theory of self-confident shapkozakidatelstva, for which many generals (in battles and before the Military Tribunal), millions of soldiers and officers paid with their lives.

Soviet poster

“As for other methods and forms of warfare, they were simply neglected, especially on an operational-strategic scale,” noted Marshal Zhukov, referring to practicing a counter engagement, retreating actions and battles in an environment with breakthroughs from the enemy ring. Our officers learned all this on the battlefield, practically without skill, acting on ingenuity and circumstances, often at their own peril and risk. “A major gap in Soviet military science,” Zhukov also notes, “was that we did not draw practical conclusions from the experience of the battles of the initial period of World War II in the West. And the experience was already there, and it was even discussed at a meeting of the highest command personnel in December 1940. " This is where it was necessary to analyze the offensive "blitzkrieg" operations of the Germans in different countries, in different weather and topographic conditions. And at the same time draw conclusions from the blunders of the French and British, who tried unsuccessfully to contain Hitler's armada. And even better - to lose these strategic operations to attack other countries in extensive army exercises, while working out the moment of defense in our territory in case of a possible surprise attack by the enemy. But this, again, was not done.