Vitebsk-Orsha operation (belor. Vitsebska-Arshanskaya aperatsya (June 23 - June 28)) - a strategic military operation of the armed forces of the USSR against German troops during the Great Patriotic War, conducted in Eastern Belarus, with the aim of collapsing the defense of the right flank of Army Group Center. It is an integral part of the Belarusian operation (Operation Bagration).

The alignment of forces

the USSR

On the Vitebsk and Orsha directions, by the beginning of June, there were 4 Soviet armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front: 5th, 31st, 39th and 11th Guards, which were reinforced by units of the offensive development: 5th Guards Tank Army, 2 -m Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, as well as the mechanized cavalry group of Oslikovsky. To the north were the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies of the 1st Baltic Front, reinforced by the 1st Tank Corps.

• 1st Baltic Front (commander General of the Army I. Kh.Bagramyan, chief of staff Colonel-General V.V.Kurasov D.S. Leonov)
• 3rd Belorussian Front (Commander General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Colonel General A. P. Pokrovsky, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov)
  • 5th Army N.I.Krylov)
  • 11th Guards Army (commanded by Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky)
  • 31st Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.V. Glagolev, Chief of Staff Major General M.I.Schedrin)
  • 39th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I.I.Lyudnikov)
  • 5th Guards Tank Army (commanded by Marshal of Armored Forces P.A.Rotmistrov)
  • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (commander of the Guards Major General of Armored Forces A.S.Burdeiny)
  • Cavalry-mechanized group (commander of the guard, Major-General N. S. Oslikovsky)
    • 3rd Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps (commanded by Lieutenant General V.T. Obukhov)
    • 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (Commander of the Guards Major General N.S. Oslikovsky, Chief of Staff Colonel S.T.Shmuylo)
  • The 1st Air Army (commanded by Aviation Lieutenant General M.M. Gromov) as of June 23 had 1,901 operational combat aircraft (840 fighters, 528 attack aircraft, 459 bombers, 54 reconnaissance aircraft).
• long-range aviation connections

coordinated the actions of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky

Germany

On the Vitebsk direction on the line east of Polotsk, Bogushevsk (Bogushevskoye) on a front of 150 km, the Soviet troops were opposed by the 3rd German Tank Army, and on the Orsha and Mogilev directions in the Bogushevsk strip (lawsuit), Bykhov at the front 225 km - units of the 4th German army.

• units of Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal Ernst von Busch)
• units of Army Group North (commanded by Colonel General Georg Lindemann)
  • 16th Army (Commander General of Artillery Christian Hansen)
    • 1st Army Corps (Commander General of the Infantry Karl Hilpert)
  • parts of the 1st Air Fleet (commander General Kurt Pflugbeil)

Parties plans

the USSR

As part of the Byelorussian offensive operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front were aimed through Polotsk, Glubokoe, Shvenchenis (Sventsiany) - to Siauliai, cutting off the German Army Group North from Army Group Center and reaching the Baltic in the Klaipeda region; the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, after the defeat of the enemy in the region of Vitebsk and Orsha and the attack on Borisov, were sent through Minsk, Molodechno, Vilnius, Kaunas, Lida and Grodno to the borders of East Prussia

At the first stage of the Byelorussian operation, the 1st Baltic and 3rd Byelorussian fronts were tasked with "The defeat of the Vitebsk grouping, the introduction of tank and mechanized troops into the breakthrough and the development of the main attack to the west, covering the Borisov-Minsk group of German troops with its left-flank grouping" .

Another hit - forces of the 11th Guards and 31st armies (3rd Belorussian Front), should be applied to the enemy's Orsha grouping and further along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov. Part of the forces of this grouping with a blow from the north was supposed to capture the city of Orsha.

It was proposed to use the mobile troops of the front (cavalry and tanks) to develop success in the general direction of Borisov. “With the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Borisov grouping and reach the western bank of the river. Berezin near Borisov " .

Germany

The German command did not expect a serious offensive by the Soviet troops in the summer of 1944 on the position of GA Center. Therefore, the plans for the Vitebsk-Orsha operation came as a surprise to the command of the army group. Field Marshal Bush, when visiting the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army on April 21, 1944, said: "In any case, based on the events of this winter, the Russian command will set very ambitious targets in the sectors of other army groups."... The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, General Reinhard, agreed with him: "The fact that the Russians intend to seize Vitebsk by an attack in strip 3 of the TA is doubtful to the commander.".

As part of GA "Center" as a whole and the 3rd Panzer Army, there were practically no mobile units. The German command planned to repel all possible attacks of the Soviet troops, relying on developed defensive structures. So, in the strip of the 27th Army Corps of the 4th Army, which covered the Orsha direction, the German defense extended to a depth of 20-25 km, with 11-14 trench lines on several defense lines, with dugouts and shelters equipped with artillery positions for direct firing aiming, 6-7 rows of barbed wire and continuous minefields.

According to Hitler's order of March 8, 1944, large cities in the zone of the army group were declared "fortresses", including Vitebsk (commandant - commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of the Infantry Friedrich Gollwitzer (German)russian, covering forces - 1 battalion, filling - 3 divisions), Orsha (commandant - Colonel Ratoliff, covering forces - 1 company, filling - 2 divisions). Army group commanders were skeptical about the effectiveness of "fortresses" in repelling an enemy offensive. So, Reinhard proposed in the event of a Soviet offensive leave Vitebsk, thus forcing the enemy to deliver its first blow to an empty space, and to withdraw and hold the defense at the "Tiger" line ... But the Fuhrer's order remained in effect.

General course of the operation

The operation was carried out between 23 and 28 June 1944. It was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began on 22 June.

22nd of June

In zone 1 of the Baltic Front, reconnaissance in force was carried out by the forces of 10 rifle companies, reinforced with tanks, after a small artillery preparation.

Units of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (6th Guards Army) during the day broke through the main defense zone of the Germans (for which the main forces of the first echelon were brought into battle) and advanced 15 km on the front by 5-7 km, pushing back units 252- 1st infantry division of the enemy by the morning of June 23 to the Savchenki-Morgi-Pligovka line.

Subunits of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps (6th Guards Army) achieved significantly less success, which managed to occupy only the first trench, and later had to repulse enemy counterattacks.

The 1st Rifle Corps (43rd Army), which launched the attack at 16 o'clock, managed to penetrate the Germans' defenses by 0.5-1.5 km. On the night of June 23, the main forces of the first echelon regiments, units of the 5th assault and 28th engineer brigades were additionally introduced in the corps sector. As a result, the village of Zamoshie was captured, by the morning the corps units reached the village of Horovatka. Advancement in some areas was up to 3.5 km.

The 60th and 92nd Rifle Corps (43rd Army) had no success during June 22, and under pressure from the enemy were forced to return to their original positions by the end of the day.

In the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, during reconnaissance in force, the advance battalions of the 65th and 72nd rifle corps (5th Army) achieved the greatest success, which captured the first 2 trenches during the day and fought in the direction of Mashkov. In order to increase the success of the rifle units, the command brought the 153rd tank brigade and the 954th self-propelled gun regiment into battle. As a result, units of the 5th Army managed to capture bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Sukhodrevka River and ferry infantry, tanks and artillery to them during the night. The enemy was forced to transfer his reserves to the place of the breakthrough.

Subdivisions of the 11th and 31st armies were not successful: having stumbled upon strong enemy resistance, they suffered significant losses and by the end of the day were withdrawn to their original positions.

In the zone of the 39th Army on June 22, reconnaissance in force was not carried out at the request of Lieutenant General II Lyudnikov, in order not to disclose the plans of the offensive (the position of the enemy troops was known).

The troops of the 1st and 60th rifle corps of the 43rd Army, after artillery preparation, broke through the enemy's defenses in the Novaya Igumenshchina-Uzhmekino sector (16 km along the front), captured the resistance nodes of Shumilino and Sirotino station during the day, and by 21-00 reached the Dobeya line - Plyushchevka - Pushchevs - Kuzmino - Uzhmekino (moving forward up to 16 km).

The blow of the 1st Baltic Front fell on the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" and was unexpected for the enemy: " The offensive north-west of Vitebsk was especially unpleasant, since, unlike the attacks on the rest of the front, it was a complete surprise» .

A deep breakthrough by the troops of the 1st Baltic Front forced the enemy to begin a quick withdrawal of units of the 9th Army Corps to the Western Dvina line, and units of the 53rd Army Corps to the southern and western outskirts of Vitebsk.

Despite the rapid advance of rifle units, the 1st Panzer Corps did not enter the breakthrough due to its slow advance (including due to the poor condition of the roads after the last rains); the command of the 1st Baltic Front decided to enter the corps after capturing a bridgehead on the Western Dvina.

Front aviation made 764 sorties. Enemy aircraft made 14 sorties.

The 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive in the Perevoz - Romanovo sector: three rifle divisions of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, after artillery preparation and air strikes, at 6:00 broke through the enemy defenses in the Perevoz - Kuzmentsy sector (6 km), crossed the Luchesa River, taking 3 crossings on the move (by 12-00), and by 13-00 they cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway at the Zamosc station. Units of the 84th Rifle Corps of the 39th Army during the day wedged themselves into the main line of enemy defense, the greatest success was achieved by units of the 158th Rifle Division, which captured the Babinovichi NP. By the end of the day, the army reached the Tishkovo-Lyadenki line, and advanced units to the Shelki area (advancing up to 13 km per day).

The 5th Army broke through the enemy's defenses in the Zarechye - Shelmino sector. Subdivisions of the 72nd Rifle Corps crossed the Luchesa River and captured bridgeheads near the villages of Kovali, Zarechye and Savchenki (where units of the 299th Infantry Division were defeated and a railway bridge was seized, thereby cutting the Vitebsk-Orsha railway). Subdivisions of the 65th Rifle Corps, after heavy fighting in the second half of June 23, captured bridgeheads on the Luchesa River in the Rudakov, Kalinovichi area. The command of the 3rd German Panzer Army tried to throw off Soviet troops from the bridgeheads on the Luchesa River, bringing into battle units of the 14th Infantry Division, supported by assault guns, but all attacks were repulsed. As a result, units of the 5th Army advanced 10 km forward and by the end of the day reached the line Savchenko - Vladykovshchina - Gryada - Nikolaevo - Pushchevo - Ponizovye - Rudaki - Bolshiye Kalinovichi - Novy Stan - Boston, expanding the breakthrough front to 26 km. The defending units of the 6th German Army Corps began to withdraw, trying to gain a foothold on the next line of defense. Under these conditions, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided to continue the offensive at night in order to disrupt the enemy's plans, and to develop success, introduce the mechanized cavalry group of General Oslikovsky (due to the poor condition of the roads, the KMG units arrived in the concentration area only by 07:00 24 June).

The 11th Guards Army broke through the enemy's defenses in the Zelenskoe Lake - Kireevo sector. Parts of the 36th Guards Rifle and 8th Rifle Corps, after artillery preparation and air strikes with the support of tanks and self-propelled guns, went on the offensive and captured the first trench of the enemy, the village of Kireyevo was also captured, however, due to the increased resistance of the 78th Infantry Division, further the advance of Soviet troops in this sector was suspended. But on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army, units of the 16th Guards Corps and the 155th fortified region attached to it successfully broke through the defenses in the wooded and swampy terrain and by 10-00 captured Yuryev Island. Despite numerous enemy counterattacks, the offensive on the right flank of the army was developing successfully (to develop success during the day in this sector, the 1st Guards Moscow Rifle Division was brought into battle, parts of which by the end of the day captured a bridgehead on the Vydreika River, the 5th Guards The Gorodok rifle division, which fought for the village of Vydritsa, as well as the 11th Guards Gorodok rifle division, which received the task of defeating the enemy south of Babinovichi). By the end of the day, the 11th Guards Army was fighting on the line Zelenukha - Chatterboxes - Settlement No. 10-forest southeast of Polypki np - eastern outskirts of Bryukhovskie np - Shibany - east of Zavolny np - Kireevo (advance per day ranged from 2 to 8 km) ...

The 31st Army wedged into the enemy's defenses to a depth of 3 km by the end of the day, fought on the forest line 2 km southwest of Kireevo NP - east of Buroye Selo, east of Zagvazdino.

Front aviation made 877 sorties (105 of them at night). Enemy aircraft made 36 sorties.

Operation results

As a result of the operation, the district centers of the Vitebsk region Shumilino (June 23), Beshenkovichi, Bogushevsk, Senno (June 25), Tolochin (June 26), Orsha, Chashniki (June 27), Lepel (June 28) were liberated.

Selected episodes

The commander of the sapper platoon, senior sergeant Fyodor Blokhin, was tasked to save the only surviving bridge in the city from destruction, so that the main forces of the 39th army, which liberated Vitebsk, could then cross it. The success of this assignment was largely predetermined by the fact that the day before Blokhin received the news of the death of his beloved son in battle. Blokhin, at first extremely upset by the death of his son, then fulfilled this task with trebled energy.

The operation to save the bridge was preceded by street battles in the center of Vitebsk on the night of June 26 by the 875th regiment of the 158th rifle division. A platoon of 12 people, led by senior sergeant Blokhin, infiltrated the enemy lines in the early morning darkness and went to the Western Dvina. The bridge was mined and could be blown up any minute. The key to success was the surprise of the attack and the speed of the operation. At the signal of the commander, the soldiers threw grenades at the enemy's trenches and burst onto the bridge. A fight ensued, which turned into hand-to-hand combat. Senior Sergeant Blokhin with a knife struck the Nazi, blocking his path, and rushed to the water, where the wires leading to the landmines were stretched, then cut them and, together with Corporal Mikhail Kuznetsov, removed the electric detonator. The engineers removed 300 boxes of explosives from the bridge supports. At that moment, Soviet tanks were already approaching the bridge.

Attack of the 215th Rifle Regiment under the command of N. B. Borisov

In the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Zabor'e, the commander of the 215th Rifle Regiment of the 179th Rifle Division of the 43rd Army, Borisov N. B., was ordered to seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Western Dvina and firmly gain a foothold on it. Assessing the situation, Borisov came to the conclusion that after capturing the bridgehead, it was necessary not to defend, but to attack, and that the capture of the village of Zaborie would be the best way, contributing to the successful crossing of the Western Dvina by the main forces of the regiment. In a swift attack, Borisov's battalion captured the village of Zaborie and in 3 days of fighting destroyed 400 German soldiers and officers (including the colonel), captured 65 prisoners, up to 80 vehicles, 20 motorcycles, 1 rifle battery, 13 machine guns, 7 warehouses (including 5 with food). The battalion lost 3 people. The operation was carried out so successfully that later, using the example of Borisov, they taught the officers how to smash the enemy with "little blood, a mighty blow".

Ferry Bespyatova in the Shumilino area

In the area of \u200b\u200bthe populated center of Shumilino, the 935th Infantry Regiment of the 306th Infantry Division of the 43rd Army under the command of A.I. Bespyatov made a breakthrough in the German defense by forcing the Western Dvina under heavy enemy fire. Bespyatov's regiment was the first to seize the bridgehead on the left bank of the Western Dvina, expand it, and this area then became an army crossing. After crossing the Western Dvina, part of the 43rd Army went to join the 39th Army, while the other continued to advance westward towards the city of Lepel. Not far from this city, Bespyatov's regiment surrounded the SS battalion and completely destroyed it.

The feat of mortar Borodulin

During the Vitebsk operation, the Katyusha gunner, a fighter of the 3rd separate guards mortar regiment S. D. Borodulin, distinguished himself, for whom the battle near Vitebsk was the last. His "Katyusha" at the crossing over the small Obolyanka River was attacked by the enemy from the nearby forest. Although the Katyusha mortar was not intended for direct fire, the mortars decided to take the battle and unleashed heavy fire on the Germans. The Nazis used artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns. From the explosion of a shell, Borodulin's Katyusha caught fire, the combat crew, which consisted of several fighters, was burned and choked with smoke. According to the surviving eyewitnesses, Borodulin with the words "Let's die, but we won't let the goats pass!" managed to fire one more, last, volley at the Nazis. Borodulin Sergey Dmitrievich, chauffeur-senior driver of the combat installation of the guard, senior sergeant Nazarenko Pavel Ivanovich and the commander of the M-8 gun of the guard, sergeant Svetlichny Timofey Ivanovich burned down along with the installation.

The feat of Yuri Smirnov

The commander of the section of the 77th Guards Rifle Regiment (26th Guards Rifle Division, 11th Guards Army, 3rd Belorussian Front) of the Guard Junior Sergeant Yuri Smirnov on the night of June 25, 1944 was part of a tank landing when breaking through the enemy defense on Orsha direction. In the battle for the village of Shalashino, Orsha district, Vitebsk region of Belarus, he was seriously wounded and captured by the enemy. The Nazis subjected the Soviet soldier to brutal torture, but the courageous fighter did not give the enemy military secrets. The Nazis crucified Yuri Smirnov on the wall of the dugout, stabbed his body with bayonets.

Guard junior sergeant Yu.V. Smirnov died a hero's death, remaining faithful to the soldier's duty and military oath until the last minute of his life. His feat is an example of soldier's valor, selfless loyalty to the Motherland.

Assault on the "Cemetery"

In June 1944, Guard Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike took command of the machine-gun company of the 56th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 19th Guards Division of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps.

At 6 o'clock in the morning on the 20th of June, after a 3-hour artillery raid, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps occupied 3 lines of fortifications of the Nazi invaders, but further enemy counterattacks did not allow us to advance further. In front of the 56th Guards Rifle Regiment, on a hill, there was a cemetery, which was the dominant height on the battlefield. All attacks to this height were repulsed by the enemy. There were large losses of tanks and self-propelled guns when trying to occupy this height.

The regiment commander set a combat mission for the guard lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike: “Gather the combat guard officers and soldiers. Create an assault company and take the cemetery. " Guard Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike understood that the order was difficult to carry out, but using tactics and experience of combat, as well as knowledge of the enemy's psychology, a bold decision was made: to install machine guns in such a way as to provide strong and aimed fire to accompany the assault company during the enemy's departure for lunch ...

The enemy machine gunners on duty could not stop the attacks of the Soviet guards, at the head of the company shouting "Hurray!" Guards Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike walked along with his close friend of the Guards Senior Lieutenant Innocent Pavlov. The “Cemetery” height was taken almost without losses. The fighting continued until the evening. The enemy, leaving the cover group, began to withdraw. The Soviet guards continued to fight and pursue the enemy in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on the next line.

Vitebsk-Orshanskaya offensive was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts in order to defeat the troops of the left wing of Army Group Center and create favorable conditions for a further offensive.

In Vitebsk-Lepel and orsha directions the troops of the German 3rd Tank Army and part of the forces of the 4th Army of Army Group Center were defended (in total, up to 17 divisions with a total strength of up to 140 thousand people). Their actions were supported by the 6th Air Fleet.

The 1st Baltic Front included the 4th Shock Army, the 6th Guards Army, the 43rd Army, the 3rd Air Army, and the 1st Panzer Corps with a total strength of over 220 thousand people.

The 3rd Belorussian Front included 39 Army, 5 Army, 11 Guards Army, 31 Army, 5 Guards. Tank Army, KMG (3rd Guards MK and 3rd Guards KK), 1st Air Army and 2nd Guards. shopping mall with a total number of more than 210 thousand people.

The concept of the operation provided for the breakthrough of the shock groupings of the fronts (6th Guards Army, 43rd Army, 1TK - 1st Baltic Front; 39th Army, 5th Army, KM G - 3rd Belorussian Front) enemy defenses north-west and south of Vitebsk, forcing The Western Dvina River and the encirclement with the subsequent destruction of the Vitebsk grouping of the German 3rd Tank Army with the simultaneous development of the offensive on Lepel and Senno. In addition, the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front (11 Guards A, 31 A, 2 Guards TK) were to defeat the formations of the German 4th Army in the Orsha region and capture the city. Subsequently, introducing into the breakthrough 5 Guards. Tank Army, develop an offensive in the Borisov direction.

On June 23, after conducting preliminary aviation training, the troops launched an offensive. Connections 6 Guards. During the day of the battle, the armies and 43 armies advanced up to 16 km in depth, expanding the penetration to 30 km. The 39th Army and the 5th Army were successfully advancing in the Bogushevsky direction. Having cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway, they advanced 10-13 km, expanding the breakthrough to 50 km. On the Orsha direction 11 Guards. The Army and 31st Army met stubborn resistance from the enemy and advanced to a shallow depth.

By the end of June 24, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. Western Dvina on the Beshenkovichi-Gnezdilovichi section, and the 6th Guards formations. The armies crossed it. The troops of the northern grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front overcame the enemy's resistance and, repelling his counterattacks, advanced 10-16 km, captured the city of Bogushevsk. On June 25, troops of the 43rd Army crossed the river. Western Dvina, by the end of the day they reached the Gnezdilovichi area and established direct contact with the troops of the 39th Army that had left here, part of whose forces broke into Vitebsk from the east.

Five divisions of the German 3rd Panzer Army were surrounded and cut apart at the same time. On June 26, the city was completely liberated; on June 27, the entire enemy grouping ceased resistance.

To develop success in the Bogushevsky direction on June 24, in lane 5, the Army entered the battle of KM G, which on June 25 liberated the city of Senno and cut the railway. On the same day, in band 5, the Army was introduced into the breakthrough of the 5th Guards. The Panzer Army, which cut the enemy's communications west of Orsha the next day.

On the morning of June 26, entered into a breakthrough in the 11th Guards. And the 2nd Guards TK began to bypass Orsha from the northwest. On June 27, Orsha was liberated by the troops of the 11th Guards. Army and 31st Army.

On June 28, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Zaozerie - Lepel line, and the 3rd Belorussian Front - to the r. Berezina north of Borisov.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated, the troops advanced 80-150 km. Conditions were created for the development of the offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions.

By June 22, 1944, preparations for a large operation of strategic importance in Belarus were completed. On June 22, Soviet troops conducted reconnaissance in force. The forward battalions, supported by artillery fire and tanks, wedged themselves into the defenses in a number of sectors and captured the first enemy trenches.

On June 23, the main forces of the three Soviet fronts launched an offensive. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts delivered the main blows in the Vitebsk, Bogushevsk, and Orsha directions. The 2nd Belorussian Front was advancing in the Mogilev direction. The 1st Belorussian Front launched a decisive offensive a day later - on June 24. Rokossovsky's armies delivered the main blow in the Bobruisk direction.

A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is crossing the Luchesa River. June 1944

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

1st Baltic Front. During reconnaissance in force on June 22, the forward battalions of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General Ruchkin from the 6th Guards Army (6 GA) broke through the enemy's tactical defenses and advanced 4-6 km. There was a threat to the flank and rear of the German 9th Army Corps. The German command was forced to begin the transfer of part of the tactical reserves of the 9th corps to the area east of Obol. As a result, the Germans were deprived of reserves on the first day, which facilitated the offensive of the 6th Guards Army and the 43rd Army. The forward battalions of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Civil Aviation and the 1st Rifle Corps of 43A also achieved some successes, wedging into the enemy's defenses.

The success of June 22 led to significant adjustments to the artillery offensive plan. So, in 6 GA, the time for artillery preparation was reduced and the amount of artillery attracted was reduced to 50%. On the morning of June 23, the shock group of the 1st Baltic Front - the 6th Guards Army under the command of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov, went on the offensive. The infantry, supported by tanks of close support, aviation and artillery, broke through the enemy's front in a sector of 30 km.

Soviet troops began to advance rapidly in the western direction. The Germans tried to hold back the Soviet offensive with artillery fire and infantry counterattacks with forces from company to battalion, supported by groups of tanks of 3-8 vehicles. However, Soviet troops continued their offensive. The 1st Rifle Corps 43 A, with the support of 6 GA units, bypassed the strong resistance node of Shumilino from the flanks and rear and after a short but stubborn battle captured the village. The garrison of the strongpoint was partly destroyed, partly surrendered.

Calculation of the Soviet 122-mm howitzer M-30 in the battle against German tanks. 3rd Belorussian Front

On the first day of the offensive, the Soviet command planned to bring Butkov's 1st Panzer Corps into battle. He was supposed to advance in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The corps began advancing at 10 o'clock (it was located 14-18 km from the forward edge), but the rain significantly impaired traffic on the roads, and outside of them, on swampy terrain, the movement of tanks was almost impossible. As a result, the tankers could not enter the battle until dark. By this time, the infantry with support tanks was fighting in the area of \u200b\u200binter-lake defiles to the west and south-west of Shumilin. Due to a significant delay and the presence of difficult terrain ahead - inter-lake defiles, the front commander Baghramyan forbade the introduction of a tank corps into battle, until the infantry overcame the inter-lake defiles.

The 23rd Guards and 1st Rifle Corps advanced 16 km in one day. On the right flag of the 6th GA, the 22nd Guards Corps, overcoming stubborn resistance from the enemy's tactical reserves, advanced 2-7 km. On the same day, at the junction of two guards corps, part of the forces of the 103rd rifle corps of the 6th GA was brought into battle. The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps was concentrated for the offensive.

Clouds and variable rain somewhat limited the actions of Soviet aviation, but it made 746 sorties (435 of them were assault). The German Air Force on this day was limited to intelligence.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General of the Army I.Kh. Baghramyan and the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation

Thus, already on the first day of the offensive of the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front, major successes were achieved. The enemy's front was broken through. The German 9th Army Corps was defeated, its units, abandoning equipment (6 tanks, 66 guns and other and property were captured), hastily retreated to the western and southern banks of the Western Dvina. From the remnants of the corps and the transferred reserves, the German command tried to create a stable defense in the Obol region and on the Western Dvina, preventing the expansion of the gap. The Soviet command, in order to maintain the pace of the offensive and prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on new lines, formed forward mobile detachments, reinforced with tanks and artillery.

On June 24, the Soviet armies continued their offensive, expanding the gap to 90 km along the front and 25-30 km in depth. The Germans fiercely resisted - Soviet troops repulsed 27 counterattacks. By the end of the day, 6 GA reached the Western Dvina. The forward detachments crossed the river on the move and captured small bridgeheads. The 43rd Army, continuing to advance in the southwestern direction, also reached the Western Dvina. The 1st Rifle Corps, under the command of Vasiliev, immediately occupied bridgeheads on the southern bank of the river. On the left flank of 43 A, units of the 92nd Rifle Corps broke through the German defenses and reached the distant approaches to Vitebsk (8 km north of the city). On the right flank of the front, the offensive of Malyshev's 4th Shock Army was unsuccessful. The Germans put up stubborn resistance, and units of the 4th Shock Army were unable to break through the enemy's defenses.

The 1st Panzer Corps began to move towards the Western Dvina. However, the few roads after the rains became impassable, almost all the bridges were destroyed by the Germans, they had to be restored. In addition, the roads were clogged with second echelons, artillery, pontoons and carts of the advancing armies. Numerous traffic jams have formed. Only after it was possible to organize the movement, tanks, artillery and pontoons were passed forward. The tank corps reached the Western Dvina only towards the end of the day and began preparations for the crossing of the arm. The planes of the 3rd Air Army made 1,127 sorties that day (weather conditions improved).

By the end of the second day of the offensive, units 43 A of the 1st Baltic Front and 39 A of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the rear of the enemy's Vitebsk grouping. The German command, trying to prevent the catastrophe that threatened the Vitebsk grouping and prevent the Red Army from crossing the Western Dvina, hastily pulled together reserves and troops from other directions. Two infantry divisions began to be transferred to the Polotsk area from the Idritsa direction; two security divisions, as well as various sapper, construction, security, penalty and other units were sent to the line of the Western Dvina. The 212nd Infantry Division was transferred from the Pskov region.

Forcing the Western Dvina. Units 6 GA and 43 A, without waiting for the approach of pontoon connections, immediately began to cross the river on various improvised floating crafts. Regimental, divisional artillery and part of anti-tank artillery regiments and light cannon artillery brigades were transported on rafts shot down by the artillerymen themselves. This artillery played an important role in holding and expanding the bridgeheads.

The crossing of tanks across the Western Dvina. 1st Baltic Front

The German command, striving at all costs to stop the Soviet offensive, threw hastily assembled units into battle. The Soviet troops located on the bridgeheads were subjected to numerous violent counterattacks. However, the German attacks failed to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. All day on June 25, the crossing of the Soviet units continued. So, he crossed the river and expanded the previously captured bridgehead of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps. By the end of the day, sappers set up pontoon crossings, which significantly accelerated the transfer of artillery and tanks. Units 6 GA and 43 A by the end of the day liberated the city of Beshenkovichi. Formations 43 A, together with the troops of the 39th Army, completed the encirclement of the enemy's Vitebsk grouping. On the same day, a ferry crossing was set up for the transfer of the tank corps. It should be noted that the striking force of this corps could not be used in this operation.

On June 26, the troops of the front shock group marched 10-20 km in battles. The German command with the remnants of the defeated units and the introduction of new divisions (290th Infantry and 221st Security) tried to halt the Soviet offensive. During the day, Soviet troops repelled up to 30 counterattacks, each with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment supported by 10-12 tanks. The 43rd Army took part in the liquidation of the Vitebsk grouping with part of its forces. The Luftwaffe, like the previous days, was not active. Thus, on June 25-26, Baghramyan's front solved the difficult task of crossing such a large water barrier as the Western Dvina. Less significant water barriers were also overcome - the Ulla and Svechanka rivers. The bridgehead was deepened to 18 km.

On June 27-28, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front developed an offensive in the western direction. The 100th Rifle Corps was included in the 4th Shock Army, and Malyshev's army regrouped its forces for the subsequent offensive on Polotsk. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th GA took a strong enemy stronghold of Obolon. Troops of the 43rd Army, with the assistance of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, stormed an important stronghold and a junction of highways - Lepel. The 1st Panzer Corps, after crossing the Ulla River, together with units of the 2nd Guards Corps of the 6th GA, took the enemy's stronghold, Kamen.

As a result, in six days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front successfully completed the task set by the Headquarters. The shock group of the front broke through the enemy's defenses, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, destroyed the Vitebsk grouping, crossed the Western Dvina, Svechanka, Ulla and, advancing with the left wing 80 km, occupied large strongholds of the Wehrmacht - Beshenkovichi and Lepel. During this time, Soviet troops destroyed more than 25 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and a lot of military equipment, including 51 aircraft, 322 guns. More than 5 thousand people were captured, 474 guns, more than 1400 vehicles and other weapons and equipment became Soviet trophies.

The offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front

On June 22, in the afternoon, the forward battalions of the divisions of the first echelon of Krylov's 5th Army, with the support of artillery, went on the offensive and with a powerful, sudden blow broke into the first enemy trench and captured it. Building on the first success, the advanced units advanced 2-4 km. At the same time, in the direction of the main attack, Soviet soldiers captured not only the first trench, but the second and third. The Germans counterattacked, trying to restore the situation, but their blows were repelled. In this direction, Soviet troops defeated two regiments of the 299th Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps and a penal battalion.

At the same time, the forward battalions of the 11th Guards Army of Galitsky attacked the German positions. They advanced along the Minsk highway. The advance units of the army broke into the first trench. However, they met strong resistance and could not advance further. Here the German troops relied on well-fortified positions. The forward battalions of Glagolev's 31st Army were unsuccessful. In the Orsha direction, the defense was held by the German 78th assault division of the 27th army corps, it was well-equipped and reinforced with about 50 assault guns.

Reconnaissance in force showed that the Germans have the weakest defense in the Bogushevsky direction. Five battalions of 5A penetrated deeply into the enemy's defenses and captured several small bridgeheads on the Sukhodrovka River. At night, engineering units of 5A built three 60-ton bridges across the river for crossing tanks and artillery, and three light bridges for vehicles. In addition, on the very first day of the battle, the German command used all the divisional reserves and the reserve of the 6th corps - parts of the 14th infantry division in the 5A offensive zone. As a result, the Germans did not have the strength to parry the blow of the main forces of the 5th Soviet Army.

Battery of heavy howitzers B-4. 3rd Belorussian Front

On June 23, a powerful artillery strike was delivered to the enemy positions. The first 5 minutes - fire raid of all artillery, 105 minutes - the period of destruction of German defensive structures with aimed fire, 20 minutes - the destruction of fortifications with direct fire, and 40 minutes - suppression of the leading edge and the nearest depth. In band 5 A, changes were made to the artillery preparation: the artillery fire was shifted into the depth of the enemy's defense.

15 minutes before the start of the assault on German positions, the Soviet Air Force inflicted an assault bombing strike on German troops. German fighters in groups of 4-6 vehicles tried to hinder Soviet attacks, but without much success. The 1st Air Army maintained air supremacy. In just a day, Soviet aircraft made 1,769 sorties, conducted 28 air battles and shot down 15 enemy aircraft.

At 9 o'clock, the Soviet infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire front. The 39th army of Lyudnikov broke through the enemy's front for 6 km and crossed the Luchesa River. At the forefront of the blow was the 5th Guards Rifle Corps. While advancing in a westerly direction, the Guards Corps advanced 12-13 km and intercepted the Vitebsk-Orsha railway. During the battle, the army defeated the 197th Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps. An attempt by the Germans to stop the Soviet offensive with the help of part of the forces of the 95th Infantry Division failed. German troops were driven back to the west.

Krylov's 5th Army delivered the main blow with its right flank. Units of the 72nd and 65th rifle corps attacked here. Formations 5 A widened the breakthrough to 35 km and advanced up to 10 km. The army crossed the Luchessa and cut the Vitebsk - Orsha railway. Opposing 5A, the 299th Infantry Division of the 6th Corps was defeated.

Galitsky's 11th Guards Army also hacked into enemy defenses, advancing to a depth of 2 to 8 km. On the left flank, in the strip of the Minsk highway, Soviet troops met a powerful enemy defense. Therefore, the command of the army, with the permission of the front commander, decided to transfer the main blow from the left flank to the right, to the zone of the 16th Rifle Corps, where success was outlined.

The 31st army of Glagolev wedged into the enemy's defenses by 3 km and fought stubborn battles with German troops. The German infantry, supported by tanks, constantly counterattacked. In this direction, the German command advanced from the reserve up to two infantry regiments reinforced with tanks and artillery.

As a result, the front's right flank achieved the greatest successes. Parts of the 39th and 5th armies broke through the German defenses 10-13 km in depth and expanded the penetration to 30 km. The armies that were advancing in the center and on the left flank encountered more serious enemy resistance. In addition, the most developed enemy defenses were located here. They wedged themselves into the enemy's defenses, but could not break through.

On June 24, units of the 39th Army entered the Ostrovno area. Soviet troops intercepted the Wehrmacht's escape routes from Vitebsk to the southwest. At the same time, units of the 84th Rifle Corps reached the eastern outskirts of the city. The Germans offered stubborn resistance. The 5th Army, overcoming the resistance of the defeated divisions and the arriving German reserves, advanced 10-14 km. At 21:00, after a powerful bombing attack by 270 bombers and attack aircraft, Soviet soldiers with a swift blow from the north broke through the German defensive formations and took Bogushevsk, an important enemy stronghold, by storm. In this case, 24 guns were captured. In connection with the success of 5 A in the zone of its offensive, the cavalry-mechanized group of Oslikovsky was introduced into the breakthrough.

The 11th Guards Army, using the success achieved by the right flank, captured the regional center of Babinovichi and defeated several enemy regiments in its area. By the end of the day, the troops of the 11th Army expanded the penetration to 30 km and advanced to a depth of 14 km. The 31st Army, repelling the enemy's fierce counterattacks, advanced insignificantly.

On June 25, Chernyakhovsky's armies continued to develop the offensive. The left flank of 39 A reached the southern bank of the Western Dvina in the Dorogokupovo, Gnezdilovichi area. Here the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front joined forces with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. As a result, the encirclement around the enemy's Vitebsk grouping was closed. In this regard, Tippelskirch noted that three divisions were cut off by the enemy and soon destroyed. In fact, in the Vitebsk region, F. Gollwitzer's 53rd army corps was surrounded - the 206th and 246th infantry, the 6th airfield and part of the 4th airfield divisions, as well as the 197th infantry division of the 6th corps. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, Reinhardt, offered to withdraw the troops, but Hitler initially forbade the corps to retreat, and when permission was received, it was too late.

At the same time, center 39 A took over the eastern part and center of Vitebsk with a decisive attack. The encircled German units launched up to 18 counterattacks against the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, desperately trying to break through to the west and southwest, but all enemy attacks were repelled.

The mechanized cavalry group of Oslikovsky captured the city of Senno in a swift dash. The forward detachments of KMG cut the Lepel-Orsha railway. The troops of the 5th Army, building on the success of the KMG, advanced 20 km, destroying the scattered enemy units along the way. Army units liberated more than 100 settlements. In addition, taking into account the great success in the 5th Army's offensive zone, where Soviet troops broke through all German defensive lines and broke into the operational space, at the direction of the representative of the Vasilevsky Headquarters in the Bogushevsky direction, they decided to throw the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Rotmistrov into battle ...

The 11th GA successfully attacked and broke through two fortified enemy lines. On June 25, in the offensive zone, 11 GA was led into a breakthrough by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps under the command of Burdeyny. He received the task to intercept German communications: the Minsk road northwest of Orsha and the Orsha-Lepel railway. The 31st Army on the right flank broke through the German defenses on the Dnieper.

Thus, in three offensives, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front completely broke through the German defenses. Soviet troops advanced from 30 to 50 km in depth and on a front of 100 km. The Vitebsk and Orsha groupings were disunited, and five enemy divisions were surrounded in the Vitebsk region. Seven German divisions were defeated or suffered heavy losses. All this time, Soviet aviation firmly maintained its air supremacy, destroying 52 enemy aircraft and making more than 2,500 thousand sorties just to attack or bombard enemy forces.

The German command, having lost the main defensive line and being defeated in the Vitebsk and Bogushevsk directions, withdrew the rear of the 3rd Panzer and 4th armies to the line of the Berezina River. At the same time, the Germans tried to delay the advance of the Soviet troops at intermediate lines. The German command began to introduce operational reserves into battle. The Germans continued to provide especially fierce resistance in the Orsha direction. Trying to hold the Minsk road, the German command transferred the 260th infantry division from the Kopys area and the 286th security division from the Tolochin area to this direction.

Fight in the station area. Vitebsk

Liquidation of the Vitebsk group

On June 25, the Vitebsk group was split into two parts. On the night of June 26, units of the 39th and 43rd armies completely liberated Vitebsk. During June 26, the surrounded group tried to break out of the encirclement ring. The Germans made up to 22 counterattacks with forces from one to two regiments supported by tanks, assault guns and artillery. As a result of fierce battles, part of the Vitebsk group with heavy losses tore into the forests in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Moshno. However, the narrow corridor was soon closed. The commander of the front Chernyakhovsky ordered to turn three divisions of the 5th army, the German group of about 5 thousand soldiers that had broken through was again surrounded around Lake Moshno.

In the afternoon of the 26th, units of the 39th and 43rd armies continued to compress the encircled enemy groups. At the same time, the Soviet Air Force delivered powerful bombing and assault strikes against them. On the morning of June 27, Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive and broke the enemy's resistance. Most of the Germans were killed. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps Gollwitzer, his chief of staff, Colonel Shimidt, and a number of other senior officers surrendered. Among those who surrendered were also divisional commanders: Müller-Bülllow (246th Infantry Division), Hitter (206th Infantry Division).

One German group - the remnants of the 4th airfield division of General R. Pistorius and other units (about 8 thousand people in total), was able to break through in the direction of Beshenkovichi. However, it ran into the forces of the 1st Baltic Front and was destroyed in the Yakubovshchina area. Special detachments of Soviet divisions continued to pursue and destroy small enemy groups until 28 June. As a result, the Germans lost 20 thousand people killed and 10 thousand prisoners. The entire Vitebsk enemy grouping was destroyed. So, according to V. Haupt, from the 53rd Army Corps, only two hundred men broke through to the German units, and the 6th Corps was defeated and suffered heavy losses.

Member of the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front V.E. Makarov, A.M. Vasilevsky and I.D. Chernyakhovsky interrogate the commander of the 206th Infantry Division A. Hitter

Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General I.D. Chernyakhovsky interrogating the commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of the Infantry F. Gollwitzer, and the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General A. Hitter

Defeat of the Orsha group

The mechanized cavalry group continued to develop the offensive in the western and southwestern directions. The cavalrymen of Oslikovsky freed Oboltsy and Smolyany from the Nazis, creating a threat from the northern direction for the Orsha group of the Wehrmacht. Rotmistrov's army liberated Tolochin. As a result, the main communications of German troops in the Orsha region were cut. The Germans tried to repulse Tolochin with strong counterattacks, but did not succeed.

At the same time, Burdeyny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps intercepted the Minsk road 15 km north-west of Orsha and continued moving southward. 11th GA on June 26 went to the north-western outskirts of Orsha. 31 A took a strong enemy stronghold Dubrovno. Thus, the Soviet troops created a threat to the northern flank and rear of the Orsha grouping. German counterattacks were unsuccessful. It was necessary to withdraw the troops so that they would not suffer the fate of the Vitebsk group.

On the morning of June 27, 31 A broke through the outer defense belt of Orsha and burst into the city. The troops of the 11th Civil Aviation also took part in the liberation of the city. The city was soon liberated from the enemy. On the same day, Rotmistrov's tankmen, developing an offensive along the Minsk road, liberated Bobr, Krupki and reached the Borisov area. The mechanized cavalry group of Oslikovsky went to the area south of the Kholopenichi. On June 28, the front's troops covered from 22 to 38 km. KMG Oslikovsky assisted the forces of the 1st Baltic Front in the liberation of Lepel and went to the Berezina.

The defeated troops of the German 3rd Tank and 4th Armies retreated with their left flank and center to the Berezina. At the same time, they continued to offer stubborn resistance on the right wing, trying to keep Borisov and cover the retreat of the Mogilev group, which was defending itself in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front. So, parts of the tank army of Rotmistrov collided with the formations of the German 5th Panzer Division, which was transferred to the Borisov direction.

The retreat of the Germans from Orsha

Outcome

For five days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts fully completed the tasks assigned to them. The northern flank of Army Group Center was destroyed, and thus the Red Army took the first step towards the destruction of the entire Minsk grouping.

The 1st Baltic Front under the command of Baghramyan broke through the enemy's defenses, forced the Western Dvina, liberated Beshenkovichi and Lepel, contributed to the liberation of Vitebsk and the destruction of the enemy's Vitebsk grouping.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Chernyakhovsky broke through the enemy's defenses, destroyed the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, and defeated the Orsha grouping. Orsha, Vitebsk and more than 1600 settlements were liberated. Soviet troops advanced 115 km in depth, creating a breakthrough of 150 km along the front.

The German 53rd Army Corps was destroyed or captured, the 6th and 9th Army Corps suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. The Germans lost only in killed more than 40 thousand people, captured more than 18 thousand soldiers and officers. 126 tanks and assault guns were destroyed, more than 1,000 guns and mortars, etc. Soviet trophies were about 70 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1,100 guns and mortars, more than 3,000 vehicles, 32 steam locomotives, more than 1 , 5 thousand cars, 255 warehouses with weapons, ammunition, provisions, equipment, etc. Soviet aviation destroyed over 70 German aircraft in air battles and on the ground.

Sappers clearing mines in Vitebsk

Ctrl Enter

Spotted Osh S bku Highlight text and press Ctrl + Enter

The 3rd Belorussian Front, led by General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky, supported the Orsha and Vitebsk campaigns with its flanks. Overall, this deep interaction between the fronts allows us to view both operations as a whole.

On the night of June 23, 1944, before the start of the general assault on the Panther line, front and long-range aviation began a massive air raid. Both enemy communications and firing defensive positions revealed during the reconnaissance in force carried out the day before were subjected to attacks.

At dawn, the artillery took the initiative... After a two-hour powerful artillery attack, the shock armies of the three fronts went over the offensive.

The most fierce battles unfolded for Vitebsk and Orsha, turned into powerful centers of resistance. The Hitlerite command attached particular importance to the retention of these cities due to the fact that Vitebsk opened the road to the Baltic States, and the shortest road to Minsk went through Orsha.

During the first day of the offensive, the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies of the 1st Baltic Front hacked the German defenses north of Vitebsk and advanced 15-20 kilometers inland along the front.

South of Vitebsk, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front successfully operated... By the end of the day, the 30th and 5th armies of the front managed to break through the enemy's defenses by 10-15 kilometers along the front 50 kilometers.

It should be noted that the 39th Army of Lieutenant General II Lyudnikov, advancing south of Vitebsk, which practically did not have a numerical superiority in men over the enemy, had to regroup its forces to achieve success, concentrating the maximum possible on the direction of the main attack. Standing in the way of the offensive of the army The 6th German Army Corps was dismembered and lost control... During the very first days of the offensive, the corps commander and all divisional commanders were killed. The remains of the corps in small groups began to retreat through forests and swamps. Successfully placed smoke screens in some sectors of the front reduced the losses of the attackers, forcing the Germans to fire at random. The advance of the fronts continued with an unrelenting pace the next day. On this day, the garrison in Shumilino was completely destroyed, surrounded the day before by units of the 43rd Army. With the introduction of the main forces of the 60th Rifle Corps into battle, the pace of its advance increased.

A day ahead of schedule, by the end of the day on June 24, the forward units of the 1st Baltic Front reached the shores of the Western Dvina and began to force it on the move, capturing five bridgeheads on the southern coast.

It was important to cross the river right away in order to prevent the retreating enemy from gaining a foothold. Due to the strong muddy roads, the rear, together with the crossing means, fell behind, and they had to carry out the crossing with improvised means. It was announced to the soldiers that those who were the first to cross the river would be nominated for the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union."

Soldiers and officers showed massive heroism in carrying out this task. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Bui, the advance units of the 212nd Rifle Corps reached the Western Dvina. One of the first to cross the river was platoon commander Vladimir Dolgov. On a makeshift raft in front of him, he was pushing a light machine gun... The crossing was carried out under continuous enemy fire. While still in the water, the lieutenant was wounded in the arm, but swam. With machine gun fire, driving the Germans away from the coast, he was able to ensure the crossing of his soldiers, whom he led to the attack. The enemy was driven back. Already twice wounded, the fearless lieutenant, reflecting the next counterattack, was killed. But the entire regiment was already landing on the bridgehead captured by his soldiers.

Vladimir Konstantinovich Dolgov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke into the enemy's defenses, and the command brought armored troops into the resulting breakthrough. The 4th Guards Tank Brigade of Guards Colonel Oleg Alexandrovich Losik received the task to break through to the railway and the Moscow-Minsk highway and close the Nazis' escape routes from Orsha.

At dawn on June 26, a platoon of the party organizer of the Guard Lieutenant Sergei Mitt company reached the line of the Adrov River.

The river is not wide, but deep. The success of the operation depended on how quickly the tanks managed to cross the water barrier.... The village of Rukli had a ferry, securely guarded by artillery and self-propelled guns. It was necessary to capture and hold the bridge until the main forces of the brigade approached and prevent the Germans from blowing it up. The command tank rushed towards the crossing at top speed. The rest of the platoon's cars followed. With fire and tracks, Mitta's tank destroyed two anti-tank guns. Ahead two kilometers from the river, tanks overtook an enemy convoy with ammunition and other military supplies... Without slowing down the movement, the tankers fired machine guns at the German soldiers accompanying the cargo, defeated the column and made a swift rush to the main goal - the crossing. At the bridge, the tankers destroyed eight enemy self-propelled guns and a long-term firing point. Seeing our thirty-fours, the German miners rushed to the bridge to blow it up, but were destroyed by a machine-gun burst. It was no more than two hundred meters to the bridge when a shell hit the command tank and the vehicle caught fire. The path to the bridge was clear, but a burning car could explode on the bridge and destroy it. This could not be allowed. Unable to bring down the flames, clearing the way for the tanks coming behind, Sergei Mitt turned sharply off the road. The tank overturned into a ditch, there was a powerful explosion.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, the Guard Lieutenant Sergei Mikhailovich Mitt was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The crew of Sergei Mitta was buried in the village of Smolyany, Orsha district, Vitebsk region. A memorial plaque is installed on the school building in the village of Rosskiy Selets, Orsha District.

The Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut. Meanwhile, units of the 92nd Rifle Corps broke into the northwestern outskirts of Vitebsk. The fighting in the streets of Vitebsk continued for two more days. We had to fight for every street and every house, especially fiercely enemies defended key positions.

One of the units was ordered to prevent the explosion of the bridge across the Western Dvina. The bridge was well shot and guarded by the enemy. The command assigned six soldiers to neutralize the explosive device. At the entrance to the bridge I had to grapple hand to hand. German sappers have already set fire to the fuse-cord... Senior Sergeant Blokhin broke through to the bridge and, under fire, managed to pull out the fuses and neutralized the heavy charge in time.

But that was not enough. It was necessary to remove the electric blasting machine and eliminate the mechanical devices for the explosion. In carrying out these tasks, the senior sergeant still managed to shoot back from the enemies and destroyed seven enemy soldiers and officers. For the heroism and courage shown in the battles for the liberation of Vitebsk, the commander of the sapper platoon Senior Sergeant Fyodor Timofeevich Blokhin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the successful actions of the army of General Beloborodov, only a 10-kilometer gap remained between the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front. With a swift throw, our troops created a "bag", which got the Vitebsk group of German troops. The enemies tried to hold the remaining corridor, but their counterattacks were repulsed. On June 25, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts met in the Gnezdilovichi area. These were the 179th Rifle Division of the 43rd Army and the 19th Guards Rifle Division of the 39th Army. So the encirclement of the Vitebsk enemy grouping, which received the name "Vitebsk boiler".

Thus, five infantry divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht were surrounded. An ultimatum was presented to the German troops surrounded in Vitebsk and time is given to resolve the issue of surrender. However, no response was received. And only when the Soviet troops went to storm the city, the enemy began to surrender. Among the prisoners were four Hitlerite generals, who were kept separately from each other. A.M. Vasilevsky recalled that the captured commander of the 53rd Army Corps, Gollwitzer, for some reason was sure that his troops were still fighting, and asked to inform him about the course of the battle. What was his surprise when in response he was shown his own former subordinates and asked to inquire himself.

It should be noted that the threat of the encirclement of the Vitebsk garrison was obvious already on the first day of the offensive operation by Soviet troops. The commander of the 3rd German Tank Army appealed to the high command with a request to begin the corps' withdrawal from Vitebsk. However he received a positive answer only on June 25, when it was already late, and the encirclement ring around the city has already closed. The Nazis made repeated attempts to break out of the encirclement. In desperate attempts to escape from the Vitebsk cauldron, part of the encircled group tried to break through, hiding behind the civilian population. Having let the women and children pass, the Red Army soldiers stopped the breakthrough in a fierce hand-to-hand fight.

Home Encyclopedia War History Read more

Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation (June 22 - 28, 1944)

The crossing of tanks across the river. Western Dvina. 1st Baltic Front. Summer 1944

The Vitebsk-Orsha operation is an offensive operation by Soviet troops in Eastern Belarus, carried out with the aim of defeating the left wing of the German Army Group Center and creating favorable conditions for a further offensive. It was an integral part of the Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration".

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 1st Baltic (commanded by an army general) and the 3rd Belorussian (commanded by an army general) fronts were involved in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation. The general coordination of the actions of both fronts in the operation was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Scheme of the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation on June 23 - 28, 1944

Preparations for the upcoming hostilities began to be carried out in April 1944. During this time, the Supreme Command Headquarters allocated significant forces and resources from its reserve: to the 1st Baltic Front - the 1st Tank Corps; 3rd Belorussian Front - 11th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, 2nd Guards Tank, 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. In addition, by the beginning of the operation, the troops received a large number of separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and brigades, artillery, mortar and engineering formations and units, aviation corps and divisions, as well as various military equipment and marching replenishment. By the beginning of the operation, the overall superiority over the enemy reached: in people - 2 times, guns and mortars - 3.8 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations (assault guns) - 5.8 times, combat aircraft - 3.9 times ...

A significant amount of work was carried out on the material and technical support of the upcoming hostilities. By the beginning of the offensive, army stocks for various types of rations were: food - 12-20 days per day, fuel and lubricants - 3.4-4.2 refueling, ammunition - 2.2-4 ammunition.

The engineering troops of the 1st Baltic Front built 275 km and repaired 820 km of roads, erected bridges with a total length of 1.8 km. Very significant road works were carried out in the bands of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In addition, to overcome the swampy terrain in all formations, gats were laid in advance, drags for artillery and heavy machine guns, twig mats, and mopping for soldiers were harvested from scrap materials.

Partisans played a special role in preparing and conducting an offensive. They were supposed to disrupt communications and communication lines of German troops, destroy headquarters, disable manpower and military equipment, carry out reconnaissance in the interests of the advancing fronts, capture and hold advantageous lines and bridgeheads on rivers until the approach of formations and units of the Red Army, disrupt the export of the population and material assets to Germany. Fulfilling this task, only on June 20, partisan detachments blew up more than 40 thousand rails, and over the next 9 days - another 20 thousand. At a time when the command of the Army Group "Center" badly needed to transfer reserves to the areas of the breakthrough of Soviet troops, movement on the enemy roads were paralyzed. Moreover, only from 26 to 29 June, the partisans derailed 147 enemy trains.

On the whole, by the summer of 1944, a powerful, quantitatively and qualitatively, grouping of forces and equipment had been created, and the fronts participating in the operation took an advantageous operational position to cover the enemy grouping in Belarus from the flanks and isolate it from the North Army Groups.

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front by the beginning of the summer covered Vitebsk from the north and northeast and were on the near approaches to Polotsk. They were opposed by formations of the 1st Army Corps of the 16th Army of Army Group "North" (Colonel General G. Lindemann), as well as the 9th and 53rd Army Corps of the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group "Center" (General Field Marshal E. Bush). This group consisted of 728 field and 622 anti-tank guns, 823 mortars, 130 tanks and assault guns. In the plans of the German command, the Vitebsk region was given primary importance, since its retention ensured the maintenance of interaction between the army groups "Center" and "North". Therefore, the enemy, despite the disadvantageous outline of the line of contact of the sides, equipped several defensive lines on the approaches to Vitebsk. The first of them, covered with almost continuous combined wire and mine-explosive barriers, was located 10-15 km from the city. At 7-10 km from the forward edge, the second line passed, on the approaches to which there were obstacles, anti-tank ditches and minefields. The last line of trenches was dug directly on the outskirts of Vitebsk, the stone buildings of which formed the basis of numerous strong points.

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front united the 4th Shock, 6th Guards and 43rd Armies (eight rifle corps, 24 rifle divisions, one rifle brigade), one tank corps and various reinforcement equipment. The front had 687 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 4,926 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, 778 anti-tank artillery pieces. Air support for the offensive was carried out by the 3rd Air Army, which consisted of 900 aircraft.

The 3rd Belorussian Front occupied the line that it reached in the fall of the previous year. By the beginning of the Vitebsk-Orshan operation, he was opposed by the 53rd and 6th Army Corps of the 3rd Tank Army and the 27th Army Corps of the 4th Army of the enemy. They consisted of 14 divisions, 12 separate security regiments and up to 35 battalions of 25, in which there were more than 2.5 thousand guns and mortars, about 320 tanks and assault guns. Air support for this grouping from the air was carried out by up to 330 aircraft.

By the beginning of the operation, the 39th, 5th, 11th Guards and 31st armies, the 5th Guards Tank and 1st Air Armies, the 2nd Guards Tank Army, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Army and 3 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, separate formations and units of various types of troops. They had more than 8.3 thousand guns and mortars, 1.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 1.9 thousand aircraft. Front troops outnumbered the enemy in men - 1.7 times, in guns and mortars - 3.2 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns (assault guns), as well as in aircraft - 5.7 times.

In accordance with the concept of the operation, it was envisaged that the shock groupings of the 1st Baltic (6th Guards A, 43A, 1st Tank Corps) and the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian (39A, 5A, KMG) fronts to break through the enemy's defenses northwest and south of Vitebsk, cross the river. Western Dvina, to encircle and destroy the units and formations of the 3rd Panzer Army of the German troops. On the outer front of the encirclement, develop an offensive against Lepel and Senno.

At the same time, with a frontal strike by the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front (11 Guards A, 31 A, 2nd Guards Tank Corps), defeat the formations of the 4th Army of German troops in the Orsha region, capture the city and further develop the offensive in the Borisov direction ...

In order to break through the enemy defense in short time the front command decisively massed forces and equipment in the most important sectors. It concentrated up to 80% of artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery units in strips of strike groupings. This made it possible to create high operational densities. Superiority over the enemy in the areas of the breakthrough reached: in humans - 3-4 times, in artillery - 3 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns (assault guns) - 10 times.

The transition to the offensive of both fronts was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began on June 22 after a 20-minute artillery preparation. In a number of sectors, the forward battalions managed to penetrate the enemy defenses from 1.5 to 8 km. The German command, noted in the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Army for June 22, 1944, took reconnaissance in force as the beginning of the "expected big offensive", therefore, it brought in divisional and, in a number of sectors, corps reserves into the battle.

On the morning of June 23, after preliminary aviation training for enemy strongpoints and artillery, the main forces of the fronts went over to the offensive. During the day of the battle, the strike groupings of the fronts advanced up to 16 km in depth, creating passages from 30 to 50 km wide.

By the end of June 24, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. Western Dvina, and the neighboring 6th Guards Army crossed it. Formations and units of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front, overcoming enemy resistance, captured the city of Bogushevsk.

On June 25, troops of the 43rd Army crossed the river. Western Dvina and established in the Gnezdilovichi area interaction with units of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, completing the encirclement of Vitebsk. 5 German divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army with a total number of more than 40 thousand people were surrounded and at the same time cut into pieces.

The representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, demanded to forestall the enemy reserves that were advancing from the depths and prevent them from taking up defense in the zone of numerous lakes and rivers on the Polotsk-Lepel line. For these purposes, the front commander, General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, decided to immediately use the main forces of the front to develop the success of the offensive, and to eliminate the grouping surrounded in the Vitebsk region, allocate only the left flank formations of the 43rd Army. Together with units and formations of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, by 6 o'clock on June 26, Vitebsk was liberated, and on June 27, the entire enemy group, which was surrounded, ceased resistance.

At the same time, the main forces of the front continued to develop the offensive in the Polotsk and Lepel 'directions. By the end of June 28, units and formations of the 6th Guards Army reached the line 18-20 km southeast of Polotsk, and the troops of the 43rd Army, pursuing the retreating units of the 3rd German Tank Army, rushed into Lepel on the move and cleared it from the invader.

During the battles from 23 to 28 June, the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front overcame more than 80 km in difficult wooded and swampy terrain, having an average rate of advance of up to 14 km per day. During this period, she liberated 1,670 settlements, including such large ones as Shumilino, Ulla, Beshenkovichi and Lepel. At the same time, the front losses in the last decade of June amounted to 23,053 people, including 4,658 people killed.

The offensive of the main forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front was developing rapidly. By the end of the first day, the formations of the 39th Army advanced 12-14 km in depth, cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway, the Vitebsk-Beshenkovichi highway, and by the end of the day on June 24 they reached the eastern outskirts of Vitebsk and started street battles.

Soldiers of the 881st Infantry Regiment are fighting in the station area.
Vitebsk, June 1944

Fearing encirclement, the commander of the 3rd German Tank Army, Colonel-General G. Reinhardt, gave the order to withdraw his troops. Finding enemy columns on the Vitebsk-Beshenkovichi highway, the 1st Air Army formations subjected them to bombing strikes.

Using air support, units of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, together with the 28th Guards tank brigadereaching the southern bank of the Western Dvina, they cut off the enemy's escape routes from Vitebsk.

The enemy lost over 20 thousand people killed and more than 10 thousand prisoners, including the commander and chief of staff of the 53rd army corps.

Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General I.D. Chernyakhovsky interrogated the commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of the Infantry F. Gollwitzer, and the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General A. Hitter. Vitebsk region, 1944

In the period from 23 to 28 June, the formations of the 39th and 43rd armies destroyed and captured more than 1 thousand guns and mortars, about 3.9 thousand cars and motorcycles, 54 tanks and assault guns, 249 warehouses of military equipment.

Destroyed German vehicles on the highway near Vitebsk, June 1944

The main forces of the 5th, 11th Guards and 31st armies operating on the Bogushevsk and Orsha axes immediately broke through the enemy's defenses only in the zone of the 5th Army of Lieutenant General N.I. Krylov. Its connections have advanced 10-12 km. The formations of the 5th Army continued to develop the offensive in the depths of the enemy defense and reached the city of Bogushevsk. His assault was preceded by a massive strike from the 1st Air Army. Using its results, units of the 144th and 215th rifle divisions broke into the city and took it.

Sappers clearing mines in Vitebsk, 1944

Residents of liberated Vitebsk. June 1944

Presentation of awards to those who have distinguished themselves in battles. 1st Baltic Front.
Summer 1944

To consolidate further success, the cavalry-mechanized group of the guard of Lieutenant-General NS Oslikovsky was introduced into the breakthrough. Its 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, in cooperation with rifle divisions, captured the city of Senno on June 25 and cut the Lepel-Orsha railway by forward units, while the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps overcame the enemy's defenses on the move and began to pursue him.

In general, in the first three days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy's defenses in a strip 100 km wide from the Western Dvina to the Dnieper, advanced 30-50 km in depth, broke enemy resistance and created conditions for the development of the offensive on Borisov and coverage 4th German Army from the north and west.

In the zone of the 11th Guards Army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, the formations of the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps, which were delivering the main blow along the Minsk Highway, encountered strong enemy opposition and during the day advanced only 2 km forward. To change the situation, by order of the representative of the Headquarters of the VKG Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, a mobile group of the front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, was introduced into the breakthrough in the Bogushevsky direction.

Her swift actions liberated the city of Tolochin, cut the Moscow-Minsk highway, the Orsha-Minsk railway for 30 km, and made an exit to the rear of the German 27th Army Corps, which was defended at the Orsha resistance junction.

At the same time, the formations of the mechanized cavalry group (from the north) and the 11th Guards Army (from the north-west) approached Orsha. At 18: 20 on June 26, the storming of the city began, and by 23:00 street battles began. The enemy turned stone structures into powerful knots of resistance, and set up permanent firing points at all road junctions. To destroy and suppress them, 152-mm howitzers and combat vehicles of the 517th flamethrower tank regiment were used. By 9 o'clock on June 27, the formations of both armies completely captured the city. They seized nine train echelons, 15 steam locomotives, 1250 wagons, 37 guns, 19 tanks and armored vehicles, 161 tractors, 1950 vehicles and tractors, 23 various warehouses, as well as other weapons and property. The enemy lost more than 100 soldiers and officers in killed and taken prisoners.

Columns of German prisoners captured in Belarus, on the streets of Moscow.
July 17, 1944

Continuing the pursuit of German troops, units and formations of the front with the right wing and center by the end of June 28 reached the r. Berezina. The advance on his left wing of the front was shackled by stubborn enemy resistance.

As a result of the five-day offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy's defenses by 115 km in depth and expanded it up to 150 km along the front, liberating 1,674 settlements.

During the fighting, the 246th and 206th Infantry Divisions, the 4th and 6th Airfield Divisions were surrounded and destroyed, the 299th, 14th, 95th, 197th Infantry Divisions were defeated, heavy losses were inflicted on the 256th and 260th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 286th security divisions. The front losses from June 23 to the end of the month amounted to 51,526 people, of which 11,014 people were killed, as well as 318 tanks, 59 guns and mortars, 113 aircraft.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orshan operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated, Soviet troops advanced 80-150 km and favorable conditions were created for a further offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions.

A quick breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense was conditioned by the skillful choice of the directions of the main strikes, the suddenness of their delivery, the timely introduction of the second echelons and mobile groups into battle, the massing of forces and equipment in the directions of the main strikes, and the firm retention of air supremacy.

Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Nefediev,
candidate of political sciences,
Deputy Head of the Scientific Research Department
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.