A new book from the author of the bestsellers "Penal Battles and Barriers of the Red Army" and "Armored Forces of the Red Army." THE FIRST study of the history of the creation and combat use of Soviet tank armies during the Great Patriotic War.

They have come a long and difficult way from the first setbacks and defeats in 1942 to the triumph of 1945. They distinguished themselves in all major battles of the second half of the war - on the Kursk Bulge and in the battle for the Dnieper, in the Belorussian, Yasso-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic offensive operations. Possessing crushing power and phenomenal mobility, the guards tank armies became the elite of the Red Army and the main striking force of the "Russian-style blitzkriegs" that broke the back of the previously invincible Wehrmacht.

Vitebsk-Orshanskaya offensive

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to prepare and consistently conduct a series of strategic offensive operations in a vast area from the Arctic to the Black Sea. At the first stage of the campaign (June - August), it was envisaged to inflict powerful blows and alternately defeat large enemy groups: first on the Karelian Isthmus and in South Karelia, then on the central sector of the front, in Belarus, and then - in the western regions of Ukraine, on the Lvov-Sandomir direction. At the second stage (September - November), it was planned to conduct operations in the Balkans, in the Baltic States and in the Far North.

Naturally, the High Command of the Wehrmacht was also preparing for the summer-autumn campaign. But when assessing the possible actions of the Red Army, it made a serious miscalculation, believing that the main events would unfold not in the central, but in the southwestern direction. This blunder was skillfully used by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army.

In the plans of the Supreme Command Headquarters, priority in the future campaign was given to the central sector of the Soviet-German front. The liberation of Belarus was possible only if such a large enemy grouping as Army Group Center was destroyed (Field Marshal E. von Busch, since June 28 - Field Marshal V. Model). Together with the right-flank formations of the 16th Army of Army Group "North" and the left-flank formations of the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group "Northern Ukraine", it numbered 1.2 million people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns. They were supported and covered by about 1350 aircraft of the 6th and parts of the forces of the 1st and 4th air fleets. The main enemy forces were concentrated in the areas of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, where they covered the directions most accessible to the offensive. The enemy occupied a pre-prepared defense in depth (250-270 km) and had the task of firmly holding the Belarusian bulge, or, as the enemy called it, a “balcony” along which the shortest routes to the German borders passed. However, the enemy, misled and not expecting the main blow of the Red Army troops in Belarus, had insufficient reserves here, moreover, some of them were shackled by the actions of the partisans.

On May 20, 1944, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army A.I. Antonov introduced I.V. Stalin had a plan that provided for the simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy's defenses in six sectors, the dismemberment of his troops and the defeat in parts. Particular importance was attached to the elimination of the most powerful enemy flank groupings in the regions of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the rapid advance to Minsk, the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy forces east of Minsk at a depth of 200–300 km. The Soviet troops had to, stepping up their attacks and expanding the front of the offensive, relentlessly pursue the enemy, not allowing him to gain a foothold on intermediate lines. As a result of the successful implementation of the operation plan, which received the name Operation Bagration, it was supposed to liberate all of Belarus, reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and the borders of East Prussia, cut the enemy's front, create favorable conditions for strikes against him in the Baltic.

The operation involved the 1st Baltic (Army General I.Kh.Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian (Colonel General, since July 28 - Army General G.F. . Zakharov), 1st Belorussian (General of the Army, since June 29, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) fronts and the Dnieper military flotilla (Captain 1st rank V.V. Grigoriev); in total, more than 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, 5200 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported by the 1st (Aviation Colonel General T.T. Khryukin), 3rd (Aviation Colonel General N.F. Papivin), 4th (Aviation Colonel General K.A. Vershinin), 6th (Colonel-General of Aviation F.P. Polynin), 16th (Colonel-General of Aviation S.I. Rudenko) Air Armies; a total of 5300 aircraft; Long-range aviation was also involved (Marshal, since August 19 - Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov) - 1,007 aircraft and aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the country - 500 fighters. Partisans worked closely with the troops.

May 30 I.V. Stalin finally approved the plan for Operation Bagration, which it was decided to start on June 19–20. There were no major changes to the plan. Her idea remained the same. Marshal G.K. Zhukov was assigned to coordinate the actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky - 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

The idea of \u200b\u200bthe Belarusian strategic offensive operation at the initial stage was to defeat the enemy troops on the flanks of the Belarusian salient. And subsequently - in inflicting powerful dissecting blows in converging directions towards Minsk, encircling and destroying the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, it was planned to develop an offensive along the entire front from the Western Dvina to Pripyat, with access to the borders of East Prussia and the banks of the Vistula. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, in cooperation with the formations of the 3rd Belorussian Front, were to strike on the northern flank of the Belarusian salient, encircle and destroy the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and reach the Chashniki-Lepel region. It was assumed that at the same time the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front would crush the Bogushevsk-Orsha enemy grouping, delivering the main blow in the direction of Orsha, Borisov, Minsk.

The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front, advancing on the Mogilev direction, were supposed to pin down the main forces of the enemy's 4th army and prevent it from retreating beyond Minsk until it was completely surrounded by the troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded and destroyed the enemy's Bobruisk grouping and subsequently attacked Minsk from the southeast in cooperation with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

In order to misinform the enemy, the fronts were ordered to create at least three defensive lines at a depth of up to 40 km. The settlements were adapting to the all-round defense. Front-line, army and divisional newspapers published materials on defensive topics. As a result, the enemy's attention was largely diverted from the prepared offensive. The troops strictly observed the radio silence regime, and a narrow circle of people were involved in the development of the operation plan. Only six people knew the complete plan of Operation Bagration: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, his deputy, the chief of the General Staff and his first deputy, the chief of the Operations Directorate and one of his deputies. The regrouping of troops was carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. All movements were carried out only at night and in small groups.

In order to give the enemy the impression that the main blow will be delivered in the summer in the south, at the direction of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the right wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, north of Chisinau, a false grouping was created consisting of 9 rifle divisions reinforced with tanks and artillery. In this area, mock-ups of tanks and anti-aircraft artillery guns were installed, and fighters patrolled in the air.

As a result, the enemy failed to reveal either the plan of the Soviet Supreme Command, the scale of the upcoming offensive, or the direction of the main attack. Therefore, Hitler of 34 tank and mechanized divisions kept 24 formations south of Polesie.

According to intelligence, the 53rd and 6th Army Corps of the 3rd Tank Army defended in front of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Vitebsk and Bogushevsk directions, and the 27th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army in Orsha. They were part of Army Group Center. During the operation, the enemy could pull up strategic reserves and strengthen Army Group Center by up to 50% additional artillery, tanks, aircraft and people. Half of them may be against the 3rd Belorussian Front.

During the preparatory period, all types of reconnaissance established that the enemy's tactical defense zone includes two zones. The first strip has two or three positions, each of which has two or three continuous trenches. The second strip is less prepared. In addition, defensive lines were created in the operational depth, especially along the banks of the Berezina and Shchara rivers. One of the vulnerable aspects of the enemy's defense was the insufficient echeloning of the operational formation of Army Group Center. The infantry was mainly located on the first defensive line.

In total, by the beginning of the operation, the 3rd Belorussian Front consisted of 1169 tanks, 641 self-propelled guns, 1175 anti-tank guns (45-mm and 57-mm), 2893 guns (76-mm and above), 3552 mortars, 689 rocket launchers, 792 anti-aircraft guns , 1864 aircraft. Without taking into account the army and front-line rear organizations and units, there were almost 390 thousand people in the front.

At the first stage of Operation Bagration, the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Baltic and 2nd Belorussian fronts, was to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping. The Supreme Command headquarters determined the direction of Orsha and Minsk as the direction of the main attack. However, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, given the presence of powerful defensive lines of the enemy here, managed to convince I.V. Stalin in the need to deliver two main blows simultaneously. The second strike was planned to be carried out in the direction of Liozno, Bogushevsk at the junction between the flanks of the 3rd tank and 4th armies of the enemy. There was a certain risk in this: the defense here was weaker, but the swampy terrain made it difficult to use the main striking force of the front - tanks. To implement his plan, General Chernyakhovsky asked to strengthen the front with one tank army. Stalin went to meet him and ordered to transfer to the subordination of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front the 5th Guards Tank Army and the artillery breakthrough division of the RGK.

On the night of May 31, private directives were sent to the fronts of the Belarusian direction and instructions to immediately begin preparing for the offensive. Stalin approved the plan for the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation without comment. Directive No. 220115 of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front said:

“The headquarters of the Supreme Command orders:

1. Prepare and carry out an operation with the aim, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the r. Berezina, why break through the enemy's defenses, inflicting two blows:

a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno; part of the forces of this grouping to advance in the north-western direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the south-west, with the aim, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk;

b) another blow by the forces of the 11th Guards. and 31st armies along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov; part of the forces of this group to take the city of Orsha with a blow from the north.

2. The immediate task of the front troops is to capture the Senno-Orsha line. In the future, develop an offensive against Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Borisov grouping and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina near Borisov.

3. Use mobile troops (cavalry, tanks) to develop success after a breakthrough in the general direction of Borisov ...

6. Readiness and the beginning of the offensive - according to the instructions of Marshal Vasilevsky ... " .

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan was ordered, in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front, to force the Western Dvina and capture the Beshenkovichi region, together with his right wing, defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk. In the future, develop an offensive in the general direction of Lepel, firmly providing the main grouping of the front from the Polotsk direction.

In accordance with the decision of General Chernyakhovsky, approved by Stalin, the front headquarters on June 20 clarified the operation plan. The operational formation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was envisaged to have two echelons. Four combined-arms armies (39, 5, 31, 11 Guards) were assigned to the first echelon, since the enemy stretched out its main forces on the main defensive line 6–8 km deep and only insignificant reserves were located in the operational zone. The second echelon consisted of the 5th Guards Tank Army and a mechanized horse group. At the same time, the tank army had to prepare for entering the battle in the directions of Orsha, Borisov and Liozno, Bogushevsk. A mechanized cavalry group with infantry reaching the line of the r. Luchesa was introduced into the breakthrough in the direction of Liozno, Bogushevsk. The total width of the enemy defense breakthrough areas was determined at 33 km, or 23.6% of the total width of the strip occupied by the front troops. The length of the breakthrough sections in the armies was different. So, the 39th army was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses in a sector 6 km wide, the 31st - about 7 km, and the 5th and 11th Guards armies - 10 km each. In order to ensure success in the army's sectors of the breakthrough, the following were concentrated: 5764 guns and mortars, or 80.1% of the total number of barrels; 1466 tanks and self-propelled guns, or 80.9% of the total. This allowed for 1 km of the front to have high densities - up to 175 guns and mortars, 44 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The duration of the artillery preparation was set at 2 hours and 20 minutes. Artillery support for the attack was planned to be carried out with a single barrage in combination with a consistent concentration of fire to a depth of 1.5-2 km. Artillery support for the entry into the breakthrough of mobile units was planned to be carried out by additional reinforcement with artillery and the involvement of army groups. Aviation of the 1st Air Army was to carry out preliminary and direct air preparation of the offensive, and then provide its support and escort; to fight against enemy aircraft in the air and strike at enemy airfields.

Particular attention was paid to the observance of the strictest secrecy in the preparation of the operation. To this end, the front headquarters determined the procedure and terms for bringing the tasks from subordinates, the occupation of the initial position by the troops, the time of zeroing in artillery, changing command and observation posts. It was forbidden to publish any documents on the preparation of the operation and to use technical means of communication for this. The newly arriving troops were to use only mobile communications, and the formations and units that were previously part of the front, during regrouping, temporarily left the working radio stations at the points of their former deployment. Written front directives for the operation were prepared by June 20. Upon receipt of them, the army commanders were allowed to issue their orders or directives.

On June 12, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Marshal of Armored Forces P.A. Rotmistrov. Headquarters representative Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky and the front commander, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky carefully worked out with him questions about the place and timing of the concentration of army troops, reconnaissance of possible directions of its actions.

“Preparations for your assignment are in full swing, with the smallest details being worked out. The troops in cash will certainly be ready by the date you indicated. Everyone has complete confidence in success. There are still concerns about the timely approach of the 4th and 15th artillery brigades, Oslikovsky's cavalry corps, ammunition, fuel and Rotmistrov's formations by rail ... have done and are doing everything to meet the deadlines set by you " .

On the morning of June 14, Stalin informed Vasilevsky that due to a delay in rail transport, the beginning of the operation was postponed to June 23.

On June 18, Marshal Vasilevsky arrived in Moscow, where, at a meeting with Stalin, he once again agreed on the entry into battle of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Orsha-Borisov direction, as on the shortest and most advantageous terrain for maneuver. “After hearing my brief report on the preparation of the 3rd Byelorussian and 1st Baltic fronts to fulfill the tasks assigned to us,” Vasilevsky recalled, “Stalin was pleased and especially focused on the use of the 5th Guards Tank Army at the front near Chernyakhovsky. I reported that in the Orsha-Borisov direction against the 11th Guards Army, the enemy's defense in engineering terms is much more developed than in the sector of the 5th Army, and the grouping of enemy forces there is much denser. Therefore, I considered the Orsha direction for the introduction of a tank army into a breakthrough to the Borisov direction less promising than the Bogushevsk-Borisov one. We agreed that temporarily the main direction of the tank army's entry into the breakthrough will be considered the Orsha-Borisovskoe one, as the shortest and most convenient terrain for maneuvering. The final decision was postponed until the first days of the operation. Therefore, we agreed that the 5th Guards Tank Army would remain in the reserve of the Headquarters for the time being, and at the right time, as a representative of the Headquarters, I would give an order to transfer it to the front. At the same time, the Headquarters provided that in all cases the main task of the tank army was to quickly reach the Berezina River, seize the crossings and liberate the city of Borisov. "

On the night of June 20, partisan detachments operating in Belarus began an operation to massively blow up the rails, destroying 40,865 rails in three days. As a result, enemy transportation on many sections of the railways was partially paralyzed.

On June 22, in the entire zone of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, reconnaissance by force was carried out by the forces of the forward battalions, which in a number of sectors wedged into the enemy's defense from 1.5 to 8 km and forced him to bring divisional and partly corps reserves into battle. The forward battalions met stubborn enemy resistance in the Orsha direction. The commander of the 4th Army reported to Field Marshal von Busch that the Soviet troops attacked the positions in the direction of Orsha with large forces. The army commander, not having accurate data and overestimating the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, made an irreparable mistake. From the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army, a message was received that the attack of the Soviet troops in the Vitebsk direction was successfully repulsed.

Field Marshal von Busch continued to consider the main direction of Orsha, Minsk. He excluded the possibility of an offensive by large Russian forces in the Bogushevsky direction, in the conditions of swampy terrain and many lakes, and focused his main attention on the Minsk highway. The commander of the 4th Army, Bush ordered to bring the reserves of the divisions into battle and stop the advance of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to Orsha. Bush had no idea that General Chernyakhovsky had misled him by presenting the reconnaissance in force as the beginning of a general offensive in order to reveal the enemy's defensive fire system.

Less than a day remained before the decisive offensive. Aviation carried out powerful strikes against enemy reserves and airfields in the regions of Orsha, Borisov and Minsk. On the night of June 23, the weather changed dramatically. All the days there was dry, hot weather, and then a heavy rain fell. Artillery preparation began in the morning. The enemy, taking the reconnaissance carried out the day before in battle for a general offensive, moved his reserves into the tactical defense zone, thereby exposing his troops to the attack of the artillery and aviation of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The strike group of the front, consisting of the main forces of the 11th Guards and 31st armies, met fierce resistance in the Orsha sector of the enemy, who occupied a deeply echeloned defense with long-term structures. By the end of the day, both armies managed to advance only 2 to 8 km. Troops of the 39th Army by one o'clock cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Zamostochie station.

In the official summary of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command of June 23, it was noted: "On the central sector of the front, the Bolsheviks launched the offensive we expected ... On both sides of Vitebsk, fierce battles are still going on ...". Ernst von Busch admitted in the evening of the same day: "A major offensive north-west of Vitebsk meant ... complete surprise, since until now we did not assume that the enemy could concentrate such large forces in front of us."

On the morning of June 24, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, after fierce battles, overcame the swamps and reached the rear defensive line of the enemy, covering the Vitebsk-Orsha highway.

The 5th Army's offensive in the Bogushevsky direction was developing successfully. On June 25, its troops occupied Bogushevsk, which was a junction connecting the defense of Orsha and Vitebsk, and, as it were, the castle of the entire Vaterland line in this region. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the r. Western Dvina in the Beshenkovichi, Gnezdilovichi sector, and the formations of the 6th Guards Army crossed the river.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, making sure that the 11th Guards Army would not be able to complete the breakthrough of the enemy defense by the morning of June 25, decided to bring into battle the mechanized cavalry group of General Oslikovsky in the Bogushevsky direction in the zone of the 5th Army. Having successfully overcome the wooded and swampy terrain, on June 25, she occupied the town of Senno and cut the Orsha-Lepel railway. Taking advantage of its success, the forces of the 5th Army advanced westward up to 20 km.

At eight o'clock in the evening on June 24, the 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the command of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. General Chernyakhovsky decided to withdraw it to the waiting area at night, regroup it in the zone of the 5th Army and, at dawn on June 26, lead it into a breakthrough also in the Bogushevsky direction. Stalin approved the decision of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, about which Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky informed the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army. “I must note that Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov reacted to the decision of the Headquarters (both about transferring his army from Headquarters to the front, and about changing the direction of its introduction into the breakthrough) without much enthusiasm,” Vasilevsky noted. - This did not escape the attention of the front commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky. True reasons I do not know of this, and it would hardly be correct to attach special importance to this if it were not for the fact that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which always showed itself brilliantly, in this case acted worse than before. "

On June 26, troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army entered the breakthrough. Its forward detachment, using a broad maneuver, bypassed the opposing enemy groups and by mid-afternoon reached the area east of Tolochin. An attempt to shoot down the units of the security division defending here on the move failed. The main forces of the 3rd Kotelnichesky Guards Tank Corps, advancing after the advance detachment, were 20 km away. The corps commander, Major General I.A. Vovchenko, following the directive of the front commander, ordering the mobile troops to introduce second echelons and reserves, did not give the enemy time to regroup and pull up their reserves. As a result, he was able to quickly deploy the main forces of the corps on the approaches to Tolochin. The enemy did not expect the appearance of Soviet troops here. The corps, having made a maneuver with the forces of one tank brigade, bypassing Tolochin from the north, and another from the south, cut off the enemy's path to the west and prevented his Orsha grouping from retreating to Tolochin. As a result of this maneuver, by the evening of June 26, Tolochin was taken. Front troops cut the highway and railroad Orsha - Borisov for 30 km and captured a large number of trophies.

In the direction of action of the 29th Panzer Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, events did not develop so well. Parts of the corps moved slowly, with heavy losses. In order to find out the reasons for the slowdown in the offensive, Chernyakhovsky sent a special commission to the corps. She determined that the enemy used ambushes extensively in battles against corps units. General I.I. Lyudnikov, a participant in the investigation into the circumstances of one of these battles, made the following conclusion: “The Germans in some areas used our tactics against us, once successfully used by Katukov, then a colonel, in battles against Guderian's tanks on the distant approaches to Moscow: to ambush ... ".

Despite all the difficulties, the sudden introduction of a tank army into battle had a decisive impact on the outcome. Vitebsk-Orsha operation... The troops of the 11th Guards and 31st armies were finishing overcoming the enemy's defenses in the Orsha region. On the morning of June 26, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of General A.S. was introduced into the zone of the 11th Guards Army. Burdeyny, who began to bypass Orsha from the northwest. V. von Haupt, assessing the course of Operation Bagration, noted: "On June 26, the rest of the armies of Army Group Center also fought the last battles in their history."

On the evening of June 27, troops of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies, with the support of the 1st Air Army and long-range aviation, liberated Orsha. In the zone of the 1st Baltic Front, the troops of the 43rd Army, having crossed the Western Dvina on June 25, reached the Gnezdilovichi area by the end of the day and made contact with the troops of the 39th Army that had left here, part of whose forces broke into Vitebsk from the east. The next day, Vitebsk was liberated, and by three o'clock on June 27, the enemy's grouping was completely eliminated, over 19 thousand people surrendered.

The formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army, while further advancing towards Borisov, met stubborn resistance from the 5th Tank and 253rd Infantry Divisions of the enemy that had arrived from near Kovel. By the end of the day on June 28, the mechanized group of General Oslikovsky captured the crossings on the Berezina only 14 km north-west of Borisov.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, advancing 80 - 150 km, created a wide gap in the enemy defense, created conditions for the rapid development of the offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius sectors. The gates to Belarus were open. According to the front headquarters, during the operation, the 246th, 106th infantry, 4th and 6th airfield divisions were surrounded and completely destroyed, the 299th, 14th, 95th, 197th infantry divisions were defeated, and major losses were inflicted on 256 1st, 260th infantry, 286th security divisions and a number of separate units. The enemy lost 41.7 thousand soldiers and officers, 126 tanks and self-propelled guns, 796 guns, 290 mortars, 1840 vehicles. About 17.8 thousand people were captured, 36 tanks, 33 self-propelled guns, 652 guns, 514 mortars, 3300 motor vehicles, 225 warehouses with military equipment were taken as trophies.

The specific features of the operation were: a quick breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone due to the skillful selection of the directions of the main attacks, their sudden delivery, and the timely introduction of second echelons and mobile groups into battle; encirclement and destruction of the enemy's Vitebsk grouping in the tactical and immediate operational zones of its defense by rifle divisions without the participation of tank formations. At the same time, the following shortcomings were revealed during the offensive: the backlog of the bulk of the artillery reinforcement during the development of the offensive in the operational depth; delays in the delivery of ammunition and fuel due to the slow pace of bridge rebuilding and weak leadership of the commandant service.

North of Orsha, the position was occupied by the German division of Lieutenant General Trout. At Hitler's rate, Trout was considered the best master of defense... He was called the "iron general". For military service Trout was awarded the Knight's Cross.

Trout's compound was opposed by the 26th Guards Division, Major General G.I. Chernov, which was part of the 11th Guards Army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. Swamps lay between the enemy and our units, secretly preparing for the offensive.

On June 22, a powerful artillery preparation began. It lasted 140 minutes, then a Katyusha salvo burst out. This was the signal to attack. Trout did not expect Soviet tanks to pass through the impassable swamps.... For several days, the rumble of engines was heard from the direction of the narrow-gauge railway, and the general was sure that the tanks were concentrated there.

In the breakthrough zone of the 26th division, the fighters were preparing for a night breakthrough, in which a group of tanks with an amphibious assault took part. The 1st company of the 77th Guards Regiment, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Zelenyuk, was assigned to the landing. At night, having overcome the swampy terrain, the tanks crushed several machine-gun points and anti-tank guns of the enemy and rushed to the Moscow-Minsk highway. Here by the highway near the village of Shalashino paratrooper Yuri Smirnov was seriously wounded and fell from the tank... Hitler's soldiers brought the wounded Red Army man to the headquarters dugout and, on Trout's orders, interrogated him. The Nazis were interested in which military unit broke through to the rear of the German troops, how many tanks, in which direction they should move. The Komsomol member did not answer a single question. For two days, the enemies beat and tortured Yuri Smirnov, but without achieving anything, crucified a young man on a wooden cross.

With great difficulty, the 11th Guards Army managed to break through the enemy's defenses near Orsha, when battles were already going on in Vitebsk.

Chernyakhovsky introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough P.P. Rotmistrova, who with a swift blow cut off the transport routes leading from Orsha to the west.

Among our first fighters who broke through the enemy's defenses in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Shalashino was Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Kustov. He was the first to break into the dugout and saw there a crucified guardsman: his forehead was pierced with nails, his face was streaked with a bayonet. Staff documents were scattered on the floor, hurriedly dropped by enemies.

The news of the martyr's death of the guardsman spread with lightning speed throughout all the units.

By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 6, 1944, Yuri Vasilyevich Smirnov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

At the site of the massacre of the Nazis with a patriot who remained faithful to the oath, in the village of Shalashino, in the urban village of Orekhovsk, Orsha district and in the center of the Yu.Smirnov state farm in the village of Buda, Vitebsk region, monuments to Yuri Smirnov were erected... A street in Minsk is named after him.

During the offensive of our troops, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces A.S., rushed to break through the enemy defense south of Orsha. Burdeyny. Tank brigades of the guard of Colonel O.A. Losik, S.K. Nesterov and the 1500th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of Guards Major T.P. Zotov acted in the depths of the enemy's defense. They had to capture a strong German stronghold and an important railway junction - Staroselie, located on the border of the Shklov district of the Mogilev region and the Tolochinsky district of the Vitebsk region.

Concentrating in the forest, the guardsmen rushed to attack from two directions... The battle was fought for each building. The Nazis desperately clung to their positions, but were forced to leave the settlement and retreat.

When the enemy left the village, the tankers of Losik and Nesterov began pursuing him. It was necessary to move forward, sowing panic among the enemies, clearing the way for the combined arms units. It was obvious that the nazis will certainly try to return the settlement, dominating the area. Therefore, self-propelled guns, a battery of guards mortars and a battery of anti-tank guns were left in Staroselie under the command of an experienced guard artillery officer, Major Zotov, who were supposed to hold this important road junction until our rifle units arrived. Self-propelled guns took up a perimeter defense. In the most tank-hazardous direction, Zotov installed a self-propelled artillery mount for Guard Lieutenant Nesterenko. A well-coordinated, battle-hardened crew could be relied on... Soon the Nazis launched a counterattack. The gun commander, senior sergeant Goloskokov, chose the enemy's lead tank, calmly let it go to the desired distance and set it on fire with the first shot.

Then another tank appeared in the crosshair of the sight - and again it caught fire from the first shot. The next was the enemy's anti-tank gun. The self-propelled gun changed position, and Goloskokov continued to shoot the enemy at close range... The artillerymen, carried away by the battle, did not notice how the Nazis with the faustpatron approached their weapon. Everyone was wounded from the explosion, the commander and loader were seriously wounded and died soon after.

The award documents describe this fight in detail:

“Nine times the enemy counterattacked, trying to break through to the Staroselie-Shklov road. At the moment of the last most brutal attack, the gun commander, senior sergeant Goloskokov, remained in the SS alone with the driver mechanic. Vladimir Goloskokov, himself wounded in both legs and in the head, bleeding, continued to fire at the advancing enemy until he was wounded in both hands. With the fire of his cannon, he provided the opportunity for our rifle units to approach Starosel without loss. The enemy's counterattacks were drowned out. The Nazis retreated with heavy lossesand. With the fire of his own gun alone, Goloskokov destroyed 20 vehicles, 3 anti-tank guns, 3 machine-gun points, up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. "

Senior Sergeant Vladimir Alekseevich Goloskokov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his stamina and courage in battle.

When Senior Sergeant Vladimir Goloskokov was sent to the hospital, he was unconscious. After regaining consciousness for a while he first of all asked not to report the injury to his mother... His mother took her five sons to the Red Army. At Lake Khasan, fighting the samurai, Paul died by the death of a hero. Anatoly was mortally wounded in the war with the White Finns. Vasily fought in 1941 near Smolensk, Yelnya, in the suburbs. Killed by throwing himself with a bunch of grenades under a tank. Fyodor was seriously wounded at Stalingrad. After the battle at Staroselya, Vladimir returned to Omsk as a disabled person of the first group.

The German garrison of Orsha, under threat of imminent encirclement, began to withdraw.

On June 27, another key node of the German defense fell. The city of Orsha was liberated by the forces of the 1st Baltic Front, namely the 11th Guards and 31st armies. The advancing Soviet troops rushed further towards Borisov, behind which was Minsk.

The Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts in order to defeat the troops of the left wing of Army Group Center and create favorable conditions for a further offensive.

On the Vitebsk-Lepel and Orsha axes, the troops of the German Third Tank Army and part of the forces of the 4th Army of Army Group Center (in total up to 17 divisions with a total strength of up to 140 thousand people) defended. Their actions were supported by the 6th Air Fleet.

The 1st Baltic Front included the 4th Shock Army, the 6th Guards Army, the 43rd Army, the 3rd Air Army, and the 1st Panzer Corps with a total strength of over 220 thousand people.

The 3rd Belorussian Front had in its composition 39 Army, 5 Army, 11 Guards Army, 31 Army, 5 Guards. Tank Army, KMG (3rd Guards MK and 3rd Guards KK), 1st Air Army and 2nd Guards. shopping mall with a total number of more than 210 thousand people.

The concept of the operation provided for the breakthrough of the shock groupings of the fronts (6th Guards Army, 43rd Army, 1tk - 1st Baltic Front; 39th Army, 5th Army, KM G - 3rd Belorussian Front) of the enemy defense northwest and south of Vitebsk, forcing The Western Dvina River and the encirclement with the subsequent destruction of the Vitebsk grouping of the German 3rd Tank Army with the simultaneous development of the offensive on Lepel and Senno. In addition, the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front (11 Guards A, 31 A, 2 Guards TK) were to defeat the formations of the German 4th Army in the Orsha region and capture the city. Subsequently, introducing into the breakthrough 5 Guards. Tank Army, develop an offensive in the Borisov direction.

On June 23, after conducting preliminary aviation training, the troops launched an offensive. Connections 6 Guards. During the day of the battle, the armies and 43 armies advanced up to 16 km in depth, expanding the penetration to 30 km. The 39th Army and the 5th Army were successfully advancing in the Bogushevsky direction. Having cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway, they advanced 10-13 km, expanding the breakthrough to 50 km. On the Orsha direction 11 Guards. The Army and 31st Army met stubborn resistance from the enemy and advanced to a shallow depth.

By the end of June 24, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. Western Dvina on the Beshenkovichi-Gnezdilovichi section, and the 6th Guards formations. The armies crossed it. The troops of the northern grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front overcame the enemy's resistance and, repelling his counterattacks, advanced 10-16 km and captured the city of Bogushevsk. On June 25, troops of the 43rd Army crossed the river. Western Dvina, by the end of the day they reached the Gnezdilovichi area and established direct contact with the troops of the 39th Army that had left here, part of whose forces broke into Vitebsk from the east.

Five divisions of the German 3rd Panzer Army were surrounded and cut apart at the same time. On June 26, the city was completely liberated; on June 27, the entire enemy grouping ceased resistance.

To develop success in the Bogushevsky direction on June 24, in lane 5, the Army entered the battle of KM G, which on June 25 liberated the city of Senno and cut the railway. On the same day, in band 5, the Army was introduced into the breakthrough of the 5th Guards. Tank Army, which the next day cut off enemy communications west of Orsha.

On the morning of June 26, entered into a breakthrough in the 11th Guards. And the 2nd Guards TK began to bypass Orsha from the northwest. On June 27, Orsha was liberated by the troops of the 11th Guards. Army and 31st Army.

On June 28, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Zaozerie - Lepel line, and the 3rd Belorussian Front - to the r. Berezina north of Borisov.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated, the troops advanced 80-150 km. Conditions were created for the development of the offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions.

Introduction

Conclusion

application

Introduction

Ten Stalinist strikes in 1944 led to the expulsion of the German invaders from our country and allowed the Supreme to set the final task: "Finish off the fascist beast in his own lair and hoist the banner of Victory over Berlin."

In April 1944, the line of the Soviet-German front looked like this. In the south, the Red Army formations reached the border with Romania and were already aiming their attacks at Bucharest. Their neighbors to the right threw the Nazis back from the Dnieper and approached the foothills of the Carpathians, cutting the German Eastern Front in two. In the north, having completely liberated Leningrad from the blockade, our troops reached Lake Peipsi, Pskov and Novorzhev. Thus, between these flanks, which had advanced far to the west, there remained a huge protrusion towards Moscow. It was called the "Belarusian Balcony". The front part of this arc ran along the line of the cities of Vitebsk - Rogachev - Zhlobin and was not so far from Moscow. Hitler's units in this ledge (it was the Army Group Center, which included more than sixty divisions) blocked the Soviet troops' path to the west. In addition, the fascist command, having a well-developed network of railways and highways there, could quickly maneuver and strike at the flanks of our troops advancing south and north of this ledge. From there, enemy aircraft bombed Soviet groupings in the north and south. The possibility of raids on Moscow was not ruled out. At the same time, the German troops in this salient and themselves, due to this position, were under the threat of our flank attacks from the south and from the north and, consequently, under the threat of encirclement. But in order to carry out an encirclement of this magnitude, enormous forces were needed. For this, Soviet troops had to defeat Army Group North in the Baltics, Army Group North Ukraine in the Ukraine, and only then could Army Group Center be enveloped from both sides. Back in late April 1944, Stalin, in the presence of General Antonov, consulted with Zhukov about the plan for the summer campaign.

A difficult regrouping was ahead: for the operation "Bagration" it was necessary to transfer the troops of five combined-arms, two tank and one air armies to new areas. In addition, the Headquarters transferred to the fronts an additional 4 combined arms, 2 tank armies, 52 rifle and cavalry divisions, 6 separate tank and mechanized corps, 33 air divisions, 2,849 guns and mortars, and 210,000 marching reinforcements.

Initially, the Soviet command envisioned Operation Bagration as a repetition of the Battle of Kursk<#"center">1. The beginning of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation in 1944

Immediately after the withdrawal of the 1st Panzer Corps to the reserve of the 1st Baltic Front, its intensive preparations began for the summer campaign of 1944.

The corps, stationed on the border of the Vitebsk and Pskov regions near the Yezerishche station, began to receive replenishment.

On April 1, 1944, tank brigades received a third tank battalion each. Now each tank brigade numbered sixty-five tanks instead of the previous forty-four. In addition, the T-34 tanks, which arrived to replenish the hull, were armed with 85 mm ZIS-S-53 cannons, capable of penetrating the armor of heavy Tiger tanks at a direct range with their armor-piercing projectile. These two important circumstances significantly increased the combat potential of the corps.

By this time, the configuration of the central section of the Soviet-German front acquired new outlines.

As a result of the victorious offensive of the Red Army in the winter and spring of 1944, our troops advanced far ahead in two directions.

In the southwestern direction, after the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, our troops reached the state border of the USSR with Romania.

In the northwestern direction, after lifting the blockade of Leningrad, our troops threw the enemy back from Leningrad by 200-220 km, reached the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area of \u200b\u200bthe enemy, and began the liberation of the Baltic republics.

It was only in the center of the Soviet-German front that a ledge occupied by the enemy was wedged into the depths of the location of our troops, which the Hitlerite command dubbed the "Belarusian balcony".

The presence of this "balcony" gave the fascist command certain strategic advantages. Firstly, it served as a powerful barrier covering the direction to Warsaw and Berlin. Secondly, it made it possible to inflict flank attacks on our troops in the event of their offensive in the north-western direction - to the borders of East Prussia or in the south-western direction - to Lvov and Hungary. Planes for bombing Moscow could take off from the same "balcony".

Preparing for the 1944 summer campaign, the enemy concentrated on this "balcony" large forces of Army Group Center, headed by Field Marshal E. von Busch (3rd Panzer, 4th and 9th Armies) and a number of formations of neighboring army groups - 63 divisions and 3 brigades in total.

The Soviet high command was also preparing intensively for the summer campaign. The tasks of the Red Army for the summer and autumn were formulated in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of May 1, 1944. They included the completion of the expulsion of the occupiers from Soviet territory, the restoration of the state border of the USSR throughout, the withdrawal of the European allies from the war on the side of Germany and the liberation of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and other peoples of Europe from fascist captivity.

The plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, code-named Bagration, was simple in concept, but impressive in scale.

The plan provided for:

simultaneous powerful strikes of four fronts - 1st Baltic (Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General, and from 26.06 Army General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian (Colonel General, and from 28.07 General of the Army G.F.Zakharov) and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian (General of the Army, and from 29.06 Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) - to break through the enemy's defenses on the Vitebsk, Bogushevsky, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions;

to split the strategic front of the enemy's defense, to encircle and destroy his grouping in the region of Vitebsk and Bobruisk;

to rapidly develop an offensive in depth, to encircle and eliminate the troops of the 4th Army east of Minsk.

These actions were supposed to create favorable conditions for a further offensive to the west in the general directions of Siauliai, Vilnius, Bialystok, Brest.

As follows from what has been said, in the implementation of this plan, the stake was placed on the swiftness of the offensive. Therefore, the decisive role was assigned to the tank forces.

Taking into account the scale of hostilities, the location and structure of the main nodes of the enemy defense, the Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration" was carried out in the form of ten relatively independent, but interconnected operations: Vitebsk-Orshansk, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk, Siauliai, Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest and Kaunas. The 1st Baltic Front, which included the 1st Tank Corps, had to take part in three of these operations: Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk and Siauliai. Therefore, further narration will be mainly devoted to precisely these operations.

2. Development of the offensive in the Vitebsk direction

If the "Belarusian balcony" as a whole protruded to the east, then the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Vitebsk<#"center">4. The course of hostilities and results

The offensive began with reconnaissance in force in the early morning of June 22<#"center">Conclusion

Thanks to successful actions in the Vitebsk-Orsha direction, it happened. In 6-day battles, Soviet troops destroyed a large enemy grouping, a large amount of equipment, and captured many trophies and prisoners. The Soviet troops showed high skill in conducting operations in wooded and swampy terrain. As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, conditions were created for the development of success in Minsk and in the direction of the South Baltic. Units and formations that distinguished themselves in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin was given the honorary names "Vitebsk" and "Orshansk".

In the Orsha direction, the offensive developed rather slowly. One of the reasons for the lack of spectacular success was the fact that the strongest of the German infantry divisions, the 78th assault division, was located near Orsha.<#"justify">vitebsk Orsha operation army

List of used literature

1. Alekseev M.A. Encyclopedia of Military Intelligence. 1918-1945 M., 2012.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Ch. ed. 1-7 vols. - S.I. Vavilov, 8-51 vols. - B.A. Vvedensky. 2nd ed. T.8. Vibraphone - Volovo. 1951.648 pp., Ill .; 50 l. ill. and maps.

3. Beshanov V.V. Ten Stalinist blows. M .: Harvest, 2004, ISBN 985-13-1738-1<#"center">application

Tutoring

Need help exploring a topic?

Our experts will advise or provide tutoring services on topics of interest to you.
Send a request with the indication of the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.

Home Encyclopedia War History Read more

Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation (June 22 - 28, 1944)

The crossing of tanks across the river. Western Dvina. 1st Baltic Front. Summer 1944

The Vitebsk-Orsha operation is an offensive operation by Soviet troops in Eastern Belarus, conducted with the aim of defeating the left wing of the German Army Group Center and creating favorable conditions for a further offensive. It was an integral part of the Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration".

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 1st Baltic (commanded by an army general) and the 3rd Belorussian (commanded by an army general) fronts were involved in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation. The general coordination of the actions of both fronts in the operation was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Scheme of the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation on June 23 - 28, 1944

Preparations for the upcoming hostilities began to be carried out in April 1944. During this time, the Supreme Command Headquarters allocated significant forces and means from its reserve: to the 1st Baltic Front - the 1st Tank Corps; 3rd Belorussian Front - 11th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army, 2nd Guards Tank, 3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. In addition, by the beginning of the operation, the troops received a large number of separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and brigades, artillery, mortar and engineering formations and units, aviation corps and divisions, as well as various military equipment and marching replenishment. By the beginning of the operation, the overall superiority over the enemy reached: in people - 2 times, guns and mortars - 3.8 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (assault guns) - 5.8 times, combat aircraft - 3.9 times ...

A significant amount of work was carried out on the material and technical support of the upcoming hostilities. By the beginning of the offensive, army stocks for various types of rations were: food - 12-20 days per day, fuel and lubricants - 3.4-4.2 refueling, ammunition - 2.2-4 ammunition.

The engineering troops of the 1st Baltic Front built 275 km and repaired 820 km of roads, erected bridges with a total length of 1.8 km. Very significant road works were carried out in the bands of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In addition, to overcome the swampy terrain in all formations, gatis were laid in advance, scraps for artillery and heavy machine guns, twig mats, and mopping for soldiers were harvested from scrap materials.

Partisans played a special role in preparing and conducting an offensive. They were supposed to disrupt communications and communication lines of German troops, destroy headquarters, disable manpower and military equipment, carry out reconnaissance in the interests of the advancing fronts, capture and hold advantageous lines and bridgeheads on rivers until the approach of formations and units of the Red Army, disrupt the export of the population and material assets to Germany. Fulfilling this task, only on June 20, partisan detachments blew up more than 40 thousand rails, and over the next 9 days - another 20 thousand. At a time when the command of the Army Group "Center" badly needed to transfer reserves to the areas of the breakthrough of Soviet troops, movement on the enemy roads were paralyzed. Moreover, only from 26 to 29 June, the partisans derailed 147 enemy trains.

On the whole, by the summer of 1944, a powerful, quantitatively and qualitatively, grouping of forces and equipment had been created, and the fronts participating in the operation took an advantageous operational position to cover the enemy grouping in Belarus from the flanks and isolate it from the North Army Groups.

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front by the beginning of the summer covered Vitebsk from the north and northeast and were on the near approaches to Polotsk. They were opposed by formations of the 1st Army Corps of the 16th Army of Army Group "North" (Colonel General G. Lindemann), as well as the 9th and 53rd Army Corps of the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group "Center" (General Field Marshal E. Bush). This grouping consisted of 728 field and 622 anti-tank guns, 823 mortars, 130 tanks and assault guns. In the plans of the German command, the Vitebsk area was given primary importance, since its retention ensured the maintenance of interaction between the Army Groups "Center" and "North". Therefore, the enemy, despite the disadvantageous outline of the line of contact of the sides, equipped several defensive lines on the approaches to Vitebsk. The first of them, covered with almost continuous combined wire and mine-explosive barriers, was located 10-15 km from the city. At 7-10 km from the forward edge, the second line passed, on the approaches to which there were obstacles, anti-tank ditches and minefields. The last line of trenches was dug directly on the outskirts of Vitebsk, the stone buildings of which formed the basis of numerous strongholds.

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front united the 4th Shock, 6th Guards and 43rd Armies (eight rifle corps, 24 rifle divisions, one rifle brigade), one tank corps and various reinforcement equipment. The front had 687 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 4,926 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, 778 anti-tank artillery pieces. Air support for the offensive was carried out by the 3rd Air Army, which consisted of 900 aircraft.

The 3rd Belorussian Front occupied the line that it reached in the fall of the previous year. By the beginning of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, he was opposed by the 53rd and 6th army corps of the 3rd tank army and the 27th army corps of the enemy's 4th army. They consisted of 14 divisions, 12 separate security regiments and up to 35 battalions of 25, in which there were more than 2.5 thousand guns and mortars, about 320 tanks and assault guns. Air support for this grouping from the air was carried out by up to 330 aircraft.

By the beginning of the operation, the 39th, 5th, 11th Guards and 31st Armies, the 5th Guards Tank and 1st Air Armies, the 2nd Guards Tank Army, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Army and 3 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, separate formations and units of various types of troops. They had more than 8.3 thousand guns and mortars, 1.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 1.9 thousand aircraft. The front troops outnumbered the enemy in men - 1.7 times, in guns and mortars - 3.2 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns (assault guns), as well as in aircraft - 5.7 times.

In accordance with the concept of the operation, it was envisaged that the shock groupings of the 1st Baltic (6th Guards A, 43A, 1st Tank Corps) and the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian (39A, 5A, KMG) fronts to break through the enemy's defenses northwest and south of Vitebsk, cross the river. Western Dvina, to encircle and destroy the units and formations of the 3rd Panzer Army of the German troops. On the outer front of the encirclement, develop an offensive against Lepel and Senno.

At the same time, with a frontal attack by the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front (11 Guards A, 31 A, 2nd Guards Tank Corps), defeat the formations of the 4th Army of German troops in the Orsha region, capture the city and further develop the offensive in the Borisov direction ...

In order to break through the enemy defense in short time the front command decisively massed forces and assets in the most important sectors. It concentrated up to 80% of artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery units in strips of strike groupings. This made it possible to create high operational densities. Superiority over the enemy in the areas of the breakthrough reached: in humans - 3-4 times, in artillery - 3 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns (assault guns) - 10 times.

The transition to the offensive of both fronts was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began on June 22 after a 20-minute artillery preparation. In a number of sectors, the forward battalions managed to penetrate the enemy's defenses from 1.5 to 8 km. The German command, noted in the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Army for June 22, 1944, took reconnaissance in force as the beginning of the "expected big offensive", therefore, it brought in divisional and, in a number of sectors, corps reserves into the battle.

On the morning of June 23, after preliminary aviation training for enemy strongpoints and artillery, the main forces of the fronts went over to the offensive. During the day of the battle, the strike groupings of the fronts advanced up to 16 km in depth, creating passages from 30 to 50 km wide.

By the end of June 24, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. Western Dvina, and the neighboring 6th Guards Army crossed it. Formations and units of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front, overcoming enemy resistance, captured the city of Bogushevsk.

On June 25, troops of the 43rd Army crossed the river. Western Dvina and established in the area of \u200b\u200bGnezdilovichi interaction with units of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, completing the encirclement of Vitebsk. 5 German divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army with a total number of more than 40 thousand people were surrounded and at the same time cut into pieces.

The representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, demanded to forestall the enemy reserves that were advancing from the depths and prevent them from taking up defense in the zone of numerous lakes and rivers on the Polotsk-Lepel line. For these purposes, the front commander, General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, decided to immediately use the main forces of the front to develop the success of the offensive, and to eliminate the grouping surrounded in the Vitebsk region, allocate only the left flank formations of the 43rd Army. Together with units and formations of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, by 6 o'clock on June 26, Vitebsk was liberated, and on June 27, the entire enemy group, which was surrounded, ceased resistance.

At the same time, the main forces of the front continued to develop the offensive in the Polotsk and Lepel 'directions. By the end of June 28, units and formations of the 6th Guards Army reached the line 18-20 km southeast of Polotsk, and the troops of the 43rd Army, pursuing the retreating units of the 3rd German Tank Army, rushed into Lepel on the move and cleared it from the invader.

During the battles from 23 to 28 June, the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front overcame more than 80 km in difficult wooded and swampy terrain, having an average rate of advance of up to 14 km per day. During this period, she liberated 1,670 settlements, including such large ones as Shumilino, Ulla, Beshenkovichi and Lepel. At the same time, the front losses in the last decade of June amounted to 23,053 people, including 4,658 people killed.

The offensive of the main forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front was developing rapidly. By the end of the first day, the formations of the 39th Army advanced 12-14 km in depth, cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway, the Vitebsk-Beshenkovichi highway, and by the end of the day on June 24 they reached the eastern outskirts of Vitebsk and started street battles.

Soldiers of the 881st Infantry Regiment are fighting in the station area.
Vitebsk, June 1944

Fearing encirclement, the commander of the 3rd German Tank Army, Colonel-General G. Reinhardt, gave the order to withdraw his troops. Finding enemy columns on the Vitebsk-Beshenkovichi highway, the 1st Air Army formations subjected them to bombing strikes.

Using air support, units of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, together with the 28th Guards tank brigadehaving reached the southern bank of the Western Dvina, they cut off the enemy's escape routes from Vitebsk.

The enemy lost over 20 thousand people killed and more than 10 thousand captured, including the commander and chief of staff of the 53rd Army Corps.

Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General I.D. Chernyakhovsky interrogated the commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of the Infantry F. Gollwitzer, and the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General A. Hitter. Vitebsk region, 1944

In the period from 23 to 28 June, the formations of the 39th and 43rd armies destroyed and captured more than 1 thousand guns and mortars, about 3.9 thousand cars and motorcycles, 54 tanks and assault guns, 249 warehouses of military equipment.

Destroyed German vehicles on a highway near Vitebsk, June 1944

The main forces of the 5th, 11th Guards and 31st armies operating on the Bogushevsk and Orsha axes immediately broke through the enemy's defenses only in the zone of the 5th Army of Lieutenant General N.I. Krylov. Its connections have advanced 10-12 km. The formations of the 5th Army continued to develop the offensive in the depths of the enemy defense and reached the city of Bogushevsk. His assault was preceded by a massive strike from the 1st Air Army. Using its results, units of the 144th and 215th rifle divisions broke into the city and took possession of it.

Sappers clearing mines in Vitebsk, 1944

Residents of liberated Vitebsk. June 1944

Presentation of awards to those who have distinguished themselves in battles. 1st Baltic Front.
Summer 1944

To consolidate further success, the cavalry-mechanized group of the guard of Lieutenant-General NS Oslikovsky was introduced into the breakthrough. Its 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, in cooperation with rifle divisions, captured the city of Senno on June 25 and cut off the Lepel-Orsha railway by its forward units, while the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps overcame the enemy's defenses on the move and began to pursue it.

In general, in the first three days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy's defenses in a strip 100 km wide from the Western Dvina to the Dnieper, advanced 30-50 km in depth, broke enemy resistance and created conditions for the development of the offensive on Borisov and coverage 4th German Army from the north and west.

In the zone of the 11th Guards Army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, the formations of the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps, which were delivering the main blow along the Minsk Highway, encountered strong enemy opposition and during the day advanced only 2 km forward. To change the situation, by order of the representative of the Headquarters of the VKG Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, a mobile group of the front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, was introduced into the breakthrough in the Bogushevsky direction.

Her swift actions liberated the city of Tolochin, cut the Moscow-Minsk highway, the Orsha-Minsk railway for 30 km, and made an exit to the rear of the German 27th Army Corps, which was defended at the Orsha resistance junction.

At the same time, the formations of the mechanized cavalry group (from the north) and the 11th Guards Army (from the northwest) approached Orsha. At 6.20 pm on June 26, the assault on the city began, and by 23.00, street fighting began. The enemy turned stone structures into powerful knots of resistance, and set up permanent firing points at all road junctions. To destroy and suppress them, 152-mm howitzers and combat vehicles of the 517th flamethrower tank regiment were used. By 9 o'clock on June 27, the formations of both armies completely captured the city. They seized nine railroad trains, 15 steam locomotives, 1250 wagons, 37 guns, 19 tanks and armored vehicles, 161 tractors, 1950 vehicles and tractors, 23 various warehouses, as well as other weapons and property. The enemy lost more than 100 soldiers and officers in killed and taken prisoners.

Columns of German prisoners captured in Belarus, on the streets of Moscow.
July 17, 1944

Continuing the pursuit of German troops, units and formations of the front with the right wing and center reached the r. Berezina. The advance on his left wing of the front was shackled by stubborn enemy resistance.

As a result of the five-day offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy's defenses by 115 km in depth and expanded it up to 150 km along the front, liberating 1,674 settlements.

During the fighting, the 246th and 206th Infantry Divisions, the 4th and 6th Airfield Divisions were surrounded and destroyed, the 299th, 14th, 95th, 197th Infantry Divisions were defeated, the 256th and 260th Infantry Divisions suffered heavy losses, as well as the 286th security divisions. The front losses from June 23 to the end of the month amounted to 51,526 people, of which 11,014 people were killed, as well as 318 tanks, 59 guns and mortars, 113 aircraft.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orshan operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated, Soviet troops advanced 80-150 km and favorable conditions were created for a further offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions.

A quick breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense was due to the skillful choice of the directions of the main attacks, the suddenness of their delivery, the timely introduction of second echelons and mobile groups into battle, the massing of forces and equipment in the directions of the main attacks, and the firm retention of air supremacy.

Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Nefediev,
candidate of political sciences,
Deputy Head of the Scientific Research Department
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.