The true reasons for Hitler's attack on the USSR. The true reason for Hitler's war against the USSR Why did Hitler start World War II

The defeat of the Third Reich in World War II was caused by many reasons, but we want to identify the main strategic mistakes made by Germany during the conflict.

Capacity reassessment

The main strategic mistake of the Third Reich was the overestimation of its own forces. The results of the victorious campaign in France were taken as the basis for calculating the number of weapons, supplies and manpower during an attack on the USSR. The German commanders were inspired by this victory - the army of France was considered the strongest land army. By the beginning of World War II, France was third in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft and fourth in terms of the power of the fleet. The total number of French troops numbered more than 2 million people.

But the war with the USSR turned out to be total, and the calculation of a lightning-fast blitzkrieg was erroneous. Implementing it proved to be a daunting task.

When the Barbarossa plan failed by the fall of 1941, it meant a strategic disaster for the Third Reich.

Transfer of landings to the British Isles

On August 15, 1940, the first German air raid on London was made. This day is considered the beginning of the Battle of Britain. In one day, the Luftwaffe lost more than twice as many vehicles as the enemy - 75 German aircraft against 34 British.

During subsequent raids, negative statistics persisted. As a result, on September 17, 1940, Hitler ordered to postpone the proposed operation " Sea lion"(landing on British Isles) for an indefinite time, October 12 - moved it to the winter. In the spring of 1941, the Balkan campaign of the Wehrmacht began, and in the summer Hitler attacked the USSR. In the spring of 1942, Hitler finally abandoned the Sea Lion.

He left London "for later", which, according to current experts, was the Fuhrer's main strategic mistake.

Inconsistent allies

Hitler wanted to fight and, as he himself believed, knew how, but he did not succeed in making friends, he did not manage to make a single force out of Germany and its allies. The Allies of the Third Reich had goals in World War II that were different from those of the Fuhrer.

Japan did not want to attack the USSR and fought with the USA. Spain gave to the Eastern Front, gave only one division, did not consider the USSR to be Mussolini's main enemy. There was contention between the allies themselves - Hungary and Romania considered each other opponents.

The alliance with the Third Reich was beneficial to the OSI countries only as long as the Germans were victorious. The diplomat from Hitler turned out to be weak.

Weak logistics

In the Third Reich during the war, supply problems constantly arose. This was caused by several factors. Firstly, German weapons were very diverse (French guns, Czech tanks), that is, they required a million unique spare parts.

The logistics of the Third Reich were weak due to personnel. Work in strategic supply was considered a duty - you will not achieve glory. Therefore, second-rate and third-rate officers turned out to be so. Ambitious and gifted officers, if they were engaged in supply, then operational.

The unresolved issue of supply on the Eastern Front manifested itself in full measure. In the German tank divisions, only a small 10th part of the equipment had caterpillar tracks. The rest of the cars were wheeled, that is, they were intended for roads.

But in the USSR they were not. The whole country in 1941 had less than a hundred thousand kilometers of paved roads. The cars got stuck in the mud and snow, the equipment even had to be left. The supply slowed down.

"Taboo Defeat"

The German historian Bernd Wegner from the University of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, among the strategic factors that led to the defeat of Germany, calls the “tabooization of defeat”, which dominated at all systemic levels both the state in general and the army in particular. Both Churchill and Stalin made important decisions at the councils, even assumed in their calculations the options for defeat.

The Third Reich could not afford this in its calculations. Any defeatist sentiments were nipped in the bud. Because of this, because of a systematic error in miscalculations, Germany could not build a reliable military-political concept of war. The same Wegner wrote: "It sounds unexpected, but Germany fought most of the war in an improvisational mode."
Even during the Berlin offensive, Hitler continued to believe that the armies of Wenck, Busse, and the army group of F. Steiner were marching towards Berlin, which would defeat the Red Army. As we know from history, they did not break.

- When was it decided in Germany to attack the USSR?

This decision was taken in the course of a successful campaign for Germany in France. In the summer of 1940, it became increasingly clear that a war against the Soviet Union would be planned. The fact is that by this time it became clear that Germany could not win the war with Great Britain with the available technical means.

That is, in the autumn of 1939, when the Second World War began, Germany had no plans to attack the USSR yet?

The idea may have been, but there were no specific plans. There were also doubts about such plans, which were later dropped, however.

What were these doubts?

Army Chief of Staff Franz Halder was not opposed to the war, but he disagreed with Hitler on one strategic issue. Hitler wanted to capture Leningrad for ideological reasons and Ukraine, where there were large industrial centers. Halder tailored disabilities the German army considered it important to take Moscow. This conflict remained unresolved.

Another issue is the supply of German troops with ammunition, ammunition, food. There were the loudest warnings about this. The German military attaché in Moscow warned that the USSR was a vast country with vast distances. But when the boss wants war, warnings about the dangers are undesirable. Recently, the Pentagon was not very willing to listen to people who doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

- Was Hitler really the main driving force of this war?

Yes. The German ambassador to the USSR hoped that relations would be good. However, the ambassador did not play a big role when it came to determining German policy.

The strategic supply of raw materials from the Soviet Union was very important for the German military campaign. In addition, the USSR allowed transit deliveries from Southeast Asia. For example, rubber for tire production. That is, there were important strategic reasons not to start a war against the Soviet Union, but the military, who fawned over Hitler and competed with each other, tried to outdo each other, offering plans to attack the USSR.

Why did Hitler want this war so much?

Firstly, these were ideological reasons, outlined in his book "Mein Kampf" - living space for the Germans and gaining access to raw materials. But from these considerations, the war could be started at any moment. Therefore, there must have been additional reasons, and the main one at that moment was the impossibility of winning the war with Great Britain.

How do you explain that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ignored Germany's preparations for war, because there were intelligence reports about this?

This passivity was based on the belief that Hitler would not be so stupid. Until the evening of June 22, 1941, Stalin thought that this was an operation of the German generals without the knowledge of Hitler, with the aim of setting him up. Only then were decisive orders given to the Red Army to crush and pursue the enemy everywhere. Up to this point, Stalin apparently refused to believe what really happened.

Hitler and the German generals were convinced that the war with Russia could be won in three months. These views were shared in the West, against the backdrop of the successes of the Germans in Europe, especially the quick victory over France.

Judging by secret documents, in particular intelligence reports, it seems that the USSR secret services knew about the impending German attack, but the army was not informed about this. Is it so?

Yes, at least there was no alarm in the army. Stalin was convinced that any provocation could force Hitler to attack the USSR. He thought that if he showed unpreparedness for war, Hitler would focus on western front. This was a big mistake for which the Soviet Union had to pay a high price. As for the intelligence data, the reports on the timing of the attack were constantly changing. The Germans themselves were engaged in disinformation. However, all information about the upcoming attack came to Stalin. He knew everything.

This was due to the completion of the preparation of the Wehrmacht for this war. But in the end, he still wasn't ready. Technical superiority was a sham. The supply of German troops was carried out by half with the help of horse-drawn carts.

The beginning of summer was also chosen because then the danger of off-road increased every day. The Germans knew that, firstly, in Russia there is no good roads, and secondly, the rains in the off-season wash them away. By autumn, the Germans were actually stopped not by enemy forces, but by nature. Only with the advent of winter, the German troops were again able to continue the offensive.

Hitler explained the war with the USSR by the fact that he was allegedly ahead of Stalin. In Russia, you can also hear this version. What do you think?

There is still no confirmation of this. But no one knows what Stalin really wanted. It is known that Zhukov had a plan to launch a preemptive strike. It was handed over to Stalin in mid-May 1941. This happened after Stalin gave a speech to the graduates of the military academy and said that the Red Army is an offensive army. Zhukov saw a greater danger in the German military plans than Stalin did. He then headed the General Staff and used Stalin's speech as an excuse to develop a plan for a preemptive strike in order to prevent the German offensive in the east. As far as we know, Stalin rejected this plan.

- Could Germany have won the war against the USSR?

Considering that Stalin and his system did not want to give up, stopping at nothing, and the Soviet people were literally driven to this war, then Germany could not win it.

But there were two points. The first - at the beginning of the war, and the second - in October 1941, when the German troops were already exhausted, but they began an offensive against Moscow. The Russians had no reserves, and Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that the gates to Moscow stood wide open. The advance detachments of German tanks then reached the outskirts of today's Moscow. But they could not go further. Stalin was apparently ready to try again to negotiate with Hitler. According to Zhukov, he entered Stalin's office at the moment when he said goodbye to Beria with words about looking for the possibility of a separate peace with the Germans. The USSR was allegedly ready for big concessions to Germany. But nothing happened.

- What were Germany's plans for the occupied lands?

Hitler did not want to occupy the entire Soviet Union. The border was to run from the White Sea in the north along the Volga to the south of Russia. Germany did not have sufficient resources to occupy the entire USSR. It was planned to push the Red Army to the east and hold back with the help of air strikes. It was a big illusion. In the occupied territories, National Socialist ideas were to be put into practice. There was no exact plan. It was assumed that the Germans would rule, and the local population would do slave work. It was assumed that millions of people would die of starvation, this was part of the plan. At the same time, Russia was to become the breadbasket of Germany-occupied Europe.

When, in your opinion, did the turning point in the war come, after which it was no longer possible for Germany to win it?

Provided that the Soviet Union was not going to surrender, and it was, except for one moment in October, it was impossible in principle to win the war. I would even say that even without the help of the West to Moscow, Germany could not win this war. Moreover, Soviet tanks, both the T-34 and the Joseph Stalin heavy tank, were superior to the German models. It is known that after the first tank battles in 1941, designer Ferdinand Porsche was sent to the front as part of a commission to study Soviet tanks. The Germans were very surprised. They were sure that their technique was much better. Germany could not win this war in any way. There was only the possibility of an agreement on certain conditions. But Hitler was Hitler, and at the end of the war he behaved more and more insanely, like Stalin at the beginning - that is, the order was given not to surrender anything to the enemy. But the price was too high. The Germans could not afford this, unlike the USSR at the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union lost millions of people, but the reserves remained, and the system continued to work.

Professor Bernd Bohn evening (Bernd Bonwetsch)- German historian, founder and first director of the German Historical Institute in Moscow, author of publications on German-Russian history

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

Nikolaus von Below - Luftwaffe officer, colonel, adjutant of Adolf Hitler.

Born in the commune of Ziten near Anklam in an aristocratic family.

In 1929 he began training as a pilot at a commercial school, in the same year he joined the Reichswehr and served in the 12th Infantry Regiment until he transferred to the Luftwaffe in 1933; served in the 132nd fighter squadron "Richthofen", later transferred to the 26th fighter squadron "Schlageter".

Nikolaus von Below, Wilhelm Keitel and Adolf Hitler

In 1937 he became Hitler's adjutant from the Air Force; despite the fact that the Fuhrer was suspicious of officers who came from the aristocracy, von Below remained one of the few members of Hitler's entourage who served him throughout the war.

In 1946 he was arrested by British troops and held until 1948, after his release he wrote a memoir entitled "On Hitler's Side". He died in 1983 in Detmold.

His Memoirs allow you to literally learn firsthand how everything happened in the matter of aggression against Russia.

To begin with, it is worth noting the causes of the war, which von Below wrote about in this chapter:

"Discourses at the beginning of the war

For me, one thing was certain: the reason for the start of the war was Hitler's determination to destroy Bolshevism.

Being next to the Fuhrer for more than two years, I became acquainted with his thoughts and views on issues of life in general, the people, the state, the party, politics and the conduct of the war.

On the basis of a whole series of experiences I have been able to paint for myself a picture of the reasons that led Hitler to make erroneous decisions in the last weeks before the war broke out.

In 1933, Hitler emerged from the internal political struggle as the winner of communism in Germany. As Chancellor of the German Reich, he saw his only task in life as the destruction of the "Jewish-Bolshevik power" in Russia. There, in his opinion, there was the only danger to the peaceful future of the German people.

All of Hitler's political decisions were steps along the way. In area domestic policy for him, the main goal in the initial period of his success was social order and security.

Hitler's foreign policy from the very beginning was aimed at creating and protecting a territorial base for the fight against Russia in such a way that no other force could stab him in the back. .

He believed that he would find understanding among the powers of the Treaty of Versailles that the prescriptions and provisions of this treaty could not be valid for all time.

Von Below immediately buries all allegations of a preemptive strike by Germany, in fact, Hitler began to prepare a war against the USSR since 1933

But she needed a huge base - the capture of Europe, its production resources and the protection of the rear

................

“France had the greatest fear of a new strengthening of the Reich and did not show any willingness to reckon with Germany's desire to revise Versailles, although Hitler declared that Alsace-Lorraine did not interest him - he did not need it to fight in the East.

But the Fuhrer needed for this the equality of Germany among other European states, an end to its humiliation and the implementation of the universal arms limitation written in the Versailles Treaty.

It was this that served for Hitler as the main prerequisites for security from the rear. When France introduced a two-year military obligation in January 1935, he regarded this as proof of the failure of all disarmament plans.

Therefore, on March 16, 1935, the Fuhrer issued a law on the creation of the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) and introduced universal military service. The Franco-Soviet-Russian Mutual Military Assistance Pact of May 2, 1935 meant for Hitler a new danger of encirclement of Germany; when the French parliament ratified this agreement on February 27, 1936, it ordered the Wehrmacht to enter the demilitarized Rhineland on March 7 of the same year. The Fuhrer, as he himself said, was now constantly biding his time.

But he also knew that the next steps to revise the Treaty of Versailles would go beyond the boundaries of the German Reich and therefore must be prepared very carefully politically and militarily. And therefore, in a speech to the Reichstag on January 30, 1937, the Führer first of all reassured the world with these words:

"The time for surprises is over."

He himself developed his plans for the fight against Bolshevism even more intensively. To do this, Hitler needed the security of his own rear in the West in order to avoid a war on two fronts, as well as a strong Wehrmacht and a reliable springboard for the concentration and deployment of troops in the East. .»

Hitler had to take Western Europe, only in order to protect yourself from a blow from the Western allies during the war against the USSR

“Hitler needed Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. He considered Austria a German land.

Her accession was never a problem for him. As for Czechoslovakia, he criticized that country for the anti-German and pro-Russian attitude of its governments, regardless of the question of the Sudeten German minority. Prague will not voluntarily join an alliance with its German neighbor.

Therefore, in the spring of 1938, Hitler planned to use the Wehrmacht to put pressure on her. He sought from Prague the freedom to judge the Germans and an alliance with Germany. It was necessary to exclude any possibility that any other European power would gain a firm foothold in Czechoslovakia.

Let the diligent Czech people supply food and war material to the Reich. Hitler achieved this goal in March 1939.

Hitler's attitude towards Poland was different. Based on the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934 and knowing about the ancient hostility of Poland to Russia, Hitler saw her as an ally in the fight against Bolshevism. He believed that Poland's fear of the Russians would serve as the starting point for a German-Polish compromise.

Therefore, his territorial demands on her did not go beyond acceptable limits. But the events of May 1938 frightened Hitler for the first time. England then undertook the encirclement of Germany in contact with Prague. The second blow came on 31 March 1939 from the British promise of guarantees to Poland.

This course of development violated the plans of Hitler, which he hatched against Russia.

He realized that he would have to fight first because of Poland. Feeling growing distrust of England, the Fuhrer was afraid that British politicians in Germany's struggle against Bolshevism saw only its strengthening, and not at all the salvation of Europe from the latter.

Thus, foreign policy Hitler since the spring of 1938 has fundamentally changed.

Adolf Hitler during the funeral service for Piłsudski in Warsaw, 1935

This passage immediately makes it clear that Hitler initially saw Poland as an ally in the fight against Bolshevism.

« Now he included in his plans a war with the West before going to Russia. But the Fuhrer hoped to forestall England by quick action. Haste drove him from success to success through 1938 and 1939, until it became fatal for him in that very week from August 25 to September 1.

Hitler was faced with a new situation, which was determined not only by politics, but also by military force. The Fuhrer's plans as a politician and Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not gravitate towards quick decisions and hasty orders. He, as an artist, needed time and a sense of proportion to create a new work.

He did not secure this time for himself, but instead stewed in the Berlin devil's cauldron, experiencing many different influences, and as a result came to erroneous decisions. All his previous preparatory measures were aimed only at a clash with Poland.

The available weapons of the Wehrmacht were enough for this. But from the moment when Hitler had already had to take firmly into account the intervention of England and France, it became necessary for him to rethink the situation and draw far-reaching new conclusions. He didn't have time for that now.

How could one explain why Hitler, precisely in these critical days, when he saw the huge clash approaching him now, but he expected only later, did not return to his principle "I can wait"? There were two reasons for this. Negotiations with Stalin and the demands of the Soviet dictator, which Hitler carried out with a grand gesture, confirmed to him the danger of Bolshevism. The Fuhrer's hope that England would give him a free hand in the East for the defense of Europe, and thereby for the preservation of the British Empire, turned out to be destroyed. Both of these dangers Hitler considered possible to avert by swift action. By itself, the victory over Poland could have changed the situation.

How soberly and realistically the Fuhrer assessed the position of his opponents, just as incomprehensible were his hopes for support from the European powers if he began to fight Bolshevism .

This was as much a mistake as the fact that Hitler underestimated the possibility of American economic and military assistance to England.

When this circumstance was brought to his attention, he, depending on the interlocutor, answered that long before the US intervention he would resolve all problems in Europe, for "woe if he did not cope with this earlier." The first part of the answer was propagandistic in nature, while the second, with another option, was intended only for those whom he trusted.

However, both responses underlined his assertion that he "could not wait any longer" and contributed to Hitler's hastily making the hardest decision of his life.

Some claimed that he was haunted by his vanity. Others stated that the Führer believed that he would not live long, and therefore had to hurry.

These explanations sounded unconvincing, although there was something true in them. I believe that in his decision Hitler was too guided by the "inner voice". He often said: from 1943 to 1945 the position of Germany would be the most difficult, and therefore it was necessary for him to carry out his political plans before the specified time. The Führer first mentioned this on November 5, 1937.

Since then, he has repeatedly amazed his entourage with forecasts that we could not explain, but on the whole attributed to his sharp mind, as well as to his thorough and logical thinking through of all problems. Often, in Hitler's reasoning, business sobriety was intertwined with implausible assumptions.

In my opinion, the liveliness of the mind and the strongly expressed fantasy painted for him phantasmagoric pictures of the future.

Closely related to Hitler's predisposition to an illusory vision of the world was his self-confidence, which went as far as asserting his own messianism. Even before my appointment to the Führer's personal headquarters, I had occasion to hear with a sense of embarrassment in Hitler's public speeches such words: he is proud that it was his Providence that destined to be the Führer of the German people!

Later, in a narrower circle, as well as among the generals, he repeatedly said that he was obliged to fulfill the tasks assigned to him, because after him no one could do it.

Such arrogant self-conceit was at odds with his inner modesty. Similar contradictions also manifested themselves when he expressed well-thought-out and tested views: for example, the intention to reckon with the possibility of a war on two fronts, that is, to take the risk for which he was always most sharply criticized.

In conversation, Hitler often quoted Frederick the Great and Bismarck as his models. After all, they, according to him, faced the same grandiose tasks and only with their courage and will led Prussia and Germany to greatness. . However, the Fuhrer did not mention that both of them, being outstanding personalities, in addition, had a strong, well-trained and armed ground army.

Frederick II inherited it from his father Frederick I, and Bismarck, before putting this army into action, managed to increase it against all odds. But above all, they both knew that they could rely on the officer corps, from the most senior general to the last Fenrich. By the beginning of the war in 1939, Hitler underestimated the significance of this unconditional loyalty and unconditional obedience, and relied on a simple "musketeer".

In the summer of 1939, Hitler repeated: “ I have forgotten how to wait, I have no more time to wait..

This impatience became fatal for him, and thus for the German Reich, in the last week before the war.

He underestimated his enemies in Europe, but overestimated himself and the Wehrmacht, in no way suitable for a long war of attrition.

I remember some conversations with my good friends in those turbulent weeks before the start of the war. We considered it tragic that the rulers of the countries that joined it in that critical phase of politics were not sufficiently aware of and respected the points of view of their opponents.

England did not want to admit that the revision of the Treaty of Versailles had become a political necessity for Germany. Hitler was unwilling to admit that the British demand for a "balance of power" in Europe was vital to the preservation of the British world empire.

However, despite this tragic and, in my opinion, not at all inevitable course of events, I was then far from thinking that Hitler should be defeated. But, undoubtedly, with the beginning of the war, a certain fear settled in my brain, which I, as an officer, did not want to admit to myself. Indeed, on August 2, 1934, after the death of Field Marshal Hindenburg, I took the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler and felt bound by it.

"Barbarossa"

That same autumn, Hitler took an important and decisive step. He sent Dr. Todt, along with Schmundt and Engel, to the East to find a place to set up his new Headquarters there.

One place in East Prussia seemed to him the most suitable, which he ordered to be equipped as an office and a reliable bomb shelter. The returned tenants offered to use the area near Rastenburg for this.

Hitler agreed and ordered that the construction of the headquarters be started immediately by April 1941. It seemed to me that this decision brought the campaign against Russia much closer..

December 1940 brought a few more very clear indications of New Year. On December 5 Hitler received Brauchitsch and Halder for a very detailed discussion of the present situation in Europe.

Bet "Wolf's Lair", its construction in the fall of 1940 was an act of preparation for war

“Their views on certain issues turned out to be very different. The longest conversations were about the situation in the air and about Russia. As regards the air war against England, the Führer said that the cessation of our daylight raids saved the British from destroying their fighters.

We were unable to destroy English industry with our raids. He called the result minimal. The material losses of the British can only be compensated by supplies from the USA, but they should not be overestimated.

“In 1941, the British will not have stronger aviation than today. Our Luftwaffe will become much stronger in the spring, ”Hitler said.

As for Russia, he said that the Russian person is inferior, and the Russian army is deprived of command.

When attacking Russia, the danger of pushing the Russians into retreat must be avoided. Offensive operations should be carried out in such a way as to dismember the Russian army into separate sections and take it prisoner. It is necessary to find such starting positions that would make it possible to carry out major encirclement operations. Hitler expected great partial successes, which should lead to the fact that at some point in Russia there will be complete disorganization. The attack on Russia was for him a settled matter.

On December 10, Hitler delivered a well-conceived speech to the workers of a military enterprise in Berlin, which, in fact, was addressed to all German military factories and all those employed in them. Here, too, he stressed: the most difficult for all of us is ahead.

In the last days of the outgoing year, Hitler informed all the components of the Wehrmacht his decision about Russia. On December 18, he handed them over to the main commands "Directive No. 21. Plan" Barbarossa ".

On December 22, 1940, the new Japanese ambassador, Oshima, presented his credentials, and the Führer greeted him with particular cordiality. Oshima returned to Japan when Hitler concluded a treaty with Russia in 1939. Now the Japanese government saw fit to reappoint him as their ambassador to Germany. It was said that the Fuhrer began to reconsider his policy towards Russia.

This was Hitler's last "act of state" in Berlin before public holidays. On December 27, we arrived in the Calais region by special train. The Fuhrer visited the batteries of long-range artillery of the ground forces and the navy, which could bombard England, as well as those structures to which he paid special attention in the summer.

Spoke words of appreciation for their actions in the past weeks. In the evening, in the carriage of a special train, he promoted Engel and me to majors out of turn, which was a great joy and surprise for us.

On December 25, Hitler visited the bomber squadron, and then received in his special train the head of the French government, Admiral Darlan, who had become Laval's successor a few days ago. The Fuhrer was dissatisfied with the conversation with him and was irritated.

He criticized Laval's removal, attributing it to anti-German influences in Petain's staff. I could not find out the details of the meeting, I could only see how annoyed the boss was with her.

On December 26, the Fuhrer visited one infantry regiment, and in conclusion - in his life standard "Adolf Hitler" in Metz. Here he felt especially at ease, and in his speech he clearly expressed his satisfaction.

His personal regiment must always be ready to act in the hot spots of the struggle: "For you, who bear my name, it is an honor to stand at the head of our struggle."

"Solutions

The winter of 1940–41 was a time of reflection, planning and decision. Hitler spent a lot of time on the Obersalzberg, because it was possible to work here in peace.

In New Year's addresses to the Wehrmacht and the German people, the Fuhrer spoke about the course of the war in 1940 and spoke about the situation on the world stage. The German ground forces, the German navy and the Luftwaffe, he proclaimed, were entering 1941 greatly strengthened and with improved weapons. He spoke about the air war as follows:

“Herr Churchill is the man who suddenly invented unrestricted air warfare, passing it off as the great secret of British victory. For three and a half months now, this criminal has been ordering night raids to bombard German cities ... In this I see cruelty, which is sheer outrage ... "

The Fuhrer's appeals hinted at the continuation of the war with even more cruel methods and had a paralyzing effect on the people. But it is amazing how patiently the mass behaved. Most said: the Fuhrer already knows what to do! All the people were harnessed to work for the war and worked with great zeal and conscientiousness.

On January 8 and 9, Hitler summoned the entire military leadership to the Berghof for one of the most important and decisive meetings that he held in this circle during the whole of 1941. First, he outlined the situation in Europe:

“Spain as an assistant disappears. France is against us. In relation to it, we have no obligations. Russia has recently made demands that it did not have before: Finland, the Balkans and Mariampol. Romania is on our side. Hungary - no problem. In Yugoslavia, all questions are still open. Bulgaria is very cautious. Doesn't want to risk his dynasty."

Hitler continued: "England wants to dominate the whole continent." And therefore, he wants to beat us there. He himself wants to be so strong that this goal will never be achieved. England hopes for Russia and America. "We cannot finally beat England by landing."

In 1941 conditions on the Continent will be such that in a further war against England we may, under certain conditions, clash with the United States. About the new British Foreign Secretary Eden

Hitler said: this man is for joint actions with Russia.

Hitler described Stalin as a man of intelligence and cunning. “He will demand more and more. The victory of Germany is unbearable for Russian ideology. Our decision should be to bring Russia to the ground as quickly as possible.

In two years the British will put up 40 divisions. The approach to the solution of the Russian question unties the hands of Japan against England in the [Far] East. Japan is ready for serious cooperation with us.” The Fuhrer said about Russian weapons: the material part, the equipment is outdated. The Russian army lacks a spiritual scope.

For the first time in such a wide circle, the Fuhrer mentioned the conduct of the war in North Africa. You can't risk Italy collapsing internally. The current Italian setbacks in Africa stem from a lack of modern weaponry. We must send our team there to help.

Hitler made it clear that he wanted to wage war against Russia this summer. Initially, he intended to start it in the second half of May. But the course of events in the Balkans and North Africa may delay the attack until June.

Those present took Hitler's statements silently and without objection. I must say: the faces of the officers were closed and, perhaps, none of them wanted to see the need for a war against Russia . Much later I learned that they only expressed their serious concerns on the way back.

My view of the future war from the very beginning of the year was not optimistic. Judging by the way events unfolded, victory did not seem possible to me.

I came to the conclusion that Hitler wants to make the vast Russian empire dependent on the Reich in order to get from it the raw materials we need to wage war with England.

This seemed to me especially important, given the possible entry of the United States into the war on the side of England.

True, this has not yet become clear, but, judging by the reports of our chargé d'affaires in Washington, something hostile was being prepared there. Roosevelt spoke of Germany more and more critically and condemningly, and the American people began to embrace the anti-German mood.

It seemed to me that Churchill was quite successful in bringing Roosevelt into his program. So the move political development in the West seemed to me very serious.

Hitler constantly said that we must deal with Russia before the United States enters the war. This calculation, as one might assume, now did not work. That is why I myself looked towards 1941 with great apprehension, having, however, no possibility of expressing my views anywhere. Only since the end of the year have I sometimes had the opportunity to talk with the Führer on this subject.

There is one feature in this text - Hitler convinced his military that a war with Russia was needed to obtain raw materials, but this was clearly Hitler's bluff

Apparently none of the military understood that Hitler was led by blind fanaticism and faith in his great destiny

If they understood this, then probably the ardent support for the decision to go to war with the USSR would be much less

"Operational plan against Russia

On February 3, 1941, Hitler held a lengthy meeting lasting several hours with Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, Keitel, and Jodl, who were later joined by Jeschonnek. Colonel General Halder estimated the strength of the Russians as follows: 121 rifle divisions, 25 cavalry divisions and 31 motorized brigades - a total of approximately 180 formations. The German side has: 104 infantry divisions, 20 tank divisions, 13 motorized and 1 cavalry divisions, and also several Romanian divisions.

The Russians have about 10,000 tanks in total, compared to about 3,500 German ones. At the same time, the chief of the general staff noted that it was necessary to bet on the moment of surprise. Russian artillery is numerically strong, but its materiel is mostly outdated. The concentration and deployment of our troops is planned as part of three army groups and four tank groups with the simultaneous occupation of the entire front line.

Hitler generally agreed with this planning, but repeated his views on the course of operations. After the first battles, in which the Russian border units will be defeated, it is important, having reached the Pskov-Smolensk-Kiev line, to strengthen the northern and southern army groups and, first of all, to seize the Baltic states, including also Leningrad, and in the south - to reach the Rostov region.

The Central Army Group, in the proper case, should only start its offensive against Moscow from 1942. Hitler first of all emphasized the main goal of 1941 - the capture of the entire Baltic space and the city of Leningrad. This goal must be constantly kept in mind by the ground forces in order to force the Russians to give up the Baltic Sea. Further, the Fuhrer spoke about individual problems important for the launch of the attack, as well as concerning the supply of troops.

An important point for Hitler was the situation in the air. On the German side, it was assumed that the Russians had air formations with long-range aircraft. Therefore, Hitler emphasized the importance of protection against air raids and air defense.

He also approved the operational plans of the Luftwaffe as part of a campaign in the East. In the very first three days, the German air force must destroy the Russian air units in order to ensure the rapid advance of the tank forces.

In the course of this long and thorough discussion of the issues of conquering an incredibly huge space, it seemed to me that this was almost impossible and the goals set were unlikely to ever be achieved.

But although, before the French campaign, Brauchitsch and Halder expressed their fears on various occasions, showing that they were completely against this war, they accepted Hitler's instructions for waging war with Russia without a single word of doubt or resistance.

It even occurred to me that, fully realizing the impracticability of these operations, they did not take decisive action against them, apparently wanting to give the Fuhrer the opportunity to drive himself into a fatal trap. Of course, at that time such thoughts were completely out of the ordinary, but the vast Russian expanses also contributed to their emergence.

…………..

Hitler's attitude towards the Russian enemy

On March 30, Hitler again convened the leaders of the Wehrmacht. In the meeting room at his office, he delivered a two-hour fundamental speech in which he outlined his thoughts on the campaign against Russia. In this speech, the Fuhrer did not focus on the tactical and strategic details of the attack on Russia.

It was important for him to convey to the command of the Wehrmacht his fundamental views on the problems that the struggle against the Russians puts forward. He declared:

"England is now pinning her hopes on America and Russia." America will be able to provide its maximum military power only after 3-4 years.

« Russia is the last enemy factor in Europe. It should be broken this or next year. Then we will be able to cope in material and personnel terms with our tasks both in the air and on the water over the next two years.

Our task in Russia must be to crush the Red Army and liquidate the state. This is a struggle between two worldviews..

Bolshevism amounts to an asocial crime and is a monstrous danger to the future. We must abandon the notion of a soldier's partnership with him. A communist can never be our comrade in arms. It's about fighting for destruction.

If we do not treat it this way, then, although we defeat the communist enemy, in a few years we will again face him. In the struggle against Russia, it is about the destruction of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligentsia.

The struggle must be waged against the poison of decay.

The army must defend itself with the same means that are used to attack it. Commissars and clerks are criminals and must be treated as such.. In the East, any cruelty is gentleness in the future.».

Hitler mentioned in particular the large number of Russian tanks and planes. But only a small number of them meet modern requirements.

The vast Russian space and vast distances make it necessary to concentrate the forces of tanks and the Luftwaffe at decisive points.

The use of the Luftwaffe after the first battles for air supremacy should be closely linked to ground operations. The Russians will not be able to resist the massive use of tanks and aircraft.

After a joint breakfast, the Fuhrer had a few more conversations in the afternoon on developments in the Balkans. First of all, he emphasized the urgency of action there caused by this, adding, however, that the start of the campaign against Russia would have to be postponed for a month. The Balkan campaign should begin no later than a week later.

These days I registered another particularly important event. On March 1, the Imperial Ministry of Aviation sent Colonel-Engineer Dietrich Schwenke to Russia with the assignment, in accordance with the German-Russian agreement, to visit Russian aircraft factories. And now he's back.

I heard about his trip from various departments of the ministry, but, unfortunately, I personally did not manage to talk to him. However, the head of the Luftwaffe General Staff's department for foreign aviation told me the most important points of his report. According to this report, there was no doubt that Russia was arming on a large scale. The newly created aircraft factories - and of such a size that Schwenke had never seen - were supposed to
day to come into operation operating.

A huge number of new airfields have been laid. Everywhere they work with the greatest diligence and zeal.

When I once mentioned this in a conversation with the Führer, I had to admit that Göring had already informed him about this. The Führer considered that this armament of the Russians should be taken very seriously. But he is deeply convinced that his plan for the Russian campaign will be carried out even at the very last moment.

On April 5, it was announced that a treaty of friendship and neutrality had been concluded between Russia and Yugoslavia. Hitler took this news with some satisfaction: in fact, by doing so, Russia proved that she wanted to go her own way. However, the envoys of Yugoslavia, Norway, Belgium and Greece were expelled from the Soviet Union by Stalin a few days later, since he no longer considered them sovereign states.

On June 14, Hitler summoned to the Imperial Chancellery the commanders of the army groups and armies participating in the Eastern Campaign. Much organizational work was required so that the simultaneous presence of so many high-ranking military leaders was not conspicuous. At noon, the generals of Army Groups North and Center were called in for a report, and by lunchtime, the generals of Army Group South. A special procedure for entering the Imperial Chancellery was established. Some cars turned into her garden from Wilhelmstrasse, and Brauchitsch's car from Hermann Göringstrasse. Other access routes were also used. Everything went well.

After a few words of welcome, Hitler ordered each army commander to report his intentions for the first days of the fighting and the continuation of the operation in his lane. In conclusion, the commanders of the air fleets reported on their intentions.

On this long day, the Führer received a proper idea of ​​the strength of the formation, the number of tanks, and many details. He rarely interrupted and listened attentively and quietly. It followed from the reports that the Red Army had a numerical superiority, but its quality, nevertheless, was not high.

From this, optimistic conclusions were drawn regarding the intensity of the upcoming battles. And if, nevertheless, the majority of the generals were opposed to this campaign, the reason for this was that this would begin a war on two fronts, which Germany, according to everyone's belief, could not endure for a long time and could not win.

Then the Fuhrer gave a dinner in his apartment, using it to treat the field marshals and generals to a long speech for about an hour.

Hitler said: this war is a war against Bolshevism. He expects the Russian to fight steadfastly and put up stubborn resistance. . “We must reckon with the possibility of his large air raids, and therefore we should organize a smart air defense.

Our Luftwaffe will certainly achieve rapid success and thereby facilitate the offensive of ground forces. The heaviest battles will be left behind in about six weeks. But every soldier must know what he is fighting for. Not for the country that we want to capture, but against Bolshevism, which must be destroyed.

The Fuhrer spoke with caustic sarcasm about the British, who preferred an agreement with Russia to an agreement with Germany. This is the policy of the 19th century, but not of the 20th century. With these words, Hitler pointed to his Alliance with Stalin, which was a purely political step taken for the sake of Danzig and the "corridor" in order to return these areas to the Reich without war.

He continued: “If we lose this war, all of Europe will become Bolshevik. If the British do not understand and realize this, they will lose their leadership role, and thereby their world empire.

Now it is even impossible to imagine how much they will end up in the hands of the Americans as a result of this war. But it is clear that the Americans see their huge profit in this war.”

In the afternoon, Hitler held several more interviews with the commanders of Army Group South formations. In front of this group of armies there was a particularly large space, which was subject to continuous expansion in the course of the advance. The Fuhrer said that the main forces of the Russian troops should be expected in the central sector of the front. If they are defeated, Army Group South will receive reinforcements from there. Brauchitsch and Halder did not say a word that day.

On June 21, Hitler dictated the Address to the German People. In it, he laid out his entire policy since the beginning of the war. He stated:

“The new rise of our people from want, poverty and shameful humiliation took place under the sign of a purely internal rebirth.

This did not affect England in any special way, much less threatened her. However, in this moment the hate-filled encirclement of Germany resumed. Both inside and outside the country, a conspiracy of Jews and democrats, Bolsheviks and reactionaries arose with one single goal: to prevent the formation of a new German people's state, to plunge the Reich into a state of impotence and poverty again.

Moscow, Hitler argued, despite all the friendly talk, was systematically preparing for the outbreak of war. The concentration of our troops on the Eastern Front has been completed. “The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the very existence of Europe, which means the salvation of all ... May the Lord help us in this struggle!”

At the beginning of 1941 I was repeatedly asked whether he knew the Russian or whether he had a presentiment of our intention to attack him. To this I could answer only one thing: I don’t know, but I assume that his long-range reconnaissance aircraft discovered the concentration of our divisions on their eastern border. The only thing the Russians do not know is when and where these formations will begin to operate.
Many years after the war, I learned from a supporter of Goerdeler that he, together with the latter, had talked in November 1940 with Molotov at the Kaiserhof Hotel.

This, he said, was an open and unconstrained conversation, during which both of them informed the Russian Foreign Minister about Hitler's plan to attack Russia in 1941. Molotov did not want to believe this and did not attach serious importance to such a statement.

But one way or another, after Molotov's trip to Berlin, preparations for war began on a large scale in Russia.

During the invasion in 1941, German troops ran into new defensive structures, discovered newly built airfields, and so on. The Russians expected our invasion, but by no means already in 1941. They were guided by the fact that Hitler would attack later.

In the last days before the march on Russia, the Fuhrer became more and more nervous and restless.

He talked a lot, walked back and forth and seemed to be waiting for something urgently. Only on the night of June 21-22, already after midnight, did I hear his first remark about the beginning of the campaign. He said: "This will be the hardest battle for our soldier in this war."

During last days before the attack on Russia, I tried to paint myself a general picture of the state of the war and imagine what could be achieved in it in the coming months. The war with England continued.

The Fuhrer planned to attack her in the summer of 1942.

A direct attack on England, I personally considered possible no earlier than the autumn of 1942, if by that time it was possible to defeat the Russians. I doubted the correctness of Hitler's optimistic assessment of the situation with Russia.

It was difficult to predict the course of operations against her. Much more threatening seemed to me the development of relations with the United States. I feared that it would not be too long before America entered the war. As a result, we get a real war on two fronts.

If, before this entry of the Americans into the war, we fail to secure an undoubted victory over the Russians, we, even in the most favorable case, can only count on a long and difficult war of attrition, the outcome of which is beyond doubt. So, I could in no way regard the general situation at the beginning of this struggle with the Russians in our favor.

But the incredibly powerful German front against Russia seemed to me proof that our adversaries would first of all mobilize the same might to oppose us. It might last long years, and during this time, I believed, we will be able to defeat one or another enemy and thereby free up forces to defeat another.

However, Hitler's idea of ​​the war in the East was quite different from that of the ground forces. Their command expected a traditional war, and he expected a fight against a stubborn and merciless enemy. Characteristic in this regard was his "order on commissars", which required the troops to shoot every commissar who fell into their hands on the spot.

This order aroused great concern in military circles, and I knew that it was not communicated to all the troops. That was the first widespread opposition to the Führer's order that became known to me. But at the same time I realized that in this way other orders of his could be systematically sabotaged.

The reason for this was the oppositional attitude of Halder to the instructions of the Fuhrer and his assessment of the situation, which I observed on various occasions.

However, the Chief of the General Staff preferred never to openly express his opposite point of view. I got the impression that Halder had to digest and "swallow" an infinite amount of things.

This is how we began a very large campaign without unity in leadership and with the highest commanders in the most responsible posts, by no means all of whom pulled the same rope. Therefore, I saw a huge danger for the operation that promised success. ”……… ..

Every year on the eve of a terrible and tragic date for our people - June 22, again and again I ask myself how could this happen? As a country preparing for war and having perhaps the strongest army at that time, it suffered a crushing defeat, 4 million Red Army soldiers surrendered and were taken prisoner, and the people were on the verge of extermination. Who is to blame for this? Stalin? It is perfectly acceptable, but is he the only one? Maybe someone else is involved in this, maybe someone's wrong actions are hiding another White spot stories about World War II? Let's try to figure it out. One year before the war 1940 Summer. World War II has been raging for almost a year. Hitler and Germany led by him reach hitherto unseen heights. France is defeated, and with this victory, almost all of continental Europe is at the feet of the Nazis. The Wehrmacht begins to prepare for war with England. On July 16, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 16 on the preparation of an operation to land troops in the UK, codenamed "Sea Lion". Not a word about the war with the USSR. Hitler does not need a war with the Soviet Union. Hitler is not suicidal. And he read the great strategists of Germany's past: Clausewitz and Bismarck. They bequeathed to the Germans that they would never fight with Russia. The war with Russia is suicide: this is a vast territory that cannot be occupied by any armies, these are impenetrable swamps and forests, a cruel winter with wild frosts. And this is an army of many millions; plus Stalin's industrialization gives this army the latest tanks, aircraft and artillery. This is a nation that has never recognized foreign invaders, its own - yes, foreign ones - no. To decide on a war with Russia, you must either have a huge strong, professional army with a militarized economy subordinate to it, or be a suicide with a guarantee of failure. As for the first, the total number of troops of Germany and the USSR has long been no secret. These figures are even given in the history books. Before the attack on the USSR, Hitler had about 3,500 tanks, about 4,000 aircraft, 190 divisions, and this number includes all divisions (both motorized, and tank, and infantry). And what about the other side? Comparing the German Wehrmacht and the USSR before the war, in all reference books, textbooks and books, I always observed one detail, perhaps unnoticed by other researchers. Leading German forces, researchers give all the troops concentrated near the border with the USSR. This is the overwhelming number of the entire Wehrmacht, in addition, Germany has only occupying forces in the occupied countries of Europe. When referring to the Soviet forces, only the ZapVO, KOVO and PribVO (western, Kiev and Baltic military districts) are given. But this is not the entire Soviet army. But it still turns out that Germany is many times inferior in number even to these districts. And if you compare the Wehrmacht with the entire Red Army? Only a madman could attack such a colossus as the USSR. Or someone who had no choice but a doomed attack. This is exactly what happened on June 22, 1941. Who, and with what unjustified actions, forced Hitler to take this step, which eventually ruined him and the Third Reich? Unjustified appetites of the aggressor The USSR, acting as a real aggressor, seized foreign territories and occupied independent states. There is nothing strange in this, any aggressors of both the past and the present have acted and are acting in this way. In 1940, the Baltic countries were subjected to aggression: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina - two primordially historical regions of Romania. What is changing, what happens after these seizures on the political map of the world? First. The borders of the Reich and the USSR are in contact, that is, now "only a spark is needed for fire." And this spark is struck by one of our military figures - Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Second. The oil fields of Romania are within easy reach - 180 kilometers. This is a direct threat to the Reich. Without oil, the Wehrmacht war machine will stop. Third. With the occupation of the Baltic states, there was a direct threat to the most important supply artery of the Reich - the transport of iron ore from Luleå (Sweden) across the Baltic Sea. And without iron ore, Germany, of course, would not have been able to fight successfully either - this is the most important resource. The aspect of "Romanian oil" is especially important. After the Stalin step and the execution of this step, G.K. Zhukov, among other things, the USSR had the following problems: Romania, having become an ally of Hitler, spoiled relations with the USSR (and how else, when territory is taken from you?), The front with Germany increased by 800 kilometers, plus another foothold from Hitler to attack THE USSR. The worst thing is that Stalin scared Hitler. It was Zhukov's capture of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina that excited the Fuhrer and the German military command. There was a direct threat to the oil fields of Romania. From that moment on, a strike against the USSR began to be developed. June 22 Alternatives Although history does not like the subjunctive mood, but still “what would happen if?” Germany is going to fight the British Empire and is preparing for the most difficult landing on foggy Albion. All this is known, but could Zhukov change something? It is quite possible that Stalin could listen to the voice of Georgy Konstantinovich and resolve military issues with him. In the summer of 1940, there were several alternatives. Let's consider them. First. With a strike on Bessarabia, do not stop, but go further and capture the whole of Romania. Hitler, who concentrated his army along the Atlantic coast, would not have been able to successfully prevent Zhukov. Ten divisions in Poland and Slovakia do not count. With the capture of the whole of Romania, the oil fields of Ploiesti are leaving the hands of Germany - and this puts the Reich in a dependent position. Synthetic fuel is not a solution: it is not enough, it is of poor quality and very expensive. Second. Zhukov could have advised Stalin to wait a bit until the Reich got bogged down in a war with England. After all, landing on Albion Island is a very risky and complicated business, and even if everything goes well, then even then Stalin and Zhukov will have a moment that is very favorable for an attack - the very moment when the German army is on this island - and for a successful operation it would take about 80-85% of the Wehrmacht. But what happened happened. The Red Army, having captured Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, stopped. Yes, you will say that Stalin did not set the task for Zhukov to crush Romania in the summer of 1940. But Zhukov could have tried, if he were a strategist, as our directors and writers portray him, to suggest to Stalin an almost win-win option. Didn't suggest. Afraid or did not understand the strategy of warfare. “As a result of the successful development offensive operations On the Central, Southern and Southwestern fronts, the Red Army occupied the cities of Brussels, Amsterdam, Bruges and others during the liberation campaign. In the direction of Vienna, Salzburg, Strasbourg, enemy troops were surrounded and surrendered in quantity ... ”The words of military reports from the front could sound like this or almost like that when the Red Army would subjugate Europe. But do we need it?***** EDITORIAL COMMENT What was the reason for the defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war? In Soviet times, they usually looked for an explanation in the suddenness of the attack, in Germany's superiority in military force (which actually did not exist), in the incompleteness of the country's transition to a military footing (which also did not exist). A brief mention was made of the “partial loss of command and control”, which is a delusion, since in this case it is necessary to talk about the partial preservation of command and control. Well-known Russian historians Yu.T. Temirov and A.S. Donets in the book "War" (M., "EKSMO", 2005). They call the main reason for the defeats of 1941 the completely mediocre command and control of the troops by the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, as well as the general inability of the command staff of the Red Army to fight. The mediocrity of Zhukov and the commanders of the Red Army was caused by the authoritarianism of the System itself, which deprived the commanders of the initiative and forced them to follow the stupid orders of the communists, and repressions in the army in the pre-war period, and the extremely weak and poor-quality training of command personnel. The authors of the book compare the terms for training specialists and commanders in the German army and in the Soviet army: the Germans, on average, spent 5-10 times more time on this training, and in some cases 30 times more. But the decisive role in the defeat of the Red Army was played precisely by Zhukov’s mediocrity as a commander, he fought “not with skill, but with numbers”, made completely ridiculous tactical decisions, ruined thousands of tanks and millions of soldiers. As a result, Zhukov was punished and dismissed, Stalin was going to shoot him for his mistakes, but he was hardly dissuaded (Zhukov himself hid this in his memoirs, explaining the removal from the post of the Chief of the General Staff by the fact that he allegedly quarreled with Stalin - this is another lie of the narcissist "commander"). But even today, Russian historians cannot tell the whole truth about the war. The glaring fact is that the 3.5 million German army surrendered in just six months of the war, 4 million Soviet soldiers, and about a million more were repressed during this period for their unwillingness to fight (in total, in the Red Army on June 21, 1941 there were 5.5 million . Human). The most important reason for the defeats is the unwillingness of the army to fight for Stalin, for the hateful power of the commissars. It has never happened before in history that entire units of the Red Army surrendered to the enemy, tying up their commissars. Moreover, out of 4 million surrendered soldiers and officers, about 1.5 million began to fight on the side of the enemy (including the millionth Russian Liberation People's Army of General Vlasov). There may be ten, one hundred traitors. But not half a million! These are no longer traitors, this is the Civil War. The people, tired of the bloody communist junta, were waiting for liberation. But the tragedy was that Hitler was not a "liberator" at all, he was a conqueror. And when the people understood this, the whole course of the war immediately changed. Therefore, after all, the main reason for the defeats of the beginning of the war was the pre-war Bolshevik yoke, which did not allow people to understand at all the meaning of protecting such an ugly and rotten state as the USSR from the enemy. It is curious that today at all events in connection with the events of 1941 (on the "Stalin Line", etc.), the idea is given that "they died, but did not give up." The historians of the “Soviet hardening” say the same thing in their articles. But what about the fact that during the 6 months of the war, out of 5.5 million personnel army, 4 million surrendered to the Germans, about a million more were repressed for unwillingness to fight (600 more than a thousand for the month of October in Beria’s certificate, of which about 30 thousand were shot in October), and only about 500 thousand soldiers and officers died or were wounded in hostilities from the pre-war composition of the Red Army? Naked statistics show that they just SURRENDED, and did not die - EVERYONE SURDERED: about 80% of the pre-war composition of the Red Army surrendered to the Germans! Let the Red Army surrender for political reasons, and many historians call this the “Act civil war", not betrayal. But there was the crappy power of the USSR - and there was its own people: things are different. The Red Army actually betrayed its people, which it was supposed to protect, who fed and clothed it, who trained it, who gave it the best military equipment in the world - while living from hand to mouth . It seems ridiculous even the very fact that 4 million Soviet prisoners of war were in the rear of the advancing 3.5 million enemy army: they could well disperse the frail guards and seize power in the rear of the Germans, thereby carrying out the ENROUND operation of the entire advancing German army. Instead, for weeks they marched in an endless column to the West in front of the windows of the Belarusians - dreaming of the imminent victory of Hitler and a new life without the Bolsheviks. That is, not so much in German captivity, but in captivity of their own illusions. This is precisely the tragedy, and it is hushed up in every possible way even today, because the behavior of 4 million surrendered Red Army soldiers must somehow be explained - but it is difficult to explain. It is much easier to call them "heroes", although Stalin considered them traitors (80% of his army!). And it’s even easier to continue to lie odiously about the fact that “they died, but did not give up.” And the truth is that in the Land of Slaves, which was Stalin's USSR, the army can only consist of slaves. And such an Army of slaves cannot fight, even having the best equipment in the world, because they do not understand the purpose of this: a slave will never be a patriot of his slavery. As a result, Hitler simply took advantage of this situation. Including a huge gift awaited him: he started the war with 3.5 thousand antediluvian tanks, and in the first weeks of the war, surrendered units of the Red Army handed him another 6.5 thousand of the latest tanks, among which a significant part were KV and T-34. They became the striking force of the Wehrmacht in the attack on Smolensk, Moscow and Leningrad, having acquired the indices "KV (r)" and "T-34 (r)". Another paradox of the initial stage of the war is that all conquered Europe gave Hitler only 3.5 thousand tanks to attack the USSR, and the surrendered Red Army added another 6.5 thousand to him, bringing the number of tanks in Hitler's army in July 1941 to 10 thousand! And this is hushed up (the number of tanks the Germans had in July-October 1941 is concealed), although without this fact it is difficult to understand how an army with 27 thousand tanks, including the invincible KV and T-34, can be defeated with 3.5 thousand tanks ... Sergei GRIGORIEV, Vitebsk "Secret Research"