Francis Bacon. Francis Bacon: biography, philosophical doctrine Antithesis sir francis bacon cube

The famous English thinker is one of the first major philosophers of modern times, age of reason. The very nature of his teaching is very different from the systems of ancient and medieval thinkers. Bacon does not even mention knowledge as a pure and inspired striving for the highest truth. He despised Aristotle and religious scholasticism because they approached philosophical knowledge with such points of view. In accordance with the spirit of the new, rational-consumer era, Bacon is characterized primarily by the desire to domination over nature. Hence his famous aphorism knowledge is power .

Before he devoted himself entirely to philosophy, Francis Bacon was one of the most prominent officials of the English royal court. His social activities were marked by extreme unscrupulousness. Having started his career in parliament as an extreme oppositionist, he soon turned into a loyal loyalist. By betraying his original patron, Essex, Francis Bacon became a lord, a member of the secret council and the keeper of the state seal, but then was caught by parliament in large bribes. After a scandalous trial, he was sentenced to a huge fine of 40 thousand pounds and imprisonment in the Tower. The king forgave Bacon, but he still had to part with his political career (for more details, see the article Bacon, Francis - a brief biography). In his philosophical writings, Francis Bacon proclaimed the goal of conquest of material power with the same ruthless one-sidedness and dangerous disregard for moral laws with which he acted in practical politics.

Portrait of Francis Bacon. Painter Frans Pourbus the Younger, 1617

Mankind, according to Bacon, must subjugate nature and dominate it. (This goal, however, animates the entire Renaissance.) The human race moved forward thanks to scientific discoveries and inventions.

Recognizing the genius of many ancient philosophers, Bacon argued, however, that their genius was of no use, since it was misdirected. All of them disinterestedly searched for abstract metaphysical and moral truths, without thinking about practical benefits. Bacon himself thinks that "science should not be reduced to the fruitless satisfaction of idle curiosity." It should turn to extensive material and productive work. In the aspirations and personality of Bacon, the practical Anglo-Saxon spirit was exhaustively embodied.

Bacon's New Atlantis

Francis Bacon was imbued with the idea that the development of science would lead in the future to the onset of a golden age. With almost undeniable atheism, he wrote about the great discoveries ahead with the elevated enthusiasm of a religious prophet and treated the fate of science as a kind of shrine. In his unfinished philosophical utopia, The New Atlantis, Bacon depicts the happy, comfortable life of a wise, small nation of islanders who systematically apply in the "house of Solomon" all previously made discoveries for new inventions. The inhabitants of the "New Atlantis" have a steam engine, a balloon, a microphone, a telephone, and even a perpetual motion machine. With the brightest colors, Bacon depicts how all this improves, decorates and lengthens human life. The thought of the possible harmful consequences of "progress" does not even cross his mind.

Bacon "The Great Restoration of the Sciences"

All the main books of Francis Bacon are combined into one gigantic work called "The Great Restoration of the Sciences" (or "The Great Revival of the Sciences"). The author sets himself three tasks in it: 1) a review of all sciences (with the establishment and special role of philosophy), 2) the development of a new method of natural science, and 3) its application to a single study.

Bacon's writings "On the Progress of Knowledge" and "On the Dignity and Multiplication of the Sciences" are devoted to the solution of the first problem. The book On the Dignity and Multiplication of the Sciences constitutes the first part of The Great Restoration. Bacon gives in her overview of human knowledge(globus intellectualis). According to the three main abilities of the soul (memory, imagination and reason), he divides all sciences into three branches: "history" (experimental knowledge in general, humanitarian and natural), poetry and philosophy.

Philosophy has three objects: God, man and nature. However, the knowledge of God, according to Francis Bacon, is inaccessible to the human mind and must be drawn only from revelation. The sciences that study man and nature are anthropology and physics. Experienced physics Bacon considers " mother of all sciences". He includes metaphysics (the doctrine of the original causes of things) among the sciences, but he is inclined to look at it as an excessive speculation.

Monument to Francis Bacon in London

BACON(Bacon) Francis (January 22, 1561, London - April 9, 1626, Highgate) was an English philosopher, writer and statesman, one of the founders of modern philosophy. Born in the family of a high-ranking dignitary of the Elizabethan court, the Lord Keeper of the Great Royal Seal. Studied at Trinity College, Cambridge (1573–76) and Grace's Inn Law Corporation (1579–82). In 1586 he became foreman of this corporation. He led extensive judicial practice and was elected to parliament. He began to occupy high government positions under James I Stuart. From 1618 - Lord High Chancellor and Peer of England. In 1621 he was removed from this post in connection with the accusation of abuse and bribery brought against him by Parliament. The last years of his life he was engaged exclusively in scientific and literary activities. He died of a cold he got while experimenting with freezing chicken to see how snow could keep meat from spoiling.

Bacon's philosophy, ideologically prepared by the previous natural philosophy, the tradition of English nominalism and the achievements of the new natural science, combined the naturalistic worldview with the principles of the analytical method, empiricism with a broad program of reform of the entire intellectual world. Bacon associated the future of mankind, its power and well-being with the success of the sciences in the knowledge of nature and its laws and the implementation of useful inventions on this basis.

The state and improvement of science became the subject of his main philosophical work, The Great Restoration of the Sciences (Instauratio Magna Scientiarum). The first part of it was the treatise On the Dignity and Multiplication of the Sciences (1623, Russian translation, 1971), which contains an encyclopedic overview and classification of all human knowledge. Bacon divides all knowledge into three areas corresponding to the three spiritual abilities of a person: memory, fantasy and reason. History corresponds to memory, poetry to fantasy, philosophy to reason, which he identifies with science in general, i.e. includes the whole set of explanatory sciences. Further grouping of sciences within these areas is carried out according to the difference in the objects of their study. This classification, which is very branched and detailed, is remarkable in that for each theoretical science, Bacon indicates either the existing or possible practical or technical discipline corresponding to it, while noting those problems that, in his opinion, need to be developed. The second part was the treatise The New Organon, or True Directions for the Interpretation of Nature (1620, Russian translation, 1935). This part is the philosophical and methodological focus of the whole Baconian idea. Here the doctrine of the method of cognition, the concept of induction as a way of rational analysis and generalization of experimental data, is set out in detail, which should radically improve all scientific research and give them a clear perspective. The third part was to represent a series of works concerning the "natural and experimental history" of individual phenomena and processes of nature. Bacon completed this plan in half: “History of the Winds” (Historia ventorum, 1622), “History of Life and Death” (Historia vitae et mortis, 1623), “History of dense and rarefied and on the compression and expansion of matter in space” (Historia densi et rari... 1658). The next three parts remained only in the project.

Bacon also speaks of the benefits of scientific and technological development in the story The New Atlantis (1627, Russian translation, 1821, 1962). Like many of his works, it remained unfinished. The story describes the utopian state of the island of Bensalema, the main institution of which is the scientific order of the "House of Solomon", the scientific and technical center of the country, which at the same time controls the entire economic life. There are remarkable foresights in the account of the order's work. This is the idea of ​​a differentiated organization of scientific work with specialization and division of labor of scientists, with the allocation of various categories of scientists, each of which solves a strictly defined range of tasks, this is also an indication of the possibility of such technical achievements as the transmission of light over long distances, powerful artificial magnets, aircraft of various designs, submarines, getting temperatures close to the sun, creating an artificial climate and models that imitate the behavior of animals and people.

Another work to which Bacon constantly turned, replenishing it with new essays, was "Experiments, or Instructions moral and political" (1597, 1612, 1625, Russian translation 1874, 1962). "Experiments" contain a wide range of views on a variety of life issues, the maxims of practical morality, considerations on political, social and religious topics. Bacon is devoted to the Tudor ideal of the military, maritime and political power of the nation-state. He analyzes the conditions for the stability and success of absolutist rule as an arbiter between various social forces; he gives recommendations to the monarch on how to suppress the old tribal nobility, how to create a counterbalance to it in the new nobility, what tax policy to support the merchants, what measures to prevent discontent in the country and cope with popular unrest and uprisings. And at the same time, in the interests of the middle class, he advocates the maintenance of trade and a favorable balance of trade, the regulation of prices and the restriction of luxury, the encouragement of manufactories and the improvement of agriculture. And although much can be gleaned from the Essays about Bacon's philosophical, ethical, and socio-political views, they belong to philosophy no more than to English literature. Their language and style are fictional. They contain expressive sketches from a whole exhibition of characters, morals, feelings and inclinations of people, revealing in their author a subtle psychologist, an expert on human souls, a captious and objective judge of actions.

In addition to the "Experiments" and works related to the development of the ideas of the "Great Restoration of Sciences", Bacon owns: an unfinished treatise "On the beginnings and origins in accordance with the myth of Cupid and the sky, or on the philosophy of Parmenides and Telesio, and especially Democritus in connection with the myth of Cupid” (1658, Russian translation 1937), in which Bacon expressed his approval of previous natural philosophy, especially its understanding of matter as an active principle; Sat. "On the Wisdom of the Ancients" (1609, Russian translation 1972), where he gave an allegorical interpretation of ancient myths in the spirit of his natural, moral and political philosophy; "History of the reign of King Henry VII" (1622, Russian translation 1990); a number of legal, political and theological works.

Baconian philosophy took shape in the atmosphere of the scientific and cultural upsurge of the late Renaissance and influenced an entire era of subsequent philosophical development. Despite the persistent elements of scholastic metaphysics and an incorrect assessment of some scientific ideas and discoveries (primarily Copernicus), Bacon vividly expressed the aspirations of the new science. From him originates the materialistic tradition in the philosophy of modern times and the direction of research, which later received the name "philosophy of science", and the utopian "House of Solomon" became in some way the prototype of European scientific societies and academies.

Compositions:

1. The Works. Collected and edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath, v. 1–14. L., 1857–74;

2. in Russian trans.: Soch., v. 1–2. M., 1977–78.

Literature:

1. Macaulay. Lord Bacon. - Full. coll. soch., vol. 3. St. Petersburg, 1862;

2. Liebig Yu. F.Bacon Verulamsky and the method of natural science. SPb., 1866;

3. Fisher K. Real philosophy and its age. Francis Bacon of Verulam. SPb., 1870;

4. Gorodensky N. Francis Bacon, his doctrine of method and encyclopedia of sciences. Sergiev Posad, 1915;

5. Subbotnik S.F. F. Bacon. M., 1937;

6. Lunacharsky A.V. Francis Bacon. - Collection. soch., vol. 6. M., 1965;

7. Asmus V.F. Francis Bacon. - He is. Fav. philosopher, works, vol. 1, M., 1969;

8. Subbotin A.L. Francis Bacon. M., 1974;

9. Mikhalenko Yu.P. Francis Bacon and his teachings. M., 1975;

10. Adam Ch. Philosophie de François Bacon. P., 1890;

11. Broad C.D. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Cambr., 1926;

12. Frost W. Bacon und die Naturphilosophie... Munch., 1927;

13. Sturt M. Francis Bacon. L., 1932;

14. Farrington b. Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science. N.Y., 1949;

15. Idem. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Chi., 1966;

16. Anderson F.H. Francis Bacon. His Career and His Thought. Los Ang., 1962.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

Bacon Francis (BESBE)

Bacon Francis

(Bacon, prod. bacon, Baron Verulamsky, Viscount St. Albansky) - was born in York Palace on January 22.

Life of Francis Bacon

Rod B. did not belong to the noble families of England, but his parents were outstanding people. Francis Bacon was the youngest son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, a prominent English jurist and keeper of the seal during the reign of Elizabeth (see above). The initial upbringing of Francis was led by his mother, the daughter of Chevalier Anthony Cooke, tutor of Edward VI. Anna Cooke was an eminent linguist and theologian, and as a faithful and devoted daughter of the Puritan church, she was interested in her fate. She corresponded in Greek with Bishop Juel and translated his "Apology" from Latin so correctly that modern criticism could not reproach her with ignorance of the language. B. was always distinguished by poor health, and therefore was forced to lead a sedentary life and engage in mental work. Information about his youth is very scarce, but the data that have been preserved about him testify to his early inclination for mental work, his richly gifted and inquisitive mind, and versatile talents. At the age of 12, he solved the question of how a magician could guess a card conceived by someone. At first, B. attributed this guessing to a deal between the magician and the servants, but then he found the psychological law on which the said trick is based. In the 13th year, in the city, B. enters the University of Cambridge ( Trinity College ), where he mainly devotes himself to the study of ancient philosophers. University lectures aroused in him a deep contempt for the course of the sciences taught there, and the result of the study of ancient philosophers was his hatred of Aristotle and his followers. Some of B.'s biographers believe that at the University B. has already sketched out a plan for his composition "The New Organon", but other biographers deny this on the grounds that the said work is one of the most mature and outstanding works of B., which was the fruit of a lifetime of reflection and his critical attitude to the teachings of the philosophers of the ancient and modern world, and therefore it is difficult to admit that a plan for such work was created in the head of a 13-year-old boy. In the city, after graduating from the University, B., together with the British ambassador Amias Paulet went to France and visited Poitiers and other parts of France. Life in France and the diplomatic service gave B. the opportunity to get acquainted with the social system of France and served as a preparation for his subsequent political activities. Being financially secure during the life of his father, B. had the opportunity to combine practical activities with studies in philosophy and literature. The sudden death of his father, which followed in the city, forces B. to leave France. A very small part of the inheritance, which he inherited from his father, made him attend to the search for means of subsistence. To this end, he chooses a career as a lawyer; but this activity was too narrow for him, and therefore he does not leave his scientific studies, focusing them on philosophy, history, literature and the study of customary law, and continues to follow politics and be interested in church issues. Only with a completely encyclopedic mind, B. and could work in all these areas, and at the same time, the idea of ​​a general transformation of the sciences remains his cherished dream. At the age of 25, he published an essay entitled: “The Greatest Work of the Modern Era” - a small book that has not come down to us, but, according to contemporaries, an essay that was distinguished by great courage and ardor. Being very ambitious, B. could not be satisfied with the modest role of a worker. The brilliance at court, the brilliance of political power did not give him rest, and two people seemed to live in him: a man of science and an ambitious man who was fond of political interests; combining ambition with perseverance, it is true that he achieves high levels, but sometimes he does not stop at dubious paths in achieving them. Throughout his life, practical ends mattered much more to him than spiritual inclinations; he tries, it is true, if possible, to combine them, but the advantage was on the side of calculation. His personal ambitious plans, however, do not exclude attractive character traits in him; Considering himself called by his origin and education to the fulfillment of great tasks, he does not cease to pursue scientific tasks during his public service. B. sets himself three goals: to benefit mankind in general, to find the truth and serve his people.

Soon, Bacon attracted the attention of Queen Elizabeth, who grants him the title of Extraordinary Advocate of the Crown, an honorary title, but which did not give him material reward, and, in order to fill this gap, he turns to his maternal relative, Burley the State Treasurer, for protection. and, with his assistance, is enlisted as a candidate for the position of the registrar of the star chamber with the possibility of obtaining this position only after 20 years. Turning to Burley with a request to provide him with patronage, B. says that the engine of his ambitious aspirations is the need that prevents him from concentrating on scientific pursuits. In the city, he sat in parliament as a deputy for the county of Middlesex and soon became famous for his oratory and ability to argue with opponents. In parliament, B. joins the ranks of the opposition, his speeches were interpreted in an unfavorable light for him, and he was considered too ardent a democrat. Continuing to engage at the same time with his scientific works, B. publishes in the city "Essays on morality." At court at this time were busy with unsuccessful campaigns in Ireland Earl of Essex; B., as a court lawyer, to please the queen, had to support the prosecution against the Earl of Essex, whose patronage he once enjoyed. The role of Essex's accuser did a lot of damage to B.'s reputation, since Essex was a popular favorite. In this incident, the whole character of B. was affected, distinguished by promiscuity in the choice of means to achieve personal benefits.

With the accession to the throne of James I, B. hopes to better strengthen his position, as he counted on the king's patronage of his scientific work; indeed, in this reign he managed to reach the highest levels in the public service. Shortly after the entry of Jacob, B. receives the title of a permanent lawyer with a salary of 40 pounds. erased and 60 lb. pension, then appointed a member of the privy council, and a year later in the city was appointed keeper of the state seal and receives the title of lord.

Separate works published by him at this time pursue the same task as his "Great Renaissance of the Sciences". He is increasingly trying to acquaint the public with the project of the transformation of the sciences. So, he publishes two books "On the Prosperity of the Sciences", later converted into a treatise "On the Dignity and Improvement of the Sciences" ( De dignitate et augmentis Scientiarum , ) and "Thread from the Labyrinth", which is the first attempt of his main work. The pamphlets: "Thoughts and Views on the Interpretation of Nature" and "Introduction to the Interpretation of Nature" served as an explanation of the purpose of the transformation he had undertaken. Treatise: "Description of the Intellectual World", "The System of Heaven", "On Principles and Principles", and other small works give us an idea of ​​his vigilant activity, along with his office work. The less time he had for scientific work, the stronger the zeal for the intended goal grew. In a letter to one of the influential persons, he himself confesses how little his soul participates in his official duties, how little he is capable of them, and directly says that thanks to this he often falls into official errors. B.'s writings spread his fame throughout Europe. He received the title of Baron Verulamsky, and then the Viscount of St. Albany. When his prosperity reached its apogee, the moment came for a terrible fall. The king's confidence grew in B., and he finally received the title of Lord Grand Chancellor and thus reached the highest level of court rank. But mighty it was not for long. The House of Commons, dissatisfied with the strictly monarchical spirit of government that James held, demanded that the chief dignitaries be held accountable. B., serving only as an instrument in the hands of Jacob in exceeding the legitimate authority of the king, limited by parliament, sealing his illegal orders, was among the first to be brought to justice. Associated with the king with a sense of gratitude for everything done to him and, not having the spirit to get rid of Jacob, B. did not have the courage to defend himself before the House of Commons. Jacob demanded absolute silence from B. during interrogations by the chamber, and B. agreed to this out of excessive zeal towards the king, also yielding to the latter's promises to come to his aid and restore him to all his former rights in case he was condemned by the House of Commons. Others see in this act B. carrying out his view of the royal power, the prerogatives of which he expanded contrary to the constitutional principle. So, he believed that the parliament does not limit the power of the king, but is only convened in emergency cases to help the king. In any case, in this incident, B. showed a lot of humility and compliance with the king and filed a pretext for accusing himself of bribing the king. Accusations of corruption tormented him terribly. His pangs of conscience and discouragement reached their extreme limit. The sentence passed on him was severe. By the verdict of the Lords, B. was sentenced to a fine of 40,000 pounds. erased and imprisonment in the Tower for as long as the king pleases; then he was deprived of the right to hold any public office and expelled forever from the court staff. This sentence was not carried out, although B. was placed in the Tower, but at the end of the second day he was released. The fine was also forgiven him by the crown. Soon he also received permission to appear at court, and in the city the sentence was canceled in the rest of his parts. He received the right to sit in the House of Lords and was invited to appear in Parliament. However, he did not attend the meetings; old age, illness, and perhaps shame kept him at home. Evidence of his plight, especially striking after the days of power and splendor, is preserved in his letters to Jacob, in which he asks him for protection. Failures in the service did not reduce B.'s energy for scientific work. During this time he publishes in final form the works: “On the Dignity and Improvement of the Sciences”, “History of Henry VII”, “History of the Winds”, “History of Life and Death”, “History of Condensation and Rarefaction”, “Introduction to the History of Gravity and Lightness ", "Introduction to the History of Likes and Dislikes of Things" and "Introduction to the History of Sulfur and Salt". B.'s health, severely undermined by moral upheavals, increasingly riveted him to a sedentary life. He retired to Grancines and from there he did not even go to Parliament, devoting his leisure time exclusively to science. “The great apostle of experimental philosophy,” says Macaulay, “was destined to perish as a victim of it. It occurred to him that snow could be used to keep animal substances from rotting. One very cold day, in early spring, he got out of his carriage, near Highgate, intending to make an experiment. To this end, he entered the cottage, bought a chicken and stuffed it with snow with his own hand. While he was performing this operation, he felt a sudden chill and became so ill that he was unable to return to Gray's Inn. The illness lasted about a week, and on the morning of the first day of Pascha, he died, apparently retaining the strength and vivacity of mind until the last days. He did not forget about the chicken, which was the cause of his death. In his very last letter, which he wrote, according to him, with fingers barely holding a pen, he did not forget to mention that the experiment with snow was a complete success. Dying, B. did not hide from himself the sad fact that, although he thought deeply, his actions were reprehensible. Conscious of his errors and his greatness, he said: "I entrust my name and memory of myself to the merciful judgment of people, foreign nations and future ages."

Philosophy of Bacon

Bacon owes his fame to the method of isolation he established. The peculiarity of his philosophy, which distinguishes him from all previous philosophers, lies in the regulation of consistent verification as the only method of research. Others before him, especially Albertus Magnus, also insisted on the need to use some of the tricks of the experimental method in research. Bacon's great predecessor and namesake, Roger B., in his Opus majus pointed to experience as the most reliable guide in the matter of research, and divided the causes of error into four categories (authority, habit, prejudice, and false knowledge). However, no previous writer succeeded in reducing all the elements of the inductive method to one coherent doctrine; in establishing such a doctrine lies the great merit of B. Roger B. said that only experience leads to accurate knowledge. Reasoning draws conclusions, but does not establish anything firmly; even mathematical proofs without the sanction of experience do not give rise to a complete and firm conviction. The experimental sciences are completely unknown to many. They have three important advantages over other kinds of knowledge. The first advantage is that experience proves and verifies those higher propositions which can be advanced by other sciences. Secondly, this method, which alone deserves the name of the ruler of the metaphysical sciences, alone reveals to us sublime truths that are inaccessible to other sciences; in the realm of empirical truths one should not seek the cause of anything until evidence of facts appears, and one should not reject facts just because reason cannot reconcile with them. The third advantage is so characteristic of this method that it does not in the least depend on its relationship to other methods: it lies in the ability to know the future, present and past, and also in those amazing operations in which experimental science surpasses conscientious astrology.

Literature about Bacon

• J. de Maistre (Jos. de Maistre), "Examen de la philosophie de Bacon" (Par., 1836);
• Macaulay, in Edinb. Review" (1837);
• Remusat (Ch. de Rèmusat), "Bacon, sa vie, son temps, sa philosophie et son influence jusqu'a nos jours" (Par., 1854);
• Fischer (Kuno Fischer), "Fr. Bacon von Verulam, eue Realphilosophie und ihr Zeitalter" (Leipz., 1856, 2nd ed. 1875);
• Meyer (J. B. Meyer), “Bacons Utilitarismus nach Kuno Fischer, Whewell und Ch. de Remusat" (in Zeitschrft. f. Philos. und philos. Kr. N. F., vol. 36, 1860, pp. 242-247);
• Dixon, "The personal history of Lord Bacons from unpublished letters and documents" (Lond., 1861), is an attempt to defend Bacon's character. Objection to this essay: “Lord Bacon, life and writings, an answer to Mr. H. Dixons pers. hist. of Lord Bacon" (Lond., 1861);
• Lasson, Montaigne und Bacon (in Archive f. neuere Sprachen und Letter., vol. 31, pp. 259-276);
• Liebig (J. v. Liebig), “Über Fr. Bacon v. Verulam und die Methode der Naturforschung" (Munch., 1863);
• Sigwart (S. Sigwart). "Ein Philosoph und ein Naturforscher über Bacon" (in Preuss. Jahrb., vol. 12, 1863, pp. 93-129);
• Kirchmann (J. H. v. Kirchmann), "Bacons Leben und Schriften" (in "Philos. Biblioth.", Vol. 32, Berl., 1870, pp. 1 - 26);
• Müller (Mach. Müller), Bacon in Deutschland (in his Essays);
• Finch, "On the inductive philosophy, including a parallel between L. Bacon and. A. Comte as philosophers” (London, 1872);
• Walsh (M. Walsh), "Lord Bacon" (Leipz., 1870);
• Lang (W. H. Laing), "Lord Bacons philosophy, a criticism" (Lond., 1872);
• Fowler (Th. Fowler), Bacon. English philosophers" (Lond., 1881);
• Abbot (E. A. Abbott), "Fr. Bacon, an account of his life and works” (Lond., 1885);
• Reichel (E. Reichel), "Wer schrieb das Novum Organon von F. Bacon" (Stutg., 1886);
• B. G. Lvejoy, "Bacon Lord Verulam, a critical review of his life and character" (1889).

About B. see also art. in The Encyclopaedia Britannica (vol. III, pp. 200-218).

In Russian:

• "The Collected Works of Bacon" (with an article by Rio on the life of Bacon and the significance of Bacon's philosophy, 2 vols., translated by P. Bibikov, St. Petersburg, 1874);
• Kuno-Fischer, "Fr. Bacon of Verulam. Real Philosophy and Its Century” (translated by H. H. Strakhova, St. Petersburg, 1867; 2nd ed., 1870); Induction), breaking with Aristotle and scholasticism. Bacon calls from the fruitless disputes of the Middle Ages to the fruitful study of nature for the sake of dominating it. Reason and experience must enter into a "lawful marriage." Scientific research, however, is hampered by delusions, by various kinds of, as Bacon puts it, "idols", our tendency to be guided by authority, by the vague meaning of words, is limited. circle of facts, deceptions of feelings and reason, etc. "Idols" must be revealed and overcome. The search for a goal in nature (cf. Teleology) should be replaced by the study of the general law of nature, i.e. causation of materialism. In 1584 he was elected to Parliament. From 1617 Lord Privy Seal, then Lord Chancellor; Baron Verulamsky and Viscount St. Albans. In 1621 he was brought to trial on charges of bribery, convicted and removed from all positions. Pardoned by the king, he did not return to public service and devoted the last years of his life to scientific and literary work.

  Bacon's philosophy took shape in the atmosphere of a general scientific and cultural upsurge in the countries of Europe, which took the path of capitalist development, the liberation of science from the scholastic fetters of church dogma. All his life B. worked on a grandiose plan for the "Great Recovery of Sciences".

  Science, according to B., should give man power over nature, increase his power and improve his life. From this point of view, he criticized scholasticism and her syllogistic deductive method, to which he contrasted the appeal to experience and its processing by induction, emphasizing the significance of the experiment. According to Marx, for B. "science is an experimental science and consists in applying the rational method to sensory data" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 142). Developing rules for the application of the inductive method he proposed, B. compiled tables of the presence, absence, and degrees of various properties in individual objects of one class or another. The mass of facts collected at the same time was to form the 3rd part of his work - "Natural and Experimental History".

  Emphasizing the importance of the method allowed B. put forward an important principle for pedagogy, according to which the goal of education is not the accumulation of the greatest possible amount of knowledge, but the ability to use the methods of acquiring it. B. divided all existing and possible sciences according to the three abilities of the human mind: history corresponds to memory, poetry corresponds to imagination, and philosophy corresponds to reason, which includes the doctrine of God, nature, and man.

  B. considered the reason for the delusion of the mind to be false ideas - “ghosts”, or “idols”, of four types: “ghosts of the race”, rooted in the very nature of the human race and associated with the desire of a person to consider nature by analogy with himself; "ghosts of the cave", arising due to the individual characteristics of each person; "ghosts of the market", generated by an uncritical attitude to popular opinion and incorrect word usage; "ghosts of the theater", a false perception of reality based on blind faith in authorities and traditional dogmatic systems, similar to the deceptive plausibility of theatrical performances. B. considered matter as an objective variety of sensory qualities perceived by man; B.'s understanding of matter has not yet become mechanistic, as with Galileo. B.'s call for experimental study of nature was a stimulus for natural science in the 17th century. and played an important role in the creation of scientific organizations (for example, the Royal Society of London). Bacon's classification of sciences was adopted by the French encyclopedists of the Enlightenment.

  Compositions:

  • The works..., v. 1-14, L., 1857-74 (Reprint, L., 1968);
  • in Russian per.
    • - Collection. soch., v. 1-2, St. Petersburg. 1874;
    • On principles and beginnings, M., 1937;
    • New organon, M., 1938;
    • New Atlantis, 2nd ed., M., 1962.

  Literature:

  • Herzen A.I., Izbr. philosophical works, vol. 1, [M.], 1948, p. 239 - 270;
  • Fisher K., Real Philosophy and its Age. Francis Bacon of Verulam, 2nd ed., St. Petersburg. 1870;
  • Milonov K. K., Philosophy of Francis Bacon, M., 1924;
  • Subbotnik S., Francis Bacon, M., 1937;
  • Melvtsl M. N., Francis Bacon, M., 1961;
  • Frost W., Bacon und die Naturphilosophie, Münch., 1927;
  • Anderson F. H., The philosophy of F. Bacon, Chi., 1948;
  • Green A. W., Sir F. Bacon, N. Y., .

  M. N. Melville.

  This article or section uses text

Francis Bacon writes about the tools of rhetoric and cites as an example 47 collected by him antithesis:

"Second meeting, […] has not yet been created, is just such a collection, which has in mind Cicero, […] demanding that we always have commonplaces ready, already thought out and worked out in advance, that could be used as arguments both “for” and “against”, for example, arguments in defense of the letter of the law and arguments in defense of the spirit of the law, etc. We I would like to extend the scope of their application to other areas and use these common places not only in legal practice, but also in all kinds of arguments and disputes.

In general, we want all common places that are especially often used (both to prove or refute, and to convince the truth or falsity of an opinion, and to praise or blame something), were thought out in advance and were at our disposal. and so that we, with all the strength of our mind, even somewhat dishonestly and contrary to the truth, try to defend or refute these theses.

We believe that for the best use of such a collection (and so that its volume is not too large) it will be best if all these commonplaces are expressed in short and sharp maxims, like a kind of ball from which you can pull a thread. any length depending on the requirements of the circumstances. This kind of work has been done Seneca, but only in relation to hypotheses or individual cases. Having a large number of such common places, we decided to give some of them here as an example. We call them "antitheses of things".

EXAMPLES OF ANTITHESIS

I. Nobility

Those who are born with valor are not so much unwilling as they cannot be bad.

Nobility is Laurel wreath with which time crowns people.

Even in dead monuments we respect antiquity; how much more should we respect her alive?

If we despise the nobility of families, then what will finally be the difference between the human race and animals?

Nobility frees valor from envy and makes it an object of gratitude.

Against

Nobility is seldom the result of valor; valor is the result of nobility even less often.

The nobility refers to their ancestors more often in order to gain forgiveness for their mistakes in their name than to occupy an honorable position with their support.

The energy of ordinary people is usually so great that in comparison with them the nobles seem like mannequins.

Nobles look back too often while running, which is a sign of a bad runner." […]

XXV. knowledge, contemplation

Only that pleasure is natural, which knows no satiety.

There is nothing sweeter than seeing clearly the delusions of others.

How good it is to have a mind in tune with the universe. All bad feelings are false ideas, and in the same way, goodness and truth are essentially one and the same.

Against

Contemplation is decent idleness. A good thought is not much better than a good dream.

The deity takes care of the world, but you think about your homeland! The statesman also uses his thoughts for sowing.

XXVI. The science

If books were written about everything, including the minutest facts, there would perhaps no longer be any need for experience.

Reading is talking with wise men, action is meeting fools.

Against

In universities they learn to believe. What science has ever taught how to apply science in a timely manner? Wisdom based on rules and wisdom gained by experience are completely opposite to each other, so that a person who has one of them is not able to learn the other.

Very often, science brings very dubious benefits, to say nothing.

Almost all scientists are distinguished by the fact that from any fact they always deduce only what they know, and do not know how to discover in it what they do not know. […]

XL. Innovations

Every treatment is an innovation.

He who avoids new medicines must wait for new misfortunes.

The greatest innovator is time; so why should we not imitate time?

Examples from the distant past are meaningless; modern ones testify to ambition and depravity.

Let the ignorant and quarrelsome be guided by examples.

Those to whom families owe their nobility are almost always more worthy men than their descendants; in the same way, innovators usually outperform those who imitate what they have done. A stubborn desire to preserve old customs is no less dangerous than bold reforms.

Since everything in the world itself is changing for the worse, then if we do not change it for the better with the power of our mind, where will there be a limit to misfortunes?

Slaves of custom are toys in the hands of time.

Against

Newborns are ugly.

Only time creates real value.

Everything new is never harmless, because it destroys what already exists.

What has become customary, if not entirely good, is at least adapted one to the other.

What innovator can imitate time, which makes all changes so imperceptibly that our senses cannot detect how they occur?

What happens unexpectedly is not so pleasant for the one who benefits from it, and much more painful for the one who is harmed by it.

Francis Bacon, The Great Recovery of Sciences / Works in 2 volumes, Volume 1, M., "Thought", 1977, p. 355-356, 367-368 and 374-375.

IX. Bacon and Antiquity

Interest in antiquity permeates the entire history of European civilization. At different times and in different social and ideological conditions, it took different forms, focused first on one source, then on other sources, embodied in their different interpretation and use in one connection or another. Even during periods of powerful social and spiritual upheavals, when it seemed that the “connection of times” was breaking and a new sense of life, other ideas and values ​​aggressively came to the forefront of history, this deep connection with the past did not break, it only changed, acquiring and constituting its own faces and forms.

Thus, having arisen as an antipode to “pagan” culture and philosophy, Christianity soon tries to embrace them, present them as its preparation, and present its own doctrine as the highest, final stage of their development. The fanatical intolerance of Tatian and Tertullian, their eloquent anathemas against the Greek philosophers are replaced by the patient creative work of Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea and Augustine Aurelius, who sought to find continuity and establish agreement between the Holy Scriptures and the spiritual heritage of antiquity. And Lactantius even hints that if we bring together the truths scattered among individual philosophers and philosophical schools, then nothing more than a genuine exposition of the Christian teaching itself should turn out. Of course, at the same time, out of all the philosophical wealth of the past, the idealistic tradition of Plato, the late Stoics and Neoplatonists was perceived and assimilated, and the result was the creation of the foundations of Christian philosophy. The ancient tradition, however, by no means all and not in everything was preserved at the cost of "enslavement by the power of God." This dual attitude towards the ancient heritage as an altera pars or alter ego permeated almost the entire Middle Ages and for Christian philosophy was, perhaps, no less important than the tragic vicissitudes of the formation of religious dogma. Subsequently, as is known, the completion of the construction of this building, Thomas Aquinas, turned to the encyclopedist of the ancient world Aristotle, making a grandiose attempt to systematize and substantiate the "sacred teaching" with the help of his philosophical and logical categories.

A different role, compared with the period of early Christianity, and indeed of the entire Christian Middle Ages, the ancient heritage plays in the Renaissance. The very concept of "Renaissance", meaning an appeal to classical antiquity, acquires its truly historical significance only when it spreads to the whole system of a new culture and way of thinking that took shape in Europe at that time, which entered a period of crisis of feudal social relations. The “revival of antiquity”, of course, gave this whole process a special coloring, but the main thing was that from that time begins the gradual decline of that type of worldview, culture and thinking, which, if not exclusively, then to a large extent, nourished the ideas images and dogmas of the Christian religion. This was facilitated by the antiquity rediscovered by the Renaissance - Greek authors and writings published and commented on by humanist scientists and not erased by theology. I specifically emphasize this seemingly commonplace, as opposed to fashionable opinions that the Renaissance was not the beginning of a great Liberation from clerical-religious consciousness, but its renewal, not the first powerful breakthrough to the worldview of the future, but a modification of the medieval ideological past.

It was then that the foundations of that worldview were laid, which connected itself with the rejection of blind faith in authority and trust in one's own mind, with the curbing of unbridled speculation by referring to the experience and principles of scientific knowledge, with the replacement of dogmatic vision with a sober and critical view of things, and finally with recognition of the earthly significance of all human and cultural values. This work was not without cost. In the ideological vacuum created, the phantoms of old and new superstition were reborn and born. For the first time, the opposition chooses as its banner the idealistic ideas of Pythagoreanism, Platonism and Neoplatonism, not shying away from their theosophical and mystical tendencies. It is possible that the poetically flexible framework of these teachings seems more convenient for seekers of the new for their own creativity than the rational schemes of the dominant Aristotelianism, fused with scholasticism. They turned to Plato and Plotinus because they did not want the tyranny of Aristotle, but had not yet worked out their own, although this in itself was one of the ways of its creation.

And Bacon's reflections are constantly repelled and again returned to the ancient classics. His writings are full of references to Greek and Roman philosophers, writers, historians, poets and orators. Their opinions, maxims, poems, stories about events and persons, he constantly cites from memory and interprets in support of his considerations. However, the Baconian attitude towards antiquity is marked by hostility not only to the scholasticism of the Peripatetics, but also to the mysticism of the Pythagoreans, and to the deified world of Platonist ideas. He openly identifies with its materialistic tradition, with the ancient Greek physiologists and natural philosophers, with the "line of Democritus." This adherent of the Christian dualism of the “divinely inspired” soul and body, whose teaching is still teeming with theological digressions, could hardly better demonstrate his true philosophical sympathies than he did by saying his eulogy to the Greek pre-Socratics.

Their naive, but fresh, greedily turned views of the world remind him of the nature of things forgotten in scholastic science, of genuine natural bodies and processes, of experience, of the problems of natural philosophy that he loves. In the fact that “they all defined matter as active, as having a certain form, as giving this form to objects formed from it and as containing the principle of motion” (5, 2, p. 306), Bacon sees the original and only fruitful principle any true, that is, experimental, science. It is precisely this that he opposes to the peripatetics, who considered matter to be passive and qualityless, only a pure possibility and an appendage of another, active principle - an intelligible form. But such a fiction of the human mind, such an abstract matter can only be the matter of discussions, and not the matter of the Universe. This is what actually happened, and science was for a long time plunged into the abyss of fruitless verbiage.

The grandiose phantasmagoria about the existent as a realm of forms, abstract ideas and fictitious matter did not in any way contribute to an orientation towards a patient and rigorous experimental study of nature. To form real things from imaginary ones - does this mean to answer the question about the true principles of things? Bacon is not interested in how one can mentally, categorically embrace and define the nature of things that exist, but what is the real nature of those simple beginnings, that primary matter from which everything in the world is formed. His approach is dominated by the interest of a natural scientist, a physicist, although the analysis itself is often carried out on a speculative-metaphysical level and language. He does not see anything positive in the work of the great idealists to create an intelligible world. Well, truth is the daughter of time, not authority! The entire significance and complexity of this problem of the conceptual and categorical structure of human concepts and theories will be revealed with all its sharpness later, when the developed science has already given their mature samples. And philosophy will add to the question of what is being, no less essential - how to express it in the logic of concepts. But even then, extreme situations will more than once force one to recall the lessons of Baconian criticism.

Here are Bacon's basic tenets. At the basis of everything lies the primordial, and it must be as real as that which arises from it. And therefore, all arguments about abstract matter and the form opposed to it make no more sense than assertions that the world and everything that exists are formed from categories and other dialectical concepts as from their beginnings. Preference should be given to those who seek to dissect, to dissect nature, and not to abstract it, who believe that matter is capable of producing every thing, action and movement from itself, and not abstract and passive, who, therefore, subordinate their thoughts and words to the nature of things, and not the nature of things to thoughts and words. It is these attitudes that underlie Bacon's attitude to the ancient philosophical heritage - his criticism of the peripatetics and his sympathy for the ancient Greek materialists.

In the treatise "On the Beginnings and Sources ..." Bacon weaves an allegorical interpretation of the myth of Cupid (in the ancient mythological consciousness of the Greeks, personifying the elemental creative principle in nature) with an analysis of the ideas of the Ionian philosophers. After all, it was they who first presented Cupid dressed, or, in other words, attributed to primary matter, the beginning of all things, a certain natural form: Thales - water, Anaximenes - air, Heraclitus - fire. Each of them believed that this is precisely the first nature, which can be said to be what it seems to be. However, did they not succumb in this case to an unreasoned impression of such perfection of some bodies that it colored everything else with its color? Indeed, in essence, they were satisfied that among the visible and tangible bodies they found one that seemed to them superior to all others, and called it "the beginning of all things." But if the nature of this principle is what it is to our senses, and all things in general have the same nature, although it does not correspond to their external appearance, then the question arises whether it is legitimate to treat all things differently and consider as a principle only that which is more significant, widespread or active. After all, Bacon himself accepts another axiom: "Nature manifests itself mainly in the smallest." And another objection. If in other things this beginning, at least temporarily, but loses its nature, does this not mean that something transient and mortal is taken for the beginning, that is, something that contradicts the very concept of “beginning”. The pioneer of inductive methodology was also a master of speculative analysis.

He also believes that the Ionians thought little about what stimulus, reason and cause make this beginning change its nature and regain it and how this is done. “Indeed,” Bacon writes, “we observe in the world a huge mass of opposites - dense and rare, warm and cold, light and darkness, animate and inanimate - opposites that mutually collide and destroy each other; and if we assume that these opposites proceed as from their source from one material substance, and at the same time do not show how this can be done, then this will be the manifestation of confused thought and the absence of any study. For if such an assumption had behind it the certainty of feelings, you would be obliged to accept it, even if it remained incomprehensible how this happens; on the other hand, if it were possible with the help of reason to find an appropriate and plausible explanation of how things happen, we might perhaps have to give up evidence; but in no case can we be required to agree with such an assumption, the reality of which is not evidenced by immediate feeling or the probability of which is not proven on the basis of reason ”(5, 2, pp. 314-315). Thus, in the problem of the emergence of the manifold from one principle, these natural philosophers encounter the same difficulties as the peripatetics, who introduced potential and fantastic matter, with the only difference that, being actual and formed in relation to one kind of things, their principle is potentially in relation to everyone else. The doctrine of peripatetism dominates Bacon's critical analysis, and the reduction to the positions of the Aristotelians is tantamount to a reductio ad absurdum for him.

He also analyzes the opinions of those who count several principles and explains all the diversity of the existing by their various combinations and ratios. Here the object of his critical analysis is Telesio's concept of the principles of heat and cold and the idea attributed to Parmenides of fire and earth as the two principles of all things. Those who accepted an infinite, or in any case a huge number of principles, hardly deserve attention at all, since in this case one does not have to invent anything to explain the diversity of things. This diversity is invested in the beginnings themselves, and thereby, in essence, the whole question of beginnings is also removed. Of all the ancients, Bacon is most impressed by the one who believed that Cupid is an Atom, who took one solid and unchanging substance as the beginning, deriving the diversity of everything that exists from the difference in its sizes, configurations and positions. He was going to start analyzing the atomistic theory of Democritus, but this part of the treatise "On the Beginnings and Origins" remained unwritten. Nevertheless, the text of the treatise that has come down to us, and the essay "Cupid, or the Atom", and his "Reflections on the Nature of Things", and other works of Bacon allow us to get a certain idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhis attitude towards Democritus.

The picture of atomistic movement, which he, apparently following Lucretius, attributes to Democritus, is composed of the initial movement of atoms under the influence of their gravity and the secondary, derived from their collision with each other. Bacon himself believes that it is impossible to identify the forces, movements and properties of atoms and their macrocompounds and therefore considers this picture, which borrows the concepts of gravity and push from the macrocosm, narrow and insufficient. What properties and movement should be attributed to atoms, according to Bacon, is not entirely clear. Atoms are the minimal seeds of matter, which have volume, place, resistance, aspiration, movement and emanations, and which, even when all natural bodies are destroyed, remain unshakable and eternal (see 5, 2, p. 335). Their strength and movement are different from the forces and movements of the products of their compounds and combinations, and at the same time, “in the body of the atom there are elements of all bodies, and in its movement and strength are the beginnings of all movements and forces” (5, 2, p. 302). Bacon doubts the legitimacy of the Democritanian opposition of atoms and emptiness, rejects Epicurus's opinion about the spontaneous deviation of their motion and hints at the ability of atoms to act at a distance. However, he notes, if it is possible to know the modes of action and movement of atoms, then perhaps we should not hope that our knowledge will fully cover their essence, since there is nothing more “closer to nature”, more primary and comprehensive. The peculiar concept of the "inexhaustibility" of the knowledge of these indivisibles in a purely speculative formulation of the question was, perhaps, the best solution.

However, here, too, he is disturbed by the ever-emerging specter of hateful peripatetism, and he wants to shield atomistics from it. An uncompromising opponent of scholasticism, Bacon is in complete command of its methods of reasoning. “... Since the destruction of larger bodies is numerous and varied, it necessarily follows that what remains an unchanged center must be either something potential or minimal. But it is not something potential, because primary potentiality cannot be like other potentialities, which are actually something one and potentially something else. Primary potentiality must be something absolutely abstract, devoid of any actuality and containing all possibilities. It remains, therefore, to think that this invariable will be minimal, unless one really asserts that there are no beginnings at all, and that every thing can be considered a beginning; that only the law and the order of change are permanent and eternal, while the existent is impermanent and changeable. And it would be better to state directly something of this kind, than, wishing to establish some kind of eternal beginning, to admit an even greater absurdity, namely, to make this beginning imaginary. For the first method, apparently, still leads to some result ... while the second method does not lead to any, for it considers beings that exist only in the concept and are only an instrument of the mind ”(5, 2, p. 335).

Charles Adam, author of The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, believes that it is Bacon who is responsible for restoring the scientific reputation of Democritus, whose very name has been forgotten for many centuries. In his monograph “Francis Bacon”, V. F. Asmus considers this attitude of Bacon to Democritus in more detail than others in our literature, noting what attracts the thinker in him, what he rejects and in what way his attitude to the concept of the great Thracian undergoes changes (see 9 , pp. 347–350). Bacon appreciates Democritus because he eliminated God from the physical system of explaining the world, thus separating natural philosophy from theology; for having attributed the structure of the universe to an innumerable series of attempts and experiments of nature itself; for seeing in the natural necessity inherent in matter the causes of all things, excluding the intervention of final or "final" causes. It is important for him that Democritus distinguishes between essence and phenomenon, the properties of material principles and things formed from them, existing “in opinion” and “in truth”. He notes the anti-dogmatism of the views of Democritus, his understanding of the whole complexity of the task of comprehending truth and distinguishing it from lies, with which it is wonderfully mixed and confused everywhere, not without the assistance of those who are more concerned about having a verbal answer to everything than about inner truth. of things. In Democritus, he is attracted by everything that Bacon himself will develop in his philosophy, creating the materialistic basis of modern science.

One of the features of the treatise "On the Beginnings and Sources" is that in it the figures of speculative-logical reasoning are suddenly colored by the play of a free, bizarre imagination. And these are precisely the places where Bacon refers to the images of Greek mythology. An even brighter firework of free fantasy permeates the essay "On the Wisdom of the Ancients." This is how another aspect of Bacon's attitude to the heritage of the ancient past emerges - his allegorical interpretation of myths.

He does not consider myths, at least in their core plots and images, to be the creations of those who expounded them in antiquity and conveyed them to our time. Neither Hesiod, nor Homer, nor other poets are the authors of myths. Poets borrowed them from ancient traditions, which, like sacred relics, like the breath of past times, penetrated into the poetry of the Greeks from the legends of even more ancient peoples. But what is a myth, what is the secret of its longevity, how should it be understood? The conceptual premise of the Baconian approach is as follows: he is convinced that just as hieroglyphic writing is older than literal writing, so allegorical thought appears before abstract logical reasoning. It is with her that we meet in myths, parables, riddles, comparisons and fables of the ancients. Here, the sacraments of religion, the secrets of politics, moral norms, the wisdom of philosophy, worldly experience are, as it were, deliberately clothed in poetic attire, and the task is to reveal their hidden meaning. Given an image, you need to find its meaning. A myth is an allegory in a certain artistic symbol; it is required to determine its rational content. Is such a reduction task, such a search for the unknown in the system of cultural-poetic equations, legitimate? It is remarkable that in order to solve an essentially non-poetic task, Bacon uses poetic means, so to speak, reverse imagery, for the ingenuity of his imagination, completely subordinate to reason, is not in the creation of the allegory itself, but in the interpretation of what he takes for allegory. “He treats myths like Aesop treats animals; he recreates them and puts in them the truths they are supposed to embody. He... in this case is an allegorical poet. He is as much an interpreter of myths as Aesop is a zoologist” (49, p. 135), Kuno Fischer remarked. While deciphering a quasi-encrypted text, our thinker uses the widest and freest associations of his fantasy. This freedom is limited only in one thing: the truths that he puts into mythological plots and images are the truths of Baconian natural, moral and political philosophy familiar to us.

Here is an example of his colorful and free interpretation - the myth of Pan. Pan is one of the oldest Arcadian deities, whose cult later undergoes changes. In the views of mystics, the image of the goat-like god of forests and pastures is transformed into a symbol of a single and integral universe; from which, apparently, Bacon proceeds in his interpretation of the myth. I will recount only a small part of it to give an idea of ​​Bacon's technique. Pan is the image of all things, that is, nature. Its pointed horns mean that the nature of things forms a kind of pyramid, ascending from countless individuals to species, genera and even more general concepts. The horns touch the sky, that is, the highest categories of science and metaphysics are in contact with the divine. Pan's body is covered with hair - this is a symbol of the radiation of things, for everything in nature emits rays to one degree or another. The long hair in Pan's beard is the rays emanating from celestial bodies, because the sun also seems bearded to us when clouds cover it from above, and its rays break through from under the cloud. The staff and pipe in the hands of Pan are symbols of harmony and power. A flute of seven reeds indicates consonance and harmony in the movement of the seven planets. The staff is a metaphor denoting that the paths of nature can be either direct or roundabout. Its curvature, according to Bacon, means that everything done in the world by divine providence is carried out in complex and intricate ways, so that the external course of events may sometimes seem contrary to their true meaning. Pan is wearing a spotted leopard-skin cape, but isn't the sky dotted with stars, the seas with islands, the earth with flowers? And so on and so forth. Thus, fantasizing and having fun with the game of his own imagination, Bacon, by the way, sets out quite a lot of well-aimed and wise considerations: about the methods of waging war (in the myth of Perseus), about selfishness (in the myth of Narcissus), rebellions (in the myth of Typhon), fanaticism (in the myth of Diomedes), favorites (in the myth of Endymion), passions (in the myth of Dionysus), philosophy (in the myth of Orpheus), matter (in the myth of Proteus) and others. To give a sense of the aesthetic flavor of Bacon's work, I will cite one more of his miniatures, but in its entirety.

MEMNON, OR EARLY

The poets say that Memnon was the son of Aurora. He wore fine armor, he was glorified by popular rumor. Arriving at the walls of Troy, he, burning with an impatient desire for great deeds, entered into a duel with Achilles, the bravest of the Greeks, and fell by his hand. Jupiter, grieving for him, sent birds to accompany his funeral with continuous mournful cries. They also say that his statue, when it was illuminated by the rays of the rising sun, issued a plaintive groan.

It seems to me that the myth tells about the unfortunate outcome of the great hopes of youth. For they are like the sons of Aurora; boasting of empty appearances and purely external things, they often dare to do something that exceeds their strength, go to mighty heroes, challenge them to battle and die in an unequal struggle. Their death always causes boundless grief, for there is nothing sadder among human destinies than the untimely beveled color of valor. After all, their youth was cut short, they were not satisfied with life and have not yet aroused envy for themselves, which would be able to soften the grief of death or moderate compassion. Moreover, not only around their funeral pyres, like these ominous birds, wailing and wailing fly; no, this sadness and sorrow continue; and the longing for them is especially acutely revived when new movements begin, when great deeds are planned, like the morning rays of the sun (5, 2, pp. 258-259).

What prompted Bacon to consider myth as an allegory? Is it not the circumstance, as Schelling would say, that the spirit of truly mythological poetry has long since died out and myth has involuntarily begun to be interpreted as a figure and a philosopheme characteristic of later poetic forms? The medieval epic and morality were allegorical. The images in the poetry of the great Dante are allegorical. The myth was also perceived as an allegory, and already Giovanni Boccaccio wrote a treatise in which he depicted the images of ancient mythology as an allegory of the starry sky. Later, Giordano Bruno also used ancient mythology allegorically, in violent fantasy adjusting its images to the concepts and ideas of his philosophical ethics. . This tradition of myth interpretation proved to be more tenacious than it might seem, judging by the initial samples. Later, the German romantics would pay tribute to it, and in the 19th century, in the form of the so-called solar-meteorological theory, it would even gain quite wide popularity. Such interpreters of historical poetic antiquities were often the least historical.

Meanwhile, the significance of Bacon's work, of course, is not that it represents a certain mythological doctrine, one of the brightest pages in the book of the allegorical theory of myth. In this regard, it would be too tempting to enumerate the vulnerabilities of the Baconian approach - the uncritical acceptance of one or another edition of the myth, the ambiguity in the interpretation of the same mythological symbols, obvious exaggerations and uncontrolled conjecture. Bacon's essays are significant in themselves as an independent vision of myths, as an artistic refraction of them in the prism of another era, as a perception of the actual "meaningful image" in the ancient mythological symbol. And I must say, he knew how to perform such operations quite effectively. At the same time, it is curious that in the penultimate book of his treatise On the Dignity and Multiplication of the Sciences, Bacon approaches biblical wisdom with a similar key. A number of maxims from "Ecclesiastes" and "Book of Proverbs of Solomon" he interprets in a purely secular prose spirit. He uses the medieval tradition of the allegorical interpretation of Holy Scripture as a device for expounding the instructions of his political and practical philosophy.

In general, this is an interesting and rewarding task: to specifically trace and compare the nature of the attitude towards the ancient heritage of different thinkers and in different eras - the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Romanticism and later. In order to highlight the peculiarity of Bacon's technique, I will give only one comparison. More than a hundred years after Bacon's works, another English philosopher, J. Toland, published a treatise in which he offered his own peculiar anatomy) of ancient philosophy. Toland is an educator, he is obsessed with the desire to prove the need for complete freedom for everyone to express and develop their views, he is a critic of an intolerant religion, an ignorant and superstitious church, a sanctimonious and conformist society. From this position, he throws his retrospective look into the distant philosophical past. The essence of Toland's treatise is already expressed in its full title - “Clidophorus, or on exoteric and esoteric philosophy, that is, on the external appearance and internal content of the teachings of the ancients: one is explicit and generally accepted, adapted to walking views and religions established by law; the other is hidden and secret, intended for the capable and thoughtful, in which the true Truth is communicated, devoid of any covers” (45, p. 313). In the concepts of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, in the teachings of the Pythagoreans, Stoics and Academicians - everywhere Toland sees a kind of double account, a double philosophy: one for the public, the other for the elite, one paying tribute to social institutions and prejudices, the other wholly and recklessly devoted to finding truth. There is a similar duality in ancient mythology, and in Jewish and Christian theology, and their allegories are one of the methods of such mystification. He, like Bacon, refracts antiquity in the prism of his time and his tasks, but this refraction is no longer the same as that of Bacon. It is devoid of multi-colored artistic dispersion, it contains only black and white tones.

In the works of Francis Bacon, his attitude to the three main areas of the ideological heritage, one way or another gravitating over European thought, is clearly traced - ancient philosophy, mythology and Christianity. Bacon's attitude to antiquity is thought out in his own way. He knows what he needs in this great warehouse of the past, and uses what he has taken to confirm the ideas and attitudes of his worldview. He purposefully interprets antiquity, and his approach differs both from an empirical description and from a simple statement of the self-consciousness of this past, understanding it “from within” its concept and era. Bacon is generally incapable of the latter, just as he is incapable of a holistic and comprehensive study of ancient philosophy and mythology in connection with the whole complex of historical conditions for their existence. However, he doesn't need it. Bacon's method is not historical, but retrospective, casting a shadow of his, Bacon's, attitudes, concepts, searches and mindsets into the past, a method that deforms the past and imposes alien contours on it.

Another thing is Christianity, which for Bacon is not only and not so much a tradition, but above all a living ideological reality. He repeatedly confirms his adherence to the teachings of the church: “But there is also sacred or divinely inspired theology. However, if we were going to talk about it, then we would have to transfer from the fragile boat of the human mind to the ship of the church; only he alone, armed with a divine compass, can find the right path, for now there are not enough stars of philosophy that have hitherto shone on our way” (5, 1, p. 537). Both Nature and Scripture, according to Bacon, are the work of God, but to explain divine Scripture it is unacceptable to resort to the same method as for explaining human writings, just as the reverse is unacceptable. Recognizing the truth of both, Bacon himself devoted himself to promoting the comprehension of the natural. The divine had too many servants and protectors without him. And so the predominant part of the best minds devoted themselves to theology, while the testers of nature numbered a few. Separating the natural science from the theological, asserting its independent and independent status, he continued to see in religion one of the main binding forces of society. In adherence to the religion of revelation, in protest against those who substantiated the dogmas of Christianity with philosophical speculations, in the fundamental distinction between the areas of faith and knowledge - "we must believe the word of God, even if the mind resists it" (5, 1, p. 538) - in All this also reveals Bacon's decisive anti-scholasticism. And this position prompts me to compare Bacon not with Tertullian, to which Kuno Fischer drew attention in his time, but rather with William of Ockham. And yet the 17th century is not the 14th century, and one may wonder if it reveals a certain paradox in Bacon's worldview. The concept of two parallel books - Nature and Holy Scripture - which our thinker generally adhered to, understandable historically, by no means removed the contradiction itself. Subsequent writers will see it, and L. Feuerbach will define its meaning in the following way. Bacon's main aim is to understand nature from itself, to build a picture of it that is not distorted by the additions of the human spirit. This is precisely what his critique of the idols of reason and his theory of experiential, inductive knowledge serve. Since nature is a physical, sensual, material essence, it can be understood only with the help of methods adequate to it, that is, sensual, physical, material means. Meanwhile, such a tendency is in conflict with the essence and spirit of Christianity, which teaches that God creates the world by word and thought, and among all his creatures, only a person with a soul is like God. And how then can a Christian Bacon reproach Plato and Aristotle for constructing the world out of words, ideas and categories? Are they not forerunners of Christianity in this? And why can't man, the "likeness of God", follow the same path in his cognition as his "high prototype" in his creative work? Is not the principle of being also the principle of knowledge? (see 47, pp. 127–129).

In Bacon's writings, naturally, we will find neither a rational answer to these questions, nor the very formulation of them. They simply did not appear before his mental gaze, at least in the form that the specific perception of the author of The Essence of Christianity gave them. All subsequent disputes about whether his philosophy is atheistic or pious, the chancellor himself could sum up with his famous aphorism: "Truth is the daughter of Time, not Authority." And time has shown which of these components of the paradoxical Baconian worldview turned out to be more stable and viable. Feeling their true resultant, the romantic, fanatic and cleric Joseph de Maester, two hundred years later, attacked Bacon with accusations of atheism, materialism and adherence to natural scientific methodology. For the materialists and atheists themselves, who made Bacon their ideological leader, such a problem does not exist at all, since the very idea of ​​the coexistence of science and Christianity seems to them a monster, a harmful illusion that must be forgotten as soon as possible. They will take from Bacon's philosophy what is alive and sober, connected with science and its method, considering the rest as illusions of too "violent imagination" or, conversely, a tribute to the prevailing worldview. For them, who grew up in a different era and solve other problems, this is already a turned page in the great book of human knowledge, a legacy of the past, a tradition that they have learned, which they use in their struggle and which has already been cast a shadow of other views and aspirations.