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  • Boris, you are wrong. Egor Ligachev - Boris was wrong "Boris, you are wrong"

    Boris, you are wrong.  Egor Ligachev - Boris was wrong

    The reproach against Boris Yeltsin turned out to be a prophecy that no one heard.
    Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yegor Ligachev. 1990


    In the distant 83rd ...

    The era of perestroika in the Soviet Union left in the memory of the people much more bitter than rosy memories. The time of great hopes ended with the collapse of the country, which left a negative imprint on the perception of this historical period.
    But the phrase “Boris, you are wrong!”, which has become winged, is remembered with a smile even by those who, due to their age, remember little about that era. However, the question of what Boris was really wrong about, who convicted him of being wrong, and how the phrase became part of folklore, hangs in the air.
    Perhaps it is worth starting from afar, from 1983, when the new leader of the USSR, Yuri Andropov, renewing management personnel, attracted Yegor Ligachev, 63-year-old First Secretary of the Tomsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, to work in Moscow.
    For the realities of the first half of the 1980s, the 63-year-old Ligachev, who, moreover, did not suffer from serious illnesses and had proven himself well in his former position, was quite a young and promising politician. In Moscow, Ligachev took the post of department head of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and later became secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
    Lev Zaikov, Yegor Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev. 1988

    Comrade Ligachev's protégé

    Ligachev enjoyed the confidence of Andropov, who instructed him to take further measures to recruit new personnel. In particular, Andropov advised to take a closer look at the 52-year-old First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin.
    Ligachev went to Sverdlovsk and was extremely pleased with what he saw, believing that Yeltsin was exactly the person the country needed in an era of change.
    True, Yeltsin's nomination to work in Moscow took place only two years later - after the death of Andropov, the reform process that had been started stalled and resumed only in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev took over as leader of the USSR.
    So, on the recommendation of Yegor Ligachev, Boris Yeltsin from Sverdlovsk found himself in big Soviet politics.
    In December 1985, Yeltsin was given the highest confidence - he was nominated for the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, which made the politician one of the most influential people in the country.
    Soon, rumors spread around Moscow about the extraordinary democracy of the new head of the capital: he allegedly personally got acquainted with the assortment of grocery stores, was treated in an ordinary clinic, and even went to work by tram.

    Party disgrace and people's love

    Yeltsin's popularity began to grow by leaps and bounds, even exceeding the popularity of Mikhail Gorbachev. Either this turned the politician's head, or personal ambitions woke up, but soon Yeltsin began to clash violently with party associates.
    On October 21, 1987, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yeltsin sharply opposed the slow pace of perestroika, criticized his colleagues, including Ligachev, and even got to Gorbachev, declaring that a "cult of personality" was beginning to form around the Secretary General.

    The tone of Yeltsin's speech did not even fit into the framework of the "perestroika" announced in the country. Party comrades, including those who sympathized with Yeltsin, declared his demarche "politically erroneous", after which he fell into disgrace and was removed from the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.
    In the traditions of the CPSU, it was not customary to wash dirty linen in public, because the text of Yeltsin's speech was not published anywhere. But in "samizdat" there were dozens of versions of this speech that had nothing to do with reality. In some of them, Yeltsin almost cursed Gorbachev and looked more like a port loader than a politician.
    It was from this legendary speech that Yeltsin's fame as an oppositionist began. It was then that Soviet citizens, who began to become disillusioned with Gorbachev, began to perceive Yeltsin as an alternative to Mikhail Sergeevich. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin during the evening meeting of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR

    Prophet in the ranks of the CPSU

    The times of perestroika in terms of intra-party struggle were not as tough as previous eras, because the disgraced Yeltsin, having lost the post of "master of Moscow", remained in the elite as first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosstroy.
    Yeltsin, who was having a hard time with his removal from office, nevertheless, by the summer of 1988, realized that there were many advantages in his current position as a “rebel”, and began to develop the role of an “oppositionist”.
    On July 1, 1988, Yeltsin spoke at the XIX Party Conference. He attacked the privileges of the highest state leaders, criticized the "stagnation", in which, in his opinion, the entire Politburo as a "collective body" was guilty, called for the removal of Ligachev from the Politburo, and eventually turned to the delegates with a call to rehabilitate him for speaking at the Plenum.
    In the midst of Yeltsin's speech, Ligachev intervened. The politician who once nominated the Sverdlovsk citizen remarked:
    - You, Boris, are wrong. We disagree with you not only in tactics. Boris, you have tremendous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive! You put your region on coupons ...
    Yeltsin ignored the remark and continued his speech.


    The phrase, most likely, would not have become winged if it were not soon used in one of the monologues “on the topic of the day” by humorist Gennady Khazanov. In the thoroughly politicized USSR of the late 1980s, the joke associated with the battle between the "people's hero" Yeltsin and the party nomenklatura immediately became extremely popular.
    From that moment on, it was adopted by Yeltsin's supporters, who took to the streets with posters "Boris, you're right!" and even "Rule, Boris!".
    The last wish was soon fulfilled. And the longer Boris ruled, the more prophetic Ligachev’s words seemed: “Boris, you have tremendous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive!” ...
    Yes, there was no longer any sense from this prophecy. Yeltsin's destructive energy did its job.
    And the only good thing left for the people from that era was a catchphrase ...

    http://back-in-ussr.com/2016/07/boris-ty-ne-prav-istoriya-kr...

    Ligachev E.K.

    Boris was wrong

    PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN THE KREMLIN

    In April 1983, after seventeen years of work in Siberia, in Tomsk, I was transferred to Moscow and appointed head of the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in other words, the Department of Personnel and Party Committees. However, if we take into account the system of party-state leadership that existed in those years, then we were talking about personnel in the broadest sense, including Soviet, economic ones.

    In those memorable days in April 1983 for me, events developed unexpectedly and rapidly. I flew to the capital for a meeting on agricultural issues, which was personally chaired by Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. At that time, all members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee and regional party committees, many agrarians - in general, those who were associated with the implementation of the Food Program adopted a year earlier, gathered in the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin. Gorbachev, who was dealing with agrarian problems at that time, reported at the meeting - he reported sharply, sharply, with criticism of both local leaders and the center.

    I remember that I sent a note to the presidium of the meeting asking for the floor to speak, but I did not have any particular hopes on this score. During the entire Brezhnev period, during the seventeen years that I worked as the first secretary of the Tomsk regional party committee, I never once managed to speak at the Plenums of the Central Committee. In the early years, I regularly signed up for speeches, but over time, hopes faded: it became clear that the same speakers were constantly being released to the podium - presumably, those who knew well what and how to speak. I did not see any intrigues against myself personally in this kind of discrimination - many secretaries of the regional committees were in such a position, who for a long time and conscientiously dragged their heavy load. For example, Manyakin S.I., who has worked in Omsk for more than twenty years, is an experienced, businesslike and very intelligent person, in all those years he spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee only once.

    But with the arrival of Andropov, the secretaries of the regional committees immediately felt that changes had begun in the Central Committee. New hopes have arisen. This prompted me to submit a note to the presidium at the agrarian meeting in the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin.

    Not even an hour passed before I was given the floor. As always, I had the text of the speech prepared in advance - just in case. However, I almost did not look at the paper, because I was talking about what I had suffered - about how, in 7-8 years, the Tomsk region moved from food consuming to producing. He also spoke about the fact that the population of Western Siberia is growing at the expense of oil and gas workers, and they need to be fed, primarily by developing agriculture on the spot.

    The meeting in the Kremlin ended at six o'clock in the evening, and I hurried to the Central Committee to resolve some specific Tomsk questions with the secretaries. And as I remember now, late in the evening I finally got to the apartment of my son, who lived in Moscow, to visit him before flying to Tomsk.

    The plane took off in the morning. The ticket was in my pocket, and I intended to go to bed early: after all, according to Tomsk time, which was four hours ahead of Moscow, it was already deep night.

    But at ten o'clock in the evening the phone suddenly rang. They asked me.

    I picked up the phone, of course, not suspecting that this late phone call would change my whole life dramatically and that the same sudden late-night phone calls, like the call of fate, would sound in February 1984, on the day Andropov died, and in March 1985 year, on the day Chernenko died. In short, I picked up the phone and heard:

    Egor, this is Mikhail... I need you to be with me tomorrow morning.

    We met Gorbachev in the early 1970s when we happened to be part of a delegation traveling to Czechoslovakia together. Since then, at the Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, on the days of party congresses, when all the secretaries of regional and regional committees gathered in Moscow at the same time, we invariably and friendly communicated, exchanged views on both private and general issues. And when Gorbachev became secretary of the Central Committee, and then a member of the Politburo, and in addition on agrarian problems, I began to visit him often. In addition, Gorbachev in those years was the only member of the Politburo who could be found at work until late in the evening. This circumstance was important for the Siberian secretary of the regional committee, who, arriving in Moscow, wandered around the capital departments from morning to night, solving issues of developing petrochemistry and the food industry, “knocking out” the limits of funds for creating a modern construction base, a center of science and culture, and even in general, dealing with many problems related to the life and life of Tomsk residents.

    It was not difficult to assume that at the agrarian conference in the Kremlin it was Gorbachev who gave me the floor. And when that late phone call rang, at the first moment I decided that Mikhail Sergeevich wanted to express his thoughts in connection with my speech - according to those who approached me after the meeting, it came out, as they say, to the point.

    Mikhail Sergeevich, but I have a ticket in my pocket, I'm leaving early in the morning, - I answered.

    It has long been customary between us that Gorbachev called me Yegor, and I addressed him by his first name and patronymic.

    We must be late, Yegor,” Gorbachev said calmly, and from his tone I immediately understood that the call had nothing to do with today's meeting. - We'll have to return the ticket.

    Everything is clear, I will be with you in the morning, - I agreed without further debate, although there was just no clarity.

    However, I will say right away: such cases, involving the cancellation of a flight and the delivery of air tickets, are not at all uncommon for the secretaries of regional party committees who arrived in the capital on business. In those years, I personally, probably ten times had to return the ticket and postpone my departure to Tomsk for reasons of a very prosaic nature. Either a necessary meeting with one of the ministers or leaders of the State Planning Commission is postponed, or, on the contrary, a meeting that was not previously planned loomed. But you never know what unexpected things can detain in the capital the secretary of the regional committee, who arrived three thousand kilometers away. It's better to stay a day than fly again.

    In general, that night I slept soundly, did not suffer from conjectures, and the next morning, at exactly ten o'clock, I was at Gorbachev's - the main entrance, third floor, on the right.

    Of course, it would be possible to arrive earlier - right at nine o'clock. But, I repeat, I remained completely unaware of the true purposes of the invitation, and I knew from my own experience that for every leader, the working day begins with getting to know the situation, reading emergency messages and redrawing the pre-planned schedule in case unforeseen circumstances arose. In addition, it was Thursday, at eleven o'clock a meeting of the Politburo was scheduled. I, of course, took this into account, because I knew that the time of the meetings of the PB was strictly observed: precisely on Thursdays and precisely at eleven o'clock - such an order was established under Lenin and, on the whole, was maintained almost until the 28th Congress of the CPSU.

    Since Gorbachev did not tell me the exact hour of the meeting, based on all of the above, I decided that ten in the morning would be the most convenient time for him. And, as they say, with the chime of the clock he opened the door of his waiting room.

    From that moment, a new countdown of time began for me, a new time of life, before which even the turbulent Tomsk period faded.

    Gorbachev received me immediately and, having greeted me, immediately stunned me:

    Egor, there is an opinion about transferring you to work in the Central Committee and confirming you as the head of the organizational and party department. Here's what I can tell you so far. Not more. It all depends on how events develop. Yuri Vladimirovich will invite you for a conversation. He asked me to talk to you first, which I do. This is Andropov's order.

    Frankly, internally I experienced a certain confusion. The question was not as simple as it might seem at first glance. The fact is that the head of the organizational department at that time was Kapitonov I.V. Of course, the Politburo has the right to replace him by its decision, but Kapitonov is the secretary of the Central Committee, and only the Plenum of the Central Committee is already competent here. In addition, the second secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Chernenko was on vacation at that time, under him Gorbachev would hardly have been able to intervene so decisively in personnel matters, especially since it was the head of the organizational department. Among the members of the Politburo there was an unspoken but indestructible subordination - not to interfere in personnel matters if they are not part of your duties. Incidentally, this order was subsequently strictly followed by myself, it largely excluded the possibility of targeted influence on the selection of personnel by each member of the PB individually, leaving this right to the General Secretary and, of course, to the entire Politburo as a whole, since the final decision taken collectively. Since events were obviously developing outside the box, it became clear to me that Gorbachev had Andropov's confidence.

    3.2. "Boris, you're wrong!"


    You have energy, but your energy is not creative, but destructive.

    E. K. Ligachev


    Now few will remember why she was going and what exactly she decided. But the awakening of political activity in the country began with the party conference. And the nomination of delegates to the party conference was the first attempt to change the Soviet election procedure.

    In the old days, both delegates and deputies were appointed by the authorities. Whoever is approved in the Central Committee will be. In the spring of 1988 it was already different. Of course, the system for electing delegates was not very democratic. All party organizations could nominate their own candidates, but the real selection took place at the plenums of party committees, which weeded out those who were objectionable.

    Nevertheless, a certain number of people known for their democratic convictions were nevertheless elected.

    Boris Yeltsin set himself the task of getting elected at all costs as a delegate to the 19th party conference and speaking at it. This would be the beginning of a return to politics. He only dreamed about it.

    Many party organizations nominated him as a candidate for delegate, but the authorities had every opportunity not to let him go to the conference. However, Gorbachev understood that this could not be done. Not to give Yeltsin a mandate means to show that no democratization is taking place in the party. Mikhail Sergeevich did not want this at all. And the election of Yeltsin as a delegate to the XIX - All-Union Party Conference, no doubt, happened with his knowledge. At the same time, the Secretary General even turned a blind eye to the gross violations of the election procedure.

    Yeltsin was registered with the party in Moscow. However, the capital's communists refused to trust him with a delegate mandate.

    An attempt to nominate him from his native Sverdlovsk did not pass either, although the candidacy of the former leader was actively supported by the largest Ural enterprises - Uralmash, Verkh-Isetsky and Electromechanical Plants.

    “They came up with such a system,” Yeltsin writes indignantly, “party organizations put forward many candidates, then this list goes to the district committee of the party, there it is sifted; then in the city committee of the party, there they sift again, finally, in the regional committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic. In a narrow circle, they left only those who, in the opinion of the apparatus, would not let you down at the conference, would speak and vote as they should. This system worked perfectly, and the name Yeltsin disappeared even on the outskirts of the main heights.

    Perhaps that is how it was. But then it is all the more incomprehensible how the Central Committee let him in as a delegate from ... Karelia, because even purely formally this was a violation of all the rules. He had no more to do with Karelia than with the Cape Verde Islands.

    Gorbachev seems to have thought otherwise. Nothing that the procedure was violated, they looked, they say, where is this Karelia! But the Karelian delegates sat on the balcony, that is, the farther Yeltsin is from the podium, the calmer for Gorbachev. It is unlikely that anyone will suspect him of the fact that Yeltsin's "revolutionary" speech at the party conference was coordinated and carefully prepared.

    However, in the presentation of Lev Sukhanov, who is uninitiated in the intricacies of the true reasons for Yeltsin's inclusion in the Karelian delegation, it was supposedly such a diabolical plan, which was invented by "manipulators from the apparatus." They couldn’t ignore Yeltsin as a member of the Central Committee, so they included him in the Karelian delegation, because they “planned to“ lift it ”to the balcony - a kind of Kamchatka, breaking through from which to the podium, bypassing numerous KGB cordons, was almost unrealistic” . However, subsequent events do not fit at all, moreover, they contradict Sukhanov's calculations.

    It must be said that the 19th Party Conference was supposed to be a landmark, turning point. Kind of a stage.

    It was planned to be broadcast live throughout the country. This means that any sharp speech would automatically become public. By the time the party conference opened, the country already knew that Yeltsin was one of the delegates, and with bated breath, millions of viewers were waiting for his speech.

    Yeltsin prepared seriously for the conference. As Sukhanov assures, he rewrote his future speech fifteen (!) times, invariably testing each new version on grateful listeners - relatives and helpers. For five or six nights he did not sleep at all: he was worried.

    On June 28, the Kremlin Palace of Congresses was overcrowded. Yeltsin, not embarrassed, looked at - some at close range, some from the side - as an overseas, outlandish little animal. Since the time of the plenum of the Moscow city committee - for almost half a year - he did not go out in public.

    How further events unfolded is perfectly described in the aforementioned book by A. Khinshtein, and therefore we will give him the floor. However, we recall that A. Khinshtein was a fierce opponent of the hypothesis of "secret collusion" between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, according to which Yeltsin made his "revealing" speech at the October (1987) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. What made him change his point of view by 180 degrees, A. Khinshtein does not explain.

    “Together with the Karelian comrades, they put him in the gallery. However, this was the only detail that coincides with the conspiratorial version of Sukhanov. Everything else is from the evil one.

    According to the regulations, Yeltsin's speech was not scheduled. And with what fright should it appear there; an ordinary ordinary delegate - one of thousands? Not everyone made reports, even members of the Politburo.

    But Yeltsin really needs to break through to the podium. This is his last, perhaps, chance to return to big politics. And he writes note after note to the presidium: give me the floor.

    Their response is zero. And then on the final day of the conference, July 1, Boris Nikolayevich decided on a frank demarche. Holding the delegate mandate in his hand - like a banner over the Reichstag - he goes down, straight to the podium. Hundreds of camera flashes accompany his triumphant forced march.

    But where are those "numerous KGB cordons" about which Sukhanov was worried? Ay?

    Yes, that's the thing, that there were no "cordons". More precisely, protection, of course, stood in the corners, but extended exclusively to journalists and servants. Purely technically it was impossible to swaddle a delegate in front of a crowd of thousands, under the chirping of video cameras and clicking cameras.

    With a stiff gait, Yeltsin approaches Gorbachev. (“I took the tribune like a Winter one,” he will say later, not without humor.) The hall freezes. The speaker, who is broadcasting something - the secretary of the Rostov Regional Committee Volodin - is interrupted in mid-sentence. And in this instantly formed silence, Yeltsin's hoarse voice is heard: “I demand to give the floor for the speech. Or put the question to the vote of the entire conference.”

    And the secretary general is a strange thing! - nods in agreement.

    medical diagnosis

    “Hysterical syndrome most often occurs in extreme or conflict situations. Due to their liveliness and expressiveness, people with hysterical disorder easily establish relationships with others. Their emotions look exaggerated and are aimed solely at attracting attention to themselves.

    “Invite Boris Nikolayevich to the presidium room,” Gorbachev tells his assistant Boldin, “and say that I will give him the floor, but let him sit down, and not stand in front of the podium.”

    However, Yeltsin refuses to go into the back room. He sits unceremoniously in the front row and begins to wait patiently. Soon he is invited to the stage.

    Well, where is the sinister conspiracy here? Where did the cunning intrigues of the “apparatus manipulators” disappear?

    One might think that Gorbachev did not understand how Yeltsin's nomination as a conference delegate would end. Of course, I understood. To expect obedience and non-resistance from Boris Nikolayevich would be sheer stupidity.

    Why then let him into the hall? Why were they given the floor?

    And how not to provide - the opponents object in response. Otherwise, they say, a public scandal would inevitably arise.

    Completeness. First, the scandal could have been avoided from the start. Do not include him in the list of delegates, remove him from the Central Committee - and that's it.

    And secondly, such an experienced apparatchik as Gorbachev, even under these conditions, was quite capable of fooling Yeltsin around his finger.

    Would have promised him a word at the very end. And then they didn't would. Forgot. Blinked. For clarity, some clerk would have been fired - for an irreparable offense inflicted on a member of the Central Committee, but after. When the passions would have subsided.

    Or, meeting his wishes, they would put the issue of providing a tribune to the general vote. The result could have been predicted in advance.

    Furthermore. Even beforehand, Gorbachev knew perfectly well that Yeltsin would climb onto the podium.

    Only later, after the August coup, it turns out that Yeltsin was constantly under the hood of the KGB. Behind him was secret surveillance, his phones were tapped, and the Gosstroy office was stuffed with "bugs".

    (“Much of what we discussed in his office,” Sukhanov’s aide writes, “immediately became public. We had no doubt that we were within reach of the “big ear.”)

    Considering that Yeltsin ran his report through his assistants in his office fifteen times - after each subsequent revision - even the text of the upcoming speech should have been known at the top.

    The secretary of the Moscow city committee, Yuri Prokofiev, claims that in the evening, on the eve of the last meeting, the second secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Yuri Belyakov, called him at home and said that Yeltsin was supposed to speak, and he, Belyakov, "asks me to speak out against him."

    That is, there was no "storming of the Winter" at all. On the contrary, the Politburo was obviously ready for this forced march.

    But instead, Boris Nikolaevich is kindly called to the microphone, and they even put tea in a glass holder in front of him.

    First of all, Yeltsin decides to set the accents and play back past mistakes. The reason for this was excellent. Just the day before, one of the delegates, the head of the department of the Aerohydrodynamic Institute, Zagainov, quite sharply walked over his person, indignant at why Yeltsin was giving interviews to Western journalists, and not to the Soviet press? Zagainov also touched on the history of the Moscow City Committee, saying that "unintelligible repentance at the plenum of the Moscow City Committee did not clarify his position."

    "We would like to hear his explanation at the conference," he announced on behalf of the rank and file communists. That's right - do not wake dashing while it is quiet.

    Yeltsin gladly gives these explanations. He loudly announces that his interviews in Soviet publications are not censored, so he has to communicate with foreign correspondents.

    As for the “inarticulate” speech at the shooting plenum of the city committee, he was “seriously ill, bedridden”, the doctors “pumped him up with medicines”, “and I was sitting at this plenum, but I couldn’t feel something, but I could speak practically to those more".

    Having finished with the introduction, Boris Nikolaevich proceeds, in fact, to the main part of the report - the one that was written and rewritten 15 times.

    He is again in his accustomed accusatory - prosecutorial role. The hall becomes numb, listening to his escapades, from time to time bursting into applause.

    Yeltsin says that the apparatus of the Central Committee has not been reorganized, the party is lagging behind the people. The elections of leaders, including the secretaries of the Central Committee and the general secretary, should be universal, direct and secret, with a clear age limit - up to 65 years - and with the departure of the general, the entire Politburo should also change.

    To the roar of applause, he proposes to immediately get rid of the old ballast, "who voted to the fifth star and the crisis of society", to significantly reduce the apparatus, eliminating, in particular, the sectoral departments of the Central Committee. The party must become open, with a transparent budget and freedom of opinion.

    Particular excitement was caused by his accusations of total corruption and excessive privileges of the Bolshevik elite - "if something is missing in our country, in a socialist society, then everyone should feel the shortage equally, without exception."

    “For 70 years we have not resolved the main issues,” Yeltsin throws, “to feed and clothe the people, to provide services, to resolve social issues.”

    At that moment, millions of people clung to TV screens and radio speakers. Yeltsin said exactly what almost everyone thought, only he did not dare to admit it publicly.

    It was his true finest hour, and he himself, sensing this, decided to finally put a spectacular end.

    Yeltsin: Comrade delegates! A sensitive question. I only wanted to address the issue of political rehabilitation for me personally after the October plenum of the Central Committee.”

    An uproar rises in the hall, and Boris Nikolayevich, like a professional orator, makes an elegant move.

    “If you think that time no longer allows, then that's it,” he throws up his hands and is about to leave the podium, but Gorbachev intervenes.

    GORBACHEV: Boris Nikolaevich, speak, they ask. (Applause.) I think let's remove the mystery from the Yeltsin case. Let him say everything that Boris Nikolayevich thinks to say. And if something appears with you, you can also say. Please, Boris Nikolaevich.

    The General Secretary took little risk. The experience of the October plenum and the auto-da-fe of the city committee showed that at the first wave of his hand, hundreds of politically sensitive party members would rush to the podium and again begin to trample the disobedient into the mud. Every word Yeltsin said could easily be used against him. And Mikhail Sergeevich, in a good-natured manner, makes a wide, cordial gesture.

    In his short, emotional speech, Yeltsin asks to cancel the decision of the October plenum, in which his speech was recognized as erroneous.

    Where did his former repentant timidity go? Now he declares that everything he said in October is confirmed by life itself. Yeltsin calls his only mistake only the moment of his speech - the eve of the 70th anniversary of October. That is, claims can be exclusively to the form, but not to the content.

    "It will be in the spirit of perestroika," Yeltsin exclaims, "it will be democratic and, I think, will help it by adding confidence to the people."

    Ringing like! It turns out that we are not talking about a particular case, not about a specific speech and a single party member: about the fate of perestroika as a whole. Paraphrasing Louis XIV, Boris Nikolaevich could well have added: "Perestroika is me."

    medical diagnosis.

    Manic syndrome is characterized by elevated mood, combined with unreasonable optimism, accelerated thinking and excessive activity. Along with verbosity, there is an overestimation of one's own capabilities.

    Yeltsin was seen off from the podium with applause. During the break, many approached him, shook hands, expressed support. And here is how B. Yeltsin himself describes this "historical" episode that happened on the final day of the party conference:

    “I prepared for a fairly combative performance. In it, he decided to raise the question of his political rehabilitation.

    Later, when the 19th Conference ended and a flurry of letters of support addressed to me fell upon me, many authors reproached me for the only circumstance: why did I ask the party conference for political rehabilitation? “What, you didn’t know,” they asked me, “who was elected to the conference for the most part, how were the elections to it? Was it possible to ask these people for something? “And in general,” one engineer wrote, it seems from Leningrad, “Woland even said in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita: never ask anyone for anything ... But you forgot this holy rule.”

    And yet, I believe that I was right in putting this question before the delegates. It was important to state my position and say aloud that the decision of the October plenum of the Central Committee, which recognized my speech as politically erroneous, is in itself a political mistake and must be canceled. I had no great illusions that this would happen, but I still hoped.

    In the end, a real folk rehabilitation took place. In the elections to people's deputies, almost 90 percent of Muscovites voted for me, and nothing can be more expensive than this, the most important rehabilitation ... The decision of the October plenum can be canceled or not - it no longer matters. It seems to me that this is much more important now for Gorbachev himself and the Central Committee.

    However, I am getting ahead of myself. The right to speak was still to be won. I understood that everything would be done to keep me from the podium. Those who prepared the party conference had a clear idea that it would be a very critical speech, and they did not want to listen to all this.

    And so it happened. Day, two, three, four, the last day of the conference is already underway. I was thinking about how to be - how to perform? The list is long, from this list, of course, there will always be someone to whom it is safe to give the floor, if only not to give it to me. I send one note - no answer, I send a second note - the same thing. Well, then I decided to take the podium by storm. Especially after literally forty minutes before the break, the chairman announced that after lunch the conference would move on to adopting resolutions and decisions. When I heard that my name was not on this list, I decided to take an extreme step. Addressed to our Karelian delegation. I say: "Comrades, I have only one way out - we must take the podium by storm." Agreed. And I went down the long stairs to the doors that lead directly to the passage to the podium, and asked the KGB guys to open the door. And the KGB officers treated me, for the most part, I must say, not bad - they opened both doors, I pulled out my red mandate, raised it above my head and walked with a firm step along this long passage, straight to the presidium.

    When I reached the middle of the huge Palace, the hall understood everything. Presidium - too. The speaker, I think, from Tajikistan, stopped talking. In general, a dead, eerie silence was established. And in this silence, with my arm outstretched, with a red mandate, I walked straight ahead, looking Gorbachev in the eyes. Every step resonated with my soul. I felt the breath of more than five thousand people, their eyes fixed on me from all sides. He reached the presidium, went up three steps, approached Gorbachev with a mandate in his hand and, looking into his eyes, said in a firm voice: “I demand that I give the floor to speak. Or put the question to the vote of the entire conference.” Some momentary confusion, and I'm standing. Finally he said, "Sit in the front row." Well, I sat in the first row, next to the podium. I see how the members of the Politburo began to consult among themselves, to whisper, then Gorbachev called the head of the general department of the Central Committee, they also whispered, he left, after which his worker came up to me and said: “Boris Nikolaevich, you are asked to go to the presidium room, with you there want to talk." I ask: "Who wants to talk to me?" - "I do not know". I say: “No, this option does not suit me. I will sit here." He left. Again the head of the general department is whispering to the presidium, again some kind of nervous movement. Again, an employee comes up to me and says that one of the leaders will come to me now.

    I understood that I was not allowed to leave the hall. If I go out, the doors won't be opened for me again. I say: "Well, I'll go, but I'll see who will leave the presidium." I quietly walk down the aisle, and from the front rows they say to me in a whisper, - no, do not leave the hall. Not having reached three or four meters to the exit, I stopped and looked at the presidium. A group of journalists settled down next to me, they also say: “Boris Nikolayevich, don’t leave the hall!” Yes, I myself understood that it was really impossible to leave the hall. No one rose from the presidium. The speaker continued his speech. The same comrade comes up to me and says that Mikhail Sergeevich promises to give the floor, but we must return to the Karelian delegation. I realized that until I get there, until I return back, the debate will be curtailed and they will not give me a word. Therefore, I answered - no, I asked the delegation for leave, so I won’t go back, but I like the place in the first row. He turned sharply and sat down again in the center, by the aisle, directly opposite Gorbachev.

    Was he really going to let me on the podium, or did he come to the conclusion later that it would be a loss for him if he put the question to a vote and the audience favored giving me the floor? Hard to say. As a result, he announced my speech and added that after the break we would move on to the adoption of resolutions.

    I then tried to play options: what if the Chekists had not opened the door, or the presidium would still have managed to persuade me to leave the hall, or Gorbachev, by his pressure and authority, would have persuaded the hall to stop the debate, what then? For some reason, I still have a firm belief that I would have performed anyway. Probably, then I would have appealed directly to the delegates of the conference, and they would have given me the floor. Even those who treated me badly, with suspicion or with condemnation, even they were interested in what I would say. I felt the mood of the hall and somehow I was sure that they would give me the floor.

    I went to the podium. There was a dead, almost oppressive silence. Started talking."

    “I performed. To some extent, the strongest tension had an effect, but nevertheless, it seems to me, I coped with myself, with my excitement, and I said everything that I wanted and had to say. The reaction was good, at least they applauded until I left the hall and went upstairs, to the balcony, to the Karelian delegation. At this time, a break was announced, my delegation showed warm attention to me, someone smiled, someone tried to support me with a handshake. I was excited, tense, went out into the street, I was surrounded by delegates and journalists, they asked a lot of questions.

    Suspecting nothing, after the break I sat down with my delegation. Now, according to the regulations, the adoption of resolutions and other decisions of the conference will begin. But it turns out that the break was used to prepare a counterattack against me and my performance.

    Ligachev's speech was memorable. It will then spread through anecdotes, reprises, performances, satirical drawings, etc. In the published transcript, they even had to correct his speech, the main ideologist of the country looked too mediocre. Whatever labels he put on me, what he just made up about me, despite all his stormy efforts, it was petty, vulgar, uncivilized.

    It seems to me that it was after this speech that his political career successfully came to an end. He dealt himself such a crushing blow that he would never be able to recover from it. He should have resigned after the party conference, but he doesn't want to. I don't want to, but I still have to. He has nowhere to go, which has since caused many nervous laughter.

    Next performance. Lukin. The young first secretary of the Proletarian District Party Committee of Moscow. He diligently poured dirt on me, performing the honorable task of his superiors. Later I often thought about him - how will he continue to live with his conscience? .. And in the end I decided that he would be wonderful to live with his conscience, he had it hardened. These young careerists, going upstairs, manage to tell so many different lies and twists that it’s better not to mention conscience here at all.

    Chikirev. Director of the plant named after Ordzhonikidze. It was he who made up the story about the first secretary, who allegedly threw himself from the seventh floor because of me, besides that, he said a lot of other things. I listened to this and could not understand - a terrible dream or reality. I was at his factory, once I even spent the whole day there with Minister Panichev. As always, he visited both the dining room and the change houses, and at the end of the meeting he made comments, he seemed to agree. And suddenly here he suffered such that it is simply impossible to retell, he lied, distorted the facts.

    Quite unexpectedly for everyone, spoiling the planned scenario, a Sverdlovsk resident V. A. Volkov came to the podium and said kind words to me. Before that, I never knew Volkov.

    His impulsive, sincere performance is a natural human reaction to militant injustice. But the frightened first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee, Bobykin, sent a note to the presidium a few minutes later. I will quote it: The delegation of the Sverdlovsk Regional Party Organization fully supports the decisions of the October (1987) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Comrade Yeltsin. No one authorized Comrade Volkov to speak on behalf of the delegates. His speech received complete condemnation. On behalf of the delegation - the first secretary of the regional party committee Bobykin. But he did not consult with the delegation.

    In conclusion, Gorbachev also said a lot about me. But still not so bazaar and unbridled.

    Everyone who was around was afraid to even turn to me. I sat motionless, looking up at the podium from the balcony. It seemed that I was about to lose consciousness from all this ... Seeing my condition, the guys who were on duty on the floor ran up to me, took me to the doctor, they gave me an injection so that I could still endure, sit out until the end of the party conference. I returned, but it was both physical and moral torment, everything inside burned, swam before my eyes ...

    It was hard for me to get through this. Very hard. I didn’t sleep for two nights in a row, I worried, I thought - what’s the matter, who is right, who is wrong? .. It seemed to me that everything was over. I have nowhere to justify myself, and I would not. The session of the 19th Conference was broadcast by Central Television throughout the country. I won't be able to wash off the dirt that was poured over me. I felt: they are happy, they beat me, they won. At that moment I had some kind of state of apathy. I didn't want any struggle, no explanations, nothing, just to forget everything, just to be left in peace.

    And then all of a sudden telegrams and letters went to Gosstroy, where I worked. And not ten, not a hundred, but bags, thousands. From all over the country, from the farthest corners. It was some fantastic nationwide support. They offered me honey, herbs, raspberry jam, massage, etc., etc., so that I could heal myself and never get sick again. I was advised not to pay attention to the nonsense that was said about me, because no one believes in them anyway. They demanded of me not to become limp, but to continue the struggle for perestroika.

    I received so many touching, kind, warm letters from people completely unfamiliar to me that I could not believe everything, and I asked myself where this came from, why, for what? ..

    Although, of course, he understood where these sincere feelings came from. Our endured people could not calmly and without compassion watch how a person was mocked. People were outraged by the obvious, frank injustice. They sent these bright letters and thus extended their hands to me, and I was able to lean on them and stand up.

    So, the story of eight months ago repeated itself. Just as at the October Plenum of 1987, Yeltsin was given a public, demonstrative party flogging. The delegates who came out to the podium of the party conference again stigmatized him, demanded that the liar voluntarist be held accountable.

    Immediately after Yeltsin's speech, a break was announced. But now the break is over. According to the regulations, the conference was supposed to proceed to the adoption of documents, but M. Gorbachev, noting that the work of the conference was ongoing, gave the floor to G. Usmanov, First Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU. He immediately stated that he should touch on the issues that Yeltsin raised in his speech and, in particular, said:

    “Still, I would like to dwell on two points from the first part of Comrade Yeltsin's speech. As for his speech at the October (1987) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he completely built it into today's speech. As for the second part of Comrade Yeltsin's speech, his political rehabilitation. All members of the Central Committee who took part in the work of the October Plenum are present here. Boris Nikolaevich said here that he made the only mistake by speaking at the wrong time.

    Let's see: is it true? It seems that the time then he chose not by chance. He not only spoke, but also stated that he did not agree with the pace of the ongoing work on perestroika, and asked for his resignation. Then Mikhail Sergeevich turned to him and said in a fatherly way: “Boris, they say, take your words back, gather your strength and continue to head a very large authoritative Moscow party organization.” But Boris Nikolaevich categorically refused. And, as you know, the Moscow Party Organization has passed its decision on this issue. We have no reason not to trust such an authoritative metropolitan party organization. Moreover, Yeltsin, by his actions and deeds, does not work for the authority of the party and our country, handing out his interviews to various foreign agencies right and left. He is published, he works for his authority.

    Therefore, on behalf of our delegation, I do not support the request for his political rehabilitation. After all, wherever we work, we have another most serious duty: to strengthen the unity and cohesion of our party in every possible way - the key to success, our cementing force.

    The next to come to the podium was the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, S. Shalaev. He procrastinated about trade unions for a long time, tired everyone and just wanted to move on to Yeltsin's speech, as he was reminded of the regulations - he had to leave the podium.

    With this in mind, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, V. Välyas, immediately began to express his "purely personal opinion on the speech of Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin." He remembered a trip to Nicaragua as part of the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which was headed by the disgraced secretary

    “Speaking at a textile factory (still a bad textile factory, we are helping to build it) in front of the workers, perhaps out of thoughtlessness, perhaps out of fatigue, he admitted the phrase: “What, you don’t want to work? Go without pants." Alas, it was broadcast on television. And there was a translator nearby who translated everything correctly. It hurts, because there really are guys in Nicaragua who don't have clothes yet. No clothes.

    I think that our party forum calmly, in a party way, solves problems in principle, for this we have party wisdom, we have endurance. But I say: a person who speaks before a high party forum must have a party conscience for this.

    Of course, everyone was waiting for what Yegor Ligachev would say. Yeltsin was also waiting for this speech. He saw how Yegor Kuzmich, sitting in the presidium, hastily sketched out the theses of his future speech. Then this speech will go from hand to hand, and the phrase "Boris, you're wrong" will become an aphorism. But all this will come later. In the meantime, Gorbachev is giving the floor to Comrade Ligachev, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

    Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, undoubtedly Yeltsin's worst enemy, made the most striking speech. The phrase thrown by him then remained forever in history, turned into an idiom - "Boris, you're wrong!".

    That's exactly how - Boris - not by name, patronymic or last name, Ligachev addressed his counterpart. In principle, his age allowed him to do this - he was eleven years older than Yeltsin - but such collective farm familiarity immediately aroused rejection among people.

    By the way, in the official transcript of the famous phrase, this does not appear. But many witnesses claim that Ligachev's speech was so emotional that the transcript had to be carefully corrected.

    Of course, in an amicable way, Ligachev should not have performed. They even tried to keep him, to convince him. But Yegor Kuzmich was adamant.

    “No amount of persuasion on the part of the members of the Politburo and the Secretary General, all of us, could keep him from going to the podium,” writes Politburo member Vadim Medvedev. - The speech was sustained in Ligachev's characteristic offensive-cocklike spirit, in the style of the prevailing "non-stop" stereotypes, and contained a number of incorrect remarks that set the teeth on edge with references to the brilliant Tomsk experience. In general, this performance only added points to Yeltsin.

    Frankly speaking, Ligachev did not discover anything new. He only listed, summed up all the negative things said about Yeltsin in recent times. In particular, he said:

    “Perhaps it is more difficult for me than for anyone from the leadership to speak in connection with the speech of Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. And not because it was about me. It's just time to tell the whole truth. Why is it difficult to speak? Because I recommended him to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, then to the Politburo. (However, Yegor Kuzmich at another time assumed responsibility for appointing Yeltsin head of the Central Committee department: “As for his further advancement, let others take it upon themselves.” - A.K.). Where did I come from? I proceeded from the fact that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was an energetic person, at that time he had extensive experience in leading the prominent Sverdlovsk regional party organization, respected by all in our party. I saw this organization at work when I came to Sverdlovsk as a secretary of the Central Committee ...

    ... You can not be silent, because the communist Yeltsin embarked on the wrong path. It turned out that he has not creative, but destructive energy. His assessments of the perestroika process, of the approaches and methods of work recognized by the Party, are groundless and erroneous. Both the Moscow City Party Committee and the Plenum of the Central Committee, at which he was in good health, came to this conclusion. More than 50 people spoke at the plenums of the Moscow City Committee and the Central Committee of the CPSU, and all unanimously adopted the well-known decision ...

    …There are reasonable suggestions in his speech. But on the whole, it shows that he did not draw correct political conclusions.

    Moreover, he presented all our politics as a complete improvisation ...

    ... you, Boris, worked for 9 years as the secretary of the regional committee and firmly put the region on coupons. This is what political phrase and reality mean. This is what the discrepancy between word and deed means...

    ... it is bad when a communist, a member of the Central Committee, not having received the support of the party, appeals to the bourgeois press. Just as you can’t throw words out of a song, you can’t erase this fact now. Apparently, Comrade Yeltsin wanted to remind himself, to please him. They say about such people: they just can't get past the podium. Do you love, Boris, so that all the flags go to you! Look, if you're constantly doing interviews, you don't have time or energy left for anything else.

    ... being a member of the Politburo, attending its meetings, and meetings last for 8 - 9 and 10 hours, he almost did not take any part in discussing the vital problems of the country and in making decisions that all the people were waiting for. He was silent and waited. Weird, but it's a fact. Does this mean party partnership, Boris?

    ... Comrades, can one agree that under the banner of restoring historical truth, it is often completely distorted? Is it possible to agree that the Soviet people are in our printed publications! - presented as slaves (I almost quote), who were supposedly fed only with lies and demagogy and subjected to the most severe exploitation?

    ... During the years of stagnation, I lived and worked in Siberia - a harsh, but truly wonderful land. I am often asked what I was doing at that time. I proudly answer: I built socialism. And there were millions of them. It would be a betrayal if I did not speak about those with whom I connected my fate, shared joys and sorrows. Many of them have already passed away. Not everything worked right away. They had to finish and remake, but they worked without looking back, perhaps because they knew that they would not be sent further than Siberia. They worked to make people live better, to give the state more and to defend the interests of the region.

    A party worker has one privilege - to be ahead, to fight for the policy of the party, to serve his people faithfully and truthfully.

    Having trampled on Yeltsin to his heart's content, the high-ranking speaker went to the other extreme and began to glorify the Secretary General and praise perestroika, which finally lost this battle. And the whole war as a whole. From now on, the name of Yegor Kuzmich was inextricably and strongly associated with the reactionary communist wing. He has become a household name, partly a caricature. An aged Bolshevik-dogmatist a la Suslov: perhaps without galoshes.

    “He inflicted such a crushing blow on himself that he will never be able to recover from it,” Yeltsin noted.

    Oddly enough, Yegor Kuzmich turned out to be almost the only political centenarian of the entire Politburo. He even survived the Yeltsin era, because in 1999 he was elected to the State Duma on the list of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (he was clearly included for only one purpose: to annoy the president), and as an elder he opened the first plenary session, sitting on the presidium next to Yeltsin, which is why both of them are pleased they definitely didn’t experience it ... Not only that, contrary to B. Yeltsin’s predictions, he not only “recovered from a crushing blow”, but twenty years later wrote the book “Who Betrayed the USSR”, which became a notable political event of the post-Yeltsin and even post-Putin era, the circulation of which sold out in just a matter of days. The annotation of the book says that: “The sharp political battle between E. Ligachev and B. Yeltsin became a memorable event of the perestroika period. Unfortunately, Ligachev's phrase "Boris, you're wrong!" became prophetic for the fate of the state, which was soon headed by Yeltsin.

    In his book, E. K. Ligachev answered the question that served as its title in this way: “I am constantly asked: who is the culprit of all those troubles that have fallen upon the people with terrible force? Time gave the answer to this difficult question - Gorbachev.

    There was also a successor to Gorbachev's cause - B. N. Yeltsin, who brought the citizens of the richest country in terms of natural resources to impoverishment. He played this role to the fullest. At the 19th Party Conference in 1988, I said: “Boris, you are wrong! … You have energy, but your energy is not creative, but destructive.” The prediction turned out to be correct. I would be happy if I was wrong."

    The wise Yegor Kuzmich was not mistaken, and his famous phrase, which the "democrats" then mocked, turned out to be truly historical. However, the above quote from his book needs, in our opinion, to be clarified. No, not “there was ... a successor to Gorbachev’s cause - B. N. Yeltsin ...”, he was “calculated” and attracted by Gorbachev at the very beginning of perestroika as a shock, destructive force.

    Yes, Yegor Ligachev, like Boris Yeltsin, also left the podium to thunderous applause. As you can see, both had supporters. Yeltsin was sharply opposed at the conference by the editor-in-chief of Pravda V. Afanasiev, the general director of the NPO Sergo Ordzhonikidze Machine-Tool Plant N. Chikirev, and the first secretary of the Proletarian District Committee of the CPSU of Moscow I. Lukin. They presented specific claims to Yeltsin.

    Chikirev N. S. “When Comrade Yeltsin came to us, to Moscow, he was received very well. He was received with great support, with great attention. When he traveled to plants and factories, we saw his diligence. We saw that he really wanted to have food in Moscow and that we work better.

    Here he was at my factory for 6 hours, made the only remark that I consider absolutely unfair. I do not want to express it for the reason that it is absolutely incompetent - to see for the first time in a person's life and express what he had no right to express to me. This is the first.

    I think that the collective in which I grew up knows me better than Comrade Yeltsin knew.

    At the last district party conferences, a new composition of the district committees and their leadership was elected. Shortly before this, Comrade Yeltsin was elected to the Moscow City Committee. All the secretaries of the district committees of the party - and I have been a member of the city committee for more than one term, worked for many years in the Komsomol and the party - were elected under Comrade Yeltsin. And after that, in a very short time, for some year, he replaced 23 first secretaries out of thirty-three with the help of a sycophant who was sitting in his organizational department. I don't think that Comrade Yeltsin was such a perceptive person that in six months he could recognize the secretaries and heap up so much. This is one fact. And here is the second fact. If he told us today about 1937, then my family has gone through a lot. So, the secretary of the district committee of the party, who grew up before our eyes, a super-honest and conscientious person, jumped out of the window after an undeserved scolding for the poor supply of food to the district. And in the Kiev region, it is not very easy to establish this business. In the morning, two trains arrived at the Kievsky railway station, and the Kievsky district was again without food. So try to establish supplies in the Kiev region. I live near this area. At the bureau of the city committee they dismantled, they gave a "stricter", and after that a comrade from the eighth floor jumped. The most honest person died, whom Moscow knew, whom we knew - members of the city committee of the party, whom the secretaries of the district committees knew. Why is it better than 1937? This man was not Shchelokov, he was not Rashidov. He was a communist, a devoted communist. Let Comrade Yeltsin bear this death in his heart.”

    Lukin I. S. First Secretary of the Proletarian District Party Committee of the City of Moscow: “I am a young first secretary, elected a little over a year ago, and I cannot classify myself among those who are offended by Comrade Yeltsin. But, judging by other speeches from this podium and some, in my opinion, not quite mature applause, I feel that there is still the hypnosis of Yeltsin's phrase.

    When I heard him in 1984 at a scientific-practical conference (I was in the hall, he was in the presidium), it also seemed to me that he was, so to speak, a bright speaker, an interesting person. But now the hypnosis has dissipated. During your leadership of the city party organization, Comrade Yeltsin, I came across your style and methods of work.

    I am convinced that the attempt to force perestroika has led in Moscow to literally breaking up the party organization. You, speaking about yourself, said about the "shadow of the distant past." And your methods of working with cadres in Moscow, primarily with the party, are they not a "shadow of the distant past"? The first secretaries of the Kuibyshev, Kiev, Leningrad and many other district committees of the party not only left, but were actually broken, spiritually destroyed. Your soulless attitude towards people was manifested in the endless replacement of personnel. My predecessor, an honest and decent man, was also forced to leave: his health could not stand it.

    Yes, and in the economic life of the city, we are still disentangling your desire to become famous for bright promises to Muscovites. But the main thing in your style is the desire to please the masses. You choose only one method - to drive a wedge between the party committees and the working class, the intelligentsia. That's what you did in Moscow, and that's what you tried to do today, actually driving a wedge between the conference delegates, the hall, and the presidium. This, Comrade Yeltsin, you will not succeed. It won't pass!

    I am convinced, comrades, that today it is too early to talk about political rehabilitation. You, Comrade Yeltsin, apparently have not yet drawn any conclusions. I am convinced that the delegates of our conference will be able to recognize a bright phrase in any package, the desire to express their own ambitions. And the guarantor of this is our today's conference.

    M. Gorbachev gave the floor to speak only to those whose support he counted on. The presidium also received notes asking for the floor from many delegates. But these notes were carefully sorted. Nevertheless, one of the delegates, the secretary of the party committee of the Kalinin machine-building plant from Sverdlovsk, V. Volkov, like Yeltsin, took the podium by storm and said a few words in defense of his disgraced countryman. “I think it will not only be hard on my soul if everything remains the way it was after the speech of comrade Ligachev on Yeltsin.

    Yes, Yeltsin is a very difficult person, he has a difficult character; he is a tough person, maybe even cruel. But this leader, working in the Sverdlovsk regional party organization, did a lot for the authority of the party worker and the party, he was a man whose word was not at odds with his deed. Therefore, even today he remains a high authority among ordinary people.

    I believe that the Central Committee of the Party damaged its authority when the materials of the October Plenum were not published. This gave rise to a lot of rumors, which only harmed the cause.

    I do not agree with Comrade Ligachev's statement about cards either. The way it was with products under Yeltsin, unfortunately, does not exist today.

    Our region ranks third (maybe I'm wrong, of course, but somewhere in third place) in Russia in terms of industrial output. And our rural population is proportionately very small compared to other regions.

    What else do I want to say? We are not familiar with Yeltsin's speech at the October Plenum, and therefore it is difficult for us today to make a decision on rehabilitation, on changing the assessment given by the Plenum of the Central Committee. But there is no need to hang labels anyway.

    Comrade Yeltsin in his speech practically raised most of the questions that had been raised before him in speeches. At least very many. Therefore, I want to say again (and I think that the members of the Sverdlovsk delegation will support me) that Yeltsin did a lot for the Sverdlovsk region, where even today his authority is very high.

    As we have already noted, in his memoirs B. Yeltsin claimed that he left the party conference with a heavy heart. He seemed to be afraid that people would believe in the tub of dirt poured on him:

    “I didn’t sleep for two nights in a row, I worried, I thought - what’s the matter, who is right, who is wrong? .. It seemed to me that everything was over. I have nowhere to justify myself, and I wouldn’t even begin to ... I won’t be able to wash off the dirt that was poured over me. I felt: they are happy, they beat me, they won. At that moment I had some kind of state of apathy. I didn’t want any struggle, no explanations, nothing, just to forget everything, just to be left alone.”

    It must be assumed that we are dealing with yet another example of Yeltsin's coquetry. Of course, he was worried, and he certainly did not sleep at night. But emotions invariably went hand in hand with cold calculation.

    Yeltsin was well aware that the sympathies of the majority would be on his side. For the first time - publicly, throughout the country - he voiced the thoughts of millions. As for the arranged flogging, it's even better - we love the offended.

    Very soon thousands of letters and telegrams went to Gosstroy. Every day, new bags of correspondence were brought to Yeltsin's office. People from all over the Union expressed their sympathy and support to him, sent jam and medicinal herbs.

    And most importantly, unlike the October plenum, when Yeltsin's speech was hidden from society, his current march has already become the property of millions, since it happened before their eyes.

    If the political rehabilitation of Yeltsin did not take place, then a completely different, much more, perhaps important, rehabilitation took place - the people's rehabilitation.

    From now on, all the eyes of the country were riveted not to Gorbachev, but to Yeltsin, it was he who became the ruler of thoughts, the spokesman for popular discontent. Boris Nikolaevich confidently burst into the forefront of the political struggle ... And he was helped in this, quite consciously, by none other than Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, whose behavior at the last party conference once again convincingly confirmed that they acted in accordance with a clearly developed plan for the liquidation of the CPSU and the collapse Soviet Union.

    The era of perestroika in the Soviet Union left in the memory of the people much more bitter than rosy memories. The time of great hopes ended with the collapse of the country, which left a negative imprint on the perception of this historical period.

    But the phrase “Boris, you are wrong!”, which has become winged, is remembered with a smile even by those who, due to their age, remember little about that era. However, the question of what Boris was really wrong about, who convicted him of being wrong, and how the phrase became part of folklore, hangs in the air.

    Perhaps it is worth starting from afar, from 1983, when the new leader of the USSR Yuri Andropov, updating management personnel, attracted the 63-year-old First Secretary of the Tomsk Regional Committee of the CPSU to work in Moscow Egor Ligachev.

    For the realities of the first half of the 1980s, the 63-year-old Ligachev, who, moreover, did not suffer from serious illnesses and had proven himself well in his former position, was quite a young and promising politician. In Moscow, Ligachev took the post of department head of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and later became secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

    Lev Zaikov, Yegor Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev. 1988 Photo: RIA Novosti / Boris Babanov

    Comrade Ligachev's protégé

    Ligachev enjoyed the confidence of Andropov, who instructed him to take further measures to recruit new personnel. In particular, Andropov advised to take a closer look at the 52-year-old First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU Boris Yeltsin.

    Ligachev went to Sverdlovsk and was extremely pleased with what he saw, believing that Yeltsin was exactly the person the country needed in an era of change.

    True, Yeltsin's nomination to work in Moscow took place only two years later - after the death of Andropov, the reform process that had been started stalled and resumed only in 1985, when the post of leader of the USSR was taken over by Mikhail Gorbachev.

    In December 1985, Yeltsin was given the highest confidence - he was nominated for the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, which made the politician one of the most influential people in the country.

    Soon, rumors spread around Moscow about the extraordinary democracy of the new head of the capital: he allegedly personally got acquainted with the assortment of grocery stores, was treated in an ordinary clinic, and even went to work by tram.

    Party disgrace and people's love

    Yeltsin's popularity began to grow by leaps and bounds, even exceeding the popularity of Mikhail Gorbachev. Either this turned the politician's head, or personal ambitions woke up, but soon Yeltsin began to clash violently with party associates.

    On October 21, 1987, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yeltsin sharply opposed the slow pace of perestroika, criticized his colleagues, including Ligachev, and even got to Gorbachev, declaring that a "cult of personality" was beginning to form around the Secretary General.

    The tone of Yeltsin's speech did not even fit into the framework of the "perestroika" announced in the country. Party comrades, including those who sympathized with Yeltsin, declared his demarche "politically erroneous", after which he fell into disgrace and was removed from the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.

    In the traditions of the CPSU, it was not customary to wash dirty linen in public, because the text of Yeltsin's speech was not published anywhere. But in "samizdat" there were dozens of versions of this speech that had nothing to do with reality. In some of them, Yeltsin almost cursed Gorbachev and looked more like a port loader than a politician.

    It was from this legendary speech that Yeltsin's fame as an oppositionist began. It was then that Soviet citizens, who began to become disillusioned with Gorbachev, began to perceive Yeltsin as an alternative to Mikhail Sergeevich.

    Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin during the evening meeting of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. Photo: RIA Novosti / Boris Babanov

    Prophet in the ranks of the CPSU

    The times of perestroika in terms of intra-party struggle were not as tough as previous eras, because the disgraced Yeltsin, having lost the post of "master of Moscow", remained in the elite as first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosstroy.

    Yeltsin, who was having a hard time with his removal from office, nevertheless, by the summer of 1988, realized that there were many advantages in his current position as a “rebel”, and began to develop the role of an “oppositionist”.

    On July 1, 1988, Yeltsin spoke at the XIX Party Conference. He attacked the privileges of the highest state leaders, criticized the "stagnation", in which, in his opinion, the entire Politburo as a "collective body" was guilty, called for the removal of Ligachev from the Politburo, and eventually turned to the delegates with a call to rehabilitate him for speaking at the Plenum.

    In the midst of Yeltsin's speech, Ligachev intervened. The politician who once nominated the Sverdlovsk citizen remarked:

    - You, Boris, are wrong. We disagree with you not only in tactics. Boris, you have tremendous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive! You put your region on coupons ...

    Yeltsin ignored the remark and continued his speech.

    The phrase, most likely, would not have become winged if it had not been used soon in one of the monologues “on the topic of the day” comedian Gennady Khazanov. In the thoroughly politicized USSR of the late 1980s, the joke associated with the battle between the "people's hero" Yeltsin and the party nomenklatura immediately became extremely popular.

    From that moment on, it was adopted by Yeltsin's supporters, who took to the streets with posters "Boris, you're right!" and even "Rule, Boris!".

    The last wish was soon fulfilled. And the longer Boris ruled, the more prophetic Ligachev’s words seemed: “Boris, you have tremendous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive!”...

    Yes, there was no longer any sense from this prophecy. Yeltsin's destructive energy did its job.

    And the only good thing left for the people from that era was a catchphrase ...