Losev Dialectic of myth summary. Alexey Losev "Dialectic of Myth" (summary)

Foreword

INTRODUCTION

I. MYTH IS NOT MYTH OR FICTION, IT IS NOT FANTASTIC FICTION

II. MYTH IS NOT AN IDEAL BEING

III. MYTH IS NOT A SCIENTIFIC AND, IN PARTICULAR, A PRIMITIVE SCIENTIFIC CONSTRUCTION

1. Certain mythology and certain science may overlap, but fundamentally they are never identical.

2. Science is not born from myth, but science is always mythological

3. Science can never destroy a myth

4. The myth is not based on scientific experience

5. Pure science, in contrast to mythology, does not need either the absolute givenness of the object,

nor the absolute given of the subject,

nor complete truth

6. There is a special mythological truth

IV. MYTH IS NOT A METAPHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION

1. Metaphysicality is hindered by the this-worldliness and sensuality of myth

2. Metaphysics is scientific or scientific, mythology is the subject of direct perception

3. This feature of mythology is universal (including Christianity)

4. Mythical detachment and hierarchy

V. MYTH IS NEITHER SCHEME NOR ALLEGORY

1. The concept of expressive form

2. Dialectics of scheme, allegory and symbol

3. Different layers of the symbol

4. Examples of symbolic mythology:

VI. MYTH IS NOT A POETIC WORK

1. The similarity of mythology with poetry in the field of expressive forms

2. Similarity in the field of intelligence

3. Similarity in terms of immediacy

4. Similarity in detachment

5. The deepest divergence in the nature of detachment

6. Poetry and mythology

7. Essence of Mythic Renunciation

8. The principle of mythical detachment:

VII. MYTH IS A PERSONAL FORM

1. Summary of the previous

2. Basic dialectics of the concept of personality

3. Every living person is one way or another a myth

4. Mythological and personal symbolism

5. Essay on the dialectics of mythical time

6. Dreaming

7. Access to a new deepening of the concept of myth

VIII. MYTH IS NOT A SPECIALLY RELIGIOUS CREATION

1. The most common similarities and differences between mythology and religion

2. Energy and substance of religion

3. Face and personality in mythology; examples from types of pictorial space

4. Religion cannot but give rise to a myth

IX. MYTH IS NOT DOGMA

1. Myth is historical, dogma is absolute

2. Mythic historicism

3. Fixing the concepts of religion, mythology and dogmatic theology

4. Mythology and dogmatics of faith and knowledge

5. To the mythology of materialism:

6. Bourgeois mythology of materialism

7. Types of materialism

8. Mythology and dogmatics in the doctrines of

9. Conclusion

X. A MYTH IS NOT A HISTORICAL EVENT AS SUCH

1. Natural-material layer of history

2. Layer of consciousness and understanding

3. Layer of self-consciousness, or words

XI. MYTH IS A MIRACLE

1. Introduction

2. What is not a miracle?:

3. Other miracle theories

4. The main dialectic of a miracle:

5. Expediency in a miracle versus other types of expediency

6. Originality and specificity of mythical expediency:

7. Real being is a different degree of mythicity and miraculousness:

XII. REVIEW OF ALL DIALECTIC MOMENTS OF MYTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE

1. Dialectical necessity

2. Non-ideality

3. Extra-scientific and specific truth

4. Non-metaphysical

5. Symbolism

6. Detachment

7. Myth and religion

8. Essence of mythical historicism

XIII. FINAL DIALECTIC FORMULA

1. What did we have before the introduction of the concept of a miracle?

2. Dialectical formula of myth

XIV. TRANSITION TO REAL MYTHOLOGY AND THE IDEA OF ABSOLUTE MYTHOLOGY

Introduction

1. Dialectics is mythology, and mythology is dialectics

2. Overview of Syntheses of Absolute Mythology

3. Continued

4. Summary

5. A few examples of solid myths from absolute mythology

Alexey Fedorovich LOSEV.

DIALECTICS OF MYTH

Foreword

This little study has as its subject one of the darkest areas of human consciousness, which was formerly occupied mainly by theologians or ethnographers. Both of them have become disgraced enough that now we can talk about revealing the essence of the myth by theological or ethnographic methods. And the trouble is not that mystical theologians and empiricist ethnographers (mostly theologians are very bad mystics, trying to flirt with science and dreaming of becoming complete positivists, and ethnographers - alas! - often very bad empiricists, being in the chains of one or another arbitrary and unconscious metaphysical theory). The trouble is that mythological science has not yet become not only dialectical, but even simply descriptive-phenomenological. All the same, one cannot get rid of mysticism, since myth claims to speak of mystical reality, and, on the other hand, no dialectic is possible without facts. But if it is supposed that the facts of the mystical and mythical consciousness which I cite as an example are confessed by myself facts, or that the doctrine of myth consists only of the observation of facts alone, it is better for them not to delve into my analysis of myth. It is necessary to wrest the doctrine of myth both from the domain of theologians and from the domain of ethnographers; and one must first force one to take the point of view of dialectics and the phenomenological-dialectical purification of concepts, and then let them do whatever they want with the myth. In my positive analysis of myth, I did not follow many who now see the positivism of the study of religion and myth in the forcible expulsion of everything mysterious and miraculous from both. They want to reveal the essence of the myth, but to do this, they first dissect it so that it contains nothing either fabulous or even miraculous. This is either dishonest or stupid. As for me, I do not at all think that my research will be better if I say that a myth is not a myth and religion is not a religion. I take myth as it is, i.e., I want to reveal and positively fix what a myth is in itself and how it thinks of its own wonderful and fabulous nature. But I ask you not to impose on me points of view unusual for me and I ask you to take from me only what I give, that is, only one dialectics myth.

The dialectic of myth is impossible without sociology myth. Although this work does not specifically give a sociology of myth, it is introduction into sociology, which I have always thought philosophically-historically and dialectically. Having analyzed the logical and phenomenological structure of the myth, I turn at the end of the book to the establishment of the main social types mythology. I deal specifically with this sociology of myth in another work, but even here the all-encompassing role of mythical consciousness in different layers of the cultural process is clear. A theory of myth that does not capture cultures down to her social roots, there is a very bad myth theory. You have to be a very bad idealist to tear the myth from the very thick of the historical process and preach liberal dualism: real life- in itself, and the myth - in itself. I have never been a liberal or a dualist, and no one can reproach me for these heresies.

A.Losev

INTRODUCTION

The task of the proposed essay is a significant disclosure of the concept of myth, based only on the material provided by mythical consciousness itself. Any explanatory, for example, metaphysical, psychological and other points of view should be discarded. The myth must be taken as myth, without leading him to what he himself is not. Only having this pure definition and description of the myth, one can begin to explain it from one or another heterogeneous point of view. Not knowing what a myth is in itself, we cannot speak about its life in one or another alien environment. We must first take a stand most mythology, to become the most mythical subject. We must imagine that the world in which we live and all things exist is a world mythical that in general there are only myths in the world. Such a position will reveal the essence of myth as myth. And only then can one engage in heterogeneous tasks, for example, "refute" a myth, hate or love it, fight it or plant it. Without knowing what a myth is, how can one fight or refute it, how can one love it or hate it? One can, of course, not reveal the very concept of myth and still love or hate it. However, all the same, someone who puts himself in one or another external conscious relation to myth must have some kind of intuition of myth, so that logically the presence of myth itself in the mind of the one who operates with it (operating scientifically, religiously, artistically, socially, etc.) nevertheless precedes the actual operations with mythology. Therefore, it is necessary to give an essentially semantic, i.e., first of all, phenomenological, dissection of the myth, taken as such, independently taken in itself.

I. MYTH IS NOT MYTH OR FICTION, IT IS NOT FANTASTIC FICTION

This fallacy of almost all "scientific" methods of investigation of mythology must be rejected in the first place. Of course, mythology is fiction, if we apply to it the point of view of science, and even then not any, but only one that is characteristic of a narrow circle of scientists of modern European history of the last two or three centuries. From some arbitrarily taken, completely conditional point of view, a myth is indeed fiction. However, we agreed to consider the myth not from the point of view of some scientific, religious, artistic, social, etc. worldview, but exclusively from the point of view of the same myth, through the eyes of myth itself, through mythical eyes. It is this mythical view of myth that interests us here. And from the point of view of the mythical consciousness itself, in no case can it be said that myth is a fiction and a play of fantasy.. When the Greek, not in the era of skepticism and the decline of religion, but in the era of the heyday of religion and myth, spoke of his numerous Zeus or Apollo; when some tribes have a custom to put on a necklace of crocodile teeth to avoid the danger of drowning when swimming big rivers; when religious fanaticism reaches the point of self-torture and even self-immolation; – then it would be quite ignorant to assert that the mythical stimuli operating here are nothing more than an invention, pure fiction for these mythical subjects. One has to be short-sighted to the last degree in science, even simply blind, in order not to notice that myth is (for the mythical consciousness, of course) the highest in its concreteness, the most intense and most intense reality. It's not a fantasy, but... the brightest and most authentic reality. This - absolutely necessary category of thought and life, far from any chance and arbitrariness. Let us note that for the science of the 17th-19th centuries its own categories are by no means as real as its own categories are real for the mythical consciousness. For example, Kant connected the objectivity of science with the subjectivity of space, time and all categories. And even more than that. It is precisely on this subjectivism that he tries to substantiate the "realism" of science. Of course, this attempt is absurd. But the example of Kant perfectly shows how little European science valued the reality and objectivity of its categories. Some representatives of science even loved and love to flaunt such reasoning: I give you the doctrine of liquids, but whether these latter exist or not is none of my business; or: I proved this theorem, but whether something real corresponds to it, or whether it is a product of my subject or brain - this does not concern me. The point of view of the mythical consciousness is completely opposite to this. Myth - the most necessary - it must be said directly, transcendentally necessary - a category of thought and life; and there is absolutely nothing accidental, unnecessary, arbitrary, invented or fantastic in it. This is the true and most concrete reality.

Mythological scholars are almost always in the grip of this general prejudice; and if they do not speak directly about the subjectivism of mythology, then they give certain more subtle constructions that reduce mythology to the same subjectivism. So, the doctrine illusory apperception in the spirit of Herbart's psychology in Lazarus and Steinthal is also a complete distortion of the mythical consciousness and in no way can be connected with the essence of mythical constructions. At this point, we must pose a dilemma. Or we are not talking about the mythical consciousness itself, but about this or that attitude towards it, our own or someone else’s, and then we can say that the myth is an idle fiction, that the myth is a childish fantasy, that it is not real, but subjective, philosophically helpless, or, on the contrary, that it is an object of worship, that it is beautiful, divine, holy, etc. Or, secondly, we want to reveal nothing else but the myth itself, the very essence of the mythical consciousness, and - then the myth is always and necessarily a reality, concreteness, vitality and for thought - a complete and absolute necessity, non-fantastic, non-fictitious. Too often, mythologists have liked to talk about themselves, that is, about their own worldview, so that we also go the same way. We are interested in the myth, and not this or that era in the development of scientific consciousness. But from this side, it is not at all specific and even simply not typical for a myth that it is a fiction. It is not an invention, but contains the strictest and most definite structure and is logically, i.e., first of all, a dialectically necessary category of consciousness and being in general.

Losev, like Casirrer, develops the semantic idea of ​​culture. The life of primitive man is connected with nature - the world of living beings. Man tried to explain the world, to embody the unity of his connection with nature. J. Vico proposed a philosophy of myth. Myths are the fantasies of ancient people, they intuitively felt the presence of higher powers and came up with poetic images.

Taylor suggested looking for the roots of myth in animism - endowing inanimate objects with a soul.

Jung. The root of the myth is in particular the worldview of primitive people (from feelings, experiences).

In the 20th century - new approaches: 1) Malinovsky - an expression of faith (myth). 2) Levi Strass - there is mythological thinking - the collective unconscious.

inside a symbol. in the village

Myth is an expanded realized symbol, communication of a person and God (openness of the personality of God in energy or the realization of a symbol). Orthodoxy is closest to absolute myth (or communication of a person and God), but this communication is distorted, since name worship has not yet been developed. The distortion can be removed in the real speech of a real subject by structuring pure experience using the dialectical-phenomenological method. Phenomenology here is a simple description (by no means in the sense of Husserl's philosophy), and dialectics is the magic of communication with God, communication, but not only a logical construction.

General field Problems

Losev begins his work on the comprehension of the myth at the turn of the transition of Russian-speaking philosophy under the rule of ideology - and accordingly resolves the emerging issues. It is not easy to understand his system (which is not simple in itself), because it is covered by a hidden philosophy, and the surface of the text sometimes bears an accidental character introduced by ideological correction. But be that as it may, its problems do not go beyond the problems that were obvious at that time: the philosophy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was faced with a serious task. Denaturalization of the subject area due to the introduction of several critical factors - criticism of syllogistic logic and the construction of new, predictive logics (pure logic), as well as criticism psychological theories, which replaced the theory of consciousness at that time, - led to the loss of the subject of philosophical research and exacerbated the problem of the "basic question of philosophy", hiding at its core the uncertainty of consciousness as a phenomenon. The solution to this problem consisted in redefining the concept of "phenomenon" and resolving on the basis of the newly given definition of the problems of "conscious", "pre-conscious" and "out-of-consciousness".

For many philosophers of the beginning of the century, this trend determined their desire to understand the problem of myth. For Russian-speaking philosophers, this problem became the problem of mystical revelations. For Losev, this problem of myth became the problem of his entire philosophical concept, in which interest in myth as a form of consciousness and in mythology as a form of communication with God merged. How does he determine the method of working in such a complex problem field? "The myth should be taken as a myth, without reducing it to what it is not itself. Only having such a pure definition and description of the myth, one can begin to explain it from one or another heterogeneous point of view." What is a myth?

Before we try to define a myth, we must have some intuition about the myth, for the existence of a myth precedes logical operations with it. Therefore, Losev first of all gives a phenomenological description of the myth through an indication of what the myth is not, and this is the delimitation of other forms of consciousness and creativity in the process of communicating with the myth. Like no one else, the ancient philologist Losev had access to visions of the myth from within the myth itself, moreover, prepared by a long and complex work with the myths themselves (mythological texts from antiquity to the theory of socialism). And one can even say that the dialectic of myth is not so much a description of the interpretation of any personal God, but rather a description of Losev's interpretation of the myth-God and the realization of myth in the personality of Losev the philosopher.

Analyzing some provisions of science and philosophy, in which the myth was fixed as "other to itself", Losev comes to the conclusion that there are six theses, which in turn phenomenologically detail the concept of myth:

"... 1. Myth is not fiction or fiction, not fantastic fiction, but - logically, that is, primarily dialectically, a necessary category of consciousness and being in general.

2. Myth is not an ideal being, but a vitally perceived and created material reality.

3. Myth is not a scientific, and in particular, a primitive scientific construction, but a living subject-object interaction that contains its own, extra-scientific, purely mythical truth, reliability, fundamental regularity and structure.

4. A myth is not a metaphysical construction, but a real, material and sensually created reality, which at the same time is detached from the usual course of phenomena, and, therefore, contains a different degree of hierarchy, a different degree of detachment.

5. Myth is neither a scheme nor an allegory, but a symbol; and, already being a symbol, it can contain schematic, allegorical and life-symbolic layers.

6. Myth is not a poetic work, but its detachment is the erection of isolated and abstract things into an intuitive-instinctive and primitive-biologically mutually related sphere with the human subject, where they are combined into one inseparable, organically fused unity.

The destruction by the dialectical method of metaphysical-naturalistic dualism, still expressed in simple negative phenomenological descriptions of myth, leads Losev to a clearer and more precise definition of myth. "... Myth is such a dialectically necessary category of consciousness and being (1), which is given as a material-life reality (2) of a subject-object, structurally executed (in a certain image) mutual communication (3), where it is estranged from isolated-abstract thingness life (4) is symbolically (5) translated into a pre-reflective-instinctive, intuitively understood smart-energetic face (6). Even shorter: a myth is an intelligently given symbol of life, the need for which is dialectically obvious. Even more clearly: myth is the symbolically given intelligentsia of life. And the symbolically realized intelligentsia for Losev is a person, and, consequently, a myth is a person, a personal being or an image of a personal being, the face of a person.

But in what sense is personality? How is personality determined? Not as a substantial, but only as "energetic self-affirmation of the personality", "... affirmation in its revealing and expressive functions", "... an image, a picture, a semantic phenomenon of a personality." Myth as a personality, or, more correctly, personality as a myth is, in customary terms, only personal being, born and becoming, that is, given historically. And this historically means - in time. In what time is the mythological becoming? The answer is obvious - in the mythological. And Losev pays attention to the dialectics of mythological time, which was elaborated in detail in "Ancient Cosmos", Special attention. Time, according to Losev, is something not temporary, that is, eternal: the paradox of time is that it has no end, that is, it is infinite, therefore, it is eternal. However, eternity itself is given immediately, while time is fluid. In this sense "time is the illogical becoming of eternity", "where boundless becoming and eternal self-presence are one and the same" Time in this sense is not uniform. Different time spaces can have different speeds of time. And the myth has, thus, a different speed of formation in different personal implementations. And this also leads to the emergence and formation of various mythological systems. “One and the same thing, one and the same person can, therefore, be represented and depicted in infinitely different forms, depending on the plane of spatio-temporal being we think of it.” 2 Myth is in such a system a personal being given historically, but is not a historical event as such. History has three obvious layers of comprehension (and understood precisely from the point of view of personal being) - natural-material, which is a collection of facts; a layer of understood facts, that is, facts of consciousness that provide factual material for the formation of consciousness, and a layer of historical self-consciousness. History is for itself both an object and a subject, the object of its own consciousness. "History is self-consciousness, becoming, i.e. emerging, maturing and dying self-consciousness." History is the creation of consciously expressive facts, "but what is creatively given and actively expressed self-consciousness? This is a word." So, a myth is always a word, "A myth is in words a given personal story." In such a concept of myth (hence, the world), at first glance, opposite, contradictory and irreducible teachings were mixed and synthesized in a unique way, the comprehension of which leads researchers to various derivations of the “main Losev formula”. However, Losev's teaching is not the sum of phenomenology and dialectics, which gives symbolism; and not the addition of imyaslaviya, sophiology and symbolism, which gives hesychasm, but hesychasm, realized by the method of phenomenological dialectics. This unusual confusion leads Losev to synthesize in one category the concepts of personality, history, words, ... and this category is "miracle". The dialectic of myth as a miracle is a pure description of the phenomenon of myth in itself, considered from the point of view of myth itself, where a miracle is the coincidence of a randomly flowing empirical history of a person with its ideal task. "A myth is a miracle" - this is the formula that covers all the antinomies and antitheses considered. What ideal task are we talking about? What is this expediency? Losev distinguishes four types of expediency: 1) logical, as a result of which an organism is obtained; 2) practical or volitional, which results in technical perfection (for example, morality); 3) aesthetic, which results in a work of art; 4) and mythical or personal, which results in a miracle. Mythical expediency is the conceivability of a thing in relation to its ideal-personal being, and such conceivability is decisively applicable to any thing. “The whole world and all its constituent moments, and everything living and inanimate, are equally a myth and equally a miracle.” The final dialectical formula of a myth is this: mythe". On the logical conclusion of the "Dialectics of Myth"

Despite the fact that Losev, by his own admission, exhausts all aspects of the question of mythical consciousness, the dialectic of myth does not end there. The category of myth obtained as a result of the work as a synthesis of four concepts (personality, history, miracle and word) is not clear enough for the ordinary understanding of myth (and after all, Losev’s task was precisely to reveal the myth from within the myth itself, that is, to bring the concept of myth to meaningfulness in the ordinary framework). Taking the first and last categories denoting the myth, namely, the word and the personality, Losev points out that the myth is nothing but the word about the personality, the word of the personality and the word that expresses and manifests the personality. And what is a word that is original, unique and not related to any other thing, if not a name? The name is what is expressed in the person, reveals the person and what the person is to another. Thus, myth is a name. By adding the two remaining categories, we achieve an indication of history and miracle. What is a name if not a miracle, since it is unique? And we'll call it a magical name, a wonderful name. And history is an indication of the sequence of development, the unfolding of a name. The definition of myth thus takes on its final form: myth is an expanded magical name. "This is the final and last core of the myth, and then all other transformations and simplifications must fall silent." So, the myth, understood from within the myth, is the final and indivisible semantic point of the myth itself. Myth is nothing but myth itself, revealed in itself. What has been learned as a result of long work is the concept of myth. And all subsequent research cannot lie on the plane of the study of myth in and for itself. All subsequent studies are studies of myth for something else. And here Losev turns to the problem of studying myth as some absolute reality, which, when applied to something else, gives a real myth, with its strict classification, which first includes the main types of myths, and then specific, individual myths. Mythology, which exists as the only possible picture of the world, Losev calls absolute mythology. Mythology, which does not understand itself (that is, which has not completed the procedure that Losev creates in his work, calling it the propaedeutics of myth) is relative mythology.

Losev's positions:

1) considers myth as one of the elements of culture

2) the myth is not a subject - but being itself, i.e. myth is an objective nature.

3) there are 2 types of mythology (absolute, relative)

DIALECTICS OF MYTH
FOREWORD
This little study has as its subject one of the most
dark areas of human consciousness, which was previously dealt with mainly
way theologians or ethnographers. Both have been disgraced enough to
now we could talk about revealing the essence of the myth by theological or
ethnographic methods. And the trouble is not that mystical theologians and
empiricist ethnographers (for the most part, theologians are very bad mystics, trying to
flirting with science and dreaming of becoming complete positivists, and ethnographers - alas!
- often very bad empiricists, being in the chains of one or another arbitrary
and unconscious metaphysical theory). The trouble is that the mythological
science has not yet become not only dialectical, but even simply
descriptive-phenomenological. Still, you can’t get rid of mysticism, since a myth
pretends to talk about mystical reality, and, on the other hand, without
facts, no dialectic is possible. But if they consider that the facts
mystical and mythical consciousness, which I cite as an example, are
the facts I myself profess, or that the doctrine of myth consists only of
observation of some facts, it is better for them not to delve into my analysis of the myth. Necessary
wrest the doctrine of myth both from the domain of theologians and from the domain of
ethnographers; and must first be forced to take the point of view of dialectics and
phenomenological-dialectical cleaning of concepts, and then leave to do
anything with a myth. Positively analyzing the myth, I did not follow many,
who now see the positivism of the study of religion and myth in a violent
the expulsion from both of them of everything mysterious and wonderful. They want to open
the essence of the myth, but for this, they first dissect it so that it already contains
nothing is contained either fabulous or generally miraculous. It's either dishonest
or stupid. As for me, I do not at all think that my research
it would be better if I say that a myth is not a myth and religion is not a religion. I
I take the myth as it is, i.e. I want to open and positively record that
such a myth in itself and how it thinks itself of its wonderful and fabulous
nature. But I ask you not to impose on me points of view unusual for me and
I ask you to take from me only what I give, i.e. only one dialectic
myth.
The dialectic of myth is impossible without the sociology of myth. Although this essay is not
gives specifically to the sociology of myth, but this is an introduction to sociology,
which I have always thought philosophically-historically and dialectically. Dismantled
logical and phenomenological structure of myth, I turn at the end of the book to
installation of the main social types of mythology. By this sociology of myth I
I am specially engaged in another work, but even here the comprehensive role of
mythical consciousness in different layers of the cultural process. myth theory,
which does not capture culture down to its social roots, there is a very
bad theory of myth. You have to be a very bad idealist to tear off a myth
from the very thick of the historical process and preach liberal dualism:
real life - in itself, and the myth - in itself. I have never been
liberal or dualist, and no one can reproach me for these heresies.
A.Losev
Moscow. January 28, 1930

INTRODUCTION
The task of the proposed essay is a significant opening of the concept of myth,
based only on the material provided by mythical consciousness itself.
Any explanatory, for example, metaphysical,
psychological and other points of view. The myth must be taken as a myth, without
his information to what he himself is not. Only with such a pure definition
and description of the myth, you can begin to explain it with one or another
heterogeneous point of view. Without knowing what a myth is in itself, we cannot
talk about his life in one or another alien environment. We must first
take the point of view of mythology itself, become the mythical subject itself.
We must imagine that the world in which we live and all things exist is a world
mythical, that in general only myths exist in the world. Such a position
reveals the essence of myth as myth. And then only you can do
heterogeneous tasks, such as "refuting" a myth, hating or loving
it, fight it or plant it. Without knowing what a myth is, how can one
fight it or refute it, how can you love it or hate it?
You can, of course, not reveal the very concept of myth and still love it.
or hate. However, all the same, some intuition of the myth must be
who puts himself in this or that external conscious relation to the myth, so that
logically, the presence of the myth itself in the mind of the one operating with it
(operating scientifically, religiously, artistically, socially, etc.)
still precedes the actual operations with mythology. Therefore, it is necessary to give
essential-semantic, i.e. first of all phenomenological, the opening of the myth,
taken as such, taken by itself.

dialectic of myth

Thank you for downloading the book from the free e-library http://filosoff.org/ Happy reading! Alexey Fedorovich Losev. The Dialectic of Myth Preface The subject of this little study is one of the darkest areas of human consciousness, which was formerly occupied mainly by theologians or ethnographers. Both of them have become disgraced enough that now we can talk about revealing the essence of the myth by theological or ethnographic methods. And the trouble is not that mystical theologians and empiricist ethnographers (mostly theologians are very bad mystics, trying to flirt with science and dreaming of becoming complete positivists, and ethnographers - alas! - often very bad empiricists, being in the chains of one or another arbitrary and unconscious metaphysical theory). The trouble is that mythological science has not yet become not only dialectical, but even simply descriptive-phenomenological. All the same, one cannot get rid of mysticism, since myth claims to speak of mystical reality, and, on the other hand, no dialectic is possible without facts. But if they think that the facts of mystical and mythical consciousness, which I cite as an example, are the facts I myself profess, or that the doctrine of myth consists only of the observation of facts alone, then it is better for them not to delve into my analysis of myth. It is necessary to wrest the doctrine of myth both from the domain of theologians and from the domain of ethnographers; and one must first force one to take the point of view of dialectics and the phenomenological-dialectical purification of concepts, and then let them do whatever they want with the myth. In my positive analysis of myth, I did not follow many who now see the positivism of the study of religion and myth in the forcible expulsion of everything mysterious and miraculous from both. They want to reveal the essence of the myth, but to do this, they first dissect it so that it contains nothing either fabulous or even miraculous. This is either dishonest or stupid. As for me, I do not at all think that my research will be better if I say that a myth is not a myth and religion is not a religion. I take the myth as it is, that is, I want to reveal and positively fix what myth is in itself and how it thinks of its own wonderful and fabulous nature. But I ask you not to impose on me points of view that are unusual for me, and I ask you to take from me only what I give, that is, only one dialectic of myth. The dialectic of myth is impossible without the sociology of myth. Although this work does not specifically give a sociology of myth, it is an introduction to sociology, which I have always thought philosophically-historically and dialectically. Having analyzed the logical and phenomenological structure of myth, I turn at the end of the book to the establishment of the main social types of mythology. I deal specifically with this sociology of myth in another work, but even here the all-encompassing role of mythical consciousness in different layers of the cultural process is clear. A theory of myth that does not take culture down to its social roots is a very bad theory of myth. You have to be a very bad idealist to tear the myth away from the very thick of the historical process and preach liberal dualism: real life is in itself, and myth is in itself. I have never been a liberal or a dualist, and no one can reproach me for these heresies. A.Losev Moscow. January 28, 1930 INTRODUCTION The task of the proposed essay is a significant disclosure of the concept of myth, based only on the material provided by mythical consciousness itself. Any explanatory, for example, metaphysical, psychological and other points of view should be discarded. The myth must be taken as a myth, without reducing it to what it is not itself. Only with such a pure definition and description of myth can one begin to explain it from one or another heterogeneous point of view. Without knowing what a myth is in itself, we cannot speak about its life in this or that other environment. We must first take the point of view of mythology itself, become the mythical subject itself. We must imagine that the world in which we live and all things exist is a mythical world, that in general only myths exist in the world. Such a position will reveal the essence of myth as myth. And only then can one engage in heterogeneous tasks, for example, "refute" a myth, hate or love it, fight it or plant it. Without knowing what a myth is, how can one fight or refute it, how can one love it or hate it? One can, of course, not reveal the very concept of myth and still love or hate it. However, all the same, someone who puts himself in one or another external conscious relation to the myth must have some kind of intuition of myth, so that logically, the presence of the myth itself in the mind of the one operating with it (operating scientifically, religiously, artistically, socially and etc.) nevertheless precedes the actual operations with mythology. Therefore, it is necessary to give an essentially semantic, i.e., first of all, phenomenological, dissection of the myth, taken as such, independently taken in itself. I. MYTH IS NOT MYTH OR FICTION, IT IS NOT FANTASTIC FICTION This fallacy of almost all "scientific" methods of studying mythology must be discarded in the first place. Of course, mythology is an invention, if we apply to it the point of view of science, and even then not any, but only that which is characteristic of a narrow circle of scientists of modern European history of the last two or three centuries. From some arbitrarily taken, completely conditional point of view, a myth is indeed fiction. However, we agreed to consider the myth not from the point of view of some scientific, religious, artistic, social, etc. worldview, but exclusively from the point of view of the myth itself, through the eyes of the myth itself, mythical eyes. It is this mythical view of myth that interests us here. And from the point of view of the mythical consciousness itself, it can by no means be said that myth is a fiction and a play of fantasy. When the Greek, not in the era of skepticism and the decline of religion, but in the era of the heyday of religion and myth, spoke of his numerous Zeus or Apollo; when some tribes have a custom to put on a necklace of crocodile teeth to avoid the danger of drowning when crossing large rivers; when religious fanaticism reaches the point of self-torture and even self-immolation; – then it would be quite ignorant to assert that the mythical stimuli operating here are nothing more than an invention, pure fiction for these mythical subjects. One has to be short-sighted to the last degree in science, even simply blind, in order not to notice that myth is (for the mythical consciousness, of course) the highest in its concreteness, the most intense and most intense reality. This is not fiction, but the most vivid and most genuine reality. This is an absolutely necessary category of thought and life, far from any chance and arbitrariness. Let us note that for the science of the 17th-19th centuries its own categories are by no means as real as its own categories are real for the mythical consciousness. For example, Kant connected the objectivity of science with the subjectivity of space, time and all categories. And even more than that. It is precisely on this subjectivism that he tries to substantiate the "realism" of science. Of course, this attempt is absurd. But the example of Kant perfectly shows how little European science valued the reality and objectivity of its categories. Some representatives of science even loved and love to flaunt such reasoning: I give you the doctrine of liquids, but whether these latter exist or not is none of my business; or: I proved this theorem, but whether something real corresponds to it, or whether it is a product of my subject or brain - this does not concern me. The point of view of the mythical consciousness is completely opposite to this. Myth - the most necessary - it must be said directly, transcendentally necessary - a category of thought and life; and there is absolutely nothing accidental, unnecessary, arbitrary, invented or fantastic in it. This is the true and most concrete reality. Mythological scholars are almost always in the grip of this general prejudice; and if they do not speak directly about the subjectivism of mythology, then they give certain more subtle constructions that reduce mythology to the same subjectivism. Thus, the doctrine of illusory apperception in the spirit of Herbart's psychology by Lazarus and Steinthal is also a complete distortion of mythical consciousness and in no way can be connected with the essence of mythical constructions. At this point, we must pose a dilemma. Or we are not talking about the mythical consciousness itself, but about this or that attitude towards it, our own or someone else’s, and then we can say that the myth is an idle fiction, that the myth is a childish fantasy, that it is not real, but subjective, philosophically helpless, or, on the contrary, that it is an object of worship, that it is beautiful, divine, holy, etc. Or, secondly, we want to reveal nothing else but the myth itself, the very essence of the mythical consciousness, and - then the myth is always and necessarily a reality, concreteness, vitality and for thought - a complete and absolute necessity, non-fantastic, non-fictitious. Too often, mythologists have liked to talk about themselves, that is, about their own worldview, so that we also go the same way. We are interested in the myth, and not this or that era in the development of scientific consciousness. But from this side, it is not at all specific and even simply not typical for a myth that it is a fiction. It is not an invention, but contains the strictest and most definite structure and is logically, that is, first of all, a dialectically necessary category of consciousness and being in general. II. MYTH IS NOT AN IDEAL BEING Under ideal being, let us now agree to understand not being better, more perfect and sublime than ordinary being, but simply semantic being. Every thing has its meaning, not from the point of view of purpose, but from the point of view of essential significance. Thus, a house is a structure designed to protect a person from atmospheric phenomena; a lamp is a device that serves to illuminate, etc. It is clear that the meaning of a thing is not the thing itself; he is the abstract concept of a thing, the abstract idea of ​​a thing, the mental significance of a thing. Is there a myth such an abstract-ideal being? Certainly not in any sense. Myth is not a product or object of pure thought. Pure, abstract thought is the least involved in the creation of a myth. Wundt has already shown well that myth is based on an affective root, since it is always the expression of certain vital and vital needs and aspirations. The least intellectual effort is needed to create a myth. And again, we are not talking about the theory of myth, but about the myth itself as such. From the point of view of one theory or another, one can speak about the mental work of the subject creating a myth, about its relation to other mental factors of myth formation, even about its prevalence over other factors, etc. But, arguing immanently, mythical consciousness is least of all intellectual and thought-ideal consciousness. At