Roman Fyodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg. Literary and historical notes of a young technician The Red Army defeated the troops of Baron Ungern

On December 29 (17th century), 1885, Roman Fedorovich Ungern von Sternberg was born - one of the most odious leaders of the White movement, a participant in the Civil War in the Far East, who gained fame as a ruthless fighter against Bolshevism, liberator of Mongolia from the Chinese invaders, "a bloody ruler Urgi ". Both reds and whites hated and feared him. Some considered him a holy righteous man, others - a crazy sadist. Many were ready to follow him to death, but even more people wished for his speedy death. Even during the lifetime of Baron Ungern-Sternberg, his name was overgrown with so many myths and legends that historians cannot figure out where the truth is, and where is outright fiction to this day.

early years

The initial period of the life of Roman Fedorovich Ungern-Sternberg and his pedigree are well known to biographers.

R.F. Ungern-Sternberg came from an old German-Baltic (Ostsee) count-baronial family. The oldest branch of the Ungerns had an admixture of Hungarian blood. In Sweden and Prussia, representatives of the clan belonged to the strata of high society, for many centuries they held high positions in these countries.

The dignity of the baron was granted to the Ungern-Sternberg by the Swedish Queen Christina in 1653. Baron Reno Ungern was the first leader of the nobility of the Baltic region after its annexation to Russia, helped Peter I in the development of the Baltic. Reno Ungern demanded many privileges from the tsar for the Baltic nobility. The Ungernov family was included in the noble matrices of all three Baltic provinces of Russia. In 1865, the opinion of the State Council for the noble family of von Ungern-Sternberg was recognized as a baronial title.

In the literature, there are different spellings of the full title name of the Ungerns: Ungern von Sternberg, von Ungern-Sternberg, and simply Ungern-Sternberg. It was in this version that the surname of our hero was used in official track records.

Almost all the ancestors and relatives of R.F. Ungern-Sternberg were in the military, served either in the guards cavalry or in the navy. Many of them took part in the events of the First World War and the Civil War in Russia.

However, the father of R.F. Ungern-Sternberg - Theodor-Leonhard-Rudolf Ungern-Sternberg had a very peaceful profession. After graduating from the course of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, he served in the Department of Agriculture of the Ministry of State Property, studied the issues of winemaking in the Crimea, traveled a lot in Europe.

Mother - Sophia-Charlotte von Wimpfen, German from Stuttgart.

Roman Fedorovich Ungern was born in Hertz (Austria-Hungary) during one of his parents' trips abroad. In 1891 they divorced, the father soon fell ill with mental illness and did not take part in the fate of his son in any way. He died in 1918 in Petrograd, in a hospital for the insane.

Mother remarried a naval officer - Baron Oskar Fedorovich von Goinigen-Hüne. In a new marriage, she had other children (Roman's half-brother and sister). No one was involved in raising the first-born. The family lived in Revel, where Roman Fedorovich attended the Nikolaev gymnasium, but did not finish the course, he was expelled for bad behavior.

In 1902 (at the age of 16), at the insistence of his mother, he was given by his stepfather to the Naval Cadet Corps in St. Petersburg. He studied poorly, because he did not receive the proper education and did not have the slightest desire to become a naval officer. The young man made the impression of a savage on the teachers: he did not know how to behave in society, was intellectually completely undeveloped, constantly violated discipline, and the exact sciences (geometry, astronomy) were not given to the cadet Ungern at all. In 1904, after spending two years in the elementary class, R.F. was expelled from the Marine Corps, again for "bad behavior" and poor academic performance.

Soviet historians, who studied the characteristics of the cadet Ungern in the archives of the Naval Corps, made very hasty conclusions about the mental retardation and closeness of the future white commander.

Meanwhile, people who really knew the baron (P.N. Wrangel, Renault and Arvid Ungern-Sternberg, ataman G.M. Semyonov, Lieutenant General V.A. on the contrary, he was a very gifted man. He possessed a sharp mind, an excellent memory, perfectly knew German, French and a little - English, understood the philosophy and history of religions. Ungern's desire to make a bad impression on others was only a pose. In his youth - the pose of an unloved child, deprived of attention, in adulthood - the pose of an oppositionist who is not satisfied with the modern social order and the way of life imposed on him.

With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, R.F. Ungern was enlisted as a volunteer in the 91st Dvin Infantry Regiment, but by the time the regiment arrived in Manchuria, hostilities had already ended.

Without a doubt, at this stage, his grandmother's cousin, General P.K. Rennenkampf. With his assistance, the young baron received an excellent service description and a light bronze medal, was promoted to corporal, and in 1906 he entered the Pavlovsk Infantry School in St. Petersburg.

Baron Ungern graduated from the school (with great difficulty) with the 2nd grade, but did not want to serve in the infantry. He submitted a petition to be sent to the Far East and to enroll himself in the Cossack Transbaikal army. The Far Eastern nature made an indelible impression on young Ungern. From June 1908 to February 1911, Roman Fedorovich served in the 1st Argun Regiment of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army with the rank of cornet.

Here an unpleasant incident happened to him: in a drunken state, the baron insulted one of the young officers of the regiment. He did not challenge him to a duel, but simply hit him in the head with a saber. Ungern had a scar for life. A court of honor took place, the offended officer resigned, and Ungern-Sternberg was transferred to the Amur Cossack Count Muravyov-Amur regiment. This regiment was stationed 1200 km from the baron's former place of service. He rode out there alone, without any supplies, accompanied only by his hunting dog and a falcon. Having passed the survival test arranged for himself, Ungern safely reached the location of the military unit in the wildest places, taiga and off-road.

In July 1913, Roman Fedorovich leaves the Amur regiment and goes to Kobdo (Mongolia) to take part in the Mongol-Chinese war as a volunteer. However, the Russian consul did not understand such a strange desire of the officer and did not let him go to war. Ungern remained to serve as a supernumerary officer in the escort unit of Esaul Komarovsky.

World War I

With the outbreak of the First World War, Ungern-Sternberg immediately joined the 34th Don Cossack Regiment, fought bravely in intelligence, one of the first to receive the Order of St. George of the 4th degree. At the end of 1914, the baron was transferred to the 1st Nerchinsk regiment - under the command of P.N. Wrangel.

In his "Notes" Wrangel gave extremely contradictory characteristics of his subordinate. On the one hand, an excellent brave officer, with knightly notions of honor, which he constantly tried to implement, on the other, he is a person of a very sharp mind, but does not have an elementary outlook, ill-mannered, not abstaining from drinking alcohol, extremely slovenly, has all kinds of contempt for everyday comfort and flaunts it:

“Ragged and dirty, he always sleeps on the floor among the Cossacks of his hundred, eats from a common cauldron and, being brought up in conditions of cultural wealth, gives the impression of a man who has completely detached himself from them. An original, sharp mind, and next to it a striking lack of culture and an extremely narrow outlook. Amazing shyness, knowing no limits extravagance ... "

Ungern, indeed, did not know how to behave in an officer's society, and indeed among people who, it seems to them, know how to live. With the soldiers and lower ranks, he felt much freer, treated them well. The baron received quite large sums of money from his mother, and spent almost everything on buying food for his subordinates. The soldiers in his company were always well-fed, dressed better, had tobacco and warm clothes.

In 1916, Ungern was removed from the Nerchinsk regiment due to a disciplinary offense (he beat the adjutant of the military commandant of Chernivtsi while drunk). The regiment had just received a new chief - the heir to the crown prince. Wrangel, as an aide-de-camp of the emperor with the knights of St. George, went to Petersburg to introduce himself to the heir. Ungern, as a cavalier of St. George, also had to go, but remained in the regiment under arrest. Wrangel suggested that the baron deliberately staged this fight in order to avoid being received by the emperor (it was quite in his nature).

In 1917, Ungern was sent to the Caucasian front in the 3rd Verkhneudinsky regiment, where he met his friend and colleague, G.M. Semyonov, who was also removed by Wrangel for embezzlement from the 1st Nerchinsky regiment.

In the fight against the Bolsheviks

Summer 1917 R.F. Ungern-Sternberg spent in Revel with his parents, and in August, together with his half-brother Maximilian, he makes an attempt to take part in the events of the Kornilov speech - he goes to Petrograd with the corps of General Krymov. The failure of the uprising forces Ungern to accept the proposal of G.M. Semyonov and go to the Far East.

Former colleague of Baron Ungern, esaul G.M. Semyonov, immediately after the July events in Petrograd, submitted to Kerensky a project for the formation in Transbaikalia of shock cavalry units from the nomads of Eastern Siberia - Buryats, Mongols, Koreans and other nationalities. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief A.A. Brusilova Semyonov was appointed High Commissioner of the Far East and the commander of the still non-existent Mongol-Buryat cavalry regiment. This regiment was parked at the Berezovka station of the Trans-Baikal railway (not far from the city of Verkhneudinsk). In September 1917, Ungern went across the country to the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway, where Semyonov launched his activities.

After the Bolshevik coup, all the powers of Semyonov, given to him by the Provisional Government, turned into nothing. The regiment was not formed, in Irkutsk, Chita and other large cities, local Bolshevik councils took power.

At Dauria station - the last border station of the CER - a detachment of 10 people gathered, who rebelled against the power of the Bolsheviks. In his memoirs, ataman G.M. Semyonov lists them all by name. Among them was Baron Ungern-Sternberg.

The Bolsheviks in Verkhneudinsk soon realized that Semyonov was forming anti-Bolshevik detachments and on December 1, 1917, they tried to arrest him and disband the detachment. However, Semyonov put up armed resistance. The Reds declared these events "an unsuccessful attempt to seize power in Verkhneudinsk." Then Semyonov went to Chita, forcibly took from the Chita Council of Deputies the money allocated for his detachment by the Provisional Government, after which he left for Manchuria.

In Harbin, with the help of their small detachment and personal courage (rather, arrogance), Semenov and Ungern managed to disarm numerous detachments of the military guard of the CER, which fell under the influence of Bolshevik agitators. Some detachments went over to the side of Semyonov. Having replenished and well armed their detachment of 559 people, on January 29, 1918, the Semyonovites invaded Transbaikalia, occupying its eastern part, Dauria. Soon the Trans-Baikal Cossacks, who had rebelled against the Bolsheviks, joined Semyonov. In August 1918, the Semyonovites took Chita, where in 1920, after the death of Kolchak, Semyonov formed the PRVO (Government of the Russian Eastern Outskirts) Semyonov, as a local native, had considerable authority among the Cossacks. The Cossacks did not know Ungern, so Semenov instructed the Baron to form foreign battalions.

In the summer of 1918, Ungern began to create his famous Foreign (Asian) cavalry division in Dauria. It was based on Buryat and Mongolian horsemen.

Divisional Commander Ungern

By and large, the activities of Semyonov and Ungern in Transbaikalia had no effect on the course of the Civil War. Nevertheless, she very much tempered the appetites of the Chinese, who, with the weakening of Russia's power in the Far East, tried to seize not only the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but also a significant part of Primorye.

Ungern decided that the white formations needed to make friends with the Mongols in order to exploit their long-standing feud with the Chinese and prevent the rapid expansion of the Republic of China into Russian territories. Under the threat of the most severe measures, he forced all the Russian officers of his division to learn the Mongolian language. In native units, either representatives of the local nobility or Russian officers, who enjoyed the greatest respect among the foreigners, were appointed commanders.

In 1918-1920. The main task of the Foreign (Asian) division of Ungern was to guard the railway from the Olovyannaya station to the Manchuria station, as well as to restore order on the Russian territory of the CER. In fact, Ungern took over the functions of the former tsarist administration in the territories entrusted to him: he paid salaries to workers and employees of the CER, benefits to the families of military personnel, etc.

Soviet propaganda lamented for a long time about the cruelty of the regime introduced by Ungern. In the territories controlled by the baron, everyone who was convicted of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks was persecuted, a strict requisition policy was pursued, and punitive measures were taken against deserters and traitors of all stripes. Do not forget that R.F. Ungern was accountable for his actions to G.M. Semyonov, he actually provided his rear, was engaged in the supply of the entire Trans-Baikal army.

At the beginning of the Civil War, very significant sums were in the hands of Semyonov, requisitioned from the Far Eastern branches of large Russian banks. In 1919, Semyonov's Cossacks detained and "requisitioned" one of the five echelons with the gold reserves of the Russian Empire, en route from Omsk to Vladivostok. Part of the gold (different amounts are called in the literature - from 7 to 20 million gold rubles) was given by Semyonov to Baron Ungern. Being himself a completely unselfish and honest person, Ungern treated this money only as a means to achieve a common goal - to save Russia from Bolshevism. He demanded the same not only from his subordinates, but also from all persons, one way or another connected with the issues of supplying the army. Ungern was especially merciless towards thieves, bribe-takers, persons convicted of corruption crimes. He shot and hanged officers who were caught stealing without mercy, regardless of ranks, titles and previous merits.

The discipline in Ungern's division was ironclad. Eyewitnesses recalled that for stealing fodder, Ungern ordered the culprit to be put in a horse-machine; for any minor offense, he could personally beat the officer with a tashur - a stick used by the Mongols to drive horses. During these years, the baron completely abandoned the use of alcohol, severely punished his subordinates for drunkenness, especially during periods of hostilities. I must say that all the baron's eccentric antics during the Daurian period concerned exclusively Russian officers. Ungern behaved very tolerantly with the rank and file, especially the Mongols, Buryats and representatives of other local peoples. There is a known case when the division commander Baron Ungern, trying to accustom his Buryat orderly to cleanliness, washed his clothes in front of his subordinates.

Repeatedly Ungern released the captured Red Army soldiers captured in battle on all four sides, and offered good horsemen to serve in his division. Many accepted this offer and stayed with Baron Ungern until the very end.

In his political views, Ungern was a staunch monarchist. Ataman G.M. Semyonov did not share his monarchist sympathies, leaning rather toward a nationally oriented military dictatorship of the Socialist-Revolutionary type, but no political disagreements arose between the boss and the subordinate. Semyonov condescended to the "eccentricities" of the baron, appreciated his honesty and disinterestedness, gave him almost complete freedom of action. Semyonov had no other person capable of quickly creating combat-ready military formations from wild nomads. After all, Ungern, on the territory entrusted to him, successfully implemented his own, Semyonov project of 1917.

At the end of the Civil War, when the remnants of Kolchak's armies moved to the Far East, ideological differences within the white camp often escalated into armed conflicts and clashes between representatives of various political currents. A sad example of such a confrontation in the Far East was the split of the white forces into Kappelevites and Semyonovites. After the tragic death of V.O. Kappel S.N. Voytsekhovsky, who took over the command, withdrew the remaining forces to the territory under the control of G.M. Semyonov. Formally, he obeyed the ruler of the Trans-Baikal Territory, although the majority of the "Kappelevites" insisted on maintaining their army as a separate combat unit.

The composition of the Kappel troops for the most part was too heterogeneous. Among the Kappelevites there were many liberal intelligentsia, as well as workers who shared socialist views. In the Semyonov army, the liberals were unequivocally considered accomplices of the Bolsheviks, and the officers who served in the Komuch People's Army were treated with great suspicion.

Voitsekhovsky did not immediately develop a relationship with either Semyonov or Ungern. The coordinated actions of the command of the Far Eastern Army did not work out. Among the Kappel officers, the eccentric Ungern was referred to as "the mad baron."

Today it is quite obvious that there is no reason to speak of any special, sophisticated cruelty of Baron Ungern in the Daurian period. Bloody and inevitable reprisals against prisoners became the norm on all fronts of the civil war. Nor did the Reds have to count on mercy, who appeared before the divisional court martial.

The Kappelevites refused to serve with the monarchist Ungern, and Ungern, for his part, also did not feel any respect or trust in the officers who once stood up in the service of the "Samara Constituent Assembly."

In order not to aggravate further contradictions, in May 1920 Voitsekhovsky transferred his post to General Lokhvitsky, who demanded that G.M. Semyonov remove Ungern from the army. In the end, Lokhvitsky himself left, and the white forces in the Far East suffered defeat after defeat.

Ungern's "Panmongolism"

In the summer and autumn of 1920, the white armies, under the onslaught of the red troops, retreated further and further to the east. It was impossible to conduct hostilities without a reliable rear base. Under these conditions, Ungern began to establish contacts with the military and aristocratic elites of Mongolia and China, hoping with their help to obtain a reliable rear base and from there to draw reserves for further struggle.

In the literature dedicated to Baron Ungern, his aspiration to the East is very often associated with certain mystical moods inherent in the Baron, with his passion for Buddhism, in particular Chittamatra, a doctrine that considers objective reality to be only a figment of the subject's imagination. Some biographers of Ungern seriously argue about which of the greats of this world could be his spiritual mentor, speak of Ungern's Pan-Mongol plans as "restoring the empire of Genghis Khan", recalling the conceived Ungern "crusade" of the yellow race against the white mired in debauchery and idleness Europe, etc.

In fact, it was much simpler. Relying on the political elites of Mongolia and China, the convinced monarchist Ungern tried to oppose the communist "red" Europe with the monarchism of the eastern rulers. Only in the idea of ​​a strong monarchical power, he saw the salvation of not only Russia, but the whole world from the rule of the communists. In communism itself, Ungern saw not just a political or economic doctrine. In his understanding, it was a militant religion, a religion of conquerors who will stop at nothing. He strove to oppose the religion of communism with a religion of national identity based on patriotism, faith and authority of the ruling monarch, the viceroy of God on earth. Ungern did not intend to restore the "empire of Genghis Khan" from sea to sea. In reality, he considered it necessary to create just a kind of autonomous "buffer state" - Great Mongolia, which in time could become a base for rallying all anti-Bolshevik forces in the Far East.

In 1919-1920, Ungern sent out several dozen letters to Mongol princes, lamas, and Chinese monarchist generals, setting out his ideas. There were only a few responses. Despite all the efforts of the baron, monarchical unity did not work out.

In the summer of 1919, Ungern-Sternberg traveled to China in order to establish contacts with the monarchist groups existing there. The first result of his trip was a scandal at the old Russian embassy in Beijing, and the second was the marriage of Ungern to the Chinese princess Ji of the Zhangkui clan. The princess had a European education, spoke English well, after baptism into Orthodoxy she received the name Elena Pavlovna.

The modern historian A.S. Kruchinin believes that Ungern's marriage was of a purely formal nature and was subordinated to a single goal - to legalize cash payments to the princess's relatives who held high posts in the Chinese army and made plans for the restoration of the monarchy. Thus, Ungern tried to win supporters in the monarchist party of China, and the princess and her relatives - to improve their shaky financial situation.

As for the scandal at the embassy, ​​most likely it was associated with the position taken by Russian diplomats who were at that time in China. Most of them cared only about their own well-being, but not about the interests of Russia. The Russian government until 1917 was the guarantor of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, which was formed after the collapse of the Qing empire. But on the territory of the universally recognized independent state, already from the summer of 1919, Chinese troops ruled. The Russian envoy to Beijing, Prince N.V. Kudashev, did not even formally protest against the Chinese invasion of Outer Mongolia. The agile Chinese, under the guise of Russian turmoil, simply "squeezed" Mongolia from Russia, dreaming of taking possession of other Russian territories with impunity. Then Ungern decided to fix the situation on his own.

Hike to Urga

In the summer of 1920, the White forces launched their last broad offensive in Transbaikalia. In August, under the pressure of the Red forces, the troops of Ataman Semyonov, abandoned by the Japanese allies, were forced to retreat. In these difficult conditions, on October 1, 1920, Ungern crossed the border with his division and headed straight for the capital of Mongolia - Urge (the Mongols called the city Niisl h? Ree, which translates as "capital (main) monastery").

Urgu was occupied by a well-armed Chinese garrison of more than 7 thousand people. R.F. Ungern, with only 1,500 men of his Asian division behind him, entered into negotiations with the Chinese command, offering to surrender the city voluntarily. Naturally, all his proposals were rejected with a laugh.

On October 26-27 and November 2-4, the Ungernovites unsuccessfully stormed Urga, suffered heavy losses, and retreated to the upper reaches of the Kerulen River.

Wintering conditions in the Mongolian steppe were the most severe. But Ungern's division successfully attacked the Chinese caravans going to Urga. The Baron generously shared his trophies with the Mongol nobility, so his army was replenished not only at the expense of Russian volunteers retreating from Transbaikalia. The Mongol princes also organized mobilization among the local tribes. Ungern was supported by the widest sections of the local population, since they saw in him a liberator from Chinese rule. The theocratic monarch of Mongolia Bogdo-gegen VIII, who was under Chinese arrest at his residence near Urga, secretly sent Ungern a blessing to expel the Chinese from the country.

Buddhist priests bribed by Ungern spread rumors throughout Urga that all Mongols pray and demand punishment of the Chinese for sacrilege, that everyone will die here. On the night of February 1, 1921, the subversive detachment of the Ungernovites freed Bogdo Gegen from arrest, which completely demoralized the Chinese. Simultaneously with this daring action, Ungern's troops approached Urga and surrounded the city from all sides.

There were legends that Ungern, a few days before the decisive assault, himself visited besieged Urga alone. In his usual attire - a crimson Mongolian robe and white hat - he entered the city unarmed, through the main gate. Ungern drove through Urga, examined all the local sights, cursed and beat a Chinese soldier who was sleeping on the post near the prison with a stick, after which he calmly returned to his camp. When the Chinese learned about this, their fighting spirit was finally broken, and they were ready to surrender to Ungern without a fight ...

In fact, it was not without a fight. The battle for Urga lasted from 1 to 5 February 1921. First, the Ungernovites broke through the defensive positions of the Chinese on the outskirts of the city. On February 3, in order to create the appearance of the approach of reinforcements, Ungern ordered numerous bonfires to be lit on the hills around Urga. The reserve detachments were guided by these bonfires in preparation for the decisive assault on February 4.

The Chinese garrison left Urga on 5 February. In March-April, Ungern's troops, destroying all Chinese military bases, finally drove the invaders from the former territory of Outer Mongolia.

On February 22, 1921, a solemn ceremony of the re-erection of Bogdo Gegen VIII to the throne of the Great Khan of Mongolia took place in Urga. For services to Mongolia, Ungern was awarded the title of darkhan-khoshoi-chin-wan in the degree of khan; many of the baron's subordinates received the titles of Mongol princes. Mongol lamas began to call Ungern Mahakala which means "god of war" or "war god". If we translate these honors into the category of Christianity, then we can say that Roman Fedorovich Ungern-Sternberg was canonized during his lifetime.

From his immediate superior - G.M. Semyonov Ungern also received approval and the rank of major general.

However, the brilliant victory in Mongolia did not justify the hopes of the newly-made khan to create a rear base in this country for a new wave of the white movement. Ungern did not receive real power. Mongolia continued to be ruled by the former Mongol nobility. Her gratitude for her liberation from the conquerors could not be too generous in such a poor steppe country. Roman Fedorovich was a brave warrior, a talented commander, perhaps a good teacher and psychologist, but he was not given the exact sciences, and he could not count money. The gold received from Semyonov had long been spent on supplying the troops, bribing Mongolian lamas and Chinese monarchists, and the resources of Mongolia did not allow for the long-term maintenance of the Asian division in Urga. In addition, the Mongols have long been accustomed to treating Russians and Russia as givers rather than takers. For most of the Mongol nobility, there was no difference between "white" and "red" Russians. When the whites ran out of material goods, the Mongols began to take them from the Reds. Even before Ungern took Urga, Bogdo-gegen VIII sent a delegation to Soviet Russia and established contacts with the Reds. Many influential Mongolian lamas did not hesitate to simultaneously take money from Ungern and cooperate with the Bolsheviks. Among the military emigrants and civilian refugees arriving in Mongolia from Transbaikalia, there were many Bolshevik agents, agitators, and other persons directly interested in the disintegration of the Ungernov division. The baron's "counterintelligence", which terrified the former Kappel officers, was powerless to do anything. Further "standing" in Urga threatened the decomposition of the division already in April-May 1921.

Ungern's Northern Expedition

In the spring of 1921, Siberia was covered by a wave of anti-Bolshevik peasant uprisings. The scale of peasant uprisings in Siberia in many respects exceeded the actions of the Tambov peasants ("Antonov movement"). But if the Tambovites had their own undoubted leader and a relatively small territory, then the Siberian uprisings took place extremely scattered throughout the endless expanses of the Trans-Ural part of the country. The performances of the poorly armed and equally poorly organized peasant detachments were quickly suppressed by the regular units of the Red Army and the red partisans that had been pulled into Siberia. Ungern decided that his division had a chance to become the unifying and leading center of peasant uprisings in Eastern Siberia. He was especially inspired by the fact that many local peasant uprisings took place under the slogan of restoring the monarchy.

In May 1921, Ungern undertook a campaign on the territory of Soviet Siberia. The purpose of the campaign, he announced the restoration of the power of the legitimate monarch Mikhail II Romanov, since his death was not yet widely known at that time.

The Asian division was divided into two brigades. The first (under the command of Ungern) advanced on Verkhneudinsk, Troitskosavsk and Selenginsk. The second brigade under the command of Major General Rezukhin was supposed to go to Tataurovo, making a raid along the red rear, blowing up bridges and tunnels. By this time, the Reds had already transferred regular units from European Russia to the border with Mongolia. They were joined by the army of the Far Eastern Republic (Far Eastern Republic). A significant preponderance of forces was on the side of the Reds. The large-scale popular uprising against the Bolsheviks, which Ungern had hoped for, did not take place. There was practically no communication between the two brigades of the division. Rezukhin, having suffered a series of defeats, was forced to retreat to Mongolia under the threat of encirclement. Ungern's brigade was also unable to take Troitskosavsk, turned back to join Rezukhin. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks undertook a campaign on the territory of Outer Mongolia, the combined forces of the Bolsheviks and the Red Mongols occupied Urga.

On August 1, 1921, the Ungernovites won a victory at the Gusinoozyorsky Datsan, but there was no question of further advancement deep into Soviet territory. The Asian division was opposed by battle-hardened numerous units of the regular red army. They were armed with armored cars, heavy artillery, airplanes. Ungern could only oppose their arsenal with Mongolian cavalry and a dozen machine guns. A threat of encirclement arose, and Ungern again left for Mongolia.

Conspiracy and capture

A series of defeats, the loss of Urga, the prospect of wintering in the Mongol steppes, as well as Ungern-Sternberg's insane plans to transfer his troops to Tibet quickly did their job. In both brigades there was a conspiracy against the baron.

On the night of 17-18 August 1921, Major General Rezukhin was killed by his subordinates. In Ungern's brigade, all the officers loyal to the baron were killed, even his Buryat orderly; Cossacks fired at Ungern's tent. According to eyewitnesses, in addition to rifle shots, two grenades were thrown at her, but Ungern, as if by magic, remained unharmed. He did not immediately understand that absolutely everyone had betrayed him, for some time he rushed around the camp, tried to restore order, but after repeated shots in his direction, he preferred to hide in the steppe.

On August 19, both mutinous brigades headed east in order to get through Mongolia to Manchuria, where their families remained.

There are several versions of the capture of Baron Ungern. According to one of them, the most common, on the morning of August 19, Roman Fedorovich left for the location of the Mongol battalion, which left the camp during the nighttime confusion. He continued to believe in the selfless devotion of the Mongol horsemen to him, so he did not expect betrayal on their part. Ungern himself offered the Russian instructor officers a choice: to stay with him or follow the brigade to Manchuria. Almost all of the officers decided to leave. As soon as they left their commander, the Mongols tied Ungern up and killed all the Russian instructors (including those of lower ranks) who remained in the detachment. The next day, the Mongol detachment was attacked by a small red partisan unit under the command of the military commissar Shchetinkin. The Mongol detachment significantly outnumbered the partisans and could have offered decent resistance, but, despite Ungern's commands and shouts, the Mongols fled, leaving their tied commander at the mercy of the victors.

The death sentence of R.F. Ungernu was actually carried out in Moscow, personally by Lenin. In a telephone conversation on August 26, 1921, Lenin conveyed his opinion on the Baron's case:

"I advise you to pay more attention to this case, to obtain a verification of the solidity of the accusation, and if the evidence is complete, which, apparently, cannot be doubted, then arrange a public trial, hold it as quickly as possible and shoot it."

The next day, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a decision on Baron Ungern in a wording that fully coincides with this directive of Lenin.

Judging by the surviving interrogation protocols of Ungern, during the investigation the baron did not betray anyone, did not slander anyone, did not answer any of the specific questions about the whereabouts of his former comrades-in-arms. He fully agreed with almost all the charges against him. The captive Ungern did not hide his monarchical views, he took full responsibility for the punitive policy in the territories under his control, not attributing anything to his subordinates.

Modern historians consider half of the charges against Ungern of extrajudicial executions, unimaginable atrocities, Jewish pogroms and mass executions to be fiction. Nevertheless, during the trial, Ungern behaved very dignified, did not deny anything against him and did not justify himself.

The comedy of the public trial took place on September 15, 1921 in Novonikolaevsk (Novosibirsk) in the Sosnovka summer park. The hearing of the case of Baron Roman Fedorovich Ungern von Sternberg took 5 hours and 20 minutes. The accused was found guilty on all counts and shot on the same day in the evening in the building of the Novonikolaevsky GPU.

After the news of the execution of the baron, the ruler of Mongolia Bogdo-gegen gave the order to hold services on Ungern in all Mongolian temples. True, not everyone believed that the baron was dead. Local Buddhist lamas made fun of the news of the shooting: is it possible to kill Mahakala (the god of war) with an ordinary bullet? So, there were rumors that the Reds caught a completely different person, similar to Ungern-Sternberg, and the liberator of Mongolia himself went to one of the Tibetan monasteries, where he meditates and recites the so-called secret mantra leading to nirvana. And some said that Ungern found his way to the mysterious country of Agharti and went there with his most devoted companions - to serve the "king of the world." The day will come when evil will finally reign in the world, and at that moment the cavalry division of Roman von Ungern-Sternberg will enter the scene to deal a mortal blow to the forces of evil.

If we cast aside all the mythology that surrounds the figure of Roman Fedorovich Ungern-Sternberg to this day, then we can say that this extraordinary person left a significant mark in history.

Thanks to Ungern, who was able to captivate a handful of Cossacks and soldiers on a campaign against Urga, which seemed insane to contemporaries, today's Mongolia is an independent state from China. If the Asian Division had not taken Urga in 1921 and had not expelled Chinese troops from the territory of Outer Mongolia, then there would have been no reason for the introduction of Red Army units into Mongolian territory in response to the Ungern attack on Transbaikalia. Outer Mongolia, which gained independence after the collapse of the Qing Empire, could have been annexed by China and become a Chinese province like Inner Mongolia. Not a single country, once seized by the Manchu Empire, was able to restore its independence from China, except for Mongolia, to which Baron Ungern came to restore historical justice.

Elena Shirokova

Literature:

Belov E. Baron Ungern von Sternberg: Biography. Ideology. Military campaigns. 1920-1921 - M., 2003.

Zhukov A.V. Baron Ungern.- M .: Veche, 2013.

Kuzmin S.L. The story of Baron Ungern. Reconstruction experience. - M., 2011.

Yuzefovich L.A. Autocrat of the desert. The phenomenon of the fate of Baron R.F. Ungern-Sternberg. - M., 1993.

Works of art:

Markov S.N. Red Buddha. - M., 1992.

Sokolov B.V. Baron Ungern. Black horseman. - M., 2007.

Yuzefovich L.A. Sand riders. - M., 2005

On September 15, 1921, Baron Ungern was shot. A convinced monarchist, he did not envision any other state structure for Russia. From the very beginning of the revolution, the baron already had his own plan for the creation of the Middle Kingdom, uniting all nomadic peoples of the Mongolian root, "in their organization not subject to Bolshevism."

"Bloody Baron" R. F. Ungern: myths and facts

To date, literature about the life and work of R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg is large enough. During the Soviet period, certain tendencies developed in the writings about the baron associated with the mythologization of his image. Despite the fact that in modern Russian literature the assessment of the activities of R.F. Ungerna has undergone significant changes, the clichés that developed during the Soviet era still continue to exist. One of the first studies on the struggle of R.F. A.N. Kislov wrote Ungern against the Soviet regime. For the first time his small work "The Defeat of Ungern" was published in the magazine "War and Revolution" in 1931. The author set as his goal an overview of military operations, so he dwelt little on the atrocities of the "bloody baron". At the same time, he was the only one who accused R.F. Ungerna in the burning of the village of Kulinga with all the inhabitants, including women and children, at the entrance of the Asian Cavalry Division into Mongolia. In 1964, the work of A.N. Kislov was published already in the form of a monograph under the same title. The author was more eloquent, describing the deeds of the baron, whose image was already firmly established in Soviet literature: “The brutal bandits robbed and killed peaceful Soviet citizens, shot communists and Soviet workers, sparing neither women nor children ... Ungern took with him about a hundred hostages, threatening with brutal reprisals in the event of any opposition from the residents, ”wrote A.N. Kislitsyn without any reference to the source of information.

The next researcher of the fight against R.F. Ungern turned out to be even more severe. B. Tsibikov's monograph was written in 1947, while Soviet literature was full of exposing the atrocities of fascism. From the point of view of the author, R.F. Ungern was the forerunner of fascist ideology and, accordingly, simply had to be a bloody executioner. To B. Tsibikov's credit, it should be noted that he did not falsify the data, drawing information from the press of the 1920s. For example, he stated that by order of R.F. Ungern in Urga killed over 400 people. The author described in great detail the massacres of Jews, citing specific names. B. Tsibikov colorfully painted pictures of how the soldiers of the Asian division, taking by the legs, tore the children into two halves, and R.F. Ungern supervised the slow burning at the stake of a random traveler caught on the road in order to extort from him where the money was kept.

In the future, Soviet authors no longer resorted to such artistic techniques to depict the atrocities of the baron, but the image of the "bloody" was entrenched in R.F. Ungernom is very strong. In 1957, G. Kurgunov and I. Sorokovikov wrote in their book dedicated to the Mongol revolution: “Ungern is a refined sadist, for him pleasure is not only in the death of his victim, but in the intolerable torment of this victim, caused by various tortures. Here and the burning of the living at the stake, snatching pieces of meat from the back with hooks, burning the heels with a hot iron, etc. " In the monograph "The collapse of the anti-Soviet underground in the USSR" D.L. Golikov declared R.F.Ungern a "fanatic Black Hundred", pointing out that the baron left behind the ashes of burnt villages and corpses, he handed out all the property of the "recalcitrant" to members of his gang and fed by robbery. Based on newspaper publications during the Civil War, the author stated that R.F. Ungern burned huge villages along with women and children, and also shot hundreds of peasants. Similar trends persisted in the literature of the 90s. The author of the monograph "The Political History of Mongolia" SK Roshchin wrote that RF Ungern was "a tyrant, a maniac, a mystic, a cruel, withdrawn man, a drunkard (in his youth)." At the same time, the author did not refuse to the baron in some positive qualities - asceticism, frantic energy, courage.

In the 90s, researchers gained access to the memoirs of R.F. Ungern's contemporaries, and most importantly, they could be freely referenced in publications. It suddenly turned out that the baron's comrades-in-arms were no less strict with his activities than Soviet literature.

For the first time, the life and work of R.F. Ungern received adequate coverage in the fictionalized book of Leonid Yuzefovich. Unfortunately, the author's approach to the memoirs of the Baron's contemporaries was practically devoid of criticism. In the work of A. Yuzefovich, R.F. Ungern was captured exactly as he was reflected in the memoirs of his comrades-in-arms. At the same time, the assessment of the baron's activities was generally positive. The author of the monograph "Baron Ungern von Sternberg" EA Belov was careful with the testimonies of the baron's associates. But his objectivity in describing the actions of the Asian Cavalry Division during the campaign to Russia betrayed him. Based on the testimony of R. F. Ungern during interrogations, the author concludes that “in the temporarily occupied territory of Siberia, Ungern behaved like a cruel conqueror, killing entire families of communists and partisans, not sparing women, old people and children”. In fact, the execution, by order of R.F. Ungern, of three families from dozens of villages occupied by the division was an exception (here the baron was guided by some unknown to us, but very specific reasons). In addition, E.A. Belov, in describing the baron's atrocities on Soviet territory, referred to the most unscrupulous memoirist N.M. Ribo (Rezukhin). Hence the descriptions of the mass robbery of the civilian population, the rape of women, torture and even the burning of an old Buryat at the stake. All this is not confirmed by other sources and therefore cannot be considered reliable.

S.L. Kuzmin, the editor of collections of documents and the author of the introductory article to them, deliberately distanced himself from the memoirists, focusing on the military and political activities of R.F. Ungern.

Despite the large number of publications on this topic, the personality and some aspects of R.F. Ungern's activities remain in the shadows. Until now, there was not enough information to confirm or refute the traditional stamp of the "bloody baron", which was widespread both in Soviet literature and in the memoirs of R.F. Ungern's contemporaries. The situation was changed by the publication of documents and memoirs, carried out under the editorship of S.L. Kuzmin in 2004. Now there is an opportunity to highlight this area of ​​activity of R.F. Ungern, to separate facts from myths. How many victims did the “bloody baron” have, who exactly fell from his hand, what was R.F. Ungern’s guided by, determining punishments for enemies, his own subordinates and “random people”, and, finally, how exceptional his actions were against the general background of the Civil War - this material will allow you to answer these questions.

Materials published by S.L. Kuzmin are divided into two blocks 1) documents; 2) memoirs. In turn, the collection of documents highlights the materials of the investigation and trial of R.F. Ungern. Acquaintance with these sources leaves a strange impression. All three groups of documents show us their own image of the baron, not like the rest.

Biographical materials, documents on the activities of R.F. Ungern at the head of the Asian Cavalry Division and his correspondence depict the Baron as a purposeful person, strategist, talented commander and organizer. R.F. Ungern differed from the leaders of the white movement A.V. Kolchak, A.I.Denikin, N.N. Yudenich in that he was a convinced monarchist and did not think of any other state structure for Russia. The commanders-in-chief of the white armies were in a position of non-determination, believing that the army should not participate in politics. From the very beginning of the revolution, the baron already had his own plan for the creation of the Middle Kingdom, uniting all nomadic peoples of the Mongolian root, "in their organization not subject to Bolshevism." These nomadic peoples were supposed to liberate Russia and then Europe from the "revolutionary infection" in the future.

Ungern began to embody his plan in life on the Caucasian front. In April 1917, he formed a detachment from the local residents of the Aisars, which brilliantly proved itself during the hostilities. His initiative was supported by the captain G.M. Semenov, who wrote to A.F. Kerensky about the national formations and on June 8, 1917, left for Petrograd to carry out these plans. The activities of R.F. Ungern and G.M. Semenov were continued after the October Revolution already in the Far East, where they entered into a struggle with the Soviet regime.

Having spent almost the entire Civil War at the most important railway point of communication between the Far East and China, the Dauria station, R. F. Ungern continued to work on the embodiment of his plans for the restoration of the monarchy on a worldwide scale. The main hope in this regard was China, where the civil war between republicans and monarchists also continued. Traces of global intentions are already visible in the letter of R.F. Ungern to G.M. Semenov on June 27, 1918, where he proposed that the Chinese in their detachments should fight the Bolsheviks, and the Manchus - with the Chinese (apparently, the Republicans), Ungern believed that this would be beneficial for Japan as well. On November 11, 1918, in a letter to P.P. Malinovsky, R.F. Ungern was interested in the preparation of a peace conference in Philadelphia and found it necessary to send there representatives from Tibet and Buryatia. Another idea that R.F. Ungern threw to his correspondent was about organizing a women's society in Harbin and establishing its ties with Europe. The last line of the letter read: "Political affairs occupy me entirely."

At the beginning of 1918, in Manchuria, G.M. Semenov convened a peace conference, which was attended by representatives of the Kharachens and Bargut. A brigade was created from the Kharachens as part of the White troops. The second conference was held in February 1919 in Dauria. It was of a general Mongol character and aimed at creating an independent Mongolian state. At the conference, a provisional government of "Great Mongolia" was formed, the commander-in-chief over the troops was handed over to G.M. Semenov. During the Civil War, R.F. Ungern began to train his officers to work with the Mongols. As can be seen from the order for the Foreign Division of January 16, 1918 (probably a mistake, in reality, 1919), its commander paid special attention to training personnel in the Mongolian language. Since January 1919, R.F. Ungern was appointed by G.M. Semenov responsible for the work of the gold mines, which were under the control of the ataman.

It is obvious that the potential opponents of R.F. Ungern and G.M. Semenov were not only the Bolsheviks, but also the Kolchakites. In case of successful actions of the Eastern Front and the capture of Moscow, republican-minded generals from A.V. Kolchak's entourage would come to power. R.F. Ungern prepared for the continuation of the war against the revolution in any person by forming detachments of Buryats, Mongols and Chinese.

There is no complete clarity about the withdrawal of parts of the Asian Cavalry Division to Mongolia. This was the period of the collapse of the white movement in the Far East. Its leaders were not sure of the future and began to look for ways to escape. In his monograph, E.A. Belov provides information that during this period R.F. Ungern asked the Austrian government to give him a visa to enter the country, but did not receive permission. The baron's decision to go to Austria could be dictated by other motives. E.A. Belov cites a draft international treaty drawn up at the headquarters of G.M. Semenov. It provided for the entry into Russia of the troops of Great Britain, France, America and Japan with the aim of restoring the monarchy and with the subsequent annexations of the territory. Perhaps, in Europe, R.F. Ungern was assigned the role of a diplomat, which he had already played from February to September 1919 during his trip to China.

S.L. Kuzmin believed that by order of G.M. Semenov, R.F. Ungern had to carry out a partisan raid through Mongolia in order to cut the railway, and then raise an uprising against the Bolsheviks in the region of Irkutsk - Nizhneudinsk - Krasnoyarsk. GM Semenov wrote that he had a single plan in case of defeat of the White movement in the Far East. In this case, the base of the White Army was to be moved to Mongolia. According to G.M. Semenov, an agreement on this was reached between representatives of the Khamba principality, the authorities of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. Detachments of the Chinese monarchists of General Zhang Kui-yu were to take part in the campaign. Mongolia was supposed to be liberated from the Chinese Republican troops, after which it was planned to transfer the hostilities to the territory of China. The operation to seize Mongolia was being prepared in complete secrecy. Everything stated by G.M. Semenov is fully confirmed by the diplomatic efforts undertaken by R.F. Ungern after the occupation of Urga.

This "Mongolian" plan was not destined to come true in its full form because of the refusal to support GM Semenov, both the Japanese and the Chinese monarchists. Instead of "retreating to Urga," the chieftain himself fled to China, and most of his troops ended up in Primorye. The fall of Chita happened much earlier than G.M. Semenov expected, so the partisan raid of the Asian Cavalry Division turned into an independent operation to create a new base of the White movement in Mongolia.

After the capture of Urga, R.F. Ungern stepped up his diplomatic activities. Emissaries were sent to the Chinese and Mongol princes and generals. The Baron sent letters to many prominent figures in Mongolia and China. Lama Yugotszur-hutukhta, appointed by the Bogd-Gegen as commander of the troops of the eastern outskirts of Khalkha, the baron wrote that his diplomatic assistance was necessary for an agreement with the head of the monarchists Sheng Yun, the princes Aru-Kharachiin-wan and Naiman-wan. R.F. Ungern in his letter proclaimed the unification of Tibet, Xinjiang, Khalkha, Inner Mongolia, Barga, Manchuria, Shandong into a single Central State. The baron also envisioned the possibility of a temporary defeat in the fight against the revolutionaries: “Temporary failures are always possible, therefore, when you have gathered a sufficient number of troops, I could, in case of failure, retreat with the remnants of the Khalkhasians to you, where I would have recovered and, having united with You, I began to continue the holy work started under your leadership. " R.F. Ungern's plan to unite the forces of the Russian counter-revolution, the Mongols and the monarchists of China was calculated for a long time. The trip to Russia in 1921 was only the first step in the practical implementation of these projects. The betrayal of his own officers prevented the Baron from taking further steps in this direction.

Many contemporaries considered the campaign of R.F. Ungern in Transbaikalia as an adventure. But there may be a different view on this question. V.G. Bortnevsky, who studied the activities of the White emigration, noted that the emigrants began in 1921 in the firm belief in the nearness of a new campaign against the Bolsheviks. This hope was reinforced by the news of the uprising in Kronstadt, mass peasant uprisings and unrest of the workers, strife in the party leadership. Materials from the collection "Siberian Vendee" show that in 1920-21 Siberia was engulfed in anti-Bolshevik uprisings. The regions liberated from the whites have already experienced all the "charms" of the surplus appropriation system. The uprisings were led by former partisan commanders. It was obvious that in 1921, after the harvest, the struggle would begin with renewed vigor. It was this peasant mass that R.F. Ungern wanted to lead. He could not have foreseen that the policy of the Soviet government would change and a transition to NEP would take place.

Many of the actions of R.F. Ungern were designed just for the peasant masses. During the uprisings in Siberia, the slogan "For Tsar Michael" was repeatedly put forward, and R.F. Ungern raised the flag with the monogram of Mikhail II (although the Romanov dynasty did not at all dovetail with the creation of the Middle Empire). The common slogan was "against Jews and commissars." R. F. Ungern immediately became an anti-Semite. In the troops of G.M. Semenov there was a Jewish company, the Volfovichi brothers were agents of R.F. Ungern himself, but in Urga the baron staged an ostentatious Jewish pogrom. In order No. 15, he ordered the extermination of Jews along with their families.

In case of success on Russian territory, R.F. Ungern could not dream, like other white commanders, of reaching Moscow. His task was to create the Middle State, and only then liberate China, Russia and Europe from the revolution. In his campaign, he had to stop, for example, on the line of the Urals. It was theoretically possible to liberate this territory from Soviet power, but it was impossible to withstand the offensive of the five-million-strong Red Army. R.F. Ungern had to rely on the help of one of the great states. Most likely, it was supposed to be Japan. Who, but her emperor, was concerned about the restoration of shattered thrones? In 1932, the Japanese managed to restore the monarchy in one of the parts of China. A representative of the Qin dynasty, Pu Yi, was placed on the throne of the puppet state of Manchukuo.

The last researcher of the activities of R.F. Ungern, S.L. Kuzmin, believed that one of the incentives that forced the baron to make a trip to Siberia was the incorrect information reported by the defectors. They talked about the weakness of the Soviet regime and the discontent of the population. An analysis of the documents of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Siberian Revolutionary Committee suggests that R.F. Ungern was very well aware of the situation in the FER.

The food crisis in the FER caused a conflict in the army command and in the top party leadership. At the end of April 1921, the Politburo in Moscow decided to replace the commander-in-chief of the FER G.H. Eikhe VK Blucher, "since the army is close to decomposition." In connection with the decision taken, a split occurred among the communists of the Far Eastern Republic. By order of the Dalburo G.H. Eikhe was placed under house arrest. On April 30, 1921, I.N.Smirnov informed V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky by direct wire that due to the inactivity of G.H. Eikhe, the army was decaying, his authority had finally fallen. G.H. Eikhe introduced Semyonovites and Kapelevites in all headquarters, which paralyzes the confidence of the military masses in the command. I.N.Smirnov demanded to remove the Dalbureau, recalling its members together with G.H. Eikhe to Moscow. In turn, G.H. Eikhe telegraphed to L.D. Trotsky that the Buffer government was ignoring the instructions of the center and was following the separatist path, a "partisan-intriguing trend" (which he had repeatedly reported on) was clearly manifested. The work of reorganizing partisan detachments into regular units met with fierce resistance at the top of the partisan command, which decided on a real coup in the army, as G.H. Eikhe reported.

In the spring of 1921, the RDC was going through a serious crisis, caused, among other things, by the actions of the Asian Cavalry Division in Mongolia. In the light of all of the above, the idea of ​​R.F. Ungern had quite real outlines. This is exactly how the Fifth Army's RVS appraised it in its letter to VI Lenin: “If Ungern succeeds, the highest Mongolian circles, changing their orientation, will form, with Ungern's help, a government of autonomous Mongolia under the de facto protectorate of Japan. We will be confronted with the fact of organizing a new White Guard base, opening a front from Manchuria to Turkestan, cutting us off from the whole East. " Smirnov's message to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on May 27, 1921 looked even more pessimistic. He stated that the internal situation of the FER is well known to the enemy. I.N.Smirnov regarded the situation of the FER army as hopeless and predicted catastrophic consequences.

R.F. Ungern was tried twice. The first trial of the baron was carried out by his associates. The officers of the Asian Division, having drawn up a conspiracy, decided to kill their commander. For many years after these events, in their memoirs, they continued to condemn the baron for ruthlessness and cruelty. The second trial took place in Novonikolaevsk on September 15, 1821. This time, Ungern was judged by his enemies, the Communists.

Ungern's defender said at the trial in Novonikolaevsk: “A person who, during his long military career, exposed himself to the possibility of being constantly killed, a fatalist, who sees his captivity as fate, certainly does not personally need protection. But, in essence, the historical truth around the name of Baron Ungern, ... which was created, needs protection. " For the sake of this historical truth, a researcher often has to take on the functions of an investigator, which is simply necessary in the Ungern case, since his enemies, both in the white and in the red camp, were interested in distorting historical reality. The officers of the Asian Cavalry Division needed to justify their rebellion against the commander during the hostilities, and the Reds wanted to use the "bloody baron" in their propaganda.

At the trial, R. F. Ungern was accused of the fact that when his troops attacked the population of Soviet Russia (as a system of subjugation), methods of mass extermination were used (up to and including children, who, according to R. F. Ungern, were massacred in that case , so as not to leave "tails"). Ungern used all kinds of torture against the Bolsheviks and the "Reds" Ungern: breaking in mills, beating with sticks in the Mongolian way (the meat lagged behind the bones and in this form the person continued to live), imprisonment on ice, on a hot roof, etc.

From this it was concluded that Ungern was guilty of: “in the brutal massacres and torture of a) peasants and workers, b) communists, c) Soviet workers, d) Jews who were massacred without exception, e) extermination of children, f) revolutionary Chinese etc.

Let's see how proven these charges were.

During interrogation about the punishment he used, Ungern said that he used the death penalty. When asked about the types of executions, he replied: "they were hanged and shot." To the question "Did you use the Mongolian method of beating until the pieces of meat fly off?" - Ungern, apparently with surprise, answered: "No, then he will die ...". Ungern admitted that he put people on ice and a roof. During interrogation at the trial, Ungern was asked how many sticks he ordered to be given as punishment. Ungern replied that only soldiers were punished with sticks, they beat them on the body and gave up to 100 blows. In the literature, you can find an indication that 200 blows put a person on the brink of death. This statement raises serious doubts. For example, punishment with rods (the same sticks), widespread in Russia in the 18th - first half of the 19th centuries, led to death in the region of 4000 blows, there are cases when they survived and received 12000 blows. There is no information that someone died from punishment with sticks in the Asian Cavalry Division.

Apparently, the investigators were never able to understand the meaning of the punishments imposed by the baron. They believed that boarding on ice and on the roof was a form of torture, so it was sometimes added “on a hot roof”.

During the interrogation of the accused, the judges were interested in why R.F. Ungern beat the adjutant during the First World War. He was asked: "Did you often beat people?" “Few, but it did happen,” replied the baron.

RFUngern was repeatedly asked whether he ordered the burning of villages. He answered in the affirmative, but at the same time explained that the "red villages" were burned empty, as the inhabitants fled from them. When asked if he knew that the corpses of people were ground in wheels, thrown into wells, and in general all sorts of atrocities were perpetrated, R. F. Ungern replied: "This is not true."

The only specific question about the executions of families was asked to R.F. Ungern during interrogation on August 27 in Troitskosavsk. The baron admitted that he ordered to shoot 2 families (9 people) in Novodmitrovka together with the children. At the same time, he added that another family was shot in Kapcharaiskaya, about which the investigators had no information.

The command staff and political workers of the 232nd regiment and the chief of staff of the 104th Cannabich regiment were shot. In the Gusinoozersky datsan for robbery of a convoy, R. F. Ungern ordered to flog all the lamas. For the misappropriation of money, the centurion Arkhipov was hanged, the order was given to shoot Kazagradni for the fact that he serves both him and the Reds.

During the interrogations, only one name of the civilian executed by order of R.F. Ungern was mentioned, this is the veterinarian V.G. Gey, an old member of the cooperative Tsentrosoyuz. From the answer of R.F. Ungern, it can be concluded that he was asked about whether the murder of Gay was caused by mercantile interests. He replied that Gaia had almost no metal money at all. No questions were asked about the fate of the Gaia family.

In the report compiled by the investigators on interrogation of R. F. Ungern on September 1 and 2, 1921, it was said that he first denied “the beating of the entire male population of the Mandal village”, and then confessed that this was done with his knowledge. In this case, the baron apparently went to meet the investigators and took charge. MG Tornovsky mentions the village of Mandal, but without any comments. The situation was different with the seizure of the settlement of Maimachen. The chakhar commander Nayden-van conducted this raid on his own, without the permission of the baron. The capture of Maymachen was accompanied by robbery and possibly the murder of civilians. After this incident, the chahars were sent back to Urga by the baron.

Only once was R.F. Ungern asked whether he knew about the violence against women perpetrated by L. Sipailov. R.F. Ungern replied that he did not know this and considered these rumors absurd. During interrogation, R.F. Ungern recalled that there was one woman whom he ordered to put on ice (she spent the night on the ice of a frozen river).

When asked about the motives of his cruelty with his subordinates, R. F. Ungern replied that he was cruel only with bad officers and soldiers and that such treatment was caused by the requirements of discipline: "I am a supporter of stick discipline (Frederick the Great, Paul I, Nicholas I)" ... This discipline and kept the whole army.

Strange as it may seem, but the investigators and judges did not make any efforts to find out the scale of R. F. Ungern's crimes. In the published materials of the investigation and the court, there are no testimonies of witnesses, only a few times it is mentioned that they were. The court did not take into account the fact that the baron denied the robberies and executions of civilians imputed to him, as well as the burning of villages along with women and children. The specific crimes in which the baron pleaded guilty were the shooting of three families (2 families of 9 people, the number of the third is unknown), his associates Arkhipov, Kazagrandi and the cooperator Gey. The number of Jews, members of the Tsentrosoyuz and prisoners of the Red Army who were shot by order of R.F. Ungern was not established. In the materials of the investigation it was indicated that the baron either released the prisoners of the Red Army, or accepted them into the ranks of the division. There were cases when he took communist prisoners to command positions.

It seems that the communist investigators were amazed at the modesty of the baron's "cruelties". All the crimes revealed to the wave fit into the everyday practice of the Bolsheviks themselves. But RFUngern at the trial had to correspond to the image of the “bloody baron” and serve as a scarecrow for the population of Russia. Hence the attempts to make the disciplinary punishments practiced by the baron look like torture (sitting on a hot roof, beating with sticks until the meat is separated), and the obvious, unfounded multiple exaggeration of the victims of R.F. Ungern's activities.

R. F. Ungern was sentenced to death in the Kremlin. On August 26, 1921, Lenin sent his opinion on the Baron's case over the telephone to the Politburo, ending with the words: "... arrange a public trial, conduct it as quickly as possible and shoot it." The next day, the conclusion of V. I. Lenin in the same wording was approved by the Politburo. The party leaders did not at all take into account that on January 17, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution abolishing the death penalty against the enemies of Soviet power. In this respect, the trial of R.F. Ungern was in strong contrast to a similar case heard in early March 1921. In Soviet newspapers, this process was covered under the title "The Bloody Feast of Semyonovshchina". Fourteen participants in the massacre of prisoners in the Red Barracks of the city of Troitskosavsk on January 8 and 9, 1920, were brought to trial. In those days, up to 1000 people were killed. In order to stop the executions, the city duma was forced to ask for the introduction of Chinese units into the city. Although the main perpetrators of the events in the Red Barracks fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities, some of them were also accused of participating in the murders: the prisoners were chopped down with sabers, stabbed with bayonets, beaten with rifle butts and tried to poison them with poison. The result of this noisy trial was the sentence: seven defendants were sentenced to twenty years of community service, one to ten years, one to ten years probation, three were acquitted, and one was expelled from the FER.

The trial of the baron's comrades-in-arms was strict, but it can be assumed that it was just as little objective as the Bolshevik one. Many researchers noticed that the officers and ranks of the Asian Cavalry Division, who left their memories, were directly related to the uprising against R.F. Ungern. They were interested in denigrating the baron in order to absolve themselves of responsibility for the failure of the campaign and the murder of the commander. At the same time, they tried to shift the responsibility to the baron for all the bad things that were done by the division during the campaign in Mongolia. Hence the attempts to present R.F. Ungern as an inherently cruel person who displayed this quality in all periods of his life.

What were the judges from the white camp able to show to R.F. Ungern? It turns out that very little (if we take it on faith). Indeed, by order of the baron, people were not only hanged and shot, but even burned alive. It is impossible to justify these actions, even referring to the emergency situation of that time. But one can try to understand why R.F. Ungern acted in one way or another, how he was guided in passing sentences, what goals he set for himself. Were the baron's contemporaries right, led by the poet Arseny Nesmelov (A.I. Mitropol'skii), who claimed that R.F. Ungern simply satisfied his sadistic passion with his cruel actions?

The main prosecutor of R.F. Ungern was destined to become M.G. Tornovsky. For many years he collected material in order to paint an "impartial" picture of the activities of the Asian Cavalry Division. Of the ten specific persons killed by order of R. F. Ungern and listed by M. G. Tornovsky (Chernov, Gay, Arkhipov, Lee, Drozdov, Gordeev, Parnyakov, Engelgart, Ruzhansky, Laurenz), other memoirists have: A. S. Makeeva - 6; N.N. Knyazev - 3; from M.N. Ribo - 2; Golubev has 1.

M.G. Tornovsky (1882 - after 1955) - graduate of the Irkutsk military school. During the First World War, he was a battalion commander on the Russian-German front. He received the rank of colonel and was seconded to work at the Irkutsk military school. After the revolution, he left for Harbin, where he joined the anti-Bolshevik organization "Committee for the Defense of the Motherland and the Constituent Assembly." Later, in the army of A.V. Kolchak, he commanded the 1st Jaeger Regiment. In 1919 he was sent to the headquarters of A.V. Kolchak, but on the way he received the news that the admiral had been shot, and remained in Urga.

During the siege of the city by R.F. Ungern, M.G. Tornovsky was imprisoned by the Chinese, where he spent about two months. On January 10 or 11, 1921, he was released by order of the Minister of War from Beijing. After the announcement in Urga about the admission of volunteers to the Asian Cavalry Division, M.G. Tornovsky appeared at the headquarters of R.F. Ungern and introduced himself to General B.P. Rezukhin. He was appointed chief of staff. MG Tornovsky recalled that he “didn’t have a heart for the Semenovites,” as their activities were well known to him. A colleague of M.G. Tornovsky, lieutenant A.I. Orlov and centurion Patrin, who passed from G.M. Semenov to A.V. Kolchak in 1919, generally fled from Urga so as not to serve with R.F. Ungern. It is surprising that the baron has appointed an unfamiliar officer to the post of chief of staff. In the eyes of RFUngern, MG Tornovsky was compromised even by the fact that he was a member of the Committee for the Defense of the Motherland and the Constituent Assembly. Not to mention the fact that, for not entirely clear reasons, the regiment commander left the theater of operations and for a year was engaged in business in Urga, while the Asian division was in continuous battles. R.F. Ungern was generally very suspicious of Kolchak's chief officers, preferring not to hire them. Most likely, M.G. Tornovsky was assigned to the headquarters for a more thorough check. After two weeks of work, apparently having received a favorable review from B.P. Rezukhin, R.F. Ungern appointed him to his personal headquarters. M.G. Tornovsky himself admitted that there was not a single person at his disposal and he did not receive any assignments (except for the interrogation of Colonel Laurenz).

R.F. Ungern was extremely cold with his new subordinate. On February 5, M.G. Tornovsky entered service in the Asian Cavalry Division, and on March 17 he was wounded and was out of action for two months. Until the very exit of the division from Urga, M.G. Tornovsky did not have access to information and used only rumors about what was happening. The fact that, setting out on a campaign, R.F. Ungern did not leave his former chief of staff in Urga (who still walked on crutches and could not get on a horse on his own) speaks volumes. On June 14, MG Tornovsky caught up with the division and was appointed a "marching quartermaster", although the division did not have a quartermaster at that time. Thus, the author also conveyed the description of the hostilities of the Asian Cavalry Division in his memoirs from hearsay.

Soon a new circumstance appeared, which very much set M.G. Tornovsky against the division commander. According to the memoirist, Captain Bezrodny arrived at the Selenga River, bringing many documents that compromised Kolchak's officers. Regarding M.G. Tornovsky, Bezrodny managed to obtain evidence that he bows to V. I. Lenin and sympathizes with his activities. The denunciation was based on a conversation that actually took place, where M.G. Tornovsky noted that Lenin would go down forever in the history of Russia. Only the intercession of General B.P. Rezukhin forced R.F. Ungern to refrain from reprisals against the alleged Bolshevik. Although later the memoirist received the assignment to propagandize the goals of the anti-Bolshevik campaign in the villages, he never earned the trust of R.F. Ungern. This "recruiting and agitation bureau" recruited only three volunteers in 15 days of work. As a result, on August 10, by order of R.F. Ungern, M.G. Tornovsky was appointed a simple horseman in the first regiment, where, however, he was put in charge of the orderlies.

MG Tornovsky stated that he knew nothing about the conspiracy. A complete surprise for him was the murder of B.P. Rezukhin. Nevertheless, M.G. Tornovsky was elected as a brigade commander by officers and took her to China. R.F. Ungern he never saw again. Even from this brief overview it is clear that M.G. Tornovsky had no reason to love R.F. Ungern. They served together for a very short time and their relationship did not work out. Considering all of the above, M.G. Tornovsky can hardly be considered an impartial witness. Most of his memories are hearsay. Memories of RF Ungern's comrades-in-arms generally repeat each other in many places. This is understandable, none of the fighters of the Asian Cavalry Division could be at the same time in all places of operations of its units. It turns out that there are practically no witnesses to the baron's "atrocities". All memoirists transmit rumors or other people's stories. To be completely objective, let us use the testimony of the most "impartial" prosecutor MG Tornovsky, who compiled the memoirs of his predecessors.

The most impressive of the punishments applied by R.F. Ungern was the massacre of ensign Chernov. The first to describe Chernov's execution was Golubev (1926), who apparently served in the Asian Cavalry Division (there is no other information about him). According to his story, after the failure of the first offensives on Urga, the Asian division withdrew to Aksha, having with it a large trainload of wounded. The former commandant of Dauria, Colonel Laurens and Warrant Officer Chernov, commanded there. Having agreed among themselves, they decided to kill the patients who had money. Later, in order to lighten the baggage train, they gave the order to poison the seriously wounded, but the paramedic did not follow this instruction. When R.F. Ungern received information about abuses in the wagon train and the infirmary, he ordered the arrest of Warrant Officer Chernov, flogging him, and then burning him alive at the stake. Subsequently, the message about the crime and execution of Chernov was repeated with various variations by many memoirists. For example, in 1934 N.N. Knyazev wrote that Chernov was burned for the murder and robbery of several wounded horsemen who were lying in the infirmary. Obviously, R.F. Ungern specifically gave Chernov's execution an indicative, demonstrative character in order to prevent the repetition of such cases in the future.

According to Golubev, Lieutenant Colonel Laurenz was an accomplice in Chernov's crime. MG Tornovsky, who personally interrogated Laurenz, confirmed this message. According to his testimony, Laurenz was accused of robbing the Mongols and wanting to poison the wounded who were in the hospital. It can be assumed that M.G. Tornovsky was indeed instructed to interrogate Laurets about his official activities, but he did not know anything about the actual charge. Lieutenant Colonel Laurenz, as commandant of Dauria, was the closest employee of R.F. Ungern. Together with the commander of the Annenkovsky regiment, Colonel Tsirkulinsky, he was wounded during the second assault on Urga. Then Tsirkulinsky and Laurenz received a special assignment and were sent to China.

Information about the mission of Lieutenant Colonel Laurenz can be obtained from a letter to RF Ungern by an unknown military sergeant major on January 25, 1920: “Lieutenant Colonel Laurenz leaves for Hailar, probably in Harbin for accurate reconnaissance of the situation on the ground ...”. Two letters from Laurenz to R.F. Ungern from February 1 and 7, where he reported on the completion of the assignment, have survived. On March 2, 1921, R.F. Ungern wrote to Zhang Kun that he did not believe Colonel Laurenz, since he had fled.

The mission of Laurenz and Tsirkulinsky turned out to be risky. The Chinese began to arrest people associated with the baron. Tsirkulinsky was arrested while trying to conduct a transport with medicines to Urga. He was imprisoned in a Chinese prison and tortured. The cargo was confiscated. For his loyalty to R.F. Ungern forgave Tsirkulinsky not only for the loss of cargo, but also for the desertion of the officer's hundred of the Annenkovsky regiment, whose commander Tsirkulinsky was before being wounded. When he returned back, R.F. Ungern appointed him chief of defense of Urga. Apparently, Laurenz behaved differently and, fulfilling the baron's assignment, did not show steadfastness and loyalty to the white cause, for which he was shot.

During the trial of R.F. Ungern, several names of persons who were shot by order of the baron were mentioned. The priest F.A. Parnyakov was of particular interest to the judges. To a question put to him on this subject, R. F. Ungern replied that he ordered to kill the priest because he was the chairman of some committee. In the future, the Bolsheviks continued to play the card of F.A. Parnyakov: “A Christian believing in God sends another Christian - priest Parnyakov to the next world, since he is red ... Baron Ungern is a religious man, I have no doubt about it , and this underlines the fact that religion has never saved anyone from the greatest crimes, ”- the prosecutor E. Yaroslavsky angrily exclaimed.

What did the baron's associates write about the priest, whose death was used by the Bolsheviks to expose religion? Colonel V.Yu. Sokolnitsky, chief of staff of the Kaigorodov detachment, wrote that Fyodor Parnyakov was a Bolshevik and chairman of one of the Urga cooperatives. A member of the Military Board of the Yenisei Cossack Host K. I. Lavrentyev, who was imprisoned by the Chinese during the siege of Urga, claimed that Fr. Fyodor Parnyakov played a provocative role in the fate of Russian prisoners. He slowed down their transfer to a warm room. M.G. Tornovsky, who had lived in Urga since 1820, quite specifically described the activities of F.A. Parnyakov. He called the priest a "Bolshevik leader", one of the main conductors of communist ideas. F.A.Parnyakov and his comrades M.G. Tornovsky accused of the death of about 100 Russian people who were shot on their denunciations in Urga and its environs. Elsewhere, the memoirist wrote that F.A. Parnyakov and his sons had been involved in a terrorist group of revolutionaries since 1905. The priest himself was "a drunkard, a bawdy, an undoubted atheist." Obviously, the order to shoot the priest was given by R. F. Ungern at the request of a part of the inhabitants of Urga, who considered F.A. Parnyakov a Bolshevik and an agent of the Chinese.

Doctor S.B. Tsybyktarov headed the hospital at the Russian consulate in Urga. After the capture of the city by Ungern, he was arrested on charges of Bolshevism and shot. On this occasion, M.G. Tornovsky in his memoirs assumed that S. B. Tsybyktarov was slandered by someone or killed with the aim of requisitioning his property. From the memoirs of D.P. Pershin, who accompanied S. B. Tsybyktarov to the baron after his arrest, it follows that the latter was very regretful that he made speeches at a meeting in Urga in the presence of escort Cossacks. RF Ungern himself spoke about SB Tsybyktarov: “In Chita, at a meeting, I heard him crucifying for the communists and for all kinds of freedoms.”

After the capture of Urga, some of Kolchak's chief officers were shot. MG Tornovsky wrote that Lieutenant Colonel Drozdov was shot for panic rumors. In this regard, A.S. Makeev recalled that R.F. Ungern liquidated the panic moods by shooting Lieutenant Colonel Drozdov, who was spreading rumors. After that, no one else dared to doubt the "stability of Urga life."

In Urga, the former Kyakht commissar A.D. Khitrovo was arrested and shot. According to the memoirs of D.P. Pershin, two days before the arrest Khitrovo went to him and talked about the horrors of the Semyonovschina in Troitskosavsk. He condemned the chieftaincy and considered it the reason for the collapse of A.V. Kolchak. A.D. Khitrovo took part in the decision of the Troitskosavsk city government to invite the Chinese to the city in order to stop the arbitrariness of the Semenovites. D.P. Pershin recalled that several members of the city government were shot by the Bolsheviks for inviting the Chinese. A.D. Khitrovo did not escape this fate, but on the orders of R.F. Ungern.

MG Tornovsky recalled that RF Ungern confiscated a large tannery in Urga and put Gordeev (in the past, a large tanner-breeder on the Volga) to manage it. Soon Gordeev was hanged for an unimportant act. What is this "unimportant act"? MG Tornovsky mentioned that Gordeev stole $ 2,500 and some sugar. K.I. Lavrentyev also pointed out that Gordeev was shot for stealing sugar from the warehouses of the plant. The commander of a hundred Asian Cavalry Division received 30 rubles a month, in comparison with this, the theft of $ 2,500 was a very serious matter (R. F. Ungern hanged marauders for a stolen piece of cloth).

Since 1912, the Tsentrosoyuz cooperative was operating in Mongolia, which was engaged in the procurement of meat and leather. After the revolution, the leadership of the Tsentrosoyuz reoriented to contacts with Soviet Moscow. The employees of the cooperative supplied money and food to the Red partisans, while at the same time disrupted the supply of meat to the White Front. Before the occupation of Urga, R.F. Ungern was disposed towards the total extermination of the employees of the Tsentrosoyuz as Bolsheviks. But before the assault, two Trans-Baikal Cossacks, grassroots employees of the cooperative, ran over to Ungern and passed on information about all the employees of the Tsentrosoyuz. During the last battle for Urga, former White Guards from among the employees of the cooperative joined Ungern's fighters and began to exterminate their former colleagues, the Bolsheviks. Subsequently, R.F. Ungern continued repressions against members of the Tsentrosoyuz, suspected by him of Bolshevism. So the veterinarian V.G. Gey was killed along with his family. M.G. Tornovsky, who described his death, mentioned that R.F. Ungern had information that V.G. Gey was in constant communication with the headquarters of the 5th Soviet army in Irkutsk. F. Ossendovsky in his book "Beasts, Men and Gods" wrote about V.G. Geya: "He did business on a grand scale, and when in 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power, he began to cooperate with them, quickly changing his beliefs. In March 1918, when Kolchak's army drove the Bolsheviks out of Siberia, the veterinarian was arrested and tried. However, he was quickly released: after all, he was the only person capable of delivering supplies from Mongolia, and he really immediately gave Kolchak all the meat he had in his possession, as well as the silver received from the Soviet commissars. "

For theft, R. F. Ungern often shot his own officers, even honored ones. M.G. Tornovsky, apparently from the memoirs of A.S. Makeev, borrowed a story about the execution of the aide-de-camp of the Baron and his wife Ruzhanskiy. The adjutant, having received 15,000 rubles under a forged document, fled, hoping to capture his wife, a nurse in the hospital, but they were caught and executed. After that, A.S. Makeev received the post of adjutant.

Most of the memoirists describing the conclusion of the Ungernov epic mentioned the execution of Colonel P.N. Arkhipov. He joined the Asian Cavalry Division before the final assault on Urga, bringing with him a hundred of 90 Cossacks on horseback. M.G. Tornovsky dedicated a separate subsection of his work to the death of P.N. Arkhipov. At the end of June, R. F. Ungern received news from L. Sipailov that P. N. Arkhipov concealed part of the gold captured during the capture of the Chinese bank (according to various sources, 17-18 pounds, or three and a half poods). The colonel confessed everything and was executed (according to various sources, he was shot, hanged or strangled after torture).

Despite the fact that R. F. Ungern was forced to resort to the services of executioners and informers, this does not mean that he treated these people with respect and love. The Baron endured them as long as they were needed. N.N. Knyazev pointed out that during the withdrawal from Troitskosavsk R.F. Ungern gave a written order to General B.P. Rezukhin to hang his chief executioner L. Sipailov when he arrives at the detachment. At the same time, the chief physician of the division A.F. Klingenberg was severely punished. The massacre of him was remembered by many memoirists. M.G. Tornovsky described this reprisal against the doctor (June 4, 1921) as follows: R.F. Ungern, seeing a badly bandaged wounded man, ran up to A.F. Klingenberg and began to beat him first with tashur, and then with his feet, as a result breaking his leg. After that, the doctor was evacuated to Urga. On closer examination of the biography of A.F. Klingenberg, it must be admitted that the baron could have had another reason, besides poor nursing, to punish his chief physician. The memoirist Golubev described the activities of A.F. Klingenberg: after fleeing from the Reds from Verkhneudinsk, he began to work as a doctor in Kyakhta, where he became friends with local Jews. Finding himself mobilized in the division of R.F. Ungern after the capture of Urga, A.F. Klingenberg led the massacre of the Jews. At the head of the Cossacks, he came to the apartments of his old acquaintances, confiscated money and valuables, and then shot the owners. Then AF Klingenberg became an informant and reported to the Baron about conversations among the wounded in the hospital, "having cut the lives of many." For this, he was shot by order of Colonel Tsirkulinsky after the Whites had left Urga.

There is no clarity about the circumstances of the death of the other two doctors. MG Tornovsky reported on the execution of a Korean dentist Li and a medical assistant from Omsk Engelgardt-Yezersky. Moreover, the latter was burned in the same way as Warrant Officer Chernov. MG Tornovsky did not know the reasons for these executions. They were mentioned in passing by A.S. Makeev (about Lee), D.D. Aleshin and N.M. Ribot (about Engelgardt-Yezersky). If we take these messages on faith, then we can trace some unusual partiality of the Baron to medical workers. G.M.Semenov recalled that when he was in Hailar, R.F. Ungern gave the order to shoot Dr. Grigoriev, who was conducting propaganda against the baron. Among the orders of R. F. Ungern on a separate Asian Cavalry Brigade, an order dated December 20, 1919, concerning the arrest of the doctor of the Ilyinsky brigade, was preserved. The baron ordered the arrest of the physician for one day and two nights for the same thing, for which he had already arrested him two weeks ago: “I'll see who gets tired of it earlier: whether to put me in prison, whether he should be in prison,” wrote R. F. Ungern (note that contrary to the opinion prevailing in the historical literature about the regime at the Dauria station, the order is only about arrest, no physical impact was provided at all). The doctors responded to the baron with dislike, one of them - N.M. Ribot - took an active part in the conspiracy against the commander of the Asian Cavalry Division. It is obvious that R.F. Ungern was a monarchist of ultra-right convictions. In his eyes, anyone who did not share his views on the state system was a Bolshevik. Thus, almost all of the Russian intelligentsia of that time was included in the number of such “Bolsheviks”. In the course of the actions of the division, R.F. Ungern had to face close encounters mainly with doctors. With them, as with representatives of the "revolutionary intelligentsia", he was sometimes, to put it mildly, too harsh.

The suspicion of R. F. Ungern towards new people who got into the division was fully justified. At various levels of the party leadership, including the highest one in Moscow, directives were repeatedly issued on sending agitators to the baron's detachments with the aim of decomposing them. In a monograph devoted to the activities of the Cheka-GPU, published in the 70s, it was argued that the capture of R.F. Ungern was organized by the plenipotentiary representative of the GPU of Siberia I.P. Pavlunovsky. In the detachments of the baron, Soviet agents acted, who organized a conspiracy in the Asian Cavalry Division. Although such a statement seems very dubious, the Chekists definitely set themselves a similar task.

A very illustrative example is the description in the memoirs of the massacre of R.F. Ungern over the only cavalry artilleryman of the division, Captain Oganezov. In the description of M.G. Tornovsky, Oganezov was sent to graze cattle as punishment for the fact that his battery fired from a closed position. Another version of this event is given by N.N. Knyazev. According to his recollections, Oganezov was punished for shelling the hill where the baron was at that time. We will never know how these events happened. Other memoirists do not mention them. But if you combine both stories, it turns out that Oganezov fired at the hill where R.F. Ungern was after he was forbidden to shoot from closed positions. In this case, the punishment was quite moderate, since the baron could suspect malice. MG Tornovsky, in conclusion of his memoirs, stipulated that in emigration Oganezov "cordially recalled General Ungern." Perhaps in this case, too, the baron was right?

The biggest crime of R.F. Ungern was the Jewish pogrom in Urga. MG Tornovsky recalled (from hearsay) that before the occupation of Urga, the baron gave the order: “When the occupation of Urga, all communists and Jews should be destroyed on the spot, their property should be taken away. To hand over one third of what is taken to the headquarters, and leave two thirds in their favor. " The author pointed out that of all the Jews of Urga, a girl was saved, who was adopted by a Russian nanny, and a girl who became Sipailov's concubine, who was later strangled by him. NN Knyazev dwelt on this issue in more detail. Describing the views of the baron, he noted the confidence of R. F. Ungern that “the Russian revolution was organized by the Jews and only an evil Jewish force supports and aggravates the revolutionary process in Russia. He believed that the establishment of order in our homeland is impossible as long as there are Jews. " The author noted that some exceptions were made in Urga. The life of Volfovich and the attorney at law of Mariupol, a dentist and another Jew, for whom the “Urgin barons” Fitinghof, Tizengausen and von Witte asked for, was saved. A.S. Makeev conveyed the following words of the baron: “I do not divide people by nationality. All - people, but here I will act differently. If a Jew cruelly and cowardly, like a vile hyena, mocks defenseless Russian officers, their wives and children, I order: when Urga is taken, all Jews must be destroyed - cut out. This is a well-deserved revenge for not twisting the arms of their reptile. Blood for blood!".

From the memoirs of A.S. Makeev, it follows that besides the desire to replenish the division's treasury and stimulate the Cossacks in the struggle for Urga, giving the order to exterminate the Jews, R.F. Ungern was guided by the same feeling of revenge. The baron had a lot of information about everything that happens in the besieged city. For the same reasons, after the capture of Urga, the wealthy merchant M.L. Noskov, a confidant of the Jewish firm of Biderman, was executed. According to M.G. Tornovsky, M.L. Noskov strongly oppressed the Mongols, and D.P. Pershin recalled that the merchant was inhospitable to the Russian refugees and refused money to the envoys of R. F. Ungern. All this was attributed by the baron to all the Jews who lived in Urga.

According to eyewitnesses of the events, after the capture of Urga by the Baron, from 100 to 200 people were killed there, about 50 of them were Jews. It is not yet possible to concretize or at least clarify these figures. Subsequently, RF Ungern adopted the slogan popular at that time in Siberia, and his order No. 15 proclaimed: “to destroy commissars, communists and Jews together with their families”. The investigators who interrogated the baron concluded that "the baron absolutely does not accept the revolution and considers the cause of the revolution of the Jews and the fall in morals, which the Jews took advantage of." He "does not understand the people's power in Soviet Russia and is firmly convinced that power will certainly pass to the Jews."

The Asian Cavalry Division did not even have the semblance of a military court. RFUngern personally conducted the investigation and passed the verdict. What was the baron guided by in this speedy legal proceedings? R.F. Ungern infinitely trusted his own intuition. There are memories of how, at the first meeting, he asked the person "are you a socialist?", "Are you a Jew or a Pole?" At the same time, the baron looked into the eyes of the interlocutor. The fate of the interrogated depended on the impression made. R.F. Ungern had a whole network of informants. They operated in China, Mongolia and in the ranks of the Asian Cavalry Division itself. The baron checked the information received during personal interrogation. The informers and witnesses were not present and were not interrogated again. In the same way, R.F. Ungern acted in the selection of Jews and commissars among the prisoners of the Red Army. Memoirists disagree on the results of this selection. Even with very high accuracy, this method of the baron inevitably had to fail.

There are cases when R.F. Ungern deviated from his rule of personal interrogation. Tragic events took place at the beginning of 1921 in the city of Ulyasutai. Many officers who had fled from Soviet Russia gathered there. As a result of a short struggle, they were led by Colonel Mikhailov, but soon a new group of officers arrived, led by Colonel Poletik, who claimed their leadership rights. He presented documents from the "Central Russian Committee for the Fight against the Bolsheviks." On April 10, the ataman Kazantsev arrived in Ulyasutai and, presenting the powers of the baron, demanded that Mikhailov, Poletiko and a number of other persons urgently go to Urga. On the way, this group was met by another envoy of R.F. Ungern, Captain Bezrodny. He conducted a thorough search and most of the officers found jewelry or papers that compromised them. 11 people from the group were immediately shot. F. Osendovsky, who was traveling with this group, claimed that Bezrodny was carrying with him a "stack" of death sentences signed by the baron.

R.F. Ungern was not afraid of death, he said that only she could free a Russian officer from the fight against the Bolsheviks. The baron was not afraid of the infantry; at the trial he declared that he could have gotten away from a million infantrymen. Of course it was bravado. Several thousand scattered white fighters were opposed by the Red and Chinese armies of many thousands, which included artillery and cavalry. Even the most skilled cavalryman had to retreat in the face of this force. But the heir to the Crusaders had a formidable weapon at his disposal - fear. Deliberately cultivating the myth of his own cruelty and madness, R. F. Ungern multiplied the strength of the Asian Cavalry Division. Only the Chinese fear of the "mad baron" allowed his soldiers to take possession of Urga with its 15,000 garrison. The rebellious officers were so afraid of R.F. Ungern that among them there was not a person capable of personally killing the baron. Seeing that he was returning to the camp, Colonel Evfaritsky, military sergeant major Markov and 8-9 more officers fled and no longer joined the detachment.

According to various sources, on August 18-21, an uprising took place in the Asian Cavalry Division, led by senior officers. As a result, B.P. Rezukhin was killed, and R.F. Ungern was captured by the Reds. From that moment on, the division, breaking up into separate detachments, ceased to exist. What caused the death of the Asian Cavalry Division? Her officers believed it was the legendary cruelty of the baron. Modern researchers explained it by military failures, the unwillingness of officers to leave for the West, etc. It seems that one of the main factors that ruined the business so successfully started in Mongolia was the unique secrecy of R. F. Ungern. The officers who knew him in the pre-revolutionary period noted that the baron avoided society and preferred solitude. Even when he became the head of a division, he did not betray himself. Under R.F. Ungern there was no headquarters, although the chiefs of staff of the division were appointed, but often they were completely random people. The baron did not have his own entourage and, apparently, no friends at all (except, perhaps, B.P. Rezukhin). Even the adjutants knew nothing of his plans. R.F. Ungern did not trust his senior officers, did not hold their meetings and did not involve them in strategic planning. Finally, he did not appear in front of the division's personnel. His orders were apparently simply read out in the hundreds. One can understand that it was difficult for the baron to communicate with representatives of sixteen languages, but the neglect of his Russian fighters, in the end, cost him his life.

The most severe of the accusers of R.F. Ungern, M.G. Tornovsky, blamed the baron for the orders to execute seven ranks of the Asian Cavalry Division, to this can be added 40 officers who deserted from the Annenkovsky regiment (most of them were killed). In addition, by order of R.F. Ungern, 22 military and civilians who were not part of the division were executed, plus up to 50 Jews who died during the pogrom in Urga. A total of 119 people. MG Tornovsky, apparently deliberately, left in the shadow the executions of entire families and executions of prisoners. It is surprising that during the investigation and trial of R.F. Ungern these issues were also practically not considered. Even with the most approximate calculation, the number of victims of the Asian Cavalry Division from August 1920 to August 1921 did not exceed 200 people (the death toll of the Chinese cannot be established even approximately). Companions of the baron pointed to two cases when, on his order, people were burnt alive. During the investigation, R.F. Ungern admitted that, on his order, three families were shot, along with women and children. The most serious crime of the baron is the sanctioning of the Jewish pogrom in Urga.

It makes no sense to compare Ungern's "atrocities" with the acts of the Bolsheviks. It is obvious that V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky, on the scale of Russia, managed to achieve much more than the baron at Dauria station and within Mongolia. The Bolsheviks were ruthless to their enemies. That there is only one institution of hostages, who were taken on the basis of class and shot without any guilt. For example, generals P.K. Rannenkampf, R.D. Radko-Dmitriev and N.V. Ruzskaya were executed with a group of hostages in Kislovodsk. Under the direct leadership of R.S. Zalkind (Zemlyachki) and Bela Kun, thousands of officers of the Wrangel army, who believed the Bolsheviks and decided not to leave their homeland, were shot. Among the largest examples of the execution by the Bolsheviks of women and children is the execution in Yekaterinburg of the royal family.

The communists were just as ruthless towards their fellows. For L.D. Trotsky, the execution of every fourth or tenth soldier in the guilty regiment was a normal occurrence. Commissioners, commanders and military experts were shot. You can recall such big names as B.M. Dumenko and F.K. Mironov. A vivid idea of ​​the torture and executions practiced in the red camp is provided by a collection of materials from the Special Investigative Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the Bolsheviks. The results of the exotic torture are documented in photographs. It is not surprising that the Bolshevik investigators during the trial of R.F. Ungern were very interested in the question of whether the baron put people on a hot roof as punishment.

Even if we take only the Trans-Baikal theater of military operations of the Civil War, the number of victims of R. F. Ungern does not at all look unusual. On March 28, 1919, during the seizure of the village of Kurunzulai by the partisans, seven captured Cossack officers and six Cossack volunteers were shot. In the course of the Red Terror that followed, six people were shot in the village of Mankovo, and twenty civilians in the Aleksandrovsky plant. On July 14, 1919, during the uprising in the First Cossack Regiment of Ataman Semyonov, thirteen officers and twenty Cossacks were killed. On July 16, the partisans shot another thirty-eight Cossacks. Although the decisions on executions were passed by the revolutionary court, it was no different from the sole court of the baron, since it was guided not by laws, but by class principles.

The minutes of the Sakhalin Regional People's Court sessions were published on charges of participants in the events in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. In the summer of 1920, the anarchist Tryapitsin, who commanded a unit of partisans who had occupied Nikolaevsk, received a directive from the military headquarters of Y.D. Yanson with instructions to protect the city from the advancing Japanese troops at any cost. Tryapitsin used this directive to massacre the civilian population, which, in his opinion, consisted of counter-revolutionary elements. Among the accusations read out at the trial, there was the following: "Suffice it to recall the filling of Amguni with corpses, the mountains of corpses that were taken out on boats into the fairway in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, and one and a half thousand corpses thrown on the ice of the Amur after the Japanese performance." Tryapitsyn was charged with burning the city, exterminating the peaceful Japanese population and half of the inhabitants of the Sakhalin region. He was sentenced to be shot.

The cruelty of R.F. Ungern was not something special in the white camp. What he did was normal for punitive operations on the Eastern Front. But what we know about the activities of L.G.Kornilov, M.G.Drozdovsky, A.P. Kutepov makes the number of victims of the "bloody baron" simply ridiculous. For example, the assistant and closest employee of MG Drozdovsky, Captain D.B. Bologovsky, recalled that during the Yassy-Don campaign, a "special intelligence team" was formed. During the campaign, they shot about 700 people. Only in Rostov - 500 people. The main task of the "team" was not the fight against the Reds, but the destruction of the former, which harm the White cause and contribute to the advance of Soviet power. Later, under the direct leadership of D.B. Bologovsky, the leader of the Kuban self-styled N.S. Ryabovol (a member of the Kuban Rada - one of the white governments) was killed.

We must take into account the exceptional conditions in which R.F. Ungern had to act. The defeat of the white movement on all fronts led to the complete demoralization of the white army. The Cossacks on the Southern Front and the soldiers of A.V. Kolchak equally massively abandoned the front and surrendered. Monstrous examples of demoralization are known, for example, in the units of Ataman B.V. Annenkov during the retreat to China (they killed and raped the wives and daughters of their own Cossack officers). R.F. Ungern was able not only to keep his regiments from collapse (where there were 16 nationalities, and the Russians were in the minority), but also to make them fight and win valiantly. For this, urgent measures were needed. According to the memoirists, the baron resorted to execution in the form of burning at the stake twice - during the defeat near Urga (Warrant Officer Chernov) and after the failure of the first campaign to the Far East Republic (physician Engelgardt-Yezersky). Each time, the combat capability of the division, despite the defeat, was fully restored. In this case, R.F. Ungern showed himself as an experienced psychologist. He was able to turn punishment into a powerful means of visual agitation and intimidation. It should be borne in mind that the usual execution would have made little impression on the Asians, and even on the Russians, taking into account the conditions of that time. Hence the burning at the stake. Actually, the range of unusual executions was limited to this.

What can be said in the conclusion? R.F. Ungern is the only military leader of the Civil War, whose victims are known practically by name. After analyzing the available sources, it was not possible to find the actions of the Asian Cavalry Division, about which Soviet authors wrote. Neither in the protocols of interrogations and court hearings, nor in the memoirs of contemporaries, do we find descriptions of the murders of women, children and civilians (with the exception of the Jewish pogrom and three families during the campaign to Siberia), nor the monstrous tortures in which the baron took part. On the contrary, it becomes obvious that R.F. Ungern did everything to preserve the combat effectiveness of his division and attract the sympathy of the population to it. He severely suppressed the facts of looting, mercilessly fought against robbers and thieves, resorted to the most severe means to maintain discipline. He destroyed those whom he considered enemies. The authors of the memoirs testify that R.F. Ungern never personally not only carried out his death sentences, but did not even attend interrogations with partiality. A.S. Makeev recalled that when the Cossacks brought the kid to the Baron on the march, he refused to accept the gift, saying: “You fools, can you really beat the defenseless? People need to be beaten, not animals. " There is evidence that R.F. Ungern did not carry weapons with him even in a combat situation. SE Khiltun cited the opinion of the Daurian esaul about the baron: “Grandfather doesn’t beat him in vain, he will flare up and strike; He will not shoot you, he knows his character and therefore never carries a revolver ... ". The same S.E. Khiltun recalled that during his first meeting with the baron on the streets of Urga, where the battle was still going on, he saw R.F. Ungern without weapons, only with a tashur and two grenades. Some memoirists recalled that when, when the baron tried to hit them with a tashur, they took up arms, his enthusiasm subsided. It is surprising that none of these officers dared to offer physical resistance, to return blow for blow. Such was the strength of the baron's personality that people dared to confront him only with weapons in their hands. The officers did not have enough determination to kill him.

Neither the materials of the trial, nor the memoirs of contemporaries provide material that allows one to compare the real figure of R. F. Ungern with the image of the “bloody baron” that exists in literature. Let's try to trace how this image was formed. During the operations of R. F. Ungern in Mongolia, the political organs of the Far Eastern Republic took care of propaganda. For this purpose, special leaflets were published, which spoke of the atrocities of Ungern's gangs. They were compiled both for the Red Army and the civilian population, and for the fighters of the Asian Cavalry Division itself (Bashkirs, Tatars). Another source of materials for drawing up the image of R.F. Ungern was the press. Newspapers and newspapermen of the 1920s differed little from modern ones. The main role in the direction of publications was played by the conjuncture of the host country of the printed organ and the political order of the editor, owner or sponsor. Thus, for example, the organ of the All-Siberian Regional Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the newspaper Volya, which is in Vladivostok, although it did not praise the activities of R.F. Ungern, did not dare to scold her either, because the Semenovites were nearby. The pages of "Volya" contained reports on the campaign of RFUngen in Mongolia, battles in the area of ​​the Akshi River, on the storming of Urga, and all this without comment. The newspaper "Latest News" located in Paris, published under the editorship of PN Milyukov, could not be shy in expressions. For its publishers, the events in the Far East were not significant, but all the same, articles were published in its issues condemning the activities of the ataman G.M. Semenov. The main motive behind the publications was that an anti-Bolshevik democratic movement was emerging in Siberia, which was hindered by the chieftaincy. For example, the well-known critic G.M. Semenov A.P. Budberg pointed out in his article that the ataman brought great benefits to the Bolsheviks by his activities. The newspaper generally preferred not to touch upon the activities of R. F. Ungern, since at that time articles about the history of falsification of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" were published from issue to issue. Against this background, the message about the Jewish pogrom in Urga, perpetrated on the orders of a white general, would look completely inappropriate.

Soviet newspapers were in a completely different position. They were obliged to participate in the ideological struggle against the not yet defeated G.M.Semenov and his colleague R.F.Ungern, respectively, the "black ataman" and the "bloody baron." Here are some examples of this newspaper company. The newspaper "Dalne-Vostochnaya Respublika", which in 1921 published the essays "Semyonovshchina" from issue to issue, also related to RF Ungern. On December 10, 1920, the newspaper published an article "Baronovshchina". It described how the "executioner baron", acting on the instructions of the "black chieftain", went on a raid to the West. The action was covered by the fact that G.M. Semenov announced in the press about the expulsion of R.F. Ungern's units from the armed forces for arbitrariness. Already in the next issue was placed the article "Horrors of the chieftaincy". It vividly described the events of the end of 1918, when, on the orders of R.F. Ungern, in the village of Utsrukhaitun, the Cossacks whipped one of the peasants, and his father was taken to Dauria, from where he never returned. The baron himself was referred to in the article as "the executioner and the vampire." To strengthen the impression, the journalist reported that according to rumors in Dauria, the executed were not buried, leaving them to be devoured by the wolves. The story of how, during the retreat of the whites, one of the officers of R. F. Ungern shot through a samovar in the house of the executed man, "to leave a memory" to his wife, allegedly as revenge. Apparently, the nascent Soviet journalism did not yet have enough experience; writers still preferred to find facts rather than invent them. Finally, already at the beginning of 1921, it was reported that "the movement of Ungern's gang to the east is accompanied by atrocities and terror over the civilian population inherent in baronial fellows." The robbery of the village of Antuanch and the murder of 200 Chinese were cited as concrete facts.

The Dalne-Vostochny Telegraf newspaper approached the exposure of RF Ungern more radically. In August 1921, the heading "Ungerovshchina" was introduced in it for some time. The editorial office of the newspaper reported that it had at its disposal many letters, reports, proclamations, depicting the true character of R.F. Ungern and his campaign in Mongoia. What did the editorial board really have at its disposal? In the center of the publications were the stories of the former authorized representative of the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR in Mongolia Maksteneck. He very emotionally described how, after the capture of R.F. Ungern, Urga not a single day passed without execution and up to 400 killed were registered. Baron Burdukovsky's adjutant massacred entire families. "Having occupied Urga, Ungern gave his soldiers the right to kill all Jews and" suspicious "Russians with impunity for three days and confiscate their property," Maksteneck said. For greater dramatization, this "eyewitness" reported that all the cattle were slaughtered in the homes of Jews along with women and children. Among the specific persons executed by order of the baron, the names of the merchants Noskov and Suleimanov were cited (from the memoirs of the White Guards it is known that N.M. Suleimanov performed the duties of the quartermaster and assistant to the mullah in the division).

Newspapers published in China made a great contribution to the creation of the image of the "bloody baron". It is obvious that Russian journalists in China, in order to earn the favor of the new owners, simply had to scold R.F. Ungern. Another reason was the antagonism between the atamans and the Kolchakites, among whom the journalistic fraternity most often belonged. Russian journalists in China did not eat their bread in vain. In several issues of the Harbin newspaper "Russia" an article was published "the massacre of Ungern", which later became a source of material both for Soviet historical literature and for the memoirs of RF Ungern's comrades-in-arms. No. 41 described in detail the punishments practiced in the Asian Cavalry Division. One of the easiest measures of punishment was the torture "sent to the roof", where they were kept without food or drink for up to seven days, the journalist wrote. In the interpretation of the newspaper, RFUngern's entry into Urga with the slogan "Kill the Jew, save Russia!" was greeted with enthusiasm by the Russian monarchists. They actively participated in pogroms, robberies and murders. For the sake of reliability, a number of original names were given in the article. For example, NM Suleimanov, the "field quartermaster", was declared an informer, thanks to whom many were executed. The plot about the death of the Jewish lawyer Ryabkin was painted in bright colors. He fled from Sipailov's detachment, received ten bullet wounds, was caught and executed - his nose and ears were cut off, his arms and legs were cut off. Cases of strangulation of Jewish women and children are described. The specific names of the witnesses, the only surviving Jews of the Barabanovskys, are given.

Judging by the Soviet press, foreign newspapers published in China did not stand aside from the revelations of R.F. Ungern. According to information from the Far Eastern Telegraph, in September 1921, the English newspaper Peking Tianjin Times published an article about the capture of the "mad baron." It listed the "incredible deeds" of R. F. Ungern and "mourned the harm caused by Ungern and others like him to the anti-Bolshevik case." In this case, the baron fell victim to the already international antagonisms. Leading European countries and the United States did not want Japan's strengthening in the Far East. They did their best to suppress Japanese interference in the internal affairs of Russia. The conductor of Japanese influence, Ataman G.M. Semenov, in this regard, was persecuted in the American and European press. R.F. Ungern shared the fate of his commander-in-chief.

The materials of newspaper publications testifying to the atrocities of the Asian Cavalry Division in Mongolia and Transbaikalia are not supported by documentary materials. Despite this, newspaper articles formed the basis of some memoirs and historical studies. Everything that is known today about the Baron R. F. Ungern does not fit with the image of the “bloody baron”, which is entrenched in literature. Extraordinary circumstances forced to resort to extraordinary, sometimes very cruel, measures. Striving to implement his ideas, just like his opponents V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky, R.F. Ungern did not reckon with real people, he dreamed of creating a new ideal kingdom and the renewal of man. The civil war, with its harsh realities, created an environment in which the brave officer and dreamer was forced to play the role of the executioner. But even so, according to GM Semenov, "all the oddities of the baron always had a deep psychological meaning and striving for truth and justice." This statement of the chieftain is confirmed by the materials given above. The stamps that have formed in historical literature for decades cannot be refuted by one article or even a series of monographs. For a long time the horrors of the Civil War in the Far East will be associated with the name of Baron R. F. Ungern, but time will sooner or later put everything in its place.

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http://www.pravaya.ru/ludi/450/4835

Baron Robert-Nicolaus-Maximilian (Roman Fyodorovich) von Ungern-Steernberg(it. Nikolai Robert Max Baron von Ungern-Sternberg; December 16 (29), 1885, Graz - September 15, 1921, Novonikolaevsk) - Russian general, a prominent figure in the White movement in the Far East. Restored the independence of Mongolia.

Chevalier of the Order of St. George, 4th degree, Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree, Orders of St. Anna, 3rd and 4th degrees, Order of St. Stanislav, 3rd degree.

From the old German-Baltic (Ostsee) county and baronial family, included in the noble matrices of all three Russian Baltic provinces. The family comes from Hans von Ungern, who in 1269 was a vassal of the Archbishop of Riga.

Father - Theodor-Leonhard-Rudolph. Mother - Sophie-Charlotte von Wimpfen, German, native of Stuttgart. Ungern's parents traveled a lot in Europe, the boy was born to them in Austria.

Apparently in 1888 the Ungerns returned to Estonia. In 1891, Theodore and Sophia divorced. In April 1894, Sofia remarried - to Baron Oskar-Anselm-Hermann (Oskar Fedorovich) von Goiningen-Hüne. From 1900 to 1902, Roman Ungern briefly attended the Nikolaev Gymnasium (now Gustav Adolf Gymnasium) in Reval (now Tallinn, Estonia), from where he was expelled due to the fact that in 1901 he stopped attending classes, as he fell ill with pneumonia and left for treatment to the south and abroad

On August 1, 1902, his stepfather wrote an application for Roman Ungern's enrollment in the Naval Cadet Corps in St. Petersburg. During his studies, his behavior was uneven, headstrong and gradually deteriorated. As a result, in February 1905, Roman Ungern was taken into the care of his parents. During the Russo-Japanese War, Ungern entered the 91st Dvinsky Infantry Regiment as a volunteer 1st category, but this regiment was not in the war, and the baron asked to be transferred to the Cossack division at the front. This did not work out, and he went over to replenishment in the 12th Velikolutsk regiment, assigned to the South Manchu theater of military operations. But by the time he arrived in Manchuria, the fighting had already ended. In November 1905 he was promoted to corporal. In May 1913 R. F. Ungern was awarded a light bronze medal for the Russo-Japanese War. In 1906 he was transferred to the Pavlovsk military school, from which he graduated in 1908 and, at his request, was enrolled in the Trans-Baikal Cossack army.

Cossack service

From June 1908 he served in the 1st Argun Regiment of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army with the rank of cornet. In 1910 he was transferred to the 1st Amur Cossack Regiment. In 1912 he was promoted to centurion. In July 1913, he resigned and left for Kobdo, Mongolia. Ungern's goal was to participate in the national liberation movement of the Mongols against China, but he was allowed to serve only as a supernumerary officer in the convoy of the Russian consulate. The legend that Ungern collaborated with Ja Lama in Mongolia is refuted by documents. Having received news of the beginning of the war in 1914, Ungern immediately left for Russia.

Order of St. George 4th century

With the outbreak of the First World War, he entered the 34th Don Cossack Regiment, operating on the Austrian front in Galicia. During the war, he was wounded five times, but returned to duty with unhealed wounds. For his exploits, bravery and courage he was awarded a number of orders.

Soon after arriving at the front, on September 22, 1914, in a battle near the farm, Podborek Ungern showed heroism in battle, for which he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree. On December 27, 1914, the Duma of the Order of St. George of the 10th Army “recognized the centurion Baron Roman Ungern-Sternberg, who was attached to the 34th Don Regiment, worthy of being awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, for being at farm Podborek 400-500 steps from the enemy's trenches, under real rifle and artillery fire, gave accurate and correct information about the location of the enemy and his movements, as a result of which measures were taken that entailed the success of subsequent actions. "

R. F. Ungern during the First World War.

At the end of 1914, the baron transferred to the 1st Nerchinsk regiment, during his service in which he was awarded the Order of St. Anne of the 4th degree with the inscription "For Bravery". In September 1915, Ungern was seconded to the cavalry detachment of the Northern Front of Ataman Punin of Special Importance, whose task was to carry out partisan operations behind enemy lines in East Prussia. During his further service in the special detachment, Ungern received two more orders: the Order of St. Stanislav, 3rd degree and the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree.

Baron Ungern returned to the Nerchinsk regiment in July or August 1916. On September 20, 1916, he was promoted from the centurion to the Polesauly, and then to the Esauly - "for military distinction." In September 1916, he was awarded the Order of St. Anne, 3rd degree.

In October 1916, in the city of Chernivtsi (now Chernivtsi, Ukraine) he committed an antidisciplinary act and was removed from the regiment. In 1917, Ungern went to the Caucasian front. There is an assumption that he was transferred there by the commander of the 1st Nerchinsk regiment, Colonel Baron P.N. Wrangel. There he was again together with his friend G.M.Semenov - the future chieftain. Here, in the area of ​​the lake. Urmia in Persia (Iran), Ungern participated in organizing the volunteer detachments of the Assyrians who fought on the side of Russia. The Assyrians performed well, but this did not have a significant impact on the course of hostilities, as the Russian army continued to fall apart under the influence of the February Revolution of 1917.

In July 1917, GM Semyonov left Petrograd for Transbaikalia, where he arrived on August 1 with the appointment, at his request, of the Commissar of the Provisional Government in the Far East for the formation of national units. Following him in Transbaikalia, his friend, the military sergeant-major Baron Ungern, also appeared. In October or November 1917, Ungern with 10-16 people created a counter-revolutionary group in Irkutsk. Apparently, Ungern joined Semyonov in Irkutsk. Having learned about the October Revolution of 1917, Semenov, Ungern and 6 more people left for Chita, from there - to the station. Dauria in Transbaikalia, where it was decided to form a regiment.

Preparing for the Civil War

In December 1917 Semenov, Ungern and 5 more Cossacks disarmed the demoralized Russian garrison of st. Manchuria. Here Semyonov began to form the Special Manchurian Detachment (OMO) to fight the Reds. At the beginning of 1918, Ungern was appointed commandant of Art. Hailar. The Baron disarmed the pro-Bolshevik units located there. Successful operations inspired Semyonov and Ungern to expand their activities. They began to form national detachments, including representatives of the Mongols and Buryats. After the appearance in the winter and spring of 1918 in Transbaikalia of numerous echelons with pro-Bolshevik-minded soldiers returning from the collapsed German front, the Semyonov detachment was forced to retreat to Manchuria, leaving behind only a small piece of Russian land in the region of the Onon River. In the spring and summer of 1918, on the Daurian front, the OMO fought protracted battles with the Reds, in which Ungern participated. After the Soviet power in Transbaikalia fell, Semyonov in September 1918 approved his rate in Chita. In November 1918, Ungern was promoted to major general. He moved from Hailar to Dauria.

On September 1, 1918, a Separate Native Horse Brigade was formed in Dauria, on the basis of which the Indigenous Cavalry Corps was later formed, then transformed into the Asian Cavalry Division under the command of Ungern (see the history of its creation and organizational structure). Ungern was actually the full-fledged ruler of Dauria and the adjacent section of the Trans-Baikal Railway. From here he made raids against the Red partisans of Transbaikalia. Like other whites and reds, Ungern made extensive use of requisitions to supply his troops. First of all, the Reds and those suspected of sympathizing with them, as well as those who exported money and goods abroad in large quantities, were subject to requisitions. The supply of the baron's troops was better than most of the other white units in Siberia. There was a massive recruitment of volunteers. The discipline was based on concern for personnel and cruel punishments.

Ungern developed a plan to restore monarchies and fight against revolutions in Eurasia, starting from Manchuria, Mongolia and China and further west. In the context of this plan, in February - September 1919, he traveled to Manchuria and China. There, he established contacts with monarchist circles, and also prepared a meeting between Semyonov and the Manchu militarist Zhang Zuolin. In July 1919, Ungern in Harbin, according to the Orthodox ceremony, married Princess Ji, a representative of the overthrown Qing dynasty. She received the name Elena Pavlovna Ungern-Sternberg. They communicated in English. The purpose of the marriage was political: Ji was a relative of General Zhang Kuivu, the commander of the Chinese troops of the western part of the CER and the governor of Hailar.

In November 1919, the Red troops approached Transbaikalia. At the beginning of 1920, an uprising took place in Irkutsk, the city was captured by the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Political Center; Admiral Kolchak was killed. In January - February 1920, the Red partisans launched a broad offensive. In March 1920, they took Verkhneudinsk, the Semyonovites retreated to Chita. In June - July 1920, the whites launched their last broad offensive in Transbaikalia. Ungern acted in the direction of the Alexandrovsky and Nerchinsky factories in coordination with the troops of General V.M. Molchanov. White could not withstand the pressure of the superior forces of the Reds. Ungern began to prepare a departure to Mongolia. On August 7, 1920, the Asian Division was transformed into a partisan detachment.

Mongol epic

Liberation of Mongolia

In August 1920, the Asian Division left Dauria and left in the direction of Mongolia, occupied by Chinese troops. There is an assumption that the campaign was planned as a deep raid to the rear of the Soviet troops who were attacking Chita, the details of the plan were kept secret, which required misinformation about the "disappeared division" and the "arbitrariness" of the baron, but in October 1920 Semyonov's troops retreated, and therefore Ungern's raid to the rear of the Reds became meaningless. Analysis of the documents shows that Ungern had his own plan: to begin the restoration of monarchies from Mongolia. Ungern and his division in Urga were awaited with hope by many: for the Mongols he was the herald of the revival of independence, while for the Russian colonists he carried liberation from the Chinese yoke.

Ungern's army crossed the border with Mongolia on October 1 near the village of Ust-Bukukun and headed southwest. Approaching the capital of Mongolia Niisl-Khure, the baron entered into negotiations with the Chinese command. All his demands, including the disarmament of the Chinese troops, were rejected. On October 26-27 and November 2-4, 1920, the Ungernovites stormed the city, but were defeated, suffering significant losses. The Chinese tightened the regime in Urga, establishing control of religious services in Buddhist monasteries, plundering and arresting Russians and Mongols, regarded as "separatists."

After the defeat, Ungern's army withdrew to the upper reaches of the Kerulen River in the Setsen Khan aimag in eastern Mongolia. Here Ungern received moral and material support from all strata of the Mongolian population. The financial position of the division improved, including through the capture of caravans heading from China to supply the Chinese garrison of Urga. The division was subject to cane discipline, including brutal executions after torture of marauders, deserters and thieves. The division was replenished at the expense of individual groups of whites who penetrated from Transbaikalia. The Mongol princes, including G. Luvsantseveen, organized the mobilization of the Mongols. The theocratic monarch of Mongolia, Bogdo-gegen VIII, who was under Chinese arrest, secretly sent Ungern his blessing to expel the Chinese from the country. According to the memoirs of M. G. Tornovsky, by the time of the decisive assault on Urga, the number of the Asian division was 1,460 people, the number of the Chinese garrison was 7 thousand people. The Chinese also had great superiority in artillery and machine guns, and created a system of trenches in and around Urga.

Colonel Dubovik, who joined Ungern in Mongolia, drew up a report with an attachment to the disposition of the capture of Urga. Ungern and his closest assistant B.P. Rezukhin recognized it as excellent, gathered senior officers and accepted it with some amendments (for more details, see :).

On the night of February 1, 1921, two hundred Tibetans, Mongols and Buryats headed by Ts.Zh. Tubanov, Bargut Luvsan and the Tibetan Saja Lama set out from the U-Bulan valley ( Ooo bulan, southeast of Urga) to the southwestern slope of Mount Bogdo-ula (south of Urga) in order to free Bogdo-gegen from arrest. The main forces of the whites moved on the city. On the same day, a detachment under the command of Rezukhin captured the advanced positions of the Chinese south of Urga. Two hundred (under the command of Hobotov and Neumann) approached the city from the southeast. On February 2, Ungern's troops, after the fighting, captured the rest of the advanced positions of the Chinese and part of Urga. During these battles, the Ungernovsky detachment freed Bogdo-gegen from arrest and took him to the Manjushri-hiyd monastery on the Bogdo-ula mountain. This has had a demoralizing effect on the Chinese people.

On February 3, Ungern gave his troops a rest. On the hills around Urga, the Whites lit large fires at night, along which Rezukhin's detachment was guided, preparing for the decisive assault. The bonfires also gave the impression that the reinforcements that surrounded the city had approached Ungern. On February 4, the baron undertook a decisive assault on the capital from the east, first capturing the Chinese barracks and the trading settlement of Maimachen. After fierce battles, the city was captured. Part of the Chinese troops left Urga before and during the fighting. However, small battles took place on February 5th.

I.I.Serebryanikov assesses the personal role of Baron Ungern in the capture of Urga as follows:

Those who knew Baron Ungern noted his great personal courage and fearlessness. He was not afraid, for example, to visit besieged Urga, where the Chinese would pay dearly for his head. It happened in the following way. On one of the bright, sunny winter days, the baron, dressed in his usual Mongolian attire - in a red and cherry robe, in a white hat, with a tashur in his hands, simply drove into Urga along the main road, with an average gait. He visited the palace of the main Chinese dignitary in Urga, Chen Yi, then past the consular town he returned to his camp. On the way back, passing by the prison, he noticed that the Chinese sentry slept here peacefully at his post. This violation of discipline angered the Baron. He dismounted and rewarded the sleeping sentry with several lashes of the lash. To the awakened and terribly frightened soldier, Ungern explained in Chinese that the sentry on guard was not allowed to sleep and that he, Baron Ungern, had punished him for this. Then he got back on the horse and calmly rode on. This appearance of Baron Ungern in Urga made a colossal sensation among the population of the city, and plunged the Chinese soldiers into fear and despondency, instilling in them the confidence that some supernatural forces were behind the baron and were helping him ...

On March 11-13, 1921, Ungern captured the fortified Chinese military base at Choirin in southern Mongolia; another base, in Dzamyn-Ude, a little to the south, the Chinese soldiers left without a fight. The remaining Chinese troops, retreating from Urga to the north of Mongolia, tried to bypass the capital and get into China. In addition, a large number of Chinese soldiers moved in the same direction from Maimachen (near the Russian border near the town of Kyakhta). The Russians and Mongols took this as an attempt to re-capture Urga. Several hundred Cossacks and Mongols met several thousand Chinese soldiers in the area of ​​the Urga-Ulyasutai tract near the Tola River in central Mongolia. The fighting went on from March 30 to April 2. The Chinese were defeated, some surrendered, and some broke through to the south to China. All of Outer Mongolia was now free.

Mongolia at Ungern

Urga met whites as liberators. However, at first, robberies took place in the city - either with the permission of the baron, or because he could not stop his subordinates. Soon Ungern harshly put a stop to robbery and violence.

On February 22, 1921, a solemn ceremony of the re-erection of Bogdo Gegen VIII to the throne of the Great Khan of Mongolia took place in Urga. For services to Mongolia, Ungern was awarded the title of darkhan-khoshoi-chin-wan in the degree of khan; many of the baron's subordinates received the titles of Mongol princes. In addition, the baron received the rank of lieutenant general from Semyonov. It is often mistakenly believed that Ungern became the dictator or khan of Mongolia, and the monarchical government was a puppet. This is not so: all power was exercised by Bogdo-gegen VIII and his government. The baron acted with the approval of the monarch; Ungern received one of the highest titles in Mongolia, but not power.

Ungern almost did not interfere in the actual Mongol affairs, although he helped the Mongol authorities. During this period, despite the actual isolation, a number of progressive measures were implemented in the country: a military school was opened in Urga, a national bank, health care, the administrative system, industry, communications, agriculture, and trade were improved. But in relation to the colonists who came to Mongolia from Russia, Ungern showed himself as a cruel ruler. The commander of Urga was the head of counterintelligence of the Asian division, Lieutenant Colonel L.V. Sipailo, who concentrated in his hands all the full civilian power over the colonists. With reference to Ungern's orders, 38 Jews were killed in Urga; the total number of executed different nationalities (in Mongolia and outside it) is approximately 846 people (see lists :). The reason was that Ungern saw Jews as the main culprits of revolutions and revolutionaries as their main enemies.

Realizing that the White Cause in Russia was lost, Ungern tried to use the people's dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime to restore the monarchy in Russia. He also hoped to use the actions of other white forces, the monarchists of Mongolia, Manchuria, China and East Turkestan, as well as the Japanese. Nevertheless, he did not have well-established intelligence and accurate information about the situation in these regions and Siberia, he acted contrary to the strategy of Japan. In addition, the resources of Mongolia did not allow for the long-term maintenance of the Asian division, the attitude of the local population towards the whites and the discipline of the troops from a long standing worsened.

Northern campaign of 1921

On May 21, Ungern issued order No. 15 to "Russian detachments on the territory of Soviet Siberia," with which he announced the start of a campaign on Soviet territory. Many people participated in drafting the order, including the famous Polish-Russian journalist and writer Ferdinand Ossendowski. The order, in particular, said:

… Among the people we see disappointment, distrust of people. He needs names, names known to everyone, dear and revered. There is only one such name - the rightful owner of the Russian Land, the All-Russian Emperor Mikhail Aleksandrovich ... In the fight against the criminal destroyers and defilers of Russia, remember that as the moral decline in Russia is complete and the complete mental and physical depravity cannot be guided by the old assessment. There can be only one punishment - the death penalty of various degrees. The old foundations of justice have changed. There is no "truth and mercy." There must now be "truth and ruthless severity." The evil that came to earth to destroy the Divine principle in the human soul must be uprooted ...

It should be noted that Mikhail Alexandrovich Romanov was killed in Perm in the summer of 1918. The goal of the campaign of Baron Ungern in Soviet Russia lay in the context of the revival of the empire of Genghis Khan: Russia was to unanimously revolt, and the Middle Empire (which he understood not as China, but as a country of nomads from the Pacific Ocean to the Caspian Sea, heir to the Great Mongolian empire).

In the spring of 1921, the Asian division was divided into two brigades: one under the command of Lieutenant General Ungern, the other under Major General Rezukhin. The latter was supposed to cross the border in the area of ​​the village of Tsezhinskaya and, acting on the left bank of the Selenga, go to Mysovsk and Tataurovo along the red rear, blowing up bridges and tunnels along the way. Ungern's brigade attacked Troitskosavsk, Selenginsk and Verkhneudinsk. According to M.G. Tornovsky, Ungern's brigade consisted of 2,100 fighters, 20 machine guns and 8 guns, Rezukhin's brigade - 1,510 fighters, 10 machine guns and 4 guns, units left in the Urga area - 520 people. Representatives of more than 16 nationalities served in the Asian division, mainly Russians, Mongols, Buryats, Chinese, Tatars, who made up the national detachments. In addition, detachments of whites in other parts of Mongolia were subordinate to Ungern: N. N. Kazagrandi, I. G. Kazantsev, A. P. Kaigorodov, A. I. Shubin.

In May, Rezukhin's brigade began a raid across the border with Russia west of the river. Selenga. Ungern's brigade set out from Urga on May 21 and slowly moved north. By this time, the Reds were already moving troops from different directions to the border with Mongolia. They had a multiple superiority in manpower and weapons, so Ungern's attack on Siberia was considered desirable.

Rezukhin's brigade in Transbaikalia managed to defeat several Red detachments. In one of these battles, on June 2, 1921, near the village of Zhelturinskaya, K. K. Rokossovsky distinguished himself, who received for this the second Order of the Battle Red Banner. Rezukhin had no connection with Ungern's brigade; as a result of the actions of the Reds, a threat of encirclement was created. On June 8, he began to retreat and fought for Mongolia.

Ungern's brigade was defeated in the battles for Troitskosavsk on June 11-13. Then the combined forces of the Bolsheviks and the Red Mongols, after minor battles with the security detachments of Ungern, entered Urga, left by the Whites, on July 6.

Ungern, having given a short rest to his brigade on the river. Iro, led her to join Rezukhin. Ungern's brigade approached Rezukhin's brigade on July 7 or 8, but it was possible to cross the Selenga and join forces only after 4-5 days. On July 18, the Asian division had already moved on its last campaign - to Mysovsk and Verkhneudinsk. The forces of the Asian division at the time of their performance on the 2nd campaign were 3250 fighters with 6 guns and 36 machine guns.

On August 1, 1921, Baron Ungern defeated the Gusinoozyorsky datsan, taking prisoners of 300 Red Army soldiers, 2 guns, 6 machine guns, 500 rifles and a baggage train. The prisoners were released (according to other sources, 24 communists were killed). The white offensive caused great concern for the FER authorities. Vast territories around Verkhneudinsk were declared a state of siege, a regrouping of troops was carried out, reinforcements arrived, etc. Ungern probably realized that his hopes for an uprising of the population did not come true. There was a threat of encirclement by the Reds. An important factor was the fact that now, instead of poorly organized Red partisans, Ungern was opposed by numerous, well-armed and organized troops of the 5th Soviet Army and the FER - against the background of the lack of expected reinforcements. On August 3, the Asian Division began to withdraw to Mongolia.

On August 5, during the battle at Novodmitrievka, the initial success of the Ungernovites was nullified by the red armored cars that approached. According to various sources, two families, or one person, were killed in the village. On August 7-10, the division fought back to Mongolia. On August 11, the Baron divided the division into two brigades. Ungern's brigade went ahead, and Rezukhin's brigade advanced a little later in the rearguard, repelling the attacks of the advancing Reds. On August 14-15, the Ungernovtsy crossed the impregnable Modonkul char and went to Mongolia. MG Tornovsky estimates the losses of the Whites during the second campaign to Siberia at less than 200 people killed and 50 seriously wounded. He estimates the loss of the Reds at 2000-2500 people, which is apparently overestimated.

Conspiracy and captivity

Baron R. F. Ungern and an unknown person

Ungern decided to lead the division to the west - to Uryankhai for the winter, in order to start fighting again later. Then, apparently realizing that this place, due to its geographical features, would become a trap for whites, he decided to leave for Tibet. These plans did not receive support: the soldiers and officers were sure that this would doom them to death. As a result, a conspiracy arose in both brigades against Baron Ungern with the aim of leaving for Manchuria.

On the night of 17-18 August 1921, Rezukhin died at the hands of his subordinates. On the night of August 18-19, the conspirators fired at the tent of Ungern himself, but the latter managed to escape. The conspirators dealt with several executioners close to the baron, after which both rebellious brigades went eastward in order to reach Manchuria through Mongolia.

Ungern made an attempt to return his brigade, but they drove the baron away with shots. Later he met his Mongolian division, which was arrested on August 20, 1921. Then the detachment, together with the baron, was taken prisoner by a patrol of partisans, which was commanded by the former staff captain, a cavalier of the full bow of soldiers Georgiev P.E.Schetinkin.

In the memoirs of eyewitnesses from Russia and Mongolia, several versions of the arrest of Baron Ungern have survived, on the basis of which the following reconstruction was made. On the morning of August 19, Ungern met his Mongolian division. The Baron tried to win him over to his side. Perhaps Ungern also ordered the arrest and execution of the Russian instructors in the battalion. However, the Mongols did not want to continue fighting and helped at least some of them escape. To get out of the fight, the battalion commander Bishereltu-gun Sundui with his subordinates on the morning of August 20 tied Ungern and took him to the whites (the Mongols believed that the bullet did not take the baron). By that time, the Reds from the Shchetinkin detachment learned from the prisoners about what had happened in the Ungern brigade. They dispatched a reconnaissance group and stumbled upon a tied baron with the Mongols heading towards the leaving whites.

Process and execution

On August 26, 1921, Lenin telephoned his opinion on the baron's case, which became a guide to the entire process:

I advise you to pay more attention to this matter, to obtain a verification of the solidity of the accusation, and if the evidence is complete, which, apparently, cannot be doubted, then arrange a public trial, hold it as quickly as possible and shoot it.

On September 15, 1921, in Novonikolaevsk, in the summer theater in the Sosnovka park (currently there are production buildings on Fabrichnaya Street at the intersection with Spartak Street), a demonstration process took place over Ungern. E.M. Yaroslavsky was appointed the main prosecutor at the trial. The whole thing took 5 hours and 20 minutes. Ungern was charged on three counts: first, actions in the interests of Japan, which was expressed in plans to create a "Central Asian state"; secondly, an armed struggle against Soviet power with the aim of restoring the Romanov dynasty; thirdly, terror and atrocities. During the entire trial and investigation, Baron Ungern behaved with great dignity and emphasized his negative attitude towards Bolshevism and Soviet power.

A number of the court's accusations are substantiated by facts: in relations with monarchists, an attempt to create a Central Asian state, in sending letters and appeals, gathering an army to overthrow Soviet power and restore the monarchy, an attack on the RSFSR and the Far Eastern Republic, reprisals against those suspected of being close to Bolshevism, even women and children, and in torture. On the other hand, Ungern's verdict contains a number of false accusations: the extermination of entire villages, the total extermination of Jews, actions "for the benefit of Japan's predatory plans" and the fact that the baron's actions were part of a general plan for an offensive against the RSFSR from the east.

Bogdo-gegen, after receiving the news of the execution of Ungern, ordered to serve prayers for him in all the temples of Mongolia.

Ungern's myth

After his death, Ungern's charismatic personality was overgrown with legends. According to the memoirs of some Europeans, the Mongols considered Ungern "the god of war", although such a god is absent in the Buddhist pantheon. In Tibet, the place of the god of war is taken by Dokshit Begtse (Tib .: Jamsaran), in Mongolia he is considered the patron saint of the monasteries of the capital, liberated by Ungern from the Chinese; in the folk tradition of the Mongol peoples, he was sometimes interpreted as a "god of war."

Authors of popular books of the late XX - early XXI century. they called him "the white knight of Tibet", "the warrior of Shambhala", "Mahakala", etc. From the time of his death to the present day, in different parts of Mongolia and Transbaikalia, they are looking for the treasures of Baron Ungern. In Russia, Poland and China, his “descendants” were announced, but all such claims are based on legends or falsifications.

Historical meaning

R. F. Ungern left a significant mark in history: it was thanks to the baron, with his complete disregard for danger, who was able to draw a handful of Cossacks and soldiers into the insane campaign against Urga, which seemed to his contemporaries, that today's Mongolia is an independent state from China. If it had not been for the capture of Urga by the Asian division, if the Chinese troops had not been expelled from Urga and there would have been no reason for the introduction of Red Army units into Mongolian territory in response to the Ungern attack on Transbaikalia, Outer Mongolia, which gained independence after the collapse of the Qing empire, would have been annexed by China and would become the same Chinese province as Inner Mongolia.

Baron Ungern was not a characteristic figure of the White movement, but he posed a real danger to Bolshevism in that he openly proclaimed his goal was not the vague and vague idea of ​​the Constituent Assembly, but the restoration of the monarchy.

An ardent monarchist, Roman Fedorovich hated the revolution and, in general, everything that led to the overthrow of monarchies. “The only one who can preserve the truth, goodness, honor and customs, so cruelly trampled by wicked people - revolutionaries, are the kings. Only they can protect religion and raise faith on earth. But people are selfish, impudent, deceitful, lost faith and lost the truth, and there were no kings. And with them there was no happiness, and even people seeking death cannot find it. But truth is true and immutable, and truth always triumphs ... The highest embodiment of tsarism is the union of deity with human power, as was Bogdykhan in China, Bogdo Khan in Khalkha and in the old days Russian tsars "(from a letter from the baron to a Mongol prince).

Ungern was a fatalist and a mystic. He accepted Buddhism, but at the same time did not abandon Christianity and considered all religions to express one supreme truth. Ungern's political concept was closely related to his eschatological views. In the prophecies of different religions, he found an explanation for the civil war and his vocation in the fight against revolutionaries.

Awards

• Order of St. George, 4th degree (December 27, 1914: “for the fact that during the battle on September 22, 1914, being at the Podborek farm, 400-500 steps from the enemy's trenches, under real rifle and artillery fire, he gave accurate and information about the location of the enemy and his movements, as a result of which measures were taken that entailed the success of subsequent actions ");
• Order of St. Anne of the 4th degree with the inscription "For Bravery" (1914);
• Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd degree (1915);
• Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree (1915);
• Order of St. Anne 3rd degree (September 1916).

Reconsideration of the case

Wikisource has full text Resolutions of the Presidium of the Novosibirsk Regional Court on the refusal of the rehabilitation of Baron Ungern R.F.

On September 25, 1998, the Presidium of the Novosibirsk Regional Court denied the rehabilitation of Baron Ungern R.F.

Memory

• In 1928 the poet Arseny Nesmelov wrote The Ballad of the Daurian Baron.
• He is the protagonist of a number of feature films about revolutionary events in the Far East: "His name is Sukhe-Bator" (1942, played by Nikolai Cherkasov); joint Soviet-Mongolian "Exodus" (1968, played by Alexander Lemberg); The Wandering Front (1971, Afanasy Kochetkov).
• The song “Eternal Sky” by the group “Kalinov Most”, the third in the album “Ice Camp”, released in 2007, is dedicated to Baron Ungern.
• The song of the same name by the Volgograd R.A.C.-group "My Daring Truth" (TIR) ​​is dedicated to the memory of Baron Ungern.
• The documentary novel by Leonid Yuzefovich "The Autocrat of the Desert" is dedicated to Ungern
• Baron Ungern (Jungern) is a character in Viktor Pelevin's novel Chapaev and Emptiness.
• Evgeny Yurkevich dedicated the song "Ungern von Sternberg (behind Baron Roman)" to the baron.
• Baron Ungern appears in visions of one of the main characters in Andrei Belyanin's poem Lana.
• The song "The Baron of Urga" by the neofolk / neoclassic group "H.E.R.R." is dedicated to Ungern.
• The Ukrainian black metal group "Ungern" is named after Baron Ungern, the lyrics of the group are based on anti-communism and national socialism.
• The poem by A. A. Shiropaev "Ungern" is dedicated to the Baron.
• Ungern is one of the heroes of A. Valentinov's novel "General March".

(1885 - 1921)

Yuri Kondakov, St. Petersburg

On September 15, 1921, Baron Ungern was shot. A convinced monarchist, he did not envision any other state structure for Russia. From the very beginning of the revolution, the baron already had his own plan for the creation of the Middle Kingdom, uniting all nomadic peoples of the Mongolian root, "in their organization not subject to Bolshevism."

"Bloody Baron" R. F. Ungern: myths and facts

To date, literature about the life and work of R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg is large enough. During the Soviet period, certain tendencies developed in the writings about the baron associated with the mythologization of his image. Despite the fact that in modern Russian literature the assessment of the activities of R.F. Ungerna has undergone significant changes, the clichés that developed during the Soviet era still continue to exist. One of the first studies on the struggle of R.F. A.N. Kislov wrote Ungern against the Soviet regime. For the first time his small work "The Defeat of Ungern" was published in the magazine "War and Revolution" in 1931. The author set as his goal an overview of military operations, so he dwelt little on the atrocities of the "bloody baron". At the same time, he was the only one who accused R.F. Ungerna in the burning of the village of Kulinga with all the inhabitants, including women and children, at the entrance of the Asian Cavalry Division into Mongolia. In 1964, the work of A.N. Kislov was published already in the form of a monograph under the same title. The author was more eloquent, describing the deeds of the baron, whose image was already firmly established in Soviet literature: “The brutal bandits robbed and killed peaceful Soviet citizens, shot communists and Soviet workers, sparing neither women nor children ... Ungern took about a hundred hostages with him, threatening with brutal reprisals in the event of any opposition from the residents, ”wrote A.N. Kislitsyn without any reference to the source of information.

The next researcher of the fight against R.F. Ungern turned out to be even more severe. B. Tsibikov's monograph was written in 1947, while Soviet literature was full of exposing the atrocities of fascism. From the point of view of the author, R.F. Ungern was the forerunner of fascist ideology and, accordingly, simply had to be a bloody executioner. To B. Tsibikov's credit, it should be noted that he did not falsify the data, drawing information from the press of the 1920s. For example, he stated that by order of R.F. Ungern in Urga killed over 400 people. The author described in great detail the massacres of Jews, citing specific names. B. Tsibikov colorfully painted pictures of how the soldiers of the Asian division, taking by the legs, tore the children into two halves, and R.F. Ungern supervised the slow burning at the stake of a random traveler caught on the road in order to extort from him where the money was kept.

In the future, Soviet authors no longer resorted to such artistic techniques to depict the atrocities of the baron, but the image of the "bloody" was entrenched in R.F. Ungernom is very strong. In 1957, G. Kurgunov and I. Sorokovikov wrote in their book: “Ungern is a refined sadist, for him pleasure is not only in the death of his victim, but in the intolerable torment of this victim, caused by various tortures. Here and the burning of the living at the stake, snatching pieces of meat from the back with hooks, burning the heels with a hot iron, etc. " In the monograph "The collapse of the anti-Soviet underground in the USSR" D.L. Golikov declared R.F.Ungern a "fanatic Black Hundred", pointing out that the baron left behind the ashes of burnt villages and corpses, he handed out all the property of the "recalcitrant" to members of his gang and fed by robbery. Based on newspaper publications during the Civil War, the author claimed that Ungern burned huge villages along with women and children, and also shot hundreds of peasants. Similar trends persisted in the literature of the 90s. The author of the monograph "The Political History of Mongolia" SK Roshchin wrote that RF Ungern was "a tyrant, a maniac, a mystic, a cruel, withdrawn man, a drunkard (in his youth)." At the same time, the author did not refuse to the baron in some positive qualities - asceticism, frantic energy, courage.

In the 90s, researchers gained access to the memoirs of R.F. Ungern's contemporaries, and most importantly, they could be freely referenced in publications. It suddenly turned out that the baron's comrades-in-arms were no less strict with his activities than Soviet literature.

For the first time, the life and work of R.F. Ungern received adequate coverage in the fictionalized book of Leonid Yuzefovich. Unfortunately, the author's approach to the memoirs of the Baron's contemporaries was practically devoid of criticism. In the work of A. Yuzefovich, R.F. Ungern was captured exactly as he was reflected in the memoirs of his comrades-in-arms. At the same time, the assessment of the baron's activities was generally positive. The author of the monograph "Baron Ungern von Sternberg" EA Belov was careful with the testimonies of the baron's associates. But his objectivity in describing the actions of the Asian Cavalry Division during the campaign to Russia betrayed him. Based on the testimony of R. F. Ungern during interrogations, the author concludes that “in the temporarily occupied territory of Siberia, Ungern behaved like a cruel conqueror, killing entire families of communists and partisans, not sparing women, old people and children”. In fact, the execution, by order of R.F. Ungern, of three families from dozens of villages occupied by the division was an exception (here the baron was guided by some unknown to us, but very specific reasons). In addition, E.A. Belov, in describing the baron's atrocities on Soviet territory, referred to the most unscrupulous memoirist N.M. Ribo (Rezukhin). Hence the descriptions of the mass robbery of the civilian population, the rape of women, torture and even the burning of an old Buryat at the stake. All this is not confirmed by other sources and therefore cannot be considered reliable.

S.L. Kuzmin, the editor of collections of documents and the author of the introductory article to them, deliberately distanced himself from the memoirists, focusing on the military and political activities of R.F. Ungern.

Despite the large number of publications on this topic, the personality and some aspects of R.F. Ungern's activities remain in the shadows. Until now, there was not enough information to confirm or refute the traditional stamp of the "bloody baron", which was widespread both in Soviet literature and in the memoirs of R.F. Ungern's contemporaries. The situation was changed by the publication of documents and memoirs, carried out under the editorship of S.L. Kuzmin in 2004. Now there is an opportunity to highlight this area of ​​activity of R.F. Ungern, to separate facts from myths. How many victims did the “bloody baron” have, who exactly fell from his hand, what was RFU Ungern’s guided by, determining punishments for enemies, his own subordinates and “random people”, and, finally, how exceptional were his actions against the general background of the Civil War - this material will allow you to answer these questions.

Materials published by S.L. Kuzmin are divided into two blocks 1) documents; 2) memoirs. In turn, the collection of documents highlights the materials of the investigation and trial of R.F. Ungern. Acquaintance with these sources leaves a strange impression. All three groups of documents show us their own image of the baron, not like the rest.

Biographical materials, documents on the activities of R.F. Ungern at the head of the Asian Cavalry Division and his correspondence depict the Baron as a purposeful person, strategist, talented commander and organizer. R.F. Ungern differed from the leaders of the white movement A.V. Kolchak, A.I.Denikin, N.N. Yudenich in that he was a convinced monarchist and did not think of any other state structure for Russia. The commanders-in-chief of the white armies were in a position of non-determination, believing that the army should not participate in politics. From the very beginning of the revolution, the baron already had his own plan for the creation of the Middle Kingdom, uniting all nomadic peoples of the Mongolian root, "in their organization not subject to Bolshevism." These nomadic peoples were supposed to liberate Russia and then Europe from the "revolutionary infection" in the future.

Ungern began to embody his plan in life on the Caucasian front. In April 1917, he formed a detachment from the local residents of the Aisars, which brilliantly proved itself during the hostilities. His initiative was supported by the captain G.M. Semenov, who wrote to A.F. Kerensky about the national formations and on June 8, 1917, left for Petrograd to carry out these plans. The activities of R.F. Ungern and G.M. Semenov were continued after the October Revolution already in the Far East, where they entered into a struggle with the Soviet regime.

Having spent almost the entire Civil War at the most important railway point of communication between the Far East and China, the Dauria station, R. F. Ungern continued to work on the embodiment of his plans for the restoration of the monarchy on a worldwide scale. The main hope in this regard was China, where the civil war between republicans and monarchists also continued. Traces of global intentions are already visible in the letter of R.F. Ungern to G.M. Semenov on June 27, 1918, where he proposed that the Chinese in their detachments should fight the Bolsheviks, and the Manchus - with the Chinese (apparently, the Republicans), Ungern believed that this would be beneficial for Japan as well. On November 11, 1918, in a letter to P.P. Malinovsky, R.F. Ungern was interested in the preparation of a peace conference in Philadelphia and found it necessary to send there representatives from Tibet and Buryatia. Another idea that R.F. Ungern threw to his correspondent was about organizing a women's society in Harbin and establishing its ties with Europe. The last line of the letter read: "Political affairs occupy me entirely."

At the beginning of 1918, in Manchuria, G.M. Semenov convened a peace conference, which was attended by representatives of the Kharachens and Bargut. A brigade was created from the Kharachens as part of the White troops. The second conference was held in February 1919 in Dauria. It was of a general Mongol character and aimed at creating an independent Mongolian state. At the conference, a provisional government of "Great Mongolia" was formed, the commander-in-chief over the troops was handed over to G.M. Semenov. During the Civil War, R.F. Ungern began to train his officers to work with the Mongols. As can be seen from the order for the Foreign Division of January 16, 1918 (probably a mistake, in reality, 1919), its commander paid special attention to training personnel in the Mongolian language. Since January 1919, R.F. Ungern was appointed by G.M. Semenov responsible for the work of the gold mines, which were under the control of the ataman.

Baron Ungern is one of the most mysterious and "iconic" figures of the Civil War. Buddhist lamas considered him the embodiment of the deity of war, and the Bolsheviks - "a primitive monster."

Historians and biographers view Ungern through the prism of "residual" documents, dubious memories and testimonies. The context of the archivists creates a very flat image. The only thing that can be concluded is that the baron was a man far from common sense. The rest is thought out by people, surrendering to the indomitable flow of fantasy, and the sleep of reason, as you know, gives rise to monsters.

Ultimately, in the image of Ungern we are faced with a paradoxical, or, better to say, "reckless" character, a kind of romantic "scumbag". It turns on some, it scares others. However, all these "pictures" are very far from the original. I will surprise you, Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg surpassed all the historians studying him combined in rationalism and prudence, he did not take a single step, his "performance" on impulse. And that's why….

"Life is a dream"

In his meeting in Mongolia with the famous occult writer Ferdinand Ossendovsky, Ungern said: “I spent my life in battles and studying Buddhism. My grandfather joined Buddhism in India, my father and I also recognized the teaching and confessed it. "

It is this fact that should become the starting point in the analysis of the personality of the baron. Roman Fedorovich was not only a Buddhist - he professed a very amazing Buddhist philosophical doctrine - Chittamatra, so popular among Tibetan lamas. This doctrine has a very complex system of logic and considers objective reality to be a figment of the subject's imagination. In other words, Roman Fedorovich von Ungern-Sternberg, following the teachings of the cittamatra, had to be convinced that the world around him was just a play of his mind. Convincing yourself of this is, according to this Buddhist doctrine, the first step on the path to nirvana, the highest form of spiritual liberation. However, the first step is the hardest. Tibetan lamas, for example, say that the main condition for "believing" that everything is a dream is simply to go with the flow of life, content with the role of an indifferent observer - without desires, without ambitions, without goals.

And Roman Fedorovich, following this wisdom, in his young years gave himself up to drift: a military career, without any leaps, flowed on as usual, and the baron at that time looked deep into himself. What state von Ungern-Sternberg was in then can be judged by the characteristics of Baron Peter Wrangel, who was "lucky" to be the commander of a "Buddhist" at one time:

“Ragged and dirty, he always sleeps on the floor among the Cossacks of his hundred, eats from a common cauldron and, being brought up in conditions of cultural wealth, gives the impression of a man who has completely detached himself from them. An original, sharp mind, and next to it a striking lack of culture and an extremely narrow outlook. Amazing shyness, knowing no limits extravagance ... "

Pilgrimage

In July 1913, Ungern suddenly came out of the drift. He resigns - then the baron was in the rank of a centurion in the 1st Amur regiment of the Trans-Baikal Cossack army - and leaves for the Mongolian city of Kobdo. Ungern's formal goal is to join the Mongol rebels in their fight against China. Such impulsiveness for a person professing the Buddhist Chittamatra system is quite surprising. Probably, this act was based on a much more weighty reason than a desire to help the Mongols. It is unlikely that Roman Fedorovich so easily sacrificed his military career in the Russian Empire in order to enter the Mongolian service. Moreover, he did not manage to fully participate in the liberation war of the Mongols - peace reigned there.

According to the scant information about this period of the baron's life, he spent time studying the Mongolian language and horseback night walks on the steppe, where he loved to drive wolves. True, other evidence suggests that von Ungern-Sternberg made a pilgrimage to several Buddhist monasteries and even visited Tibet.

There is even a legend that Ungern resigned to go in search of the legendary underground country of Agharti, which, according to legend, is somewhere near Mongolia and Tibet. According to the stories of Buddhist lamas, there is the throne of the "king of the world", who controls the destinies of all mankind.

Later, the writer Ossendovsky wrote that at a meeting with Ungern he discussed Agharti, and he allegedly sent two expeditions in search of the legendary country in 1921. However, how the search for the "ruler of the world's destinies" ended remains unknown.

Incarnation of the deity of war

Immediately after the start of the First World War, von Ungern-Sternberg interrupted his Mongol adventure, returned to Russia, and then went to the front. In the war, the baron showed courage bordering on recklessness, was wounded five times, but each time death, finding himself face to face with him, was forced to turn aside. One of the baron's colleagues recalled him: "In order to fight like this, you must either seek death, or know for sure that you will not die." Or, I’ll add from myself, consider yourself the god of war.

As you know, Ungern was very interested in astrology. At the time of his highest dawn, he was surrounded by a whole retinue of Tibetan astrologers, without whose "calculations" he did not take a single step.

In the early 1950s, an astrological chart of Ungern was published and analyzed in one of the Indian journals dedicated to Jyotish (Indian astrology). The astrologer drew attention to several aspects of the horoscope. The first is the conjunction of Mars with the so-called ghost planet Rahu. Under such a combination, mad brave men are born, devoid of fear by their nature. And most importantly, self-realization of a person with such a combination is possible only through war. The second aspect, the conjunction of Venus and another "shadow planet" Ketu in the 12th house of the horoscope, promised the baron "liberation" from reincarnation, nirvana, already in this life.

Looking ahead, I will say that after Ungern liberated the Mongol capital of Urga from Chinese troops in February 1921, the council of local lamas declared the baron the embodiment of Mahakala, the deity of war and destruction, who is revered in Tibetan Buddhism as the protector of the Buddha's teachings. It should be added that the lamas made their "conclusion" focusing not so much on the military exploits of Ungern as on the position of the planets in his horoscope.

Guru

As a follower of Buddhism, the Baron knew that liberation cannot be achieved without a guru. Who was Ungern's spiritual mentor, we do not know. However, evidence suggests that Roman Fedorovich never acted without consulting the lamas around him. Even the formal numbers of the orders of the commander of the Asian Cavalry Division were carefully verified by the numerological calculations of the lamas.

It is unlikely that a guru should be sought in the circle of von Ungern-Sternberg. The true spiritual mentor was most likely far from Ungern: maybe in some Mongolian monastery, maybe in general in Tibet. The lama-consultants, in all likelihood, were introduced to Ungern by his "sensei".

It is by the order of the teacher that one can explain the fact that in the fall of 1920 the Asian cavalry division of Ungern fell from its "home" place in Transbaikalia and made its famous raid into Mongolia. It is known that the Mongol ruler and high priest, the "living Buddha" among the Mongols, Bogdo-gegen VIII, being under Chinese arrest, secretly sent a message to the Baron with a blessing to free Urga from the Chinese. In the winter of 1921, the baron took the city, breaking the resistance of the Chinese troops, which outnumbered his division several times. Having regained power in Mongolia, Bogdo-gegen bestowed the title of prince on Ungern. Was he the baron's guru? Unlikely. Soon, von Ungern-Sternberg will set off on a campaign against Soviet Siberia, in which the ruler of the liberated Mongolia was hardly interested. This means that the baron was a "spiritual child" of some other person, whose ambitions were in no way limited to Mongolia.

Cleansing Karma

In Eastern traditions - Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism - the main condition for final liberation is the cleansing of the karma accumulated over all previous lives. Deliverance is a long process, stretching over many, many incarnations. However, in the same Buddhism there were movements that spoke of the possibility of ending karma in one fell swoop, during one incarnation. The latter is possible if a person precisely fulfills the purpose of his life. You can learn it through your horoscope with the help of a good astrologer or from a spiritual teacher. Ungern in the last year of his life openly declared that his mission was to restore the empire of Genghis Khan. It was for this reason that in the summer of 1921 he set off on his Siberian campaign, his last raid. It is interesting that for several months he said that he had a presentiment of his imminent death and almost named the exact time. Does this mean that Ungern was going to rebuild Genghis Khan's empire in a fantastically short time? Or was it just a declaration, and the baron himself saw his destiny in death while fulfilling an unrealizable ambition? Let's listen to Roman Fedorovich himself, who wrote in a letter to a Chinese general:

“Now it is unthinkable to think about the restoration of the tsars in Europe ... While it is possible only to begin the restoration of the Middle Kingdom and the peoples in contact with it to the Caspian Sea, and then only to begin the restoration of the Russian monarchy .. Personally, I don’t need anything. I am glad to die for the restoration of the monarchy, even if not my own state, but another. "

On the threshold of nirvana

In August 1921, Ungern was captured by the Reds. A few days later, Lenin expressed his proposal: “I advise you to pay more attention to this case, to obtain a verification of the solidity of the accusation, and if the proof is complete, which, apparently, cannot be doubted, then arrange a public trial, conduct it as quickly as possible. and shoot. " Trotsky, who headed the Revolutionary Military Council, wanted to hold a trial in Moscow, in front of "all working people." However, the "Red Siberians" persuaded their "older brothers" to hold a tribunal in Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk). It remains a mystery why Trotsky and Lenin so easily abandoned the desire to show the "show" with the "bloody baron" on the "big Moscow screen."

The archives preserved the minutes of Ungern's interrogations. They are very strange: as if the "commissars" were trying to prove to someone that it was Roman Fedorovich von Ungern-Sternberg who was interrogated. For example, for some reason the baron told during interrogation that he had visited the "living Buddha" Bogdo Gegen VIII several times and that he was very fond of champagne. Or else - when asked why he wore a cherry Mongolian robe, Ungern replied that "at a distance to be visible to the troops." By the way, the robe, in fact, was one of the main evidence that it was the baron who was arrested and shot. Another "piece of evidence" was a photograph of the captive Ungern in this very dressing gown.

This quote from the protocol also looks very suspicious: “I was taken prisoner alive due to the fact that I did not manage to take my own life. I tried to hang myself on the reins, but the latter turned out to be too wide. " The Buddhist, whom the Mongols revered as Mahakala, tells the commissars that he wanted to hang himself faintly ... It looks like a joke.

The document with the interrogation protocol ends with the words "He answers all questions without exception calmly." Perhaps these are the only words that could be believed.

They say that the baron was shot, aiming at the chest, in order to then take his brain to Moscow for research. The body was buried in the forest, in an unknown place.

Interestingly, years later, the legend of the "curse of Ungern" began to circulate: allegedly, many who were involved in his arrest, trial, interrogation and his execution, died either during the Civil War or during Stalin's repressions. In fact, this "legend", in my opinion, more "worked" not to show the magic of the "bloody baron", but to confirm once again that on September 15, 1921, the "commissars" shot Ungern.

Life after death

After the news of the execution of the baron, the ruler of Mongolia Bogdo-gegen gave the order to hold services on Ungern in all Mongolian temples. True, not everyone believed that the baron was dead. For example, many local Buddhist lamas made fun of the news of the execution: is it possible to kill Mahakala with an ordinary bullet?

So, there were rumors that the Reds caught a completely different person, similar to von Ungern-Sternberg, and the liberator of Mongolia himself went to one of the Tibetan monasteries, where he meditates and recites the so-called secret mantra leading to nirvana.

And some said that Ungern found his way to the mysterious country of Agharti and went there with his most devoted companions - to serve the "king of the world." The day will come when evil will finally reign in the world, and at this moment the cavalry division of Roman von Ungern-Sternberg will enter the scene to deal a mortal blow to the forces of evil.

By the way, the day of Ungern's death was also analyzed by an astrologer in that very Indian magazine from the 1950s. So - on September 15, 1921, according to the baron's horoscope, in the so-called "house of death" four planets joined at once: Mercury, Jupiter, Saturn and the "ghost" of Rahu. All this indicated, according to the astrologer, that von Ungern-Sternberg still left this world at that very moment. True, at the same time in the "house of enemies" the Sun and Mars, the main planet in the baron's horoscope, joined. This combination said, according to the astrologer, that Roman Ungern did not passively accept death, but, most likely, died in battle. But how can you trust astrologers? ...