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  • 19th Party Congress of China. Has the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party returned the nation's leader? Should Xi follow Putin's path

    19th Party Congress of China.  Has the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party returned the nation's leader?  Should Xi follow Putin's path

    "90290"

    On October 24, the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ended in Beijing. The delegates to the convention elected new members of the CPC Central Committee and the CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission. At the first plenum of the 19th CPC Central Committee, which took place immediately after the closing of the congress, a new composition of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee of seven people was formed, headed by the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping.

    The congress was a remarkable event not only for China. The central point of the PRC's development strategy announced at the congress is the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era." It is recognized that the "new era" will begin in 2020 and will last 30 years - until 2050. The CPC defines the content of the "new era" as the construction of a completely modernized socialist society of general welfare (general prosperity) by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC (1949) with a high level of material, political, and spiritual culture by world standards. In terms of the aggregate "national power and international influence", the PRC should by this time become one of the world leaders.

    It is planned to achieve this goal in two stages. The first stage is from 2020 to 2035, when it is planned to complete the construction of a middle-income society and, in the main, to carry out socialist modernization. The PRC will achieve technological independence and can itself become a donor of world-class innovative technologies. On this basis, it is planned to ensure a significant increase in the share of the population with an average income, to sharply reduce the gap in the level of development of cities, villages and regions, to ensure equal access to basic public services (universal pension provision and medical care), and also to significantly reduce property stratification. Chinese "soft power" will also grow in these years.

    The second stage (2035-2050) should complete the socialist modernization of China, turning it, as it is said in party documents, into a society of complete universal prosperity with mainly overcame the property stratification of the population and the gap in the level of regional development.

    The congress summarized the problems of a new stage in China's development that had emerged over the past five-year period. They are formulated as the main contradiction of Chinese society: between the constantly growing needs of the people and the unevenness and incompleteness of development. This refers to two types of gaps: the economic gap between the wealthy coastal provinces and the lagging central and western provinces, as well as the income gap between town and country and, as a result, the unresolved problem of poverty in rural areas.

    Now the way to combat poverty in China is the massive issuance of targeted microcredits to those in need in the amount of less than 50 thousand yuan for a period of three years without a mortgage, without a guarantee, with a base interest rate. On the whole, the poverty level in the PRC is decreasing. So, in 2012-2016. 55 million people were lifted out of poverty, and as of the end of 2016, there were 43 million poor in China.

    The outstripping development of the coastal provinces saturated with ports was initially identified as a macroeconomic strategy for Chinese reforms. However, the gap in regional development is now taking on threatening forms, turning into unemployment in the center of the country and barely restrained migration of workers to the overpopulated eastern (coastal) provinces. Therefore, Xi Jinping spoke in his report at the congress about the need to "create a new, more effective mechanism for the coordinated development of regions." The potential of the eastern provinces will be redirected to a greater extent than before through government stimulus measures to accelerate the economic development of the central and western regions of China.

    The congress confirmed that the main emphasis will be on the accelerated development of the real sector of the economy, and that economic growth is planned to be ensured through the accelerated introduction of scientific and technical innovations. In recent years, China has been increasing investments in R&D, in 2016 they amounted to 2.1% of GDP. According to a 2017 report by the World Intellectual Property Organization, China is the only middle-income country in the world list of the 25 most innovative economies, ranking 22nd.

    The most general condition for economic growth is recognized as the improvement of the system of the socialist market economy. Specifically, it was specified that the competition should proceed on a fair and orderly basis.

    Xi Jinping reiterated that China will continue its policy of openness in the international arena. The thesis was also voiced that international security cannot be achieved by zero-sum games and that no country can afford to act solely out of its own interests.

    Chinese state capitalism has become the basis for rapid, impressive economic growth, while capitalism and market incentives, as is clear from the CCP documents and speeches by the leaders of the Communist Party, are only tools for creating the material basis of socialism. Therefore, such great attention from congress to congress is paid in China to the economic activity of the state and to ensuring the growth of incomes of the population. After all, socialism cannot be built in a poor country.

    The fulfillment of these ambitious plans places increased demands on the quality of the party and state leadership. Hence, the official consolidation of the special role of the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping, which took place at the congress. At the same time, the very principle of collective leadership remains, and speculation about the presence / absence of a successor of Xi Jinping in China leads nowhere, only obscuring the really important strategic decisions made in Beijing at the 19th CPC Congress.

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    Participants in the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which will open at the People's Assembly House on Tiananmen Square on October 18, have already gathered in the Chinese capital. The party, with 89 million 447 thousand members (the largest political organization of its kind in the world), is represented by 2,287 delegates from party organizations in all provinces, autonomous regions, cities under central jurisdiction, party and government bodies, state enterprises, the army and the people's armed police.

    During the week, they will discuss the pressing issues of the CCP's activities and elect new members of the CPC Central Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Then, at the first plenum of the 19th Central Committee, a new Politburo of the CPC Central Committee will be elected. This ruling pyramid is crowned by the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PC PB), which currently has seven members, of which, due to unspoken age restrictions (retirement age - 68), five are to be replaced. However, the number of PC PB members may also change.

    It seems certain that the current general secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping (64 years old), who is also the chairman of the PRC, will remain at the head of the party, and therefore the country as a whole and its armed forces. Observers have no doubts that the 62-year-old Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang will remain the second member of the current "fifth leading generation".

    The CCP is the ruling party, its range of interests encompasses the socio-economic sphere, relations with the outside world, as well as the ideology of a country with a population of over 1.3 billion people. The problems of the forum in their complexity correspond to the position of the second, and according to a number of indicators - the first economy in the world. As the supreme body of the party, the congress must determine its line and policy, in other words, how to live in the Celestial Empire for at least the next five years.

    Economic sphere

    Thanks to the policy of reforms and opening up, China has established itself as a leading global manufacturer over the past four decades, and the standard of living of the population is constantly growing. It can be said that for the first time in its history, the Middle State has managed to feed, clothe and equip its population; it is successfully fighting extreme poverty, in which, according to official data, about 40 million people still live. The Chinese are confidently mastering high-tech industries, in space exploration, China competes with the United States and Russia, and the PRC's investments abroad already exceed foreign investments in their own country. In the current difficult international environment, China maintains a positive development momentum.

    However, a number of analysts draw attention to the general trend towards a slowdown in the growth rate of the Chinese economy. The local expert community admits that the era of the rapid development of the Chinese economy is coming to an end, and the leadership itself declares that with the holding of the 19th Congress, the country "will fully enter a new stage in the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics."

    Jiang Yu, an employee of the Development Center of the State Council of the PRC, calls it the third: the first stage, according to him, began after the founding of the PRC in 1949, it is characterized by the achievement of political and economic independence of China. At the second stage, with the proclamation of reforms and openness, an unprecedented economic growth and development of a market economy was observed, while maintaining the general socialist principle. The third stage, which began five years ago, the expert believes, will be completed by the middle of the 21st century, it implies a further deepening of reforms, an even greater openness of the socialist system with the strengthening of the leading role of the party, the growth of social justice, and the overall success of the market economy. "Detailed answers to the questions of how to realize the task of building a modern socialist country," the analyst sums up, "will be provided by the XIX Congress."

    "China's economic transformation will be successful," said Liu He, head of the Chancellery of the CPC Central Committee's Finance and Economics Working Group. He is considered a key figure in Xi Jinping's group of economic advisers. Experts point to the discussion around the roadmap for the transition to a supply economy, which implies tax cuts and government regulation in general. But no one dares to predict what measures the Chinese government will take to implement it.

    The change in the paradigm of economic development will force to abandon the target indicator of GDP growth, and the success of the new economic policy can be measured only by the most important criterion - improving the life of Laobai Xing, “venerable hundred names,” that is, the Chinese people themselves. The population is encouraged to live in a “new normality”, according to which growth rates are not the most important thing, it is more important to improve the quality of life.

    However, it is just the growth of domestic consumption that can help maintain China's GDP growth and even a slight acceleration of the economy. According to the chairman of the People's Bank of China (Central Bank) Zhou Xiaochuan, in the second half of 2017, the growth rate due to this factor may slightly increase and reach 7% in annual terms.

    Among the most significant measures in the framework of the program for restructuring the economy is a reduction in production in the steel and coal industries, and in some other traditional industries. Priority will be given to high-tech spheres, the service industry, and the digital economy. It is expected to raise economic efficiency through a wider participation of private capital and initiative in general, the development of public-private partnerships.

    However, it must be borne in mind that steel and coal are the pillars of the socialist economy, where millions of workers are employed. In addition to these workers, the fate of numerous managers and officials both locally and in the center is unclear. According to some observers, Xi Jinping will implement the measures of his economic headquarters with sufficient caution. The congress should demonstrate unity and stability with a general readiness for changes, and it is unlikely that any radical shifts will take place in the formula "reform and stability".

    Strict party management

    The first five years of the leadership of Xi Jinping and his team will be remembered primarily for the anti-corruption campaign. The CCP's disciplinary bodies have handled over a million cases, and more than 1.4 million government and party officials have been subjected to various punishments. In addition to "flies" - minor violators of state and party discipline - 240 "tigers", high-level corrupt officials, were punished. Among the first, even before Xi Jinping's presidency began, Bo Xilai, the former Minister of Commerce, Governor of Liaoning Province, and Party Committee Secretary of one of the largest Chinese cities, Chongqing, was arrested. Former member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Yongkang, who previously served as Minister of Public Security and Secretary of the Political and Legal Commission of the CPC Central Committee, was sentenced to life in prison. He was considered the patron saint of the "oil lobby" in the Chinese establishment.

    Just before the opening of the congress, the CPC Central Committee announced a "shameful list" of a dozen leaders of various levels who had been expelled from the party for corruption. At the head of the list is Sun Zhengcai, who headed the party committee of the Chongqing metropolis. He is accused of "abuse of office, using them for other purposes to influence certain persons for personal gain." The list also includes the former mayor of Tianjin (Northern China) Huang Xingguo, ex-chairman of the Committee on Xianggang (Hong Kong), Macao (Macau), Taiwan and overseas compatriots Sun Huaishan, former Minister of Justice Wu Aying, ex-governor of the eastern province Fujian Su Shulin, ex-secretary of the party committee of northwestern Gansu province Wang Sanyun, former chairman of the Committee for the Control and Management of Insurance of the People's Republic of China Xiang Junbo, ex-Deputy Governor of Jiangsu Province (Eastern China) Li Yunfeng, former General of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA ) Wang Jianping, ex-political commissar of the Tian Xiusa Air Force, former vice-governor of northern China's Hebei province Yang Chongyong, and ex-head of the anti-corruption committee of the Ministry of Finance, Mo Jiancheng.

    All of them were previously accused of violating party discipline, abuse of office, failure to comply with the norms of generally accepted morality. Some of those expelled from the party are charged with violation of labor laws, "breeding bureaucracy and idle lack of initiative, bribery and procuring", "misappropriation of material wealth in extremely large volumes." The decision to expel them from the CCP was made in advance, but before the 19th Congress it was announced as the final verdict.

    The campaign also affected the army - from the generals, after the former deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Tsaihou, who died in 2015 under investigation, the second former deputy chairman of the CMC, Colonel General Guo Booxiong, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

    Xi Jinping initiated the adoption of the Eight-Point Rule and the Six Prohibitions, which significantly tightened the rules of the CCP's charter and, in fact, became the new regulator of party life. These requirements suppressed banquets and tributes at public expense, excluded the payment of holidays, lavish ceremonies of meeting and seeing off, and limited the use of office space and transport. To date, these regulations have resulted in a provision on "harsh management" of the party. The population approves of the ordering of party life, judging by the reviews from the localities.

    However, some analysts point out that anti-corruption measures lead to a decrease in local activity, including economic activity. Some local leaders avoid economic experiments, do not make contacts with entrepreneurs, believing that "it is better not to take risks." In a speech in July, Xi Jinping noted the successes in the "self-government" of party organizations, but warned against "blind optimism." The movement to crush corruption, the leader said, has a long way to go.

    Charter changes expected

    In the field of ideology, Xi Jinping and his associates propose the "Chinese dream" of a "great national revival." The general secretary of the CPC Central Committee made a key speech about this at the National Museum two weeks after his election. Probably, this thesis will also sound at the 19th Congress as a reinforcement of calls for the implementation of the second "goal of the centuries" - the transformation of China into a prosperous, powerful, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist state by the centenary of the founding of the PRC (2049). The achievement by the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party (2021) of the first "goal of the centuries" - building a society "xiaokang", which is interpreted as average income, comparative prosperity - will be announced in advance at the upcoming congress.

    The party itself is talking about the impending introduction of amendments and additions to the CPC charter at the congress. They have already sounded at a recent meeting of the Politburo and a plenum of the Central Committee. Judging by the published news release, the amendments include "key theories and strategic ideas" that will be presented at the congress, the latest development of Marxism, a new concept of government (you can get an idea of ​​it from Xi Jinping's book "On Public Administration").

    According to unofficial information, during the amendments, it is planned to include the name of Xi Jinping in the founding document of the party. If these data are confirmed, he will become the third politician immortalized in the charter of the Communist Party after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In addition, he will become the second person after Mao Zedong, whose name will be included in the party "constitution" during his lifetime.

    The current version of the charter states that the CPC is guided in its activities by Marxism-Leninism, as well as "the ideas of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping's theory, the important ideas of triple representation (productive forces, culture and the general population) and the scientific concept of development." Traditionally, the leader of each leading generation must add something of his own concept to this list. The 6th Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee formally determined the status of General Secretary Xi Jinping as the leading "core" of the CPC Central Committee, and it is possible that this provision will also be included in the charter.

    According to some local analysts, the inclusion of Xi Jinping's name in the CCP's charter, as well as the provision on the "core of the party", could serve as a political basis for extending his term in office beyond 2022-2023. However, so far these are just speculations.

    Who is on the doorstep?

    And yet the main intrigue of the congress remains the composition of the party's top echelons - the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. According to the tradition that has developed in recent decades, it should include two figures under the age of 57, who will be trained to become the successors of the heads of the party / state and government. In addition to them, the PK PB should include five more important figures. As before, they will distribute among themselves the posts of the heads of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC, the country's highest legislative body), the All-China Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC, the highest consultative body representing the United Patriotic Front), one politician in office a senior member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee will oversee the sphere of ideology and propaganda, another will head the party special service - the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the seventh, as vice premier, will deal with economic issues.

    However, Xi Jinping can show his extraordinary approaches to party life here too. Informed people say that at a recent meeting in Beidaihe (this resort town on the shores of the Bohai Bay of the Yellow Sea traditionally serves as a summer meeting place for top Chinese leadership), a proposal was made to reduce the number of PB PC members from seven to five. At the same time, the current head of the Chancellery of the CPC Central Committee (analogous to the administration of the head of state) Li Zhanshu, secretary of the party committee of the economic center of the country of Shanghai Han Zheng and party leader of the rich southern province of Guangdong Hu Chunhua were allegedly mentioned as possible members of the new composition.

    Experts name several other names, including the head of the Organizational Department of the CPC Central Committee Zhao Leji, Vice Premier of the State Council Wang Yang, who was recently awarded the Russian Order of Friendship "for his great contribution to strengthening relations."

    Among the relatively "young" and promising politicians, the 57-year-old secretary of the Chongqing Party Committee, Chen Ming'er, stands out. However, he has not yet passed the "test" in the Politburo, which reduces his chances of getting into his Standing Committee.

    Earlier it was said that among the current members of the synclite, in addition to Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, the head of the disciplinary party body Wang Qishan may also stay at the top party level, despite reaching the unofficial pension threshold. However, rumors about corruption in his entourage, as well as the possible serious illness of the politician, seem to remove the question.

    But who can succeed Xi Jinping, the future leader of the "sixth generation" of Chinese leaders? It is easier to say who will not - this is Sun Zhengcai, who was ousted from the post of head of the party committee of the city of central subordination of Chongqing, on the eve of the congress. Since 2012, the veterans of the party have promised him the post of the next chairman or, at least, the premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. However, during the recent visit of the inspection team from the center to Sun Zhengcai, serious claims were made. After an internal party investigation, his case was referred to the judiciary.

    For this reason, the question of “successor” remains open. Against the backdrop of rumors about Xi Jinping's "third term", it is not a fact that the situation will clear up at the end of the 19th Congress.

    Keywords

    CPC / CHINA / PRC / 19 CONGRESS OF THE CPC / RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS / CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS / PACIFIC ASIA/ AUTHORITARISM / DEMOCRACY / CHINESE MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT / SOCIALISM WITH A CHINESE SPECIFICITY/ CHINA DREAM / COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA / CHINA / PRC / 19 CONGRESS OF THE CCP / RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS / CHINA-US RELATIONS / PACIFIC ASIA / AUTHORITARIANISM / DEMOCRACY / CHINESE DEVELOPMENT MODEL / SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS/ CHINESE DREAM

    annotation scientific article on political science, the author of a scientific work -

    The editorial board of Comparative Politics magazine publishes a summary of the discussion on the results of the 19th CPC Congress. At the round table, researchers from the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Asian and African Studies (ISAA) of the Moscow State University, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) took part in the discussion. Leading Russian experts discussed the significance of the 19th CPC Congress held in October 2017, both from the point of view of analyzing the documents of the congress and the party documents adopted at it, and from the point of view of comprehending the results of the first five years of the new generation of Chinese leaders in power. They touched upon the transformation of political power in the PRC, analyzed the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, assessed the change in ideology and China's perception of the challenges and goals of socio-economic development, weighed the chances of different models of modernization, reforms carried out by the government and their effectiveness, transformation of national interests and foreign policy priorities of the PRC The Editorial Board of the journal Comparative Politics Russia publishes brief proceedings of the roundtable discussion on the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China. The discussion gathered the researchers from the Center for Comprehensive Chinese Studies and Regional Projects of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Asian and African Studies (IAAS) of Moscow State University, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Leading Russian experts discussed the significance of the 19th Congress of the CPC held in October 2017, analyzing the documents of the Congress and assessing the results of the first five years in power of the new generation of Chinese leaders. The participants of the roundtable touched upon the transformation of political power in the PRC, analyzed the new Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, assessed the changing ideology and perception of China "s social and economic development goals, discussed the prospects of different models of modernization carried out by the government and their effectiveness, transformation of China's national interests and foreign policy priorities, Chinese relations with the USA, Russia and the East Asian countries.

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    The text of the scientific work on the topic "19th Congress of the CPC: External and Internal Consequences and Prospects of Reforms in China"

    http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2018-9-2-140-159

    19 CONGRESS OF THE CCP:

    EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL IMPACT AND PROSPECTS OF REFORM IN CHINA

    We bring to the attention of our readers the materials of the round table held on December 19, 2017 in the editorial office of the Comparative Politics magazine by the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

    The following reports were presented at the round table: O. N. Borokh, Ph.D. senior researcher Center for Social and Economic Research of China, IFES RAS; A.V. Vinogradov, D.Sc. n. Head of the Center for Political Research and Forecasts, IFES RAS, Senior Researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations; HELL. Voskresensky, prof. Doctor of Political Science Director of the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects, MGIMO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Yu.M. Galenovich, Doctor of History prof. Mr. Researcher Center for the Study and Forecasting of Russian-Chinese Relations, IFES RAS; K.A. Efremova, Ph.D. Assoc. department oriental studies, researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations; A.N. Karneev, deputy. Director, Assoc. department history of China ISAA MSU; A.V. Lomanov, Doctor of History Professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Researcher Center for the Study and Forecasting of Russian-Chinese Relations, IFES RAS, Senior Researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations; V.Ya. Poryatkov, Doctor of Economics prof. deputy director IFES RAS; E.N. Rumyantsev, senior researcher RISS.

    The round table was also attended by: E.V. Koldunova, Candidate of Political Science Assoc. department oriental studies, deputy. Dean of the Faculty of International Relations, led. Expert of the ASEAN Center of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; A.A. Kireeva, Ph.D. Assoc. department oriental studies, researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

    Information about the article:

    Received by the editors:

    Accepted for publication:

    Keywords:

    PDA; China; PRC; 19th Congress of the CPC; Russian-Chinese relations; Sino-American Relations; Pacific Asia; authoritarianism; democracy; Chinese development model; socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese dream

    Annotation: The editorial board of Comparative Politics magazine publishes brief materials of the discussion on the results of the 19th Congress of the CPC. At the round table, researchers from the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Asian and African Studies (ISAA) of the Moscow State University, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) took part in the discussion. Leading Russian experts discussed the significance of the 19th CPC Congress held in October 2017, both from the point of view of analyzing the documents of the congress and the party documents adopted at it, and from the point of view of comprehending the results of the first five years of the new generation of Chinese leaders in power. They touched upon the transformation of political power in the PRC, analyzed the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, assessed the change in ideology and China's perception of the challenges and goals of socio-economic development, weighed the chances of different models of modernization, reforms carried out by the government and their effectiveness, transformation of national interests and foreign policy priorities of the PRC , relations between China and the United States, Russia, East Asian countries.

    HELL. Resurrection. The situation on the eve of and during the congress changed and China not only skillfully took advantage of these changes, but also managed to reformat some of them in its favor. So

    first of all, the initiative was intercepted from the United States during Xi Jin-ping's speech at the Taoist Forum, in his speech he concentrated on the problem of development, declared the need to protect

    international institutions and concretized this program in the form of a Chinese development model already at the 19th Congress of the CPC, proclaiming the need for a common benefit for all participants in international life, putting forward the idea of ​​a "public good" that China can provide to the world, including through the implementation of the mega-project "one belt - one way ”, while formulating the idea of“ community of common destiny ”for all mankind. In parallel, Xi Jinping has tightened the authoritarian character of domestic politics, proclaiming the need to amend the constitution, creating the State Control Commission, which should be able to make arrests in addition to the prosecutor's office. So, in particular, at the congress, Xi said that it is necessary “... at the state, provincial, city and county levels to create control commissions, working on the basis of combining official duties jointly with party bodies to check party discipline, thus ensuring comprehensive control over all civil servants exercising public authority ”. The need for this at the congress was justified by the catchy slogan "put power in the cage of the law." In addition, a tough campaign was carried out to combat illegal migrants who lived in the suburbs of Beijing, the rules for the work of non-governmental organizations were tightened, including through the law on foreign NGOs, a decision was made to create party cells in all foreign private enterprises. giving them the right to influence investment policy and the exercise of private property rights. Measures were also taken to bring Western IT companies under control in China, a "public affairs accounting system" was announced, and much more. All this provoked a harsh reaction from a number of Western media and even a statement by the German Chamber of Commerce that German campaigns could leave the Chinese market. In parallel with this, China began to promote in every possible way the mega-project "one belt -

    one way ”as an instrument of public good and expansion of globalization, and also successfully held the next Budapest Forum, which brought together 11 EU countries, 5 Balkan countries and China to discuss trade and economic issues.

    It is important for us to understand how the ideas of the Chinese leadership proclaimed earlier and during the work of the Congress are combined, how these ideas are revealed in the materials of the 19th Congress of the CPC1. For this, it is important to analyze how the concentration and distribution of power in the political system of China takes place, what role the new system of state control will play, what the party cells at foreign enterprises can actually do, which means criticism of foreign elements in the educational process and whether this will affect cooperation between Russia and China in the scientific and educational sphere, in which direction will the system of social order and the model of modernization of China be transformed, and the construction of a system of legal regulation.

    The main contradiction of the current stage of China's development, outlined in the documents of the congress, is "the contradiction between the constantly growing needs of the people for a wonderful life and the unevenness and incompleteness of the country's socio-economic development", as well as the needs for democracy, legality, equality, justice, security, ecology and etc. At the same time, the question remains about the path that China is going to choose for further modernization and how it will address the issue of the challenges it faces:

    Unevenness and incompleteness of development;

    Lack of powerful innovation potential;

    The laboriousness of the process of intensive poverty eradication;

    A large gap in the level of development between urban and rural areas, between regions of China, in the distribution of income of the population;

    1 For the full text of Xi Jinping's speech at the 19th CPC Congress, see http: // russian. news.cn/2017-11/03/c 136726299.htm

    in solving difficulties in the field of employment, education, medical care, housing, ensuring a dignified old age, etc.

    One gets the impression that in order to resolve these issues, China is going to choose the Singapore path of development, to become "Big Singapore." For Russia, it remains largely reactive (and some analysts even believe that only imitative) role, since China is the most powerful player on the world level in the Eurasian space, and its influence in Eurasia is only increasing, as it formulates world-class projects. For Russia, however, cooperation with China appears to be more profitable than competition. Accordingly, the rapprochement between Russia and China continues, despite all the international difficulties. Thus, today we are faced with many complex issues of a debatable nature, which will require from our diplomacy and analysts new non-trivial solutions of a complex nature.

    I suggest that our discussion today focus on the following issues:

    What can the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee testify to? What are the possible further scenarios / options for the transformation of political power in the PRC? What could be the consequences of such a transformation?

    Are there any new emphases in the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics? What difficulties and challenges to social and economic development may China face? How can the reform strategy in China be transformed in response to new challenges?

    How will the national interests and foreign policy priorities of the PRC transform? How can this affect China's relations with Western countries? With Russia?

    V.Ya. Portyakov. The results and documents of the 19th Congress of the CPC are rather actively analyzed and commented on by the Russian

    MEDIA. Of the serious materials, I would like to mention the article by our former trade representative in the PRC S.S. Tsyplakova “The Leader's Modernization of China. The system of collective leadership laid down by Deng Xiaoping is a thing of the past, "published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on December 16, 2017. ... In addition, Xi achieved a significant strengthening of his position in power structures. Many members of the new Politburo of the CPC Central Committee are his nominees and even worked directly with him, incl. in the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang.

    The congress also reinforced the opinion prevailing in the Sinology community that Xi Jinping's rule may not be limited to two five-year terms. In any case, a potential pair of successors for the highest party and state posts was not identified in any way. As you know, after the 18th CCP Congress, the Hong Kong media named Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai as such. The first remained in the Politburo, but did not receive any noticeable promotion in the media. And the second was completely removed from the post of head of the Chongqing party committee.

    In the sphere of international relations, it seems important to consolidate in the Constitution of the CPC two main innovations of Xi Jinping - the "Belt and Road" initiative and the provision on "humanity as a community of common destiny." In our opinion, the second provision serves as a theoretical basis for the course of "China's peaceful development" declared by Beijing.

    In general, in the international section of Xi Jinping's Report to the 19th Party Congress, there are some nuances in comparison with Hu Jintao's report to the 18th Congress in 2012. it has a less definite character and is oriented towards all major states of the world.

    It is possible that the preservation of the old term, with some reformatting of its addressee, was an attempt to "save face" after the United States refused to accept the formulation proposed by Beijing.

    The congress demonstrated the final departure of China from Deng Xiaoping's formula "taoguang yanghui" - "try not to show yourself in anything", "not to show off your abilities." On the contrary, Beijing has publicly declared the international value, especially for developing countries, of its experience in economic construction. Interesting in this context are the titles of a number of articles after the congress issue of the magazine "Qiushi" in English (Qiushi, October-December 2017), for example: "Comparative analysis of order in China and disorder in the West", "West-centrism hides the current state of disorder in the West." , "China is a key force in promoting global stability, peace and development." Judging by this assertive and even annoying propaganda, China will be much more active in the next five years than before to strengthen its role and place in global governance.

    I would like to draw the attention of the audience to the fact that the congress states that China is entering a new stage of foreign economic openness. Its essence is the ever deeper penetration of Chinese capital, goods and services into the fabric of the world economy.

    Yu.M. Galenovich. Let us first of all turn to our bilateral relations with China. Here, first of all, it is important to analyze the content of the exchange of views on the results of the congress between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, President of the PRC Xi Jinping.

    Xinhua News Agency reported that on October 26, 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. V. Putin warmly congratulated Xi Jinping on his re-election to the post of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, as well as on the successful holding of the 19th CPC Congress. He stressed that the approval at the congress of Xi Jinping's idea of ​​socialism with Chinese characteristics but

    the howl of the era seems to be extremely important. The results of the work of the Congress fully demonstrated the trust and support enjoyed by the CCP headed by Xi Jinping from the broad masses of the Chinese people. Xi Jinping has high authority both in the CCP and among the citizens of the PRC. The Russian President sincerely wished Xi Jinping to lead the CCP, the largest political party in the world, to new successes. Relations between Russia and China are a model of the peaceful coexistence of major powers in the modern world. V.V. Putin also expressed his intention to maintain close contacts with Xi Jinping, promote cooperation between Russia and China in all areas, and maintain close ties and coordination on important international and regional issues.

    Xi Jinping thanked V.V. Putin for congratulations and noted that the just-concluded 19th Congress of the CPC approved a common course and program for the future development of the party and the state, which reflects the high level of unity of opinion among 89 million CPC members. The CCP possesses both the confidence and the ability to lead the people of China towards the realization of their goal in the struggle for a great renaissance of the Chinese nation. This is the CCP's historic duty and mission.

    Xi Jinping also stressed that China's development cannot be separated from the world. China and Russia are linked by a comprehensive relationship of strategic interaction and partnership, and China will invariably and resolutely deepen relations with Russia regardless of changes in the international situation. China intends to follow a common trajectory with Russia, to achieve even greater development of bilateral relations and even greater results.

    The exchange of views between the President of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the PRC, the publication of the content of the telephone conversation between them allows you to find out what exactly each of the interlocutors emphasizes. These statements create a high-level atmosphere in our bilateral relations. This atmosphere is taken into account in their practice

    political activities of statesmen and officials at all levels. In this atmosphere, Sinologists, specialists in those areas where they have to deal with China, are studying the relevant issues.

    Based on the aforementioned exchange of views, Sinologists in Russia should take into account that interstate relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC are currently of such a nature that the President of the Russian Federation, that is, the head of state, congratulates the head of the ruling political party in China, the Communist Party of China, on his re-election to the post of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and with the successful holding of the congress of the said party. Observance of politeness, respect for each other is an indispensable condition for maintaining relations.

    At present, judging by the words of the President of the Russian Federation, a positive attitude towards both the Chinese Communist Party and its leader is the basis for maintaining a benevolent atmosphere in bilateral relations between Russia and China. This sets the target for approval in our country, in particular, by our experts on China, as well as by the media, the activities of the Chinese Communist Party.

    Further, it also follows from this that in our country, when assessing the policy of the current leadership of the CPC-PRC, Xi Jinping's assertion about socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era should be considered extremely important. This further implies an attitude towards a positive attitude towards both the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and towards the term "socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era." This also includes a positive attitude towards the terms "original Chinese socialism", "Chinese specificity", "new era" as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party and its general secretary. The trust and support from the broad masses of the people of China to the Chinese Communist Party, led by Xi Jinping as its Secretary General, should be considered unconditional. It should also be assumed that Xi Jinping has high authority both in the CCP and among the citizens of the PRC. Further, it should be emphasized,

    that the Chinese Communist Party is the largest political party in the world. It is Xi Jinping who should be willing to lead the party to new successes.

    So, the official assessment by the President of the Russian Federation of the results of the 19th Congress of the CPC consists in full approval of the activities of Xi Jinping personally, the Communist Party of China, which he leads, as well as what is now called in China "Xi Jinping's idea of ​​socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era."

    From this point of view, both "modern Chinese distinctive socialism" and Xi Jinping's opinion that the present is a "new era" should be commended. It is from these positions that one should evaluate both the activities of Xi Jinping personally and the internal and foreign policies of the CPC-PRC. Only such a position will contribute to the preservation and development of an atmosphere of peace, good-neighborliness and partnership between Russia and China.

    From the same point of view, relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC are an example of peaceful coexistence of major powers in the modern world.

    From our point of view, eternal peace in relations between Russia and China is one of the main coincidences of the national interests of both peoples and both countries.

    So, Xi Jinping, judging by the words of the President of the Russian Federation, is our main partner in China; the basis of our bilateral relations is the principle of cooperation, the interests of cooperation should be put at the forefront; our side also seeks to coordinate positions on foreign policy issues and in the field of bilateral, multilateral, regional and global relations and problems. From this follows a positive attitude in our country towards the foreign policy of the CPC-PRC.

    In general, the main thing in this position is to attach importance to the preservation of the currently existing, external or decorative, side of our bilateral relations, to maintain an atmosphere of goodwill in our relations. Our side is interested in maintaining such an atmosphere.

    A.V. Lomanov. The main idea of ​​the report at the 19th Congress of the CPC was the proclamation of "a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It was stated that the Chinese nation is making a "great leap" (weida foyer) from "rising" (zhanqilai) and "enrichment" (futsilai) to "gaining" (qiangqi-lai). In the context of the political history of the PRC, this means that the main theme of Xi Jinping's rule is the strengthening of Chinese power. The current period is becoming a continuation of the Mao Zedong era, in which China "rose" and laid the foundations for economic and military independence, as well as the Deng Xiaoping era, when reforms made it possible to enrich the most active members of society and the country as a whole. The new emphasis on "strengthening" was embodied in the double use of the "might is strength" character in the strategic program goal of building "a rich strong (qiang) democratic civilized harmonious beautiful socialist modernized state (qianguo)" by the middle of the century.

    The thesis about the transition from “enrichment” to “strengthening” indicates that the former priority of increasing wealth by quantitatively increasing the volume of the economy is receding into the background for China. It is in this vein that the adoption at the congress of a new interpretation of the main contradiction of Chinese society as a contradiction "between the growing need of the people for a good life and uneven incomplete development" should be interpreted.

    The emergence of this formulation marks the final departure of the official theory of China's development from the legacy of Soviet political economy. Proposed in the USSR in the middle of the twentieth century. The "basic economic law of socialism" demanded to ensure "maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the entire society through the continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology." Previous Chinese interpretations of the main social controversy (1956 and 1981) followed this approach and indicated a gap between needs.

    people and the backwardness of production, which required focusing efforts on the development of economic potential.

    Xi Jinping said at the congress that China has already become world leaders in a number of production areas. And this is consistent with the thesis of the country's transition from "enrichment" to "strengthening." At the same time, the previous assessments of China as the world's largest developing country, which is at the "initial stage of socialism", were inherited and preserved. This statement makes it possible to counterbalance the excessive optimism in the interpretation of China's “new era”.

    The threefold scheme of interaction with the world community (developed countries - neighbors - developing countries), traditional for previous congresses, was modified in 2017. Instead of developed countries, the first place was given to the topic of relations with “big states” (yes), with which it is supposed to build stable, balanced, coordinated relations of cooperation. In the lexicon of Chinese foreign policy in recent years, the phrase "a new type of relationship between large states" has served as an indication of Sino-American relations. Even if we assume that at the congress this wording was used in an extended context and pointed to “big states” other than the United States, it is obvious that small developed countries have dropped out of the new classification. This may serve as an indirect indication that the new Chinese self-assessment as a country that has become rich and, in a number of areas, sufficiently developed has led to a decrease in interest in developed countries with little international influence.

    Duality can also be traced in relation to the world order and its rules. The report stressed that China will contribute to global development and act as the “protector” of international order. At the same time, it was said that a specific feature of the modern era is "accelerating the advancement of changes in global governance and world order." China wants to emphasize that it does not seek

    undermine or eliminate the modern world order, but the thesis of the need to transform global rules, taking into account the interests of developing countries, remains valid. As a large and responsible state, China intends to actively participate in the "reform and construction" of the global governance system.

    It was announced at the convention that the Chinese approach to global governance is based on "joint discussion, joint creation and sharing." This provision received a normative status and was included in the program section of the CPC charter. The obvious problem is that the rules created by the West have not been discussed with China and China is not an equal participant in the institutions supporting the functioning of these rules - even if Western politicians believe that the use of these rules and mechanisms brings substantial and “unfair” benefits to China. During the period of "strengthening", China intends to become an equal participant in the process of developing new rules, which does not find support from the leading developed countries.

    To move from discussing private issues to shaping a global agenda, China invited the outside world to work together to "create a community for the destiny of humanity." This concept became part of the "ideas of Xi Jinping of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics" canonized at the 19th CPC Congress. The report cited “lasting peace”, “global security”, “shared prosperity”, “openness and inclusiveness”, “clean and beautiful world” as key components of the “community of human destiny”.

    This set of ideas received a detailed interpretation in the speech of Xi Jinping on December 1, 2017 in Beijing at the forum for high-level dialogue between the CPC and political parties of the world. The first-person Chinese leader said that it was he who, for the first time in 2013, put forward the initiative to build a “community of the destiny of humanity”, explaining that his “one belt, one road” initiative is aimed at practical implementation.

    the emergence of the idea of ​​"community". Xi Jinping also talked about the traditional concepts of "The Celestial Empire - One Family" (Tianxia and Jia) and the wonderful world of Great Unity (Datong), when "they walked the long way and the Celestial Empire belonged to everyone" (Da Dao Xing Ye, Tianxia Wei Gong). These considerations indicate a desire to bring Chinese values ​​and beliefs into the community of destiny project.

    Xi Jinping said that based on understanding its own experience, China is ready to share with the outside world new interpretations of the laws of human development, but at the same time it will not “export” the “Chinese model” or require other countries to “copy” Chinese methods. Even with these caveats, China's attempt to enter the world stage as a bearer of a set of non-Western ideas and values ​​suitable for creating a “community of human destiny” is capable of provoking opposition from developed countries.

    At the stage of "strengthening", China wants to declare itself as the creator of a new concept of organizing interaction within the world community. The 19th Congress consolidated the course of turning the country into an influential international player, putting forward global ideas and implementing in practice serious trans-regional initiatives like the Belt and Road.

    Yu.M. Galenovich. Our bilateral relations also have their essence, their main internal content. The statements of Xi Jinping in the aforementioned telephone conversation with the President of the Russian Federation give a certain idea of ​​this. Xi Jinping, first of all, stressed that the past congress approved a general course and program for the future development of the party and state.

    This, in essence, means the demand for recognition in our country of just such an assessment of the results of the congress. At the same time, any criticism of Xi Jinping, the CCP, and what Xi Jinping calls a common course and program for the future development of the party and state is unacceptable. In fact, we have before us a new general course of the CPC, the main and

    the only first leader of which, the "core" of which is now Xi Jinping. It is about recognizing in our country a kind of personality cult of Xi Jinping, as well as his "idea" as the general course of the party and the state. Xi Jinping emphasizes precisely the unity of the party and the state in modern China. Any doubts about unity both within the party and within the state, from this point of view, are unacceptable. In fact, this is a demand not to question the stability of the position of Xi Jin-Ping, the CCP, inside the country, the stability of the situation in China.

    Xi Jinping emphasized the assertion of the unity of opinion of all CCP members. This means a manifestation of the desire that no one outside China, including in our country, should have, and should not have any doubts about this.

    Xi Jinping stressed that the CCP's population is approaching 90 million. This is a reminder that everyone on the planet has to and will have to deal with the largest and largest party-state mechanism of governing the country with the largest population on Earth. Xi Jinping also brings to our people and our country the idea that the CCP's goal is the great revival of the Chinese nation or the nation of China. Here the term "Great Renaissance" is already used directly. Realizing this goal, according to Xi Jinping, is the CCP's historic duty and mission. Consequently, Xi Jinping warns that everyone on earth will have to adapt to the CCP's fulfillment of its historical mission, its historical duty, that is, to actions aimed at reviving the nation of China, forcing all other nations on earth to reckon with the demands of the nation of China, to do what they are required if it is treated in China as part of the renaissance of the nation of China.

    Xi Jinping confirms the characterization of the current state of relations between Russia and China as relations of comprehensive strategic interaction and partnership, and further says that such relations, from the point of view of China, are

    will remain regardless of changes in the world situation. Here there is a desire to convey to our side the idea that it should be satisfied with the fact that the CPC-PRC regards it as a “partner” (but not an ally). At the same time, it should, regardless of changes in the international situation, that is, "always", "forever", be "on the sidelines" of world politics, in particular, relations between China and America. Not to enter into any unions and alliances that China considers unnecessary, and, in fact, to do what is required of her in order to revive the nation of China.

    Xi Jinping said at the congress that China intends to follow a common trajectory with Russia. This is all the same thought by Xi Jinping that humanity has a single or common destiny. In other words, every nation, including Russia, must follow the nation of China. In general, it turns out that immediately after the 19th Congress of the CPC, in the very first conversation with Russian President Xi Jinping outlined the framework and limits of Russia's actions, which is dictated by the need for the CPC to fulfill its historical duty - the Great Renaissance of the Great Nation of China.

    HE. Boroch. The economic section of the report at the 19th Congress includes the main concepts in the field of economics that emerged over the previous years under the rule of Xi Jinping. This is the thesis about the “decisive” role of the market in the allocation of resources, enshrined at the 3rd plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee (2013). This is the concept of “supply-side structural reform”, which, starting in 2015, has served as a benchmark for implementing a set of measures to reduce overcapacity, reduce inventories, restructure debt and reduce costs. At the same time, the authorities proposed "new concepts of development" (innovation, coordination, environmental friendliness, openness, accessibility). In the reporting section of the report at the congress, the concept of “new normalcy” proposed in 2014 was also mentioned, which reflected the reaction of the Chinese leadership to the objective trend of slowing down the growth rates of the Chinese economy and the focus on the quality of growth.

    At the center of the CPC's economic policy is the thesis of the transition from high-growth growth to high-quality growth. In 2017, for the first time, the party congress did not set the goal of increasing the GDP. The rationale for this change is the emergence of a new interpretation of the main contradiction in Chinese society as a contradiction "between people's desire for a good life and uneven and incomplete development." The backwardness of production is no longer discussed in this formulation, which makes it possible to remove the task of increasing the volume of the economy. However, the inertia of the pursuit of rates is so great that Chinese experts warn against considering the "incompleteness" of development in isolation from the "unevenness." Otherwise, backward regions will refer to their "incomplete development", demand investments and new projects, which will ultimately lead to striving for high growth rates.

    The economic decisions of the 19th Congress are aimed at solving structural problems, at increasing the efficiency and quality of development. The preservation of the market course of reforms is beyond doubt. The report saw a slight stylistic refinement of the previous formulation of “the decisive role of the market in allocating resources and better deploying the role of government” (replacing the “and” with a comma), which, according to Chinese commentators, further emphasizes the importance of the role of the market relative to the role of government. The “decisive role of the market” clause was included in the updated CPC charter, replacing the previous description of the role of the market as “basic”. The materials of the congress contain the thesis on the improvement of the system of property rights in the process of reforms, including a new formulation of property rights as an "effective mechanism for stimulating" the activities of economic entities. It is about clearly defining and protecting property rights, including intellectual property.

    As an important aspect of economic reforms at the 19th Congress, the improvement of the market for factors of production was indicated.

    leadership. Chinese economists note that the market for factors of production lags behind the markets for goods and services, and this hinders the market exchange of labor, land, capital, technology, and information. To solve problems in the labor market, it is planned to reform the propiska system, improve labor legislation, continue to work to reduce the gaps between town and country, between individual regions and individual industries. It is supposed to accelerate the creation of a single market for land use in the city and village. Reforming the financial market, ensuring its healthy and stable development was proclaimed an important task. The response to excessive speculative fluctuations in the securities market was the demand to place the financial market at the service of the real economy and to increase the share of direct financing. If previously the official wording demanded that "state enterprises become strong, good and large," then at the congress these demands were addressed to state capital. It is assumed that this will help advance the reform of state-owned enterprises, improve the system of state property management and the system of property rights in the public sector of the economy.

    The economic section of the report at the congress is notable for its content and concreteness. All the proposed measures are closely related to each other. In order to consolidate the already achieved successes in reducing excess reserves and capacities within the framework of the structural reform, the authorities want to not only expand the role of market mechanisms of competition and bankruptcy, but also to maximize control over the threat of financial risks. To increase the international competitiveness of the Chinese economy, it is proposed to expand the use of the “negative list” system, which indicates which areas are closed to investors, allowing entry into other sectors without asking for additional permits. This system is already in operation in China in 11 experimental free trade zones.

    Yu.M. Galenovich. Xi Jinping said at the congress that China welcomes globalization and also understands the challenges that globalization brings with it. All countries should join forces and act in the same direction, promote economic globalization based on openness, inclusiveness, favored, equilibrium and win-win.

    With regard to globalization, the CPC-PRC is striving to take advantage of economic globalization. They claim to be the best in the world to manage the affairs of the globe when it comes, above all, to economic globalization. The call to all countries to unite their efforts turns into a call to recognize China's leading, directing and controlling role in the course of economic globalization. At the same time, in practice, it turns out that the Chinese side is concerned primarily and mainly about the benefit for itself, and only for itself.

    HE. Boroch. Based on the provisions of the 19th Congress, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC in December 2017, the directions of economic work for 2018 were formulated. The key theses were "moving forward in conditions of stability", maintaining a high quality of growth, and deepening the structural reform of the proposal. There was a thesis about the holding in 2018 of “three key battles” aimed at preventing major risks, targeted targeted poverty alleviation, and combating environmental pollution. Emphasis was placed on developing the real economy and accelerating the growth of advanced industries in order for China to take a leading position in global value chains.

    A notable event was the appearance at the end of 2017 at the Central Meeting on Economic Work of the concept of "Xi Jinping's economic ideas of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It became a concretization in the economic sphere of "Xi Jinping's ideas of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics"

    rye were included at the congress in the CPC charter. The new term is inscribed in the context of normative party ideology, it replaced the arguments of Chinese theorists about the "political economy of Xi Jinping" and "the political economy of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It was noted that under Xi Jin-ping there was a continuous deepening of knowledge of the laws of economic development.

    The proclamation of a "new era" of socialism with Chinese characteristics at the congress means that China's economic development has also entered a new era of transition from accelerated growth to high quality. This statement will have a great influence on the choice of priorities in the formation of economic policy. It will not be easy to accomplish what was planned, and the Chinese leadership understands this. In Chinese political journalism, Xi Jinping is often quoted as saying that if you do not concentrate on implementing the set tasks, then "even the best goals and the best plans will remain flowers in the mirror and the reflection of the month in the water."

    Yu.M. Galenovich. In this regard, another question that Xi Jinping raised in his report at the congress is important for us in this regard: how to relate to the Sino-American rivalry? Having a global perspective is key.

    If you look at the text of the report, it turns out that the Chinese side is proposing to the American side, Xi Jinping invites Donald Trump, first, to reckon with China, perceiving it as he represents himself. Secondly, proceed from the fact that China offers the only correct path for the development of mankind under its leadership, proceed from the fact that only adaptation to China can bring benefits to the United States. Finally, thirdly, the Chinese propose to the Americans to consider that there is only one perspective for humanity, that is, the perspective, the interpretation of which is proposed by the CPC-PRC.

    There are two parts to this perspective. First, as the largest economies in the world and permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and the United States have

    broad common interests in protecting peace and stability on the planet, stimulating global development and prosperity; they have important responsibilities. The interests of the two countries overlap deeply, they need each other. China is not a rival or enemy, as some Americans think.

    Judging by what was said at the congress, including in the economic part of the report, possibly on the initiative and on the terms of China, the prospect of the emergence of a "big two" from China and America on the planet again arises.

    A.N. Karneev. One of the most important circumstances, which perhaps not a single commentator passed by, was the consolidation of power of Xi Jinping and his team, the rapid transformation of the current secretary general into a figure equal in importance to the founder of the PRC Mao Zedong and the "foreman of Chinese reforms" Deng Xiaoping, as well as a potential transformation of the structure of supreme power in the PRC into a new quality. Despite the fact that long before the congress it was more or less clear that everything was moving towards crowning Xi (who had already concentrated in his hands an unprecedented number of control and management tools) with an even more sonorous title, the inclusion of "Xi Jinping's ideas" in the party charter and other documents, after only five years of work, it still looks like some kind of aberration that is not entirely clear to foreign observers. The surprise of Western experts was best expressed by Ewan Oznos from New Yorker: "How did it happen that a little-known middle-level party functionary suddenly turned into a leader in a few years, who is now placed next to Mao?"

    On November 17, 2017, Xinhua News Agency published an editorial titled “Xi Jinping: Leader of the New Era, Pointing the Way Forward” (Xi Jinping: Xin Shidai te Lingluen), in which the Secretary General described the “helmsman” of the great dream ship, the core leader “ great struggle "against corruption and corruption, a servant of the common people, constantly thinking about the happiness of all Chinese citizens, the commander-in-chief of military reform, the leader

    great power, "general designer of construction in a new era", etc., etc. There was also an attempt in one of the provincial party organizations (in Guizhou) to introduce the term “great leader” into the official lexicon, but it did not receive support from above, probably because it could provoke impartial comparisons with North Korean leader Kim Cheng-un.

    Almost openly, the reflections of party publicists that, they say, the two general secretaries who preceded Xi Jinping were generally "weak leaders" are already slipping through a more noticeable separation of the party from the moods and aspirations of ordinary Chinese. According to the publication of the left-wing radical resource "Red China", in private speeches of some high-ranking advisers of Xi Jinping, they explain to the party activists the dialectic of the party leadership of the past twenty years: were weak leaders (zhoshi lindao) who, in order to maintain unity in leadership and prioritize economic development, closed their eyes or pretended not to notice such actions that contained serious violations of discipline or the law. This attitude allowed many people to widely practice corruption schemes and all this led to the emergence of a privileged stratum of people (quangui zieceng) who shamelessly used their position to take resources and money in their favor, which not only exacerbated the problem of the gap between the poor and the rich, but also caused the fact that the country's economic development took place in a perverted form ”2.

    2 Yuanhang ihao.

    ^ ÉIÙÈX Xi te zhidao xixiang wanquan shi fandong te ziyuzhui (Xi Jinping's guiding ideas are in fact overt neoliberalism) / Hongse Zhongguo, 07.07.2014.

    Against this background, it becomes clear how important the anti-corruption campaign, called the "great struggle" in the report, plays in strengthening Xi's authority. On the eve of the congress, the most resonant project of party propaganda in this area was the 60-episode film “In the Name of the People” (Yi Renmin de Minyi), designed to inspire viewers with an understanding of how dramatic the struggle of the party leadership against the above negative phenomena is. As an indicator of the hypersensitivity of this topic in modern conditions, we note the fact that this series (in which, by the way, the name of Xi Jinping is encrypted in the names of the three main positive characters), after the initial propaganda by the official media, suddenly ceased to be mentioned and, according to the results of the past year, the most successful the ultra-nationalist action movie "War Wolf 2" (Zhanlang 2) has become a cinematic project that meets all the requirements of party propaganda.

    Another trend in the Congress and after the Congress work is an attempt at an offensive strategy in the struggle against all sorts of unfavorable tendencies for the CCP in the ideological, political and informational spheres, including the so-called "erroneous views" and the ideology of "hostile forces." It is no secret that the entire first term of Xi and his associates in power was characterized by a rather noticeable tightening of control over the ideological sphere, which in previous years (especially in the era of Hu Jintao) developed towards greater pluralism of opinions and the possibilities of expressing a variety of ideas. This, no doubt, reflected the fears of the party leadership that in the era of the information revolution, the party did not win in ideological confrontation with opposing views. The slogan of "four certainties", according to experts, just reflects these fears.

    After the 5th generation of Chinese leaders came to power in 2012, an obvious "frost" of the ideological sphere followed - they were subjected to restrictions as forces,

    advocating the further liberalization of the political atmosphere, as well as groups of publicists and political activists defending the "left perspective" of development, magazines and websites were closed, more stringent requirements were put forward for the regulation of the virtual space, individual dissidents and bloggers were arrested, certain dissidents were removed from store shelves books. Many so-called "public intellectuals" in China, who gained prominence in the previous period with their outstanding speeches in the media and the Internet, now prefer silence, although it is not entirely clear how long this situation will last.

    One gets the feeling that even after the congress, the so-called "red genes" of Xi Jinping, manifested in the call to "not forget about those principles" (bu wang chu xin), with which the CCP created its power, and in a bizarre way combined with a completely liberal-oriented agenda days in the field of deepening economic reforms, will show themselves with new ideas and initiatives, and the Chinese intellectuals awaiting a turn to "universal values" will have to put their hopes on the back burner.

    A week after the end of the 19th CCP Congress, an important event took place to highlight the enduring goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Accompanied by all the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Secretary General Xi Jinping arrived in Shanghai to visit the house-museum of the party's founding.

    The members of the Politburo Standing Committee, following Xi, repeated the oath of everyone joining the party, and it is curious that Xi spoke from memory, without any piece of paper. “It is not difficult to memorize the oath of one who enters the party,” Xi Jinping said that day, speaking at the museum in the second half of the congress (it was held in Jiaxing on Lake Nanhu). "It is difficult to remain loyal to the ideas [with which a person joined the party] throughout his life."

    Yu.M. Galenovich. The CCP and its leadership continue to hold power in their hands. At the same time, nothing significant happens when it comes to allowing

    solve the existing problems of political and economic reforms. Perhaps the situation could be characterized as a situation in which the upper classes cannot start and implement reforms, fearing to provoke movements that will shake their power, and the lower classes do not want to rebel, risk their lives, preferring to endure while the upper classes themselves decay and release power from their hands ...

    Judging by what was reported about the congress, there seemed to be no problems in the party and in the country. The congress was not devoted to real problems, their discussion. No solutions were suggested.

    The main concern of the leaders of the CCP is the preservation of power. Under normal circumstances, there would be no need to take steps to maximize the concentration of power in the hands of one leader. At one time, it was the emergency situation, in fact, the transition to a kind of struggle against the VKP (b) -USSR, the need to mobilize the party for this struggle, and led to the creation of such a phenomenon as the emergence of "Chairman Mao". Nowadays, in a similar situation, there is a need for a "core". The emergence of the term "core" or "main representative" is a manifestation of a kind of weakness in the leadership of the ruling party, and the weakness of the party itself, the abnormality of the situation in the party and in the country. The CCP has no democracy, no elections, no discussion.

    There are no elections in China, in the CCP. The real policy is determined, personnel issues are decided by the top leadership and the party apparatus. They represent the coordination of issues between groups of leaders within the party.

    In any case, there is no reason to talk about Xi Jinping's real and real autocracy. Moreover, the main thing in Xi Jinping's previous five-year activity is his efforts to gain a foothold in power. In fact, he has no real authority, no general support.

    Although the situation in the country and in the party is such, there are so many problems that all, or most of the party leaders, considered it necessary to strengthen, at least

    Xi Jinping's nominal first place in the party hierarchy. The party, its nomenklatura, need this, obviously feeling that without this it will be impossible to firmly hold power in the country.

    Judging by the report, the party members are encouraged to consider the following as their main goal: to fight tirelessly for the Chinese dream (Chinese dream, Chinese dreams, the dream of China), that is, for the Great Revival of the Nation of China.

    The main thing is that the national idea is revival. The great renaissance of the nation of China. Nation and its revival - these are the key words and concepts. A nation is all Chinese in China and on Earth. Rebirth is the achievement of a dominant position among all nations, in relation to all of humanity.

    The report at the CPC Congress in a certain sense seems to be an attempt, instead of Marxism with its emphasis on the class struggle, to propose some sort of universal human concepts as ideology: both as attitudes within China and as principles of China's foreign policy.

    A.N. Karneev. Observers drew attention to the fact that, despite the large-scale restrictive measures of the authorities seeking to end the growing polarization of the Chinese society and public space, ideological camps that criticize the policy of the authorities both on the left and on the right continue to exist and try to periodically remind of themselves, no matter what measures to clean up the information space. One of these challenges for the authorities is the participation of a part of the population in events in memory of Mao Zedong that are not encouraged from above.

    It is curious that at the congress and after the congress, the problems of the so-called "Chinese project" (someone else's wenyan, another version of the translation - "the Chinese solution") was put forward in the field of public discussion - the reincarnation of the topic of the "Chinese model" (alien power), the discussion of which is actively was conducted in China from 2009 to 2012. However, if in the discussions about the "Chinese model" most of the participants were unequivocally opposed to the fact that

    would export the Chinese experience of successful adaptation to the processes of globalization, now the accents have changed slightly: the report said that “the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, its theory, institutions, culture are constantly developing, ... which provided countries wishing to accelerate own development and defend their sovereignty, new possibilities of choice. " “The Chinese project has its own cultural subjectivity, and this is the space of China's discourse. To go our own way means to put an end to the theory of West-centrism, to go beyond the limits of thoughtless copying, the narrow rut of cultural hegemony of the West, when “tell me about anything, here is Ancient Greece, here is the Renaissance, and here is Enlightenment” 3.

    E.N. Rumyantsev. The CPC Charter, approved at the congress, included “Xi Jinping's ideas on the distinctive Chinese socialism of a new era” among the so-called "guiding ideas" of the CPC. This decision in Beijing is justified by the merits of Xi Jinping in the development of "distinctive Chinese socialism" after the 18th CPC Congress (2012), as well as the "grandiose" tasks of the party for decades to come, the complication of the international situation and the interests of "bringing China closer to the center of the world arena. ". In practice, it, in particular, means that now speaking against Xi Jinping will mean opposing the "party line." There is also a noticeable desire to put the current Chinese leader above Deng Xiaoping and at least on a par with Mao Zedong. One gets the impression that a part of the PRC's population, especially the intelligentsia and representatives of a number of factions in the CPC, received the appearance of "Xi Jinping's ideas" without much enthusiasm.

    A.V. Vinogradov. The 19th Congress of the CPC adopted several strategic decisions, the main of which was the renewal of the ideological doctrine. All predecessors of C

    3 Cheng Meidong. Zhongguo fang'an te zhongguo tese (Chinese specifics of the "Chinese project"). http://csr.mos.gov.cn/content/2017-11/29/ content 56165.htm

    Jinping as party leader contributed to the CCP's ideological and theoretical platform. But if the "ideas of Mao Zedong" and "Deng Xiaoping's theory" symbolized turning points in the development of theory, therefore, they were defined as the result of combining the main provisions of Marxism-Leninism "with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution" or "with the practice of modern China and the peculiarities of the era," respectively. That idea of ​​"triple representation" of the 3rd generation of leaders led by Jiang Tse-min and the "scientific concept of development" of the 4th generation led by Hu Jintao were only "a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong and the theory of Deng Xiaoping ”, But not a new page. A clear tendency towards a reduction in the theoretical contribution of the leaders of the CPC showed that, within the framework of existing views, the further development of the theory is difficult and possible only in the form of clarifications and additions.

    Yu.M. Galenovich. Xi Jinping has formally consolidated his position in power. China's problems remained: the gap between the poor and the rich, between the regions of the country, the separation of the party from the people (primarily from the peasantry), the separation of the party's nomenklatura from its rank-and-file staff, the problem of private property, the problem of land ownership for peasants, the problem of self-assertion and providing for their own rights for nationalities, the problem of political and economic freedom, the problem of trust in relations between people, the problem of the relationship between man, human personality, human dignity and the state, power, party, leader or "core", etc. There are other problems as well, these are: the problem of assessing the figures of Mao and Deng; in particular, their policy towards our people and our country; the problem of assessing the history of the party, including the events of 1989 in China and the events on the border with us in 1969.

    No solutions have been found for the cardinal problems. The country remains in a state of inertia with its problems. The likelihood of internal political and internal economic internal national protests and explosions remains.

    A.V. Vinogradov. A decline in growth rates and obsolescence of the previous socio-economic model, as well as its negative social, environmental, and other consequences, put the issue of changing it on the agenda. Over the past 30 years, the main method of the CPC's activity was the improvement and completion of economic and political mechanisms within the framework of the current course, and the main instrument was the institutionalization of positive changes. The obsolescence of the model predetermined that the possibilities for improvement and institutionalization have also been exhausted.

    At the 19th Congress, the first since his election as Secretary General, Xi Jinping stated the entry of socialism with Chinese characteristics into a new era. According to the Marxist-Leninist tradition, when eras change, old patterns go away and open the way for new ones. The implementation of the new democratic revolution and the beginning of the construction of socialism were inextricably linked with the "ideas of Mao Zedong"; the policy of reform and opening up and building xiaokang society - with Deng Xiaoping's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the 19th Congress, it was announced that by 2020 China will fulfill the task of fully building the Xiaokang society. The question arose: what next?

    From the very beginning, Xi Jinping set a new historical landmark - "the great revival of the Chinese nation," that is, the completion of socialist modernization and entry into the ranks of the first powers in the world. Since the revival of China as a world leader is not yet possible by all indicators, first of all it was necessary to re-formulate the development goals and propose a new ideological and theoretical structure, successor to the previous one.

    In Marxism, the characteristic of the era is the starting point of historical analysis, the result of which could be a number of no less fundamental changes. Thus, the theoretical outline of the report was predetermined: the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics in China entered a new era, a new era

    lays the emergence of a new main contradiction, the solution of which is described by a new guiding ideology.

    In order to understand the mechanism of development, the central place in this scheme is occupied by the main contradiction. The previous change in the main contradiction from the class struggle to the economic one marked the end of the "cultural revolution" and the beginning of the stage of reforms. The main contradiction was recorded in the CPC Statutes at the 12th Congress - "the contradiction between the growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward social production." The 19th Congress proclaimed a new fundamental contradiction in Chinese society - "the contradiction between the ever-growing needs of the people for a wonderful life and uneven and incomplete development."

    In keeping with the previous contradiction, the main thrust of the CCP's activities was economic growth. The negative environmental and social impacts and the impossibility of increasing domestic consumption to world-leading levels were addressed in the new wording. It inevitably implies a shift in priority from economic growth to quality improvement, i.e. to solve social problems by improving social relations and public administration.

    The ideological and theoretical innovations were not limited to this. To achieve the goal of the second 100th anniversary in 2049, 2 stages have been identified. The first is the implementation of mainly socialist modernization by 2035, which was previously planned for the middle of the 21st century, and the second, completely new, is the complete implementation of socialist modernization, which obviously implies the elimination of the negative consequences of the previous stage of economic development. The next 3 years, therefore, will be a transitional period from one task to another. Its completion will be the main content of the report of the current generation, which has achieved the goal of fully building the Xiaokang society and has already proclaimed new strategic goals, corresponding in scale to those achieved. In this

    connection, attention is drawn to the use of Xi Jinping in the final paragraph of his speech, another provision of traditional Chinese philosophy - "Tian Xia Wei Gong."

    As a result, the CCP has a new theoretical platform, which means that the old era, the era of Deng Xiaoping, is passing away. It is this theoretical innovation that opens up wide opportunities for making changes in the economy, domestic and foreign policy, the specific content of which has yet to be determined.

    There are already definite indications of the direction in which the CCP's course and policy will change. To maintain the pace of economic growth, China needs to develop a new foreign policy strategy, resist the tendencies to contain and limit economic globalization, which has become a key element of its economic success, and for this to take a leading role in its advancement, not to focus on contradictions in the world, but to look for and create zones of cooperation. In contrast to the previous congress, the report of the Central Committee did not include the SCO and BRICS, which emphasized the division of the world at the global level, and clearly yielded priority to other foreign policy initiatives of China - the idea of ​​a community of common humanity's destiny at the global level and the Belt and Road Initiative at the regional level. , which were also recorded in the CCP Charter.

    E.N. Rumyantsev. The first five years of Xi Jinping's rule were, first of all, a period of struggle to maintain and strengthen his power. Accordingly, this was the main task of the congress. The composition of the party's new governing bodies and the inclusion in the CPC's charter of a clause on "Xi Jinping's ideas on the distinctive Chinese socialism of a new era" indicate that this task has been largely accomplished.

    Despite all sorts of projects for reorganizing the supreme bodies of the party, information about which was merged in the period preceding the congress in the Hong Kong press, their structure was preserved. The strength of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee remained the same

    (25 people) and its Standing Committee (7 people, of which 5 are new). The number of secretaries of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee has been increased from 5 to 7 (6 are new). The strength of the CPC Central Military Commission has been reduced from 11 to 7. The 19th CPC Central Committee elected 204 members, of whom 126 were elected for the first time. Also, 172 candidate members of the CPC Central Committee and 133 members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection were elected.

    Of the 376 members and candidate members of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 38 (about 10%) were purged.

    According to the estimates of specialists from the Brookings Institute, the Central Committee of the CPC of the 19th convocation was renewed by 67.3% (cf .: 50.6% at the 16th Congress in 2002 and 48.7% at the 18th Congress in 2012) ... The average age of members and candidates for members of the 19th Central Committee is 57 years old, 0.9 years more than five years ago. The youngest in composition in the last 50 years was the 17th CPC Central Committee (2007). The average age of its members and candidates for membership was 53.5 years. In terms of age, the Central Committee of the 19th convocation is the oldest in the last thirty years. It has only 28 members and candidate members under 53 years of age. There were 71 of them in the Central Committee of the CPC of the 18th convocation, and 96 in the Central Committee of the 17th convocation.

    The two youngest members of the Central Committee of the 19th convocation - candidate members of the Central Committee Tsai Song-tao (43 years old) - secretary of the party committee of the Lankao county prov. Henan, and Zhou Qi (47), Director of the Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. These cadres symbolize two of Xi Jinping's most important policies: poverty alleviation and innovation.

    According to a number of foreign experts, Xi Jinping "broke the cadre promotion system that had developed over the past 20 years, by introducing a large number of his supporters into the 19th CPC Central Committee." The same applies to the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, in which 11 out of 25 members are his fellow countrymen, classmates, or worked under his supervision.

    The "Komsomol" faction fell into disgrace. In 2013, during a meeting with the leadership of the KSMK, Xi Jinping attacked them with criticism for the fact that they “do not go to

    keeping up with the times ", for" bureaucracy "," arrogance "," loss of ties with youth. " In 2016, the leadership of the KSMK was criticized by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC Central Committee. Some KSMK cadres were accused of considering themselves "political aristocrats." Thus, the line of cadre rejuvenation initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s is no longer a priority for the CCP leadership.

    The current members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee are Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, Han Zheng. The posts of members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PCP) of the Central Committee of the CPC on the state line, according to existing practice, will be finally agreed at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC and officially approved at the sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC) in March 2018 ...

    From the point of view of the balance of forces between the inner-party factions, the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee is as follows: out of seven members, two (Li Keqiang and Wang Yang) represent the "Komsomol" group, Han Zheng is Jiang Zemin's group, and Wang Huning is a party theoretician who worked in the Central Committee party with three general secretaries. The closest people to Xi Jinping are Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji. Li Keqiang appears to have generally submitted to Xi Jinping's influence. Wang Yang also managed to earn a certain amount of confidence from the Chairman. He was the co-chair of the Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In addition, as Deputy Prime Minister, Wang oversees the poverty alleviation program, which is a priority for Xi Jinping because of his personal prestige. According to some estimates, the Jiangzeminite, Han Zheng, will most likely be relegated to the background.

    At the same time, among the aforementioned persons, there is no discernible successor to the current Chinese leader. Thus, Xi Jinping eliminated an important "party

    institute ”, namely, the appointment of a successor to the current senior leader through a generation, which has existed in the CCP since 1997. This once again confirms that there is in fact no system for the planned change of leaders in the PRC and the CPC.

    Xi Jinping's supporters now dominate the leadership of key divisions of the CPC Central Committee apparatus. The posts of the head of the Chancellery, the heads of the departments of propaganda, organizational, and international relations are now occupied by Ding Xuexiang, Huang Kunming, Chen Xi (all members of the Politburo of the Central Committee) and Song Tao, who are devoted to him.

    Thus, the analysis points to a sharp weakening of the positions of the Komsomol and Jiangzemin groups. It is also noteworthy that over the past five years a group of representatives of the so-called "party of heirs to the throne" has been removed from power in the CCP and has practically lost influence on the top leadership.

    In the next five years, Xi Jinping's leading position in the party and state, at first glance, appears to be secure. At the same time, the activities of Xi Jinping and his entourage in the first five years of being in power give reason to believe that there will most likely not be significant political and economic reforms in the party and the country in the coming years, although life may force them to take them seriously. An "assertive" foreign policy will be pursued, and a program for building up China's military power will be implemented. Within the country, further tightening of policy towards the media, dissidents and human rights defenders, Xinjiang and Tibet is not ruled out.

    K.A. Efremova. In his keynote speech on October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping dwelled on two points that are directly related to the Southeast Asia region: this is paragraph 10 "Steadily follow the path of strengthening the army with Chinese characteristics, comprehensively stimulate the modernization of the national defense and army" and paragraph 12 " To invariably follow the path of peaceful development, to stimulate the creation of a community of the common destiny of mankind ”. These two points set the main contours of the relationship

    relations between Beijing and its neighbors in the near future and deserve special consideration.

    On issues related to defense and army construction, Xi Jinping stressed the invariability of the course towards the creation of powerful modernized armed forces "with Chinese characteristics." The Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee set the goal "by 2035, basically, to modernize the national defense and army, and by the middle of this century, to completely transform the People's Army of China into the armed forces of the advanced world level." At the same time, "the army must always be ready for battle," should "deploy military training, imitating a real war." These words sound very disturbing, considering that they were spoken after the mention of Chinese economic activity on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which are the subject of territorial disputes between China and the ASEAN countries (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei).

    At the same time, Xi Jinping's report contains a reference to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" first put forward by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in December 1953 and included in the 1982 Constitution of the PRC. These principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence - were fixed in the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet and the Sino-Burmese declaration (June

    1954), and then entered the final document of the Bandung Conference (April

    1955). Thus, they are the fundamental guidelines by which China is guided in building relations with the countries of Southeast Asia (and with the outside world in general).

    The idea of ​​a "community of the common destiny of mankind" is, of course, key in understanding the global claims of China, which positions itself as a country that, under the leadership of the Communist Party, "fights for the happiness of the people and the progress of [all] human

    honor ". At the same time, Xi Jinping bluntly stated that "China will in no case sacrifice the interests of other countries for its own development, and under no circumstances will it give up its legal rights and interests." A natural question arises, how will China behave if in order to exercise its "legitimate rights and interests" it has to sacrifice the interests of other countries, including the countries of Southeast Asia? This question remains open.

    In general, the countries of Southeast Asia harbor no illusions about China's true intentions for their region. Despite the words that “no matter what level in its development China reaches, it will never claim the position of a hegemon, it will never pursue a policy of expansion,” Southeast Asia is traditionally viewed by Beijing strategists as a special, geopolitically significant zone priority Chinese interests. First of all, this concerns Myanmar, through which China is trying to get access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the narrow Strait of Malacca. "Soft" pressure from Beijing is the reality in which the ASEAN countries have to live and with which they have to put up in one way or another.

    In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative is the “carrot” that China offers to the countries of Southeast Asia in exchange for their willingness to listen to Chinese interests. Within the framework of this initiative, the states of the region can count on investments in the construction of energy and infrastructure projects, transport and economic corridors that will allow them to solve their own problems. At the same time, patronage from China often turns into Chinese domination in the economies of these countries, which causes an inevitable growth of nationalist sentiments among the Southeast Asian elites.

    In conclusion, it should be noted that the 19th Congress of the CPC did not fundamentally change China's policy towards the Southeast Asian region, since the idea of ​​"Economic

    on the Silk Road Corridor "and" Sea Silk Road of the 21st Century "has been expressed since the fall of 2013 (it is characteristic that Xi Jin-ping first voiced it while on a visit to Indonesia). In addition, China and ASEAN are linked by a common free trade area (since 2010) and smaller-scale economic cooperation projects (for example, in the Greater Mekong subregion). The interests of China and these countries are so closely interconnected that, despite the objective contradictions (such as dissatisfaction with the "creeping" Chinese expansion and territorial disputes), their relationship can be safely described as "friendly and partnership." There is every reason to believe that they will remain so in the future.

    HELL. Resurrection. Let me summarize the most important points of the discussion. First, at the 19th Congress of the CPC, in contrast to the previously adopted system of transferring collective leadership, the next generation of leaders of the PRC was not selected and designated, and a large number of Xi Jinping's colleagues who had previously worked with him in various provinces were introduced to the Politburo. In this regard, it is important to note the high intensity of propaganda in various spheres of the social life of the PRC during and after the congress. This propaganda reinforces the idea of ​​the Xi report that his report heralds a new stage in China's development, when the country is more actively involved in shaping a new world order. At the same time, there is a contradiction between the fact that China, on the one hand, positions itself as a defender of the world order, and on the other, calls for reforming global governance.

    Secondly, judging by the report, the country's leadership apparently considers China to be a fully developed country, and that is why the materials of the congress place an emphasis on interaction with developing and neighboring countries.

    Third, the CCP consolidated around Xi Jinping under the banner of the Chinese dream, which was largely made possible by the active anti-corruption campaign in the country. Against this background, the President of the PRC appears as a great leader

    tel on a par with such leaders as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in contrast to the weaker leaders of the previous two generations.

    Fourth, the economic agenda of the congress demonstrated an understanding of the challenges facing China and the need for structural reforms in the economy. The role of the market is put in the first place, and the emphasis is shifted from the pace to the quality of economic growth. The need to improve property rights, the market for factors of production, macro control to overcome financial risks, etc. is noted. Apparently, the key question of the success of the proclaimed policy will still be the real results of socio-economic reforms.

    Fifth, the CPC and the party nomenklatura continue to concentrate power in their hands, while the party lacks the institutions of elections, democracy, and discussion. At the same time, there is a group of party members in the CCP who oppose the excessive concentration of power in the hands of Xi Jinping and believe that the current level of propaganda is excessive.

    In this regard, it can be noted without exaggeration that China is currently a strong state that pursues an active foreign policy, which means that relations with China are among the most important for Russia's foreign policy. To understand the socio-political processes taking place in China, it is important to participate in discussions and expert discussions both at the Russian and international levels, and therefore, the importance of expert support for decisions is increasing.

    The material was prepared by A.D. Voskresensky

    Prepared by Alexei D. Voskressenski

    "The common desire for peace was the knowledge of China through the 19th All-China Congress of the country's Communist Party"

    "People's Daily"

    The current forum of the Chinese communists really attracted the attention of the whole world - a lot depends on its decisions. And what you wanted - what the power is, so are the consequences. Attention was also paid to the congresses of the CPSU.
    But what is the world to us?
    How can this All-China Congress affect us?

    It is not so weak that the decisions that are now being made in Beijing may affect us. In any case, Putin is delaying self-nomination for another term, most likely looking to the east. It may not come forward.
    Very briefly, the alignment in the PDA is as follows.
    There are three internal party groups (names are conditional)
    - The centrists are supporters of a compromise, in fact, this is the group of comrade Xi Jinping ("One Belt and One Road", flexibly and peacefully, without much straining, China will first become an economic leader, and then a world hegemon)
    - Army men are radicals, supporters of a military dictatorship, a tough external course (kirdyk to capitalism) and a strict hierarchy within the country (the general's son is also a general, everyone else is at attention)
    - Komsomol members are Liberal Democrats (military-economic alliance with the United States, the Pacific Ocean is an inland sea, the whole world is satellites)
    .
    All three groups are not enemies to each other - they are strategically united (no one wants to repeat the shame of Russia - the collapse of the USSR)
    Differences in tactics to achieve the goal
    .
    "Centrists" are now on the crest of a wave of success, and have sympathizers in other groups (warriors are grateful for the rise of the armed forces, liberals for the fight against corruption and the market course)
    For the centrists, the present RF is a reliable rear. Putin's regime has proved that it is not capable of raising the economy, that is, it will not be a competitor to the Russian Federation. External political squabbles in which Russia is also a blessing as in silks - it will not take it into its head to stick a knife in the back like a neighbor.
    That is, President-Putin is like honey on their lips for them - they will support him.
    .
    "Komsomol members" do not need Putin and even harmful - his RF is an extra figure for an alliance with America. The further collapse of Russia (I don’t mind those who rejected socialism) is quite a promising idea - it’s easier to plunder resources.
    .
    "CSKA" Putin according to fig. From a military point of view, Russia for the PRC is zero with atomic bombs - the People's Liberation Army of the PRC will tear the Russian army like a hot water bottle.
    To kneel, to make vassals - no problem. Any president will not rock the boat, but will faithfully serve the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
    ***
    Something like that.
    If at this congress the majority of "Komsomol members" take the CPC Politburo, then Putin will not be nominated for the next term (suitcase, train station, Europe - he will be able to bargain for a quiet old age)
    Chances are, Chinese liberals are still strong, especially in the economically developed South.
    If the “army men” take the upper hand, our guarantor, most likely, will go to the next term, although why would he? Unless, as a transitional figure.
    There is also a probability, but it is small - for radicals, for now, everything that happens is satisfying.
    If Comrade Xi strengthens his influence, then Putin is our choice for the next term.
    Most likely, the centrists have a lot of successes.

    This is all, clearly, a conclusion from conspiracy theories.
    Conspiracy theory - fareva!
    Nobody knows how it will be. Most likely even the Chinese themselves.
    .
    ps
    In his report, Xi Jinping called the income inequality of the population the most important problem of the PRC. This is a clear stone in the garden of the "Komsomol members".
    So - we are waiting, sir!

    The campaign for the election of delegates to the 19th Congress of the CPC (October 18-24, 2017) has been held since November 2016 in accordance with a special circular adopted by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee a month earlier. In all regions of the PRC, except for Tibet and Xinjiang, elections were held when the number of candidates exceeded the number of seats allocated for this region by an average of 15%. In Tibet and Xinjiang, the number of candidates matched the number of seats allocated.

    The participation of party leaders, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, in the election campaign should, according to the above document, meet the interests of enforcing the requirements of comprehensive strict party management, etc. The members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo acting at that time were elected to the congress in the provinces of Shaanxi, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia and other regions of western China.

    Xi Jinping was unanimously elected as a delegate to the congress at the party conference in Prov. Guizhou, which until recently was headed by Chen Ming'er (secretary of the Chongqing City Party Committee; at the end of the 19th Congress, he became a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee).

    Particular attention was paid to candidates for positions in the governing bodies of the party of the new convocation. Xi Jinping personally met and talked with all the candidates for the posts of members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, and the head of the organizational department of the Central Committee of the Party, Zhao Leji, for members and candidates for members of the CPC Central Committee.

    Personnel issues were in the center of attention of the CPC leadership during the preparation and holding of the congress.

    Since the beginning of this year, the first heads of 12 ministries and departments of the PRC State Council system have been replaced, at least one new deputy has been appointed to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and all four departments of the CPC Central Committee. Of the 31 administrative-territorial units of the provincial level, 23 have been replaced by party secretaries and 24 by governors. Of the 376 members and candidate members of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 38 (about 10%) were purged.

    For five years, more than 60 generals were removed and, as a rule, prosecuted for various abuses, commanders of the branches of the armed forces were replaced. Shortly before the congress, the head of the Joint Staff and the head of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Council were removed from their posts. The system of double subordination of the paramilitary police to the Central Military Council and the State Council of the PRC has been eliminated; now these troops are subordinate only to the Central Military Commission, that is, personally to Xi Jinping. 90% of the 300 army delegates attended the CPC convention for the first time.

    At the congress itself, despite all sorts of projects for the reorganization of the supreme bodies of the party, information about which was merged into the Hong Kong press in the period preceding the congress, their structure was preserved. The strength of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee remained the same (25 people) and its Standing Committee (7 people, of which 5 are new). The number of secretaries of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee has been increased from 5 to 7 (6 are new). The strength of the CPC Central Military Commission has been reduced from 11 to 7.

    The 19th CPC Central Committee elected 204 members, of whom 126 were elected for the first time. Also, 172 candidate members of the CPC Central Committee and 133 members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection were elected. In the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, 15 people entered this party body for the first time, of whom 11 worked, studied with Xi Jinping, or are his fellow countrymen. Of the 10 remaining in the Politburo for a second term, 7 are members of its Standing Committee, as well as Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Council Xu Qiliang, head of the united front department of the CPC Central Committee Sun Chunlan and secretary of the prov. Guangdong Hu Chunhua.

    The main document of the congress is the report on the work of the Central Committee of the CPC of the 18th convocation, presented by Xi Jinping. It maintains a certain continuity with a similar document of the previous congress and contains the political guidelines of the CPC leadership on a wide range of issues of domestic and foreign policy, ideology, culture, party building, etc.

    The report, in particular, says that over the past five years, the PRC's GDP has increased from 54 trillion to 80 trillion yuan, in terms of its size, China "consistently ranks second in the world." The period up to 2020 is defined as "the time of the victory period in building a society of all-round average income."

    The time from 2020 to 2050, Xi Jinping said, can be divided into two stages. First, from 2020 to 2035. on the basis of the built society of all-round average income, it will be necessary, in the main, to carry out socialist modernization. The second stage is from 2035 to the middle of the century, during which it is necessary, on the basis of comprehensive modernization, to turn China into "a rich, powerful, democratic, civilized, harmonious, wonderful socialist modernized state." Among its few known parameters today are the CPC's leadership role, the presence of "world-class armed forces," a large GDP, and China's presence "at the center of the world arena."

    By 2050, China, as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee said, in terms of complex state power and international influence, should become the "leading" state in the world.

    The warnings about the need to work in the face of a slowdown in economic growth in Xi Jinping's report are replaced by the thesis that quantitative economic growth has turned into qualitative growth. The CPC's commitment to continuing reforms was also declared. However, the New York Times notes, “His understanding of reform is unlikely to be too similar to the earlier elements of liberalization that Dan and other senior leaders launched in the 1980s and 1990s. Then the party gradually turned to market forces and outright capitalism, while relinquishing its power over many sectors of the economy. Xi Jinping's reform version points in the opposite direction: the direction of intensifying and comprehensively strengthening party control. " Indeed, as Xi Jinping said in a speech at the congress, "the party, government, military, people, education system, east, west, south, north, center - the party rules everything." This phrase is included in the CCP's charter.

    Xi Jinping's report announced "the entry of Chinese distinctive socialism into a new era." In this regard, modern Chinese theoretical scholars distinguish three stages in the history of China after 1949. On the first, associated with the name of Mao Zedong, the country "stood up to its full height," on the second, associated with the name of Deng Xiaoping, it got rich, on the third, associated with the name of Xi Jinping, "became strong" and "went towards the great revival of the Chinese nation ".

    This topic was continued in the report on amendments to the CPC Charter. The main point of this document is to include "Xi Jinping's ideas on the distinctive Chinese socialism of a new era" among the CCP's "guiding ideas." They are declared in the documents of the Congress "the latest achievement in the Sinification of Marxism", "the quintessence of the collective wisdom of the Party and the people."

    In addition, the CPC Charter was revised to include practically all political attitudes and concepts that appeared after the 18th CPC Congress (2012). For example, "two centenary goals" and "the great goal of reviving the Chinese nation" are inscribed in it, and the concept of "the culture of original Chinese socialism" is added.

    Further, the CPC Charter includes provisions on the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources, on structural reform of the proposal, on building a system of legitimacy for original Chinese socialism, developing a system of consultative democracy, on strengthening China's “soft” power, etc. The provisions on “absolute” are also highlighted. the leadership of the armed forces by the Chinese Communist Party and the need to implement "Xi Jinping's ideas of a strong army." The CPC Charter stresses the importance of fighting corruption and "strict party governance."

    According to the statutory provisions, the main social contradiction of modern China is "the contradiction between the daily growing need of the people for a wonderful life and unbalanced, incomplete development."

    One of the sections of Xi Jinping's report is devoted to the issues of military construction and the construction of the armed forces. In particular, the task was set by 2035 "to basically carry out the modernization of the defense of the state and the armed forces" and by the middle of this century - "to completely transform the people's army into first-class armed forces by world standards", "to concretely and appropriately prepare for military all strategic directions ”.

    The foreign policy section of the document retains continuity with the similar section of the report made at the previous congress. However, it lacks the formula used five years earlier about "relations of a new type between the great powers," that is, between the PRC and the United States. Instead, another appeared: "To promote coordination and cooperation between the great powers, to create a framework for relations between the great powers based on common stability and balanced development."

    At present, in accordance with the Resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the CPC, an extensive campaign has been launched to study and propagate the materials of the 19th Congress of the CPC, which received thousands of congratulatory telegrams and letters.

    According to the head of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the CPC Song Tao, they highly assess the domestic and foreign policy of China and emphasize the "growing role" of the Chinese Communist Party in the life of the world community.

    This refers to the strengthening of the role of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC).