Belgorod Kharkiv operation. Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation

The successful battles south of Kursk in the summer of 1943 were in the center of attention of friends and foes of our Motherland, the subject of controversy in the pages of the world press, the cause of disappointment within the Hitlerite bloc, and the greatest joyful event for the Soviet people.

From 5 to 12 July, our troops heroically defended themselves, then inflicted a powerful counterattack on the Nazi troops and threw them back to the positions they had occupied before the start of the offensive. From July 24 to August 2, the troops of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts were intensively and thoroughly preparing to break through the enemy's defenses and to launch a decisive counteroffensive. This was the third major counter-offensive during the Great Patriotic War.

The counteroffensive at Kursk consisted of two operations: Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov.

I, the commander of the Steppe Front, would like to tell about the offensive of the front's troops in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. It should immediately be noted that the counter-offensive near Kursk cannot be mechanically compared with the famous counter-offensives near Moscow and Stalingrad, since the military-political and economic situation at that period could not be compared logically with the situation in the summer of 1943.

Here, even before the enemy's offensive began, we had concentrated powerful strategic reserves in advance, while the enemy did not have them and was forced to start a hasty transfer of his troops to the Kursk sector from other sectors of the front, thereby weakening these sectors. Many other facts, which are not difficult to see even for a non-specialist in military affairs, testify to the incomparability of these operations.

The transition of our troops to the counteroffensive was a complete surprise for Hitler, since the German command never disclosed our intentional defense plan. Moreover, the Germans, as already noted, had little success, having only managed to drive a wedge into our defenses in the Oboyan direction to a depth of 35 kilometers. The offensive of the troops of the Western (commanded by General V.D.Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by General M.M. Popov) fronts, which began on July 12, violated the entire enemy defense on the Oryol bridgehead. By the end of July 13, the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I.Kh. Bagramyan) wedged 25 kilometers into the enemy's defenses, and a week after the start of the offensive, it advanced to a depth of 70 kilometers, posing a threat to the main communications of the Oryol enemy grouping from the north. -western. The troops of the Bryansk Front also achieved significant successes.

On July 15, sharp changes took place in the course of the struggle at the Oryol bridgehead. In the morning, after artillery and aviation preparations, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. The main blow was struck at Gremyachevo in the center of the enemy grouping that had attacked Kursk earlier. As a result of the fighting, the enemy was driven back to their original positions.

The scale of the struggle in the Oryol direction expanded more and more. A question was being resolved that was of great importance for the further development of the war: how realistic is the German plan to transfer the struggle on the Soviet-German front into stable positional forms.

At a meeting at headquarters on July 26, Hitler demanded that the commander of Army Group Center, General-Field Marshal von Kluge, promptly retreat the troops from the Oryol bridgehead, thereby reducing the front line and freeing up a number of divisions for transfer to other sectors.

Events unfolded extremely unfavorably for the enemy on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. By July 23, the formations of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts threw the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping back to their original positions.

By the end of July, the main forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were concentrated north and northwest of Belgorod, which created conditions for a deep frontal strike at the junction of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf operational group. Proceeding from this, it was decided to carry out a dissecting strike with the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the region northwest of Belgorod in the general direction to Valki, Novaya Vodolaga in order to split the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and the subsequent coverage and defeat of enemy troops in the Kharkov area.

It is interesting to cite in full the plan of operation reported to the Headquarters, which was approved and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

“To Comrade Ivanov (conditional name of IV Stalin).

We report:

In connection with the successful breakthrough of the enemy front and the development of the offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the operation will be carried out in the future according to the following plan.

1. 53A with Solomatina's corps will advance along the Belgorodsko-Kharkiv highway, striking the main blow in the direction of Pergachi. The army must reach the Olshany, Dergachi line, replacing Zhadov's units on this line.

69A advances to the left of 53A in the direction of Cheremoshnoye. Upon reaching Cheremoshnoye 69A, having handed over a couple of the best divisions to Managarov, she herself remains in the front-line reserve for replenishment of the B area of \u200b\u200bMikoyanovka, Cheremoshnoye, Gryaznoye.

69A, it is necessary to submit the replenishment of 20,000 people as soon as possible.

7th Guards And now it will advance from the Pushkarnoye area to Brodok and further to Bochkovka, turning the enemy's front from north to south.

From the Cheremoshnoye, Ziborovka line, 7th Guards A will strike at Tsirkuny and will enter the Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin line.

Part of the forces from the Ziborovka area will attack on Murom and further on Ternovaya in order to help the 57th army force the river. Seversky Donets near Rubizhne, Star. Saltov.

2. It is advisable to transfer 57A of the Southwestern Front to the subordination of the Steppe Front and now prepare a strike from 57A from the Rubezhnoye, Star. Saltov in the general direction to Uncovered and further to the state farm. Frunze.

57 And it is necessary to bring the state farm Kutuzovka, the state farm to them. Frunze, Rogan (northern).

If 57A remains subordinate to the Southwestern Front, then it must be obliged to go on the offensive in the above direction with Shumilov's approach to the Murom region.

3. For the second stage, i.e. Kharkov operation, the 5th Guards must be transferred to the Steppe Front. tank army, which will enter the area of \u200b\u200bOlshany, Staryi Merchik, Ogultsy.

The Kharkiv operation is roughly proposed to be built in the following plan:

a) 53A, in cooperation with Rotmistrov's army, will cover Kharkov from the west and southwest.

b) Shumilov's army will advance from north to south from the line of Tsirkuny, Dergachi.

c) 57A will advance from the east from the line of the state farm them. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south.

d) 69A (if it is replenished by that time) will deploy at the junction between Zhadov and Managarov in the Olshany region and will advance south to support the Kharkov operation from the south.

69 A will go to the line Snezhkov Kut, Minkovka, Prosyanoe, Novoselovka.

e) The left flank of the Voronezh front must be brought to the Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut line.

This task must be performed by Zhadov's army and the left flank of the 27th Army.

It is desirable to have Katukov's army in the area of \u200b\u200bKovyaga, Alekseevka, Merefa.

The Southwestern Front must strike from the Zamosc area in the general direction of Merefa, advancing on both banks of the river. Mzha, part of the forces to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, part of the forces must clear the forest south of Zamosc from the enemy and reach the line Novoselovka, Okhochaye, Verkh. Bishkin, Geevka.

4. To carry out the Kharkov operation, it is necessary, in addition to 20,000 replenishment, to give 15 thousand to replenish the divisions of the 53rd and 7th Guards. armies, 200 T-34s and 100 T-70s, KB - 35 units to complete the front tank units. Transfer four self-propelled artillery regiments and two engineering brigades. To supplement the front air force with attack aircraft, fighters and bombers in the following quantities: fighters - 90, Pe-2 - 40, Il-2 - 60.

We ask for approval. No. 64, 6. 8. 43.

Zhukov, Konev, Zakharov " [TsAMO, f. 48-A, op. 1691, d.233, l. 397-401].

As follows from this plan, the attacks of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts split the enemy's defense into isolated parts, and conditions were created for the destruction of the enemy grouping in parts.

What was the enemy's grouping? For the defense of the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead, the Germans kept a large grouping of troops in the amount of 14 infantry and 4 tank divisions. In addition, during the battle, the enemy deployed another 5 tank, motorized and 4 infantry divisions to this direction.

It should be noted that in the course of the war, Hitler's troops learned to create a solid, well-saturated and deeply echeloned defense.

The enemy's tactical defense zone consisted of the main and second zones with a total depth of up to 18 kilometers. At the same time, the main enemy defense zone, 6-8 kilometers deep, consisted of two positions, on each of which strong points and resistance nodes were equipped, interconnected by full-profile trenches. The trenches were connected by communication trenches. The enemy had a significant number of bunkers in strongpoints. The second lane consisted of one position 2-3 kilometers deep. There was an intermediate position between the main and second lanes.

The enemy prepared settlements for a circular defense. Around Kharkov were equipped with two circular bypasses. Belgorod was also well protected by defensive structures, strongpoints with many firing points, several rows of barbed wire with a huge number of minefields.

The stone buildings were turned into small “fortresses”.

The chalk mountains of Belgorod were used to cover the enemy troops.

It was no accident that the Germans attached great strategic importance to the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead. It was the strongest bastion of the German defense in the east, the gateway to our troops' path to the Ukraine. One of the most important economic and political centers of the Soviet Union, the second capital of Ukraine - Kharkov, as well as Belgorod, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Lebedin, Bogodukhov, Chuguev and other cities was located on the territory of this bridgehead.

Kharkov occupied a special position in the enemy's defense, which was regarded by Hitler as the "eastern gate" of Ukraine. And this is understandable: Kharkov is the largest railway junction on the routes from Moscow to Donbass, Crimea, the Caucasus, the most important junction of highways and airlines, a city of mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemical, light and food industries. Attaching great strategic importance to Kharkov, Hitler demanded that his generals hold the city at any cost.

The highly rugged terrain, combined with the solid defense of the enemy, made our offensive operations difficult.

In the 17th century, the so-called Belgorod line passed here - a defensive line, which was a series of fortresses, earthen ramparts and fortifications that protected the Russian state from raids from the south. In the places of the ancient markings, new fortifications appeared, more serious than the previous ones.

We have thoroughly prepared for the successful fulfillment of the tasks set by the Headquarters. Suffice it to note that in the directions of the main attacks of the 5th Guards and 53rd armies, operating in the main zone of the main strike, the density of artillery saturation reached 230 barrels per kilometer of the front. This created such a fire strike that, according to the testimony of the prisoners, many of the surviving German soldiers lost their minds.

At dawn on August 3, a counter-offensive began in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction with powerful artillery and aviation preparations. The enemy's defenses were broken. In the first half of the day, the formations of the combined-arms armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the direction of the main attack penetrated the enemy's defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. Soon, the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies were introduced into the breakthrough with the task of forward brigades to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and the main forces to develop success in the operational depth.

With the breakthrough of the enemy defense, the troops of the Steppe Front were practically faced with the task of liberating Belgorod. Knowing that an attack on Belgorod from the north would require very great efforts, I did everything to ensure that the formations of the right wing of the 53rd Army of General I.M. Managarov and the 1st Mechanized Corps M.D. Solomatina to enter the path of the enemy's withdrawal to the west. The strike from the front was carried out by the 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkin, and the 7th Guards Army under the command of General M.S. Shumilova (member of the Military Council Z.T. Serdyuk), crossing the Seversky Donets, was supposed to attack the enemy garrison from the east.

So, before the offensive, the front edge of the enemy's defense was carefully processed, the entire system of fire was suppressed. And then, after identifying the remaining unsuppressed firing points, they were destroyed by a repeated artillery raid and aviation of the 5th Air Army under the command of Aviation Lieutenant General S.K. Goryunova. Artillerymen of divisions and regiments and artillery divisions of the RGK played an important role in processing the enemy's front edge. We must pay tribute to the commander of the front artillery, Lieutenant General N.S. Fomin and the representative of the Headquarters, General M.N. Chistyakov, who skillfully and creatively organized such a powerful artillery offensive. But, despite all this, on August 4, enemy resistance increased.

The rate of advance of our troops has slowed down. All our attempts to go in from the flank in order to deliver a roundabout blow to the enemy failed. The main enemy tank grouping, located in front of our front, offered fierce resistance, although our tank armies had already smashed the enemy reserves.

On August 4, the troops of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, waging fierce battles, broke through the second and third defensive lines of the enemy, covering Belgorod from the north.

7th Guards Army, consisting of eight rifle divisions (111th and 15th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 49th Guards Rifle Corps, 73rd, 78th, 81st Guards Rifle Divisions of the 25th Guards Rifle Corps, 72 - I, 36th Guards and 213rd Rifle Divisions of the 24th Guards Rifle Corps) with many tank and artillery regiments and brigades, wedging into the enemy's defenses, attacked Belgorod from the east. She eliminated the Mikhailovsky bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets, and her formations began fighting on the western bank.

The German command was worried. On August 4, the 3rd Panzer Corps and SS Panzer Corps began to move from Donbass to the Kharkov direction. The directorates (headquarters) of these corps were already in Kharkov.

I demanded that the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps defeat the units of the 6th Panzer Division of the enemy and develop an offensive against Mikoyanovka. From behind the right flank of the army, the 1st mechanized corps managed to reach the Gryaznoye, Repnoe area and cut off the withdrawal route to the southwest and south for the Belgorod group of Germans.

The 69th Army, with the assistance of the 7th Guards Army, was to capture Belgorod, and the 7th Guards Army was to break through the enemy defenses and reach the Tavrovo-Brodon line in order to, in cooperation with the 69th and 53rd armies, surround the Belgorod group of Germans ...

The fighting for the city took on a fierce character. The first to enter Belgorod at 6 a.m. on August 5 were the units of the 270th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 89th Guards Rifle Division (division commander Colonel M.P. Seryugin), as well as units of the 305th and 375th Rifle Divisions under the command of the colonel, respectively A.F. Vasiliev and Colonel P.D. Govorunenko. From the east, the city was attacked by the 93rd Guards and 111th Rifle Divisions of the 7th Guards Army.

On August 5, the troops of the 69th and the formations of the 7th Guards armies of the Steppe Front took Belgorod by storm. On the same day, after intense fighting, Oryol was liberated. The capital of our Motherland, Moscow, for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, celebrated outstanding victories with an artillery salute. This was the first artillery salute in honor of the military valor of the Soviet troops. Since then, fireworks in Moscow to commemorate the victories of the Red Army have become a glorious tradition.

Meanwhile, our tank armies, possessing high maneuverability, successfully operated in isolation from the main forces of the combined arms armies. For five days, the formations of the 1st Tank Army, commanded by General M.E. Katukov, advanced into the depth of the enemy's defenses by more than 100 kilometers and by the end of August 7 captured Bogodukhov, the 5th Guards Tank Army captured Cossack Lopan and Zolochev. The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping was cut into two parts.

The offensive of our troops continued to develop rapidly. By August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front, significantly expanding the breakthrough in the western and southwestern directions, approached Boromla, Akhtyrka, Kotelva and cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway, and the troops of the Steppe Front, overcoming fierce resistance of the enemy tank group defensive lines.

The enemy thoroughly prepared for the fight for the city. Such a fortified area was not easy to take. All our attention was riveted here, to this fortress, for the construction of which the Nazis brought many thousands of people. The enemy's desire to keep the city was great.

The enemy's defense, according to reconnaissance data and the testimony of prisoners, was a system of bunkers with overlapping two or three rolls and partially reinforced concrete structures. Flanking and oblique aiming fire was widely used, all centers of resistance had fire communications, firing points were connected by communication trenches, the front edge was reinforced with engineering structures, wire and anti-tank obstacles, and minefields.

All stone buildings on the outskirts of the city were turned into a kind of long-term firing points, the lower floors of the Houses were used as firing positions for artillery, the upper floors were occupied by submachine gunners, machine gunners and grenade launchers.

Entrances to the city and streets on the outskirts were mined and blocked by barricades. The inner quarters of the city were also prepared for defense with an anti-tank fire system.

For the defense of Kharkov, the German command concentrated a strong grouping of eight infantry, two tank divisions, artillery units, many SS, police and other units, concentrating them mainly on the northern and eastern faces of the external defensive bypass with significant echeloning of troops in depth. Hitler ordered that Kharkov be held at any cost and demanded that the generals use widespread repression against soldiers and officers who showed signs of cowardice and unwillingness to fight. He pointed out to Manstein that the loss of Kharkov would threaten the loss of Donbass.

To prevent the possibility of deep coverage of the Kharkov group of forces from the south-west, the Hitlerite command introduced operational reserves into battle against the troops of the Voronezh Front - tank and motorized rifle divisions transferred from Donbass and from the Oryol direction, which inflicted strong counterattacks on our troops at Bogodukhovsky, and then and on the Akhtyrka directions. At the same time, measures were taken to strengthen the troops fighting for Kharkov. SS Panzer Divisions were deployed here: "Reich", "Death's Head", "Viking", 3rd Panzer Division and motorized division "Great Germany".

If the enemy took all measures to keep Kharkov, then we had to take it at all costs. The task was not easy. During the war, Soviet troops undertook three offensive operations to liberate Kharkov. The first offensive was carried out by the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts in May 1942. First, they broke through the enemy's defenses and advanced to an insignificant depth. However, insufficient training and a significant superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment affected. The offensive did not achieve its goal.

In February 1943, the liberation of the Kharkov region began again. During this offensive, on February 16, the troops of the Voronezh Front liberated Kharkov. But at the end of February, the enemy regrouped its forces, brought up fresh reserves and launched a counteroffensive. On March 15, 1943, Kharkov was again abandoned, although the soldiers fought heroically for the city.

It is not my task to analyze the reasons for failure. The combatants and military historians have already said their word about this. Marshal of the Soviet Union KS Moskalenko writes about this in particular detail in his book "In the Southwest Direction". However, at the time when we had to liberate Kharkov for the third time and forever, I remembered the failed lessons and decided to take into account the experience of previous operations in order to act for sure.

Of course, the strategic situation during the Battle of Kursk was more favorable for us, but this should not have reassured us. I had to think a lot and tensely, weigh all the factors, analyze data about the enemy, study the enemy's defenses, and personally check everything. There was a great desire this time to liberate the city with a full guarantee that one more time would not have to give it to the enemy. To do this, it was necessary to utterly defeat the enemy, knock him out of Kharkov, causing the city as little destruction as possible. In no case should the city or certain areas pass from hand to hand. This is precisely what leads to the complete destruction of the settlement. We knew this well from the example of Voronezh.

We began to thoroughly prepare for the upcoming heavy battles for Kharkov. Together with the commander of the front artillery, tankmen, aviators, army commanders, and in some cases also division commanders, we studied the most advantageous approaches to the city. For this purpose, I went to the NP P.A. Rotmistrova, I.M. Managarova, N.A. Hagen, M.S. Shumilov, where we together figured out where and with what forces it is better to strike. Evaluating the terrain and the nature of the enemy's fortifications, they planned a maneuver with their troops, a place where it would be expedient to concentrate the main striking force of artillery, where it would be more convenient to deliver a tank strike, where to aim aviation. It was a difficult process. It was required to take into account all the positive and negative, to find the right key to success.

Being with General N.A. Gagen, I became interested in the southeastern direction from Volchansk, but here the development of the strike could be hindered by rivers with steep banks, the enemy will probably hold on to them.

In front of the NP of General M.S. Shumilov opened a panorama of Kharkov. M.S. Shumilov managed to enter the outskirts of the Kharkov Tractor Plant. It is more convenient to take the city from here. But with this option, more artillery will be required, since it is necessary for our troops to break through the reinforced concrete factory buildings. The largest enterprise in the city did not want to cause such great destruction. Yes, and there was no particular expediency in delivering the main blow from here either. Here the actions of the tank army of P.A. Rotmistrova, which will require a significant regrouping of forces. It is better if the army of General M.S. Shumilova will take individual buildings of the plant by storm and conduct street battles.

69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkina attacked Kharkov from the north, along the Moskovskoe highway, straight ahead and had very strong strongholds in front of her in the form of factory buildings adapted for defense. It would seem that the direction is the most direct and close, but it is also the most difficult for the advancing infantry. Leaving the NP, I figured out all the pros and cons in my mind, aiming at Kharkov from all sides, from different directions, and finally came to the final decision: the most advantageous direction for delivering the main blow is the north-western, where the General's 53rd Army is located THEM. Managarov. The members of the Military Council in the army were generals P.I. Gorokhov and A.V. Tsarev, chief of staff - General K.N. Derevianko. Here are the best approaches to the city, forest, commanding heights, from which the whole of Kharkov is clearly visible. Now it was necessary to resolve the issue of ensuring the attack of this army from the west from the direction of Lyubotin, from where the enemy tank divisions intermittently counterattacked. We decided to counter tanks with tanks and attack the city of that direction with two armies: the 53rd army and the tank army of P.A. Rotmistrova. True, this army, once again returned to the front, was no longer what it was leaving us. Fierce fighting weakened it, it had only 160 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, even these forces could greatly facilitate the solution of the main task for the front.

So, in thought and doubt, the final plan for the capture of Kharkov was born, the idea of \u200b\u200ban operation was developed.

My forward command post was located in the sector of the 53rd Army of General I.M. Managarov, i.e. in the main direction.

The day and the hour of the decisive advance approached.

Not knowing the position of the troops at the front, but wishing to see Kharkov free as soon as possible, some representatives of the Ukrainian SSR came to my command post and expressed their displeasure with our slow advance. I confess that I could not give them due attention, explain everything properly, and I had no right to disclose the operational plan. Time is running out. I was absorbed in leading the troops.

All these days, the front troops were active fighting... There was no respite. The enemy was continuously pressed, knocked out of fortified units, beaten with artillery and aircraft. Slowly but surely, the troops of the front advanced forward in order to come close to the city. Of course, it would be good not only to knock the enemy out of the city, but also to surround him. However, it must be said that bypassing such a large center as Kharkov, its complete encirclement, given the existing disposition of our troops, would be associated with great destruction. This became clear when we were still on the way to the city. The enemy at that time still possessed large tank forces and was constantly maneuvering them, so the encirclement of Kharkov was a difficult task for the front. The Voronezh Front could have helped us in this, but it got involved in tank battles near Bogodukhov. The Southwestern Front could have made a deep detour, but by this time, unfortunately, the offensive of this front had not been developed.

On August 8, at my request, by the decision of the Headquarters, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to our front.

On August 10, I issued a directive to capture Kharkov. Its main idea was to crush the enemy grouping on the outskirts of Kharkov, on the outskirts of Kharkov, in the field. We clearly imagined that the struggle in a city that was so carefully prepared for defense would require very great efforts from the troops, would be fraught with significant personnel losses and could take on a protracted nature. In addition, fighting in the city could lead to unnecessary civilian casualties, as well as the destruction of residential buildings and surviving industrial enterprises. Everything had to be done to split and smash the enemy group in the field, to deprive it of interaction with the tank forces that were delivering a counterstrike in the Bogodukhov area, to isolate the city from the influx of tank reserves from the west.

Compared with the original concept of the operation, the plan for the capture of the city was clarified and consisted of the following: 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.A. Rotmistrova struck west of Kharkov - on Korotich and Lyubotin. The aim of the strike was to cut off the enemy's withdrawal routes to Poltava and isolate Kharkov from the influx of enemy reserves from Bogodukhov. 53rd Army under the command of General I.M. Managarov and the 1st Mechanized Corps under the command of General M.D. Solomatin struck at the western and northwestern outskirts of Kharkov. 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkina attacked Kharkov from the north along the Moscow highway. 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilova advanced on the north-eastern outskirts of the city, and the 57th Army - on the left wing of the front, south of Kharkov.

To ensure the breakthrough of the external defensive bypass, the troops of the Steppe Front were reinforced with 4234 guns and mortars with a ratio of 6.5: 1 in our favor.

On August 11, fierce battles were already underway with the enemy, who stubbornly defended strongholds and centers of resistance located north of the defensive bypass and covering the approaches to it. Only by nightfall did the 53rd, 69th and 7th Guards armies on the entire front come close to the outer Kharkov defensive line.

The 57th Army, having overcome the enemy's second defensive line, captured large centers of resistance and approached with its right flank an intermediate line that covered Kharkov from the southeast. In some areas, fierce battles began in the trenches.

The 69th Army, having eliminated large enemy centers of resistance in the Cherkasskoye-Lozovoye and Bolshaya Danilovka regions and annihilated up to a thousand Hitlerites, approached the city bypass on the northern outskirts of Kharkov. With its center, the army wedged itself into the depths of the city bypass, capturing Sokolniki - one of the strongholds that were part of the system - the city's defense.

The 7th Guards Army, having completed the breakthrough of the outer contour, bypassed Kharkov from the north-east; The 57th Army crossed the Roganka River, broke through the intermediate defensive line and the outer bypass with its right flank.

As a result of very intense battles on August 12 and 13, the troops of our front in a number of sectors came close to the city contour and started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov.

The German command threw everything that could be opposed to our troops for defense, and for four days we had to wage stubborn battles on the lines reached, repelling the fierce counterattacks of the Nazis, who were trying at any cost to delay our offensive. But all their counterattacks were repulsed, and the troops of the 53rd, 5th Guards Tank and 57th Armies were preparing to deliver new attacks in order to deeply cover Kharkov from the west, east and south.

Particularly fierce battles unfolded from 18 to 22 August, when the Germans tried to defeat the main forces of the Voronezh Front strike group in the Bogodukhov area in order to achieve a decisive change in the situation in their favor on the entire Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead.

However, these attempts by the enemy could not change the course of the battle for Kharkov.

On the morning of August 18, the 53rd and 57th armies continued their offensive, striving to more closely cover Kharkov from the west and south-west. The troops of the 53rd Army had to wage heavy battles northwest of Kharkov for the clearing of the forest. The offensive of the 299th and 84th rifle divisions of this army on the northern edge of the forest was not crowned with success. Then, together with General I.M. Managarov, we made a decision: by a night attack to break through the enemy's defenses and take possession of the forest. All divisional artillery, part of the army artillery and tanks were moved to firing positions for direct fire. After a powerful fire raid from part of the 299th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.Ya. Klimenko and the 84th Infantry Division under the command of General P.I. Bunyashin broke the resistance of the enemy and took possession of the forest. From the reserve, the 252nd Infantry Division was introduced under the command of General G.I. Anisimova. I watched the actions of the division. Its units quickly and skillfully advanced through the forest and, in cooperation with the 299th and 84th rifle divisions, by the morning of August 19, having cleared the forest, launched battles for the village of Peresechnaya and the Uda river crossings.

In these battles, the fighters of the 1st battalion of the 41st rifle regiment of the 81st rifle division under the command of senior lieutenant Eremenko especially distinguished themselves. The soldiers of the company of this battalion showed themselves as heroes in the night hand-to-hand combat. The forest area liberated from the enemy played the role of a good approach and a convenient springboard in the further struggle for Kharkov.

So, parts of the 53rd Army seized advantageous positions to strike at the western and northwestern outskirts of Kharkov. From a height of 208.6 and from the edge of the forest, a view of the city was opened. My observation post was equipped at an altitude of 197.3 and combined with the observation post of General I.M. Managarov. It was from here that I directed the military operations to liberate Kharkov.

To speed up the capture of Kharkov, I gave the order to concentrate the 5th Guards Tank Army in the forest area south of the village of Polevoe. With a blow to Korotich, she was supposed to cut off the enemy's escape routes from Kharkov to the west and south-west.

Using the night crossings and passages through the railway embankment and concentrating their tanks on the southern bank of the Uda, the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive and captured the enemy grouping in the Kharkov region from the west and southwest, and the 57th Army from the south- east.

For the enemy grouping in the Kharkov region, the threat of complete encirclement was created. Only one railroad and one highway remained at his disposal, and even those were under constant attacks from the 5th Air Army.

At the same time, the neighbor to the right - the 5th Guards Army under the command of General A.S. Zhadov, closely cooperating with the 53rd Army, advanced west of Kharkov.

During the intense struggle for Kharkov, the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, having successfully completed the Oryol offensive operation, reached the approaches to Bryansk; troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts launched battles for the liberation of Donbass; on the Voronezh front, enemy counterstrikes in the area of \u200b\u200bBogodukhov and Akhtyrka did not bring him success, although the troops of this front suffered significant losses in fierce battles on August 17-20. However, according to the testimony of General S.M. Shtemenko, who narrates in his book "The General Staff during the War" about that period, the intervention of I.V. Stalin, who pointed out to the commander of the Voronezh Front about the inadmissibility of dispersing forces and means, soon corrected the situation [See: S.M. Shtemenko. General Staff during the war. M., 1975, book 1, p. 245-246].

In the afternoon of August 22, the fascist German troops began to withdraw from the Kharkov region. In order to prevent the enemy from escaping the blows, in the evening of August 22, I gave the order for a night assault on Kharkov.

Throughout the night of August 23, street battles were going on in the city, fires were blazing, and strong explosions were heard. The soldiers of the 53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th Armies and 5th Guards Tank Army, showing courage and courage, skillfully bypassed the enemy strongholds, infiltrating into his defenses, and attacked his garrisons from the rear. Step by step, Soviet soldiers cleared Kharkov from the fascist invaders.

The units of the 183rd Infantry Division, which burst into the city at dawn on August 23, successfully advanced along Sumskaya Street and were the first to reach Dzerzhinsky Square. The soldiers of the 89th Guards Rifle Division along Klochkovskaya Street went to the Gosprom building and hoisted the Red Banner over it.

By 11 o'clock on 23 August, the troops of the Steppe Front completely liberated Kharkov. Most of the group defending the city was destroyed. Its remains retreated.

During the five months of the secondary occupation, the Nazis destroyed Kharkov even more. They burned and blew up hundreds of the best buildings, Dochista robbed the city, even took away tram rails, furniture, shop equipment, firewood. On the territory of the Clinical Town, where the hospital was located, the Nazis destroyed about 450 wounded soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. Ruins were everywhere. The city, which now has more than a million inhabitants, was then only 190 thousand people. According to far from complete data, the Nazis killed over 60 thousand Kharkiv residents in concentration camps, more than 150 thousand were taken to Germany. August 23 became the day of the liberation of Kharkov.

Before reporting to I.V. Stalin about the state of affairs at the front and the liberation of Kharkov, as usual, I called Poskrebyshev. He replied:

- Comrade Stalin is resting. I won't bother him. Then I decided to call myself. The first calls were not answered. I demanded from the telephone operator:

- Call again. I am responsible for the consequences.

- I'm listening ...

- I report, Comrade Stalin, the troops of the Steppe Front liberated the city of Kharkov today.

Stalin was quick to answer:

- Congratulations. We will salute in the first category.

It is worth noting that, while working at night, Stalin usually rested at that time. I knew about this, but nevertheless the capture of Kharkov was such an important event that I could not help reporting to him personally about the completion of the Kharkov operation.

In the evening, Moscow again saluted the soldiers of the Steppe Front, this time for the liberation of Kharkov, with 20 volleys from 224 guns.

On August 23, 1943, an order of the Supreme Commander was announced in all units and formations, which stated that in the battles for Kharkov all fighters, officers and generals showed their courage, heroism, courage and ability to beat the hated enemy. All the personnel of the front were expressed gratitude. 10 divisions of the Steppe Front - 89th Guards Belgorod Rifle, 252nd, 84th, 299th, 116th, 375th, 183rd Rifle, 15th, 28th, 93rd Guards Rifle - were awarded the high honor to be called "Kharkov". A number of units, as well as a large number of generals, officers, sergeants and Red Army men, received government awards.

The rally of soldiers and workers held on August 30 at the monument to T.G. Shevchenko. As we expected, enemy aircraft raged that day.

Intending, apparently, to take revenge on us for defeating it during the capture of Kharkov, the enemy decided to destroy Kharkov from the air. But not a single enemy aircraft managed to break through the fire of our anti-aircraft gunners and bypass the dense air cover of the city with the forces of the 5th Air Army. When giving the order to cover the city with aviation during the demonstration, I told the commander of the 5th Air Army that a reliable "protective umbrella" had to be created.

All the surviving residents of the city took to the streets. Kharkov was jubilant. Kharkovites rejoiced at the complete and final liberation from the Nazi invaders. The square was greeted with stormy applause and joyful exclamations by the appearance on the podium of representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the government, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, front command and delegations of party and Soviet organizations in Kharkov, intelligentsia, workers and peasants. The meeting was opened by the secretary of the Kharkov city committee of the CP (b) U Churaev. The first word was given to me. In my speech, I noted that in fierce battles, the soldiers of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the armies of the Voronezh Front, defeated the best German tank divisions and liberated Belgorod, and then the second capital of Ukraine - Kharkov.

The Battle of Kursk was the "swan song" of the German tank forces, since the huge losses in tanks and personnel they suffered in this battle excluded the possibility of restoring their former combat power. Then I conveyed militant greetings from the soldiers, officers and generals of the front to all the participants of the rally and congratulated the Kharkovites on their liberation from fascist bondage.

Then the commander of the 89th Guards Belgorod-Kharkov Infantry Division, General M.P. Seryugin, professor A.V. Tereshchenko, engineer of the Hammer and Sickle plant Borziy, and others. In conclusion, a greeting was read out on behalf of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

The square was crowded with people. White handkerchiefs flashed through the crowd every now and then - people were crying with joy.

Remembering these events, I feel a great sense of pride for our Soviet soldiers, for the entire Soviet people, who have shown unprecedented patriotism, courage and heroism in the fight against the German fascist invaders.

What are some brief lessons from what has been said in this chapter? First of all, it should be noted that both here and in subsequent chapters I will not be able to tell about the great events in detail, I will not be able to mention all, even the most distinguished commanders of formations and units, it is not possible to give a comprehensive analysis of the actions of infantrymen, tankmen, artillerymen, pilots , communications, engineers, etc., although they all deserve it. Therefore, it is difficult to dwell in detail on all issues in the conclusions.

As follows from what has been said, the victory in the battle for Kharkov did not come easily to us. The troops of the front were advancing against a powerful, not yet absorbed, enemy tank grouping, which was striking on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. I would like to tell you at least briefly about the combat valor of all the branches of the armed forces, which have shown true heroism in the struggle against a strong and experienced enemy. Our infantry - the queen of the fields, having undergone organizational qualitative changes before the war (it had many of its automatic weapons, its own artillery and mortars), took on the brunt of military labor.

The very name "infantry" has changed, it was renamed "rifle troops", whose role in the battle as the most massive type of troops was enormous. Rifle battalions and regiments, under the thunder of artillery, together with tanks, with the support of aviation, set the tone in the attack. While advancing, they completed the battle and, together with tanks, artillery and sappers, consolidated the conquered positions.

The Soviet people always pay tribute to the courage and heroism of the soldiers of the rifle troops with love. Who now knows the names of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - Alexander Matrosov, Yuri Smirnov, Meliton Kantaria, Mikhail Yegorov and many, many other soldiers of the rifle troops who glorified our Motherland with their exploits!

Our artillerymen, representatives of the fire, strike force, staunchly held back the enemy's onslaught on the defensive, excellently supported offensive operations.

The Soviet tank crews also convincingly proved their moral and military superiority over the enemy. The technical superiority of our T-34 tank clearly manifested itself on the battlefield. The tactical training of tankers was also significantly higher. Soviet tank forces under the command of generals P.S. Rybalko, P.A. Rotmistrov, S.I. Bogdanova, M.E. Katukova and V.M. Badanovs at all stages of the struggle fought skillfully and bravely, and were a mighty striking and maneuverable force of the ground forces.

Experience has confirmed that the tank armies created by the new organization have fully justified themselves as operational formations capable of conducting combat operations in the operational depth and in isolation from rifle formations.

Our pilots, commanded by Generals S.A. Krasovsky, S.I. Rudenko, V.A. Sudets, S.K. Goryunov, M.M. Gromov, T.T. Khryukin and N.F. Naumenko.

The command and staff played a significant role in the successful conduct of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Much credit goes to the entire staff of the front headquarters, which was skillfully led by General M.V. Zakharov.

The military councils of the armies, the army commanders, the army headquarters were at the height of the situation. In the battle for Kharkov, the 53rd Army was given especially important tasks. Its commander is a strong-willed, experienced and brave General I.M. During military operations, Managarov, in order to always see the battlefield, was no further than 2-3 kilometers from the line of battle formations. Moreover, the general often risked his life (for which he often received remarks from senior commanders), was wounded several times, but continued to lead the troops using the same methods.

The Military Council of the 53rd Army, where General P.I. was a member of the Military Council, stood out for its efficiency and organization. Gorokhov (I knew him when I was a regiment commander), as well as the army headquarters headed by General K.N. Derevianko.

Skillfully led the troops of the 7th and 5th Guards armies, heroes general of Stalingrad M.S. Shumilov and A.S. Zhadov. The commander of the 57th Army, General N.A. Hagen and the commander of the 69th Army V.D. Kryuchenkin.

Now it is difficult to name all the commanders and political workers of the formations and units of the front who made a worthy contribution to our victory, but their combat deeds did not go unnoticed. The homeland has repeatedly noted the merits of generals, officers, sergeants and rank-and-file soldiers of the Steppe Front with government awards.

The defeat of the enemy grouping in the area of \u200b\u200bBelgorod and Kharkov and the elimination of its Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead victoriously ended the counteroffensive in the battle of Kursk.

In the course of the offensive battles, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the assistance of the troops of the Southwestern Front, inflicted a crushing defeat on the strike group advancing on Kursk from the south and defeated 15 enemy divisions. From the second half of July, the counteroffensive of our troops grew into a general offensive of the Red Army and led to the collapse of the German fascist front from Velikiye Luki to the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov.

The Battle of Kursk and further offensives were among the most important and decisive events of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. In this battle, Hitler's offensive strategy completely collapsed and the inability of the German defense to resist our offensive, which for the first time was successfully carried out on a large scale in summer conditions, was revealed. After the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet Armed Forces firmly retained the strategic initiative until the end of the war.

The battle was a major contribution to the development of Soviet military art and military science. In this regard, I would like to once again clarify some of the above considerations regarding the concept of the operation and the use of strategic reserves.

As already mentioned, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk salient, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to go over to deliberate defense. A correct assessment of the situation and anticipation of events made it possible to draw the correct conclusion that the main events would unfold in the Kursk region. That is why the Stavka envisaged bleeding the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then choosing the moment and launching a counteroffensive with the aim of finally crushing the shock groupings of Hitler's troops.

The course of events confirmed the correctness of this decision. As a result of the defensive battle, the enemy was exhausted, drained of blood, and brought all his reserves into the battle. At this critical moment for the enemy, our troops launched a counteroffensive and finally defeated him in two strategic operations - Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov. The decisive defeat of the enemy was achieved not in a defensive battle, but in offensive operations. Here we had an outstanding example of the creative approach of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, and the front command in defining strategic tasks for the summer of 1943.

The experience of the Battle of Kursk, as well as of a number of other operations, teaches that in order to achieve major strategic success, it is necessary to have large reserves, which in this case were the troops of the Steppe Front.

The course of the Battle of Kursk showed that, thanks to the introduction of strategic reserves, it was possible to create the necessary superiority in forces over the enemy, favorable conditions for maneuver, in a short time to disrupt the enemy's offensive, and then go over to a decisive counteroffensive.

Of course, it would be ideal to preserve the Steppe Front and, if necessary, strike with all its forces. But the situation developed in such a way that the Headquarters demanded to immediately parry the enemy's strikes in the Prokhorov area with the nearest reserves. And the Steppe Front was next to the fighting Voronezh Front. That is why, first, at the direction of Headquarters, two tank corps were taken from the Steppe Front, then two armies, and after a while two more armies. In general, the experience of using strategic reserves in the Battle of Kursk is very instructive and has not lost its significance in modern conditions.

True, the nature and quality of strategic reserves have now changed somewhat, but the question of their creation and the timeliness of their introduction in the direction of the main strike remains one of the main in the art of war.

The organization and conduct of the defense near Kursk revealed the basic essence of defense in the understanding of the Soviet military art, which considers it as a type of combat operations used to bleed the enemy and create favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.

It should be recalled once again that the defense at Kursk was deliberate, and this left its mark on its entire character. It is known, for example, that our troops near Kursk were quite saturated with artillery, the positions were well equipped, and the battle formations were deeply echeloned. The defense at Kursk was not only more stable, but also more active than at Moscow and Stalingrad. This was expressed primarily in the conduct of powerful artillery and aviation counterpreparations, in the timely occupation of the strips prepared for defense, in a wide maneuver of forces and means, and in the conduct of counterattacks against enemy troops. The deep, multi-lane defense near Kursk was built primarily as an anti-tank one. It was distinguished by great stability, which was achieved by the correct location of anti-tank strongpoints and areas, close fire interaction between them, the widespread use of engineering barriers, minefields linked to the anti-tank fire system, and the maneuver of anti-tank artillery reserves. But the victory in this battle was won by the offensive.

The very important problem of organizing a breakthrough in advance prepared and deeply echeloned enemy defense in the Bryansk and Kharkov axes was successfully solved in the battle of Kursk.

The breakthrough of the enemy's defense was carried out in relatively narrow sectors of the front, on which forces and means were boldly massed, which ensured numerical and material superiority over the enemy's troops. Suffice it, for example, to note that the commander of the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front, General I.Kh. Baghramyan concentrated 92 percent of the rifle divisions and all means of reinforcement in the breakthrough sector, which constituted about 40 percent of the total front of the army's offensive. The main forces in the direction of the main attack were also concentrated in the troops of the 5th Guards and 53rd armies. Here the operational density was 1.5 kilometers per division, up to 230 guns and mortars, and up to 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of the front.

This massing of forces and means, combined with good preparation of the offensive, ensured a successful hacking of the enemy's long-term defense.

Breakthrough is an art, not just the result of arithmetic calculations. From the experience of the war, we know many examples of how sometimes it was difficult to break through. As a rule, the main content of an operational breakthrough was the defeat of the main enemy forces in the tactical zone and the creation of conditions for the introduction of mobile forces into the breakthrough - tank armies or second echelons of the front (army).

For the development of success in the operational depth in the battle of Kursk, tank armies, which constituted the mobile group of the front, were first introduced into the breakthrough. Of particular interest is the use of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Acting side by side, after breaking through the tactical defense zone, they launched a swift offensive and advanced up to 120-150 kilometers. The 1st Panzer Army, advancing on the Bogodukhov area, covered 20-30 kilometers a day in isolation from the combined-arms armies, strikes at the operational reserves, on the flanks and rear of the Nazi troops, forcing them to leave their defensive positions and retreat.

It should be noted that there were 1,380 armored units in the Steppe Front. In total, there were 4,980 tanks and self-propelled artillery units in the composition of the three fronts in the Battle of Kursk, which amounted to about 50 percent of the armored units of the entire active army. This indicates that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command provided for the massive use of armored and mechanized troops in the main strategic direction. The result of this forward-looking planning is well known.

An unprecedented oncoming tank battle unfolded near Kursk, the largest in the history of the Second World War. In the Prokhorovka area, and then in the Akhtyrka and Bogodukhov areas, there was a truly tank battle. The experience of these battles is very valuable. He showed that the success of a battle of tank armies depends on their interaction with the combined-arms armies, on the correct organization of artillery and air support, on the rapid concentration of forces in the main direction, on the swiftness of the attack and the continuity of control.

Much valuable for the development of the theory of military art was given by the experience of using the air force in the Battle of Kursk. Our aviation has won complete air supremacy. In the counter-offensive, an air offensive was carried out in full and to great depth. The fight against enemy reserves was effectively waged. Aviation, both in defense and in counteroffensive, was used massively, in close cooperation of several air armies with the country's air defense aviation.

During the period of the Kursk battle, the rear of the Red Army performed a huge amount of work, providing the troops with all types of weapons and military equipment, ammunition and fuel, food and equipment.

A kind word must be said about our glorious doctors, who gave all their strength to timely evacuate soldiers and commanders wounded on the battlefield to the rear, save the lives of Soviet soldiers and return them to duty.

Speaking about the development of tactics in the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize that the organization and conduct of a combined arms battle is a very complex type of military art. From the commanders and staffs organizing a combined-arms battle, careful preparation of the offensive, the organization of interaction and control is required, because only the combined efforts of all the branches of the armed forces can achieve success.

The actions of soldiers, subunits, units, formations and formations near Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, Belgorod were thoroughly studied, comprehensively reflected in military literature, not only in the interests of history, but also because the experience of the Battle of Kursk has not lost its significance in our days ...

Many general principles in the activities of the command, staffs and troops are of considerable interest even now, especially in the theoretical development of a nuclear-free period of the war.

The historic victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Battle of Kursk was of enormous international significance.

The freedom-loving peoples of the whole world have seen with their own eyes that, despite the absence of a second front in Europe, the military plans of Nazi Germany are failing.

The strategic importance of the victory of the Red Army in the battle of Kursk was also exceptionally great. "If the battle of Stalingrad, - said JV Stalin, - foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the battle of Kursk put it before a catastrophe."

In the battle of Kursk, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces won not only a military, but also a major moral and political victory.

In all its greatness, the high moral and combat qualities of the Soviet people, their selfless patriotism, manifested themselves in this battle.

Selfless service to the Motherland, the ability to overcome difficult trials, readiness for heroism have become the norm of behavior, a property of the characters of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

The population and local party organizations took an active part in the struggle against the hated enemy. In the midst of the battle, the partisans launched a "rail war". By mid-August, the partisans of Belarus, Ukraine, Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk and Smolensk regions stepped up their actions, which provided great assistance to the advancing fronts.

Over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers - participants in the Battle of Kursk, Kharkov and Belgorod battles were awarded orders and medals, many of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The authority of the Soviet Union as a decisive force in the struggle against fascist Germany has grown even more. The victory at Kursk strengthened the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for a speedy liberation, intensified the struggle of the forces of the anti-fascist Resistance.

The Battle of Kursk marked a major stage in the development of Soviet military art. It will remain for centuries not only as a symbol of the invincible power of the socialist state, born of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and its Armed Forces, but also as an outstanding example of the achievements of advanced Soviet military science.

Page 13 of 13

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation

FROM it is read that the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, German troops located in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Prokhorov bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But the Soviet troops were unable to immediately start pursuing the enemy. Only on July 17, part of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rearguards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19, they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st tank army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the progress of our troops these days was insignificant. On July 18, all the available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, until the end of July 19, the front was engaged in regrouping forces. Only on July 20 did the front troops, consisting of five combined-arms armies, manage to advance 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts went over to the general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, basically reached the positions that our troops had occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

The headquarters demanded to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. Having listened to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the date of the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, there were 50 rifle divisions in the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully completed. A somewhat better position was at the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by German troops were expected. So, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the 1st Tank Army had T-34 - 412, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (total - 549). 5th Guards. the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

Artillerymen of a fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursuing a retreating enemy.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery barrage. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. German artillery fire was indiscriminate. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advance units of the 1st Panzer Army crossed the Vorksla River. In the first half of the day, the infantry units advanced 5 ... 6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Panzer Army advanced 12 km into the depths of the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections of the 5th Guards. tank army advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the Dobraya region.

In a more difficult situation, units of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Without such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, its offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st mechanized corps were put into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7 ... 8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomar and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, part of the 6th Guards. armies started fighting for Tomarovka and by evening they cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, Tomar's resistance center was cleared of German troops. At that time, the mobile group of the Voronezh Front advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy's defense, creating a threat of encirclement to the defending troops.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front started fighting for Belgorod. The troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Forcing the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards left the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Belgorod bypassed the mobile formations of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops, a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomar's center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to go to the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the Soviet offensive on the southern face is much higher than the floor of Orel. But for a successful offensive of the Steppe Front, it lacked tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Stavka, the front was allocated for replenishment 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 - KV-lc. In addition, the front was reinforced with two engineering brigades and four self-propelled artillery regiments.

Grenadier after the fight. August 1943

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the Germans' resistance unit in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The commander of the artillery of the 27th Army ordered to put forward all available artillery means to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a division of rocket launchers suddenly opened fire on the convoy, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and fired. The blow was so unexpected that many German vehicles were abandoned in perfect working order. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left by German troops. According to the testimony of the prisoners, these were the remnants of 255, 332, 57th infantry and part of the 19th Panzer Division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov group of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9, the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the offensive of the Steppe Front was now bypassing the Kharkov group of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highways leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozovaya.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Tank Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive group of German troops.

Assault gun StuG 40, knocked out by Golovnev's gun. Akhtyrka area.

Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.

Anti-tank cannon Rak 40 on a trailer near the RSO tractor, left after shelling near Bogodukhov.

T-34 tanks with infantry landing in the attack on Kharkov.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11, German troops launched a counterattack on units of the 1st Panzer Army on the Bogodukhov area by a hastily assembled grouping, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and parts of SS Panzer Divisions "Totenkopf", "Das Reich "And" Viking ". This blow significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front, since part of the subunits had to be taken from the latter to form an operational reserve. By August 12, on the Valkovskoe direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans constantly attacked with tank and motorized infantry units, but could not achieve decisive success. How could they not recapture the Kharkov-Poltava railway. To strengthen the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 had only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards were also transferred to the Bohodukhiv direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, the German organization during the fighting managed to wedge a little into the junction between the 1st Panzer Army and the 5th Guards. a tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General. Vatutin decided to enter into battle the reserves of the 6th Guards. army and all the reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while parts of the 6th Guards. armies made significant progress, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, German troops, regrouping their forces, broke through the defense zone of the 6th Panzer Corps and went into the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the Ilyushin attack aircraft were insufficiently effective (by the way, the same results were noted during the defensive battles on the northern face).

The crew tries to level the overturned PzKpfw III Ausf M. SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943

Tanks T-34, knocked out in the Akhtyrka area.

Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.

The steppe front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive center and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence about the defensive structures of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German grouping on the outskirts of the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank forces into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive line of the city and began an assault on it. But only the next day, after the introduction of all artillery reserves, it was possible to wedge a little into it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. the tank army was involved in repelling the German ular in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. armies broke through the outer defensive line and approached the suburbs.

In the period from 13 to 17 August, Soviet troops began fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the size of the tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, 30 ... 40 people remained.

German artillerymen fire from an IeFH 18 howitzer at the advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943

"Studebakers" with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.

The heavy tank "Churchill" of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment of the Breakthrough of the 5th Tank Army follows the wrecked eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank turret the inscription "For Radiansk Ukraine". Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

The scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

To enlarge - click on the image

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front by striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The shock group involved the Grossdeutschland motorized division, which had been transferred from Bryansk. 10th motorized division, units of the 11th and 19th tank divisions and two separate battalions of heavy tanks. The grouping consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The group was opposed by parts of the 27th Army, consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring sectors. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyr group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the beginning of the German counteroffensive.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans conducted a heavy artillery barrage and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repelled the attacks of German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans introduced up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was disabled, and the front was broken through. By 13 o'clock the Germans broke through to the location of the division headquarters, and by the end of the day advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in the southeast direction. To localize the impact, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. Panzer Corps, who attacked the breakthrough grouping to the flank and rear.

The long-range 152mm Br-2 gun prepares to open fire on the retreating German forces.

German artillerymen repel the attack of the Soviet troops.

German troops retreat across the river. August 1943

Counterattack of Soviet troops.

Fight on the outskirts of Kharkov. August 1943

"Panthers" shot up on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At the same time, units of the right wing of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th and 47th armies) continued to develop the offensive and advanced 12 ... 20 km, hanging over the Akhtyr group from the north. On the morning of August 19, the 1st Panzer Army also launched an offensive on Akhtyrka. By noon, the advance of the Akhtyr group in the direction of Bogodukhov was stopped, and by the end of the day its position became precarious due to the overhanging of parts of the 40th and 47th armies from the rear. However, on 20 August the Germans tried to encircle two divisions of the 27th Army in the Kotelva area, but this plan failed. In repelling the offensive, the artillerymen and units of the engineering assault brigades especially distinguished themselves. Here the Germans lost 93 tanks, 134 guns and one armored train.

Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyr group was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov group of German troops. Only on August 21-25, the Akhtyr organization was destroyed and the city was liberated.

Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.

Tank T-34 on the outskirts of Kharkov.

"Panther", knocked out by the crew of the Guards. Senior Sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At a time when the troops of the Voronezh Front were fighting in the Bogodukhov area, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached Kharkov. On August 18, the troops of the 53rd Army began fighting for a heavily fortified forest on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, stuffed with machine gun points and anti-tank guns. All attempts by the army to break through the massif into the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, pushing all the artillery into open positions, did the Soviet troops manage to shoot down the defenders from their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they reached the Uda River and in some places began crossing.

In view of the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German group from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement hung over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by Soviet troops to break into the city ran into dense artillery and machine-gun fire from units left in the rearguard. In order not to allow German troops to withdraw combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front gave the order to conduct a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 am on August 23, they began an assault.

"Tamed" "Panther" on the street of liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943

Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations

Note: The first number - tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34

Irretrievable losses amounted to T-34 tanks - up to 31%, on T-70 tanks - up to 43% of the total losses The sign "~" marks very contradictory data obtained by an indirect method.

The units of the 69th Army were the first to break into the city, followed by units of the 7th Guards Army in battles. The Germans retreated, hiding behind strong rear guards, reinforced tanks and assault guns. At 4:30 am, the 183rd division reached Dzerzhinsky Square, and by dawn the city was basically liberated. But only in the afternoon the fighting ended on its outskirts, where the streets were filled with equipment and weapons abandoned during the retreat. In the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov, but the fighting continued for another week to destroy the remnants of the Kharkov defensive group. On August 30, the inhabitants of Kharkov celebrated the complete liberation of the city. The Battle of Kursk is over.

CONCLUSION

TO The battle of Ur was the first planting of the Second World War, in which masses of tanks took part from both sides. The attackers tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - to break through defensive lines in narrow areas and further develop the offensive. The defenders also relied on the experience of 1941-42. and initially used their tanks to carry out counterstrikes designed to restore a difficult situation in certain sectors of the front.

However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of their opponents' anti-tank defense. For the German troops, the high density of Soviet artillery and good engineering preparation of the defense zone turned out to be unexpected. The Soviet command did not expect the high maneuverability of the German anti-tank subunits, which quickly regrouped and met the counterattacking Soviet tanks with accurate ambush fire, even in the conditions of their own offensive. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved better results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at the positions of Soviet troops from a long distance, while the infantry units stormed them. The defenders achieved better results, also using tanks "self-propelled", firing from tanks buried in the ground.

Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, anti-tank and self-propelled artillery remained the main enemy of armored combat vehicles. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of wounded and destroyed.

Nevertheless, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of a new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defense.

Our troops occupied the city of Belgorod. The relative lull that reigned in recent days in the Belgorod direction was short-lived. The Soviet troops, having liquidated the July offensive of the Germans and threw the enemy back to their original positions, again rushed to a decisive assault on the enemy's fortified positions.
The advance of our units was preceded by a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's forward edge, its strongholds, and the fire system. Reconnaissance was carried out day and night on the ground and from the air. Using this intelligence, the sappers defused the enemy minefields in advance and destroyed the barbed wire. The reconnaissance helped our artillerymen to detect enemy firing positions, and the pilots - to find the places of accumulation of fascist tanks and infantry.
In the last days before the start of our offensive, Soviet troops in a number of places forced the enemy into battles, during which they significantly improved their positions. These battles, although they were local in nature, brought tangible losses to the Germans and, what is especially important, diverted their attention from the direction of our main attack.
The offensive began at dawn. At the moment when our infantry was accumulating for an attack, Soviet artillery rained down on enemy positions with crushing fire. At the same time, our attack aircraft and bombers attacked the enemy from the air. From the very first minutes of the battle, Soviet aircraft became the masters of the air.
New squadrons of red-star aircraft came to replace one of the detachments, the fortified positions of the Germans were engulfed in fire and smoke.
Soviet pilots and artillerymen destroyed a huge amount of enemy equipment. Our infantrymen were clearly convinced of this when they burst into the location of the Germans. In some places not only broken individual enemy guns were found, but even entire batteries and artillery battalions. Organized fire, and often a bayonet strike, the enemy infantry was thrown back with heavy losses for it. Then our tanks rushed forward. Numerous groups of Soviet armored vehicles, covered from the air by powerful detachments of aircraft, hampered the enemy's maneuver, destroying his manpower and equipment. Already the first hours of the battle, characterized by exceptionally clear interaction of all branches of our troops, inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. In order to plug the gap in their defenses, the Nazis were forced to hastily bring up their reserves and hurriedly throw them into battle on the move. Oncoming tank battles took place in some areas. Soviet units, waging fierce battles in the depths of the enemy's defenses, continued to advance. The task was to prevent the Germans from staying at intermediate lines. The soldiers beat the enemy with a shell, bullet, bayonet, grenade.
A group of self-propelled guns, which included the crew of Lieutenant Kubaevsky, supported the actions of our tanks. Enemy batteries fired heavily. Kubaevsky noticed that the Germans were shooting from the edge of the forest, and directed his gun there. With two shells, he smashed the enemy's gun, but the Germans also managed to set the gun on fire.

We offer you an illustrated edition dedicated to the military operations on the Kursk Bulge. When compiling the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal of giving a comprehensive description of the course of hostilities in the summer of 1943. They mainly used domestic documents of those years as primary sources: combat logs, reports on combat actions and losses provided by various military formations, and work protocols commissions engaged in July-August 1943 studying new models of military equipment in Germany. The publication mainly deals with the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored forces and does not consider the actions of aviation and infantry formations.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation

It is believed that the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. On July 16, German troops located in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But the Soviet troops were unable to immediately start pursuing the enemy. Only on July 17, part of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rear guards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st tank army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the progress of our troops these days was insignificant.

An artillery pursuit brigade follows retreating enemy.

On July 18, all the available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, until the end of July 19, the front was engaged in regrouping forces. Only on 20 July did the front's troops, consisting of five combined-arms armies, manage to advance 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts went over to the general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, basically reached the positions that our troops had occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

The headquarters demanded to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. Having listened to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the date of the further offensive by 8 days.

In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation in the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, there were 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully completed. A somewhat better position was at the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by German troops were expected. So, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the 1st Panzer Army had T-34 tanks - 412, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (total - 549). 5th Guards. the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery barrage. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. German artillery fire was indiscriminate. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advance units of the 1st Panzer Army crossed the Vorksla River. In the first half of the day, the infantry units advanced 5 ... 6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought into battle the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Panzer Army advanced 12 km into the depths of the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections of the 5th Guards. tank army advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the Dobraya region.

In a more difficult situation, units of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Lacking such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, his offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the 1st mechanized corps tanks were put into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7 ... 8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomar and Belgorod nodes of resistance. On the morning of August 5, part of the 6th Guards. armies started fighting for Tomarovka and by evening they cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20–40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomar's center of resistance was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy's defenses. creating a threat of encirclement to the defending troops.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front started fighting for Belgorod. The troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Forcing the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards left the eastern outskirts. armies, and from the west Bel-Yurod bypassed the mobile formations of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops, a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomar's center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to enter the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the Soviet offensive on the southern face was much higher than at Orel. But for a successful offensive of the Steppe Front, it lacked tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Stavka, the front was allocated for replenishment 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 - KV-lc. In addition, the front was reinforced with two engineering brigades and four self-propelled artillery regiments.

After the battle. August 1943.

The assault gun StuG 40 destroyed by Golovnev "s gun. Akhtyrka region.

Soviet SU-122 SP guns in combat. Kharkov line of advance, August 1943.

RSO tractor and PaK 40 gun destroyed near Bogodukhov.

The T-34 with tank-borne infantry advance to Kharkov.

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The commander of the artillery of the 27th Army ordered to put forward all available artillery means to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a division of rocket launchers unexpectedly opened fire on the convoy, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and included in the firing. The blow was so unexpected that many German vehicles were abandoned in perfect working order. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left by German troops. According to the testimony of the prisoners, these were the remnants of 255, 332, 57th infantry and part of the 19th Panzer Division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov group of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9, the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the offensive of the Steppe Front was now bypassing the Kharkov group of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highways leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozovaya.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Tank Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive group of German troops.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11, German troops launched a counterattack on units of the 1st Panzer Army on the Bogodukhov area by a hastily assembled grouping, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and parts of the SS Panzer Divisions "Totenkopf", "Das Reich "And" Viklng ". This blow significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front, since part of the subunits had to be taken from the latter to form an operational reserve. By August 12, on the Valkovskoe direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans constantly attacked with tank and motorized infantry units, but could not achieve decisive success. How could they not recapture the Kharkov-Poltava railway. To strengthen the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 had only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards were also transferred to the Bohodukhiv direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, the German group during the battles managed to wedge a little into the junction between the 1st and the tank army and the 5th Guards. a tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General. Vatutin decided to enter into battle the reserves of the 6th Guards. army and all the reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while parts of the 6th Guards. the armies made significant progress, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, German troops, regrouping their forces, broke through the defense zone of the 6th Panzer Corps and went into the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the Ilyushin attack aircraft were insufficiently effective (by the way, the same results were noted during the defensive battles on the northern face).

The PzKpfw III Ausf M of panzerdivision "Das Reich".

Retreating German troops. The Donets river. August 1943.

Soviet T-34 tanks destroyed in Akhtyrka region.

Soviet troops are moving to Kharkov.

German leFH 18 howitzer firing to advancing Soviet troops Kharkov direction. August 1943.

Studebackers towing ZIS-3 AT guns. Kharkov direction.

The heavy tank Mk IV "Churchill" of 49 Guards heavy tank regiment of 5th Guards tank army with slogan "For Soviet Ukraine" written on the turret passes a destroyed SdKfz 232 (8-Rad). Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

The SU-122 on a march. August 7 1943.

The steppe front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive center and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence about the defensive structures of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German grouping on the outskirts of the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank forces into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive line of the city and began an assault on it. But only the next day, after the introduction of all artillery reserves, it was possible to wedge a little into it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. the tank army was involved in repelling a German strike in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. armies broke through the outer defensive line and approached the suburbs.

Between 13 and 17 August, Soviet troops engaged in fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the number of a tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, there were 30 ... 40 people left.

A scheme of Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front by striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The shock group involved the Grossdeutschland motorized division redeployed from near Bryansk, the South Motorized Division, units of the 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions and two separate battalions of heavy tanks. The grouping consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The group was opposed by parts of the 27th Army, consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel the counterattack, up to 00 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring sectors. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyr group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the beginning of the German counteroffensive.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans conducted a heavy artillery barrage and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the artillery of the division successfully repelled the attacks of German tanks, but after 2 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the artillery of the division was put out of action and the front was broken through. By 13 o'clock the Germans broke through to the location of the division headquarters, and by the end of the day advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in the southeast direction. To localize the impact, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. Panzer Corps, which attacked the grouping that had broken through to the flank and rear. "Panther", knocked out by the detachment of Guards. Senior Sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov (Photo from the collection of the authors).

The "Panther" destroyed at the outskirts of Kharkov by a gun of Guards senior sgt Parfenov. August 1943.

The "Tiger" destroyed by troops of the 70th army. Orel-Kursk line of advance, July 1943.

The "tame" "Panther" on a street of liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943.

At the same time, units of the right wing of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th and 47th armies) continued to develop the offensive and advanced 12 ... 20 km, hanging over the Akhtyr group from the north. On the morning of August 19, the 1st Panzer Army also launched an offensive on Akhtyrka. By noon, the advance of the Akhtyr group in the direction of Bogodukhov was stopped, and by the end of the day its position became precarious due to the overhanging of parts of the 40th and 47th armies from the rear. Nevertheless. On August 20, the Germans tried to encircle two divisions of the 27th Army in the Kotelva area, but this plan failed. In repelling the offensive, the artillerymen and units of the engineering assault brigades especially distinguished themselves. Here the Germans lost 93 tanks, 134 guns and one armored train.

Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyr group was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov group of German troops. Only on August 21-25 the Akhtyr group was destroyed and the city was liberated.

On August 3, 1943, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation began (operation "Rumyantsev"). The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the aim of defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of the German army, liberating the Kharkov industrial region, creating the prerequisites for the final liberation from the invaders of the Left-Bank Ukraine. The operation was attended by the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, as well as the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front: more than 980 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand troops. aircraft. In total, by the beginning of the offensive on August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments.

On the part of the Wehrmacht, the 4th Panzer Army, the Kempf Army Group and the 4th Air Fleet took part in the battle: about 300 thousand people, more than 3 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and over 1,000 aircraft (according to Soviet data); 200 thousand people and 210 tanks (according to German data). The Wehrmacht had 15 infantry divisions and 4 tank divisions in the operational reserve in this direction (6th, 7th, 11th and 19th). Already in the course of the battle, the German command transferred from the Donbass and the Oryol direction, the SS Panzer Division "Viking" and the 17th Panzer Division, the Panzer Divisions of the SS "Great Germany", "Reich", "Dead Head" and the 3rd Panzer Division. The Kharkov group was also reinforced with three infantry divisions.

It is officially believed that the beginning of the offensive operation of the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, the German command, fearing that the troops stationed in the Prokhorovka area would fall victim to the flank attacks of the Red Army, ordered the retreat to their original positions under the cover of strong rearguards. The offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts, which began on July 12, and the Central Front on the Oryol arc on July 15, played a role. The troops of the Voronezh Front launched an offensive on July 16. On July 17, units of the 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Armies were able to press the German rearguards and advance 5-6 kilometers. On July 18-19, the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army joined the offensive. Tank formations advanced 2-3 km.

On July 18, the Steppe Front under the command of Ivan Konev was supposed to engage in battle, but he was regrouping forces until the end of July 19. Only on July 20 did the troops of the Steppe Front manage to advance 5-7 km. On July 22, units of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts went over to the general offensive and by the end of the next day, having knocked down the German barriers, in general reached the positions that the Soviet troops had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel on July 5. However, the further advance of the Soviet troops was stopped by the German forces, which relied on the previous defensive lines and received reinforcements. The headquarters proposed to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it was necessary to regroup the forces and replenish the units with personnel and equipment. Having listened to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command postponed the date of the further offensive until early August.

Artillerymen of a fighter brigade (combined arms type) are pursuing the retreating enemy (Photo by RGAKFD).

Plans of the Soviet command, preparation of the operation

The plan of the offensive operation was prepared by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front on the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The operation was named "Commander Rumyantsev", in honor of the great Russian commander of the 18th century, the winner of the Prussian troops Frederick the Great and the Turkish troops at Larga, Cahul. The first version of the operation provided for the encirclement of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping. The commander of the Voronezh Front, Nikolai Vatutin, wanted to carry out the classic version of encirclement and destruction of enemy troops with converging strikes ("cannes"). They planned to deliver one blow in the Krasnopolye region, the other in the Chuguev region. One strike group was to bypass Kharkov from the south, advancing to the west. The second group was supposed to advance from north to south, bypassing Kharkov from the west. If the operation was successful, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group, that is, practically the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht, would fall into the "cauldron". The second scenario was less ambitious and scaled up. It was proposed to deliver the main strikes from the Proletarsky - Krasnaya Yaruga and Chuguev areas. If the operation was successful, the entire Kempf group and most of the 4th Panzer Army were to be surrounded.

However, in order to implement both variants of the offensive operation, it was necessary to concentrate large strike groups on the flanks, which would break through the enemy's defensive formations and break through to a depth of 250 km. To create them, it was necessary to carry out a series of regroupings of forces, which took a lot of time. In addition, the possibility of detecting these regroupings by German intelligence increased. The rate did not suit such a development of events. Stalin gave about 8 days for replenishment of units, delivery of ammunition and rest. The current situation demanded a strike in as soon as possible... Soviet intelligence informed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the Belgorod-Kharkov group at that time was seriously weakened. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was deployed to the Donbass, and the SS Panzer Division "Great Germany" - to the Oryol direction. This was caused by the offensive of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts in the Donbass and the Western and Bryansk fronts on the Oryol Bulge. However, both Soviet offensives were already running out of steam, and it was necessary to rush while the German elite divisions were tied up in battles in the Donbass and in the Orel region. In addition, after Operation Citadel, a significant number of German tanks and assault guns were being repaired. Armored units were replenished with equipment. Thus, on July 31, 1942, Army Group South had 625 combat-ready tanks, 633 under repair, 190 on the way, 251 combat-ready assault guns, 84 under repair, 11 on the road. Most of the equipment required short-term repairs lasting 6 - 21 days. If the preparations for Operation Rumyantsev had dragged on for a longer period, Army Group South would have seriously strengthened its anti-tank potential.

The blow had to be delivered as quickly as possible, until the German troops recovered from Operation Citadel. Based on the instructions of the Headquarters, an offensive plan was developed. The main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, bypassing Kharkov from the west. This plan gave a significant gain in time, since there was no need to regroup forces. On the left flank of the Voronezh Front and on the right flank of the Steppe fronts, during the previous battles, there were already established shock groups. In addition, they planned to attack along the rivers, which weakened their defensive potential. After the strike groups of the two fronts moved out to the area west of Kharkov, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was to begin an offensive towards them. As a result, the idea of \u200b\u200bencircling German troops was retained. But the encircled territory was smaller, and the strike group of the Voronezh Front was stronger than that of the Steppe Front. The offensive plan was based on very high rates of movement of the shock groupings. In 3-4 days they had to advance 100-120 km. Such a swift rush should have led to the defeat of the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping before the arrival of German reserves. From the air, the Voronezh Front was supported by the 2nd Air Army (753 aircraft), the Steppe Front - by the 5th Air Army (769 aircraft).

For such an offensive, fresh forces were needed. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts withstood the German offensive, but suffered serious losses. However, the Stavka had reserves. Even during the preparation of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the headquarters of the Supreme Command formed very powerful reserves in case of a negative development of the situation. Even if the German armies were able to cut off the Kursk ledge, surrounding significant forces of the Voronezh and Central fronts, the disaster would not have happened. The Soviet command had a whole new front, capable of closing the gap that had formed. Partly the reserve armies had to be used during the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk; the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into the battle.

But most of the reserves were retained. They were used during Operation Rumyantsev. The Steppe Front was reinforced with the 53rd Army under the command of Ivan Managarov. The Voronezh Front received the 27th Army under the command of Sergei Trofimenko and the 47th Army of Pyotr Kozlov (from August 3, the army was led by Pavel Korzun). The 4th Guards Army of Grigory Kulik remained in reserve, it was planned to use it to develop success or to parry enemy attacks. In addition, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, which had suffered significant losses in defensive battles, received reinforcements.

Konev put Managarov's 53rd Army at the forefront of the front's strike, it was to deliver the main blow. Vatutin did not transfer fresh armies to the shock group, there were already serious forces there - the 5th and 6th Guards armies, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army. Therefore, the 27th Army was to advance together with the 40th Army, west of the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. Their attack was aimed at the southeast, in the area of \u200b\u200bGrayvorona. The 47th reinforced the 38th Army on the western flank of the front.

In addition, the auxiliary shock group from the 40th and 27th armies was solving the problem of possible German counterstrikes against the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. If German troops tried to strike at the base of the Soviet strike force, the 40th and 27th armies would have to take the blow. If the German reserves had attacked the flank of the Soviet tank armies reaching into the girth of Kharkov, they, in turn, would have come under attack from the 40th and 27th armies leading the offensive. To parry possible German attacks, these two armies received three tank corps (more than 400 tanks). Thus, the armored potential of the 40th and 27th armies was comparable to a whole tank army (there were 450 tanks in the 1st Panzer Army). In addition, the 4th Guards Army was located in their rear.

Before the offensive, the Voronezh Front conducted an operation to mislead the enemy in relation to the area where the Soviet troops would deliver the main blow. To the west of the assembled strike group, in the Suji area, they imitated the concentration of large armored and rifle formations. For camouflage, 8 radio stations, 450 dummy tanks and 500 dummy guns were used. The radio stations imitated the work of the radio of tank formations. The infantry made movements towards the front. These events were a success. The German command concentrated the 7th Panzer Division to protect this direction. Also, the activity of the German aviation in the Sudzha region intensified, which began to bombard the "clusters" of Soviet troops.

German defense

The Belgorod-Kharkov grouping consisted of 15 infantry and 4 tank divisions. German infantry divisions suffered serious losses in Operation Citadel and have not yet fully recovered their combat potential. German panzer divisions received reinforcements and, having repaired the damaged tanks, were in good condition.

After the withdrawal of troops to their original positions, the Germans went over to the defensive in well-fortified positions. The main line of defense was 6-8 km wide and consisted of two positions, which had strong points connected by trenches and communication trenches. The second defensive line was located 2-3 km from the forward edge, with various engineering, barrage structures and long-term firing points. The total tactical defense zone of the German troops was 15-18 km. All settlements in the defensive zone were prepared for a circular defense. The powerful strongholds - Tomarovka and Borisovka - were of particular importance. Belgorod was a powerful defense center. In 50-60 km from the front line of defense, through Bohodukhiv, Zlochev, Kazachya Lopan, Zhuravlevka and Vesyoloye, an operational rear defensive line passed. At Kharkov itself, the Wehrmacht created two circular defensive lines.

Belgorod was turned into a powerful defense center. Many strongholds were built on its territory. Around the city, defending the near approaches to it, an external defensive circuit was created. A significant number of permanent firing points were built on the outskirts of the city, and stone buildings were turned into strong points. The city was prepared for street fighting. The crossroads were fenced off with barricades, they were fired upon by machine guns. Many buildings and streets were mined. The northern and eastern parts of the city were covered with strong minefields.

The beginning of the operation. Liberation of Belgorod

On August 2, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts took up their initial positions for the offensive. For the headquarters of Army Group South, the Soviet offensive in this sector of the Eastern Front came as a surprise. The German command believed that the strike capabilities of the Soviet troops in this direction were depleted by Operation Citadel. The Germans did not expect the Soviet troops to go on the offensive so soon.

On August 3, from 5.00 to 05.05, a short artillery raid of all fire weapons of the fronts continued along the front edge of the German defense. A pause was taken until 5.35, and then a full-fledged artillery preparation began, which lasted three hours. From 7.55 to 8.15, all the barrels again fired powerful fire at the German forward edge, while the Soviet infantry, behind the fiery shaft, began to advance to the first German trench. By 8.15 the fire began to move deep into the German positions. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, Soviet aviation in groups of 20-30 aircraft bombed and fired at German positions with machine guns and cannons. Also, the aviation ironed the locations of the German artillery and reserve forces.

At 8.15 the Soviet infantry, supported by tanks, burst into the enemy's forward trenches. At 13.00, when the rifle units of the 5th Guards Army wedged into the enemy's main defensive zone for about 2 km, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle. Tank formations were supposed to complete the breakthrough of the German defense and enter the operational space. Tanks were introduced into a breakthrough in a narrow 5-kilometer stretch, it was a huge accumulation of armored vehicles.

On the very first day, the troops of the Voronezh Front broke through the German defenses to their entire tactical depth. The arrows of the 5th and 6th Guards armies advanced 8-12 km. The 1st Panzer Army, which was forced to participate in the breakthrough of the second line of defense of the Wehrmacht, advanced 12 km and reached Tomarovka. The tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army achieved the greatest success, advancing to a depth of 20-25 km. The operation was going well, but not as planned. The tankers advanced 20 km, not 40 km as originally planned.

The offensive of the troops of the Steppe Front also developed quite successfully. The artillery of the front dealt a powerful blow to the German defensive positions. However, initially the German troops withstood the blow. Then significant masses of aviation were thrown into battle. Attack aircraft and bombers dealt heavy blows at the German centers of resistance. For the final breakthrough of the German positions at 15:00, the 1st Mechanized Corps was brought into battle. During the first day of the fighting, units of the 53rd Army and the right flank of the 69th Army advanced 7-8 km.

The crossing of the Seversky Donets by the soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943

On the second day of the operation, the first hitch began. The commander of the 6th Panzer Corps, Getman, did not fulfill Katukov's order - without getting involved in the battle for the well-fortified Tomarovka, bypass it and move on, inserting a barrier. In the morning the hetman began a battle for a German strongpoint, the corps lost 21 vehicles. Only Katukov's personal intervention forced Getman to continue the offensive in the afternoon, bypassing Tomarovka from the east. A motorized rifle brigade was left as a barrier. The 5th Guards Tank Corps, which was under operational control near Katukov, also took part in the frontal attacks on Tomarovka. The corps lost 23 vehicles without success. As a result, two tank corps lost time; only the 3rd mechanized corps of Krivoshein was developing the offensive. The 31st Panzer Corps was in reserve.

On the same day, the situation in the air changed. The activity of the Luftwaffe in the Belgorod region increased sharply. German assault and bomber aviation began to inflict strong blows on the Soviet mechanized columns. Mobile units began to suffer heavy losses in people and equipment from the effects of enemy aircraft.

However, despite these obstacles, Katukov's 1st Panzer Army was able to cover about 20 km that day. German reserves were not in the path of Katukov's army. The 19th Panzer Division was transferred to Tomarovka, and the 6th Panzer Division to the Belgorod area. The 3rd mechanized corps was able to wedge itself between two German mobile formations without getting involved in battle with them. Soviet tanks continued to move south and southwest.

Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was less fortunate on the second day of fighting. The guardsmen entered the battle with the 6th tank division of the enemy, which took up pre-prepared defensive positions in the Orlovka and Bessonovka area. The terrain was inaccessible for tanks, with a large number of ravines, gullies, rivers. German troops occupied the heights, preparing positions for tanks and anti-tank artillery. The approaches to them were mined. The German defense was also strengthened by the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks (6 "Tigers"). Yegorov's 18th Panzer Corps ran into the German defenses and, having no opportunity for flanking maneuvers, stopped.

The 18th and 29th Panzer Corps of Rotmistrov's army, after the tense first day of the offensive, had limited supplies of fuel and ammunition. It was decided to enter into battle the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, which was in the second echelon. However, Vatutin's order was received to send part of the army's forces to the assault on Belgorod, to help the troops of the Steppe Front. The mechanized corps had to be sent east. As a result, on August 4, Rotmistrov's army covered 10 km. The front commander was angry. Vatutin threatened Rotmistrov with a court for exposing the flank of Katukov's army.

On August 5, the fighting for Belgorod began. Konev sent a strong 53rd army around the city from the west, and the 69th army entered the city from the north. Parts of the 7th Guards Army crossed the Seversky Donets and reached the eastern outskirts. From the west, the offensive was supported by units of the 1st Mechanized Corps (as part of the 53rd Army). The city was in a semi-encirclement and was attacked from three directions. The Wehrmacht put up stubborn resistance, clinging to every quarter and stronghold. The German command wanted to keep this powerful knot of resistance in their hands. However, the German troops could not withstand such a massive blow. As a result, by 6 pm Belgorod was completely cleared of the Germans. The steppe front solved the problem of liberating Belgorod. The turn of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps from Rotmistrov's army did not have a decisive impact on the collapse of the defense of the Belgorod node of resistance. The steppe front was doing quite well on its own.

The offensive of the 27th and 40th armies began on August 5. As early as August 4, their forward formations conducted reconnaissance in force, probing the enemy's defenses. On the morning of August 5, a powerful artillery strike was struck at the enemy's positions, after which the armies went on the offensive. The defenses of the enemy's 11th Panzer Division were broken through in a 26-kilometer sector. Soviet troops advanced 8-20 km in a day. The introduction of the 7th Panzer Division in the battle saved from the complete collapse of the German defensive order in this direction.

After the 27th and 40th armies entered the battle, the Tomarov group of the enemy was under the threat of complete encirclement. In Tomarovka, the formations of the 255th, 332nd infantry and 19th tank divisions were defended. German forces held back the onslaught of the 6th Guards Army and 6th Panzer Corps, but now they were surrounded on both flanks. There was only one way to retreat - to Borisovka. On the night of August 6, the Wehrmacht left the fortified post. By the morning of August 6, Tomarovka was liberated from the enemy.

The 1st Tank Army of Katukov, due to the delay of the 5th Guards Tank Army, was forced to leave two brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps to cover its left flank. That reduced the shock capabilities of the tip of the advancing forces. The tank army experienced the greatest resistance that day from the German aviation, and not from the enemy ground forces. In general, Katukov's army showed good results that day and covered about 30 km.