Rifles of the Russian Turkish war. About the war won, but unsuccessful

Operations in the Asian theater of war

Russian troops, assembled on the borders of Asiatic Turkey, occupied the following positions in early April: the main forces - up to 30 thousand - stood at Alexandropol; Akhaltsikhe detachment (up to 7 thousand) Lieutenant General Devel - near Alkhalkalak; Erivan detachment (up to 11.5 thousand) Lieutenant General Tergukasova - near Igdyr. These troops were under the general command of Admiral General Loris-Melikov. In addition, a special Kobuleti detachment of Major General Oklobzhio was located near Ozurget, having insignificant posts along the Black Sea coast.

Fedor Danilovich Devel Arzas Artemyevich Tergukasov

Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov

The commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces in Asia Minor, Mukhtar Pasha, by the day the war was declared, had at his disposal only 25-30 thousand, including the garrisons of the fortresses; but on top of that, almost the same number of troops were in Batum under the command of Dervish Pasha.

Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha

On April 12, an offensive opened on all fronts from the Russian side: the main forces moved towards Kars in small transitions and on April 16 concentrated on the position at Yengikei.

Mukhtar left the fortress the day before, having 7 battalions with him and, retreating before the Russian cavalry detachments sent for reconnaissance, managed to escape behind the Saganlug mountain range. - Meanwhile, Devel approached Ardahan, which turned out to be so heavily fortified that, in order to assist in capturing it, a part of the main forces was separated, entrusted to the authorities of General Geiman.

Vasily Alexandrovich Geiman

The capture of Ardagan is the first major success of the Russian army in the Caucasus in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.

Ardagan is a city in northeastern Turkey. It is located on the Ardagan Plateau in the upper reaches of the Kura River, which is divided into two parts. Ardagan had an important strategic position, covering the way to Batum and the fortresses of Erzurum and Kars. The Turkish command turned Ardagan into a heavily fortified fortress with forts and lunettes. The main defense positions were the Gelaverdy (Gyulyaverdy) heights from the east and Mount Manglas from the north. The garrison of the fortress consisted of 8100 people with 95 fortress guns. At the end of April 1877, the Akhaltsikhe detachment of the active Caucasian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General F.D. Devel (8.5 thousand infantry and cavalry with 28 guns) approached Ardagan and surrounded him. Devel did not dare to storm the city on his own and turned for help to the corps commander, cavalry general M.T. Loris-Melikov. The latter singled out a detachment under the command of Lieutenant General V. A. Geiman and together with him went to the fortress in order to carry out general leadership of the assault. Together with the reinforcements that arrived, the Akhaltsikhe detachment amounted to 15 thousand bayonets and sabers with 56 field and 20 siege weapons.

On May 4 and 5, a reconnaissance was carried out and a plan was drawn up to storm the fortress, designed for two days - May 5 and 6. On the night of May 4, the positions of 10 artillery batteries were equipped to shell the fortifications. At dawn, the attack of the Gelaverdy heights began, supported by massive fire from 20 guns. During the day the fortifications were taken. Then preparations began for the assault on Ardagan. The first column of troops under the command of Devel was to conduct a demonstrative attack on the Ramadan fort; the second, led by V. A. Geiman, delivered the main blow from the south, and part of the forces from the east from Gelaverda (Gulyaverdy). Before the assault, a massive artillery shelling was carried out, and on May 5 the infantry went on the offensive. It began earlier than planned due to the fact that intelligence discovered a hasty retreat of the enemy into the mountains. By nightfall, Ardagan was taken. The losses of the Russian troops amounted to 296 people killed and wounded, and the enemy - about 3,000 people.

Meanwhile, the detachment of Lazarev, who approached Kars, began siege work on October 13, and on November 6 the fortress was already in Russian hands. After this important event, the main goal of the actions was Erzerum, where the remnants of the enemy army were hiding and funds were collected for the formation of new troops. But here the allies of the Turks were the onset of cold and the extreme difficulty of delivering all kinds of supplies along mountain roads. In the troops standing in front of the fortress, disease and mortality reached terrifying proportions.

On January 21, a truce was concluded, under the terms of which Erzurum was handed over to Russian troops on February 11.

During military operations near Aladzhi and near Kars, the Ardagan detachment was assigned to protect the peace in the vicinity of Ardagan. After the fall of Kars, this detachment was reinforced and its leader, Colonel Komarov, was ordered to move to Ardanuch and Artvin to assert Russian influence in the valley of the river. Chorokh and to facilitate the proposed operation against Batum. The troops allocated for this, starting the movement on December 2, occupied Ardanuch, and on December 9 they defeated the Turkish detachment in positions near Dolis Khan. The news of the truce stopped them at Artvin. The Kobuleti detachment, reduced in its composition around mid-June, received a strictly defensive assignment and fortified on Mukha-Estate, and the enemy troops standing against it occupied the heights of Khutsubani. On August 1 and 12, they tried to drive our detachment from its position, but both times they were unsuccessful.

On November 15, Dervish Pasha withdrew his troops beyond the river. Kintrishi and stopped at the heights of Tsikhidziri. On January 18, the Kobuleti detachment attacked it, but was repelled, and on January 22 news was received of the conclusion of a truce. The eastern coast of the Black Sea also entered the area of ​​military operations, and here the Turks, thanks to the dominance of their fleet, could dispose of almost freely, since there were no coastal fortified points. To counteract enemy landings and maintain calm in the country, there were only insignificant detachments in

On the eve of the war, Russian artillery had 48 artillery brigades intended for operations with infantry divisions. Each brigade had six batteries - but 8 guns in each battery. The battery was a separate part and could act independently. The first division of the brigade (3 batteries) was armed with 9-lb cannons, the second - with 3-4-lb copper cannons loaded from the treasury! In four Caucasian artillery brigades, one battery each was armed with 3-foot mountain guns.

Horse artillery consisted of 26 regular and 22 Cossack batteries. Ver batteries were six-gun and were armed with rifled copper cannons loaded from the treasury. Each Caucasian division had 2 batteries. The siege artillery had 630 guns of various calibers.

Fortress artillery had 44 fortress battalions. The personnel in case of mobilization was intended for the acquisition of siege artillery, which in peacetime did not have its own personnel. In wartime, 48 spare artillery batteries were formed (according to the number of artillery brigades). In organizational terms, Russian artillery was superior to Turkish. The presence of 48 guns in the division made it possible for its commander to decisively influence the course of the battle. The independence of the batteries allowed them to operate in isolation from the rest of the brigade. In peacetime, a stock of materiel for 48 batteries was kept, and with the start of mobilization, 68 batteries could be formed. This event made it possible to quickly replenish the losses of artillery in the war. Attention is drawn to the careful thoughtfulness of the organization of artillery and its mobilization deployment. The Turks did not have a similar system in other armies of Western Europe. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army had 365 batteries with 2,808 rifled guns. In a short time, the artillery industry of Russia ensured the creation of ratios in our artillery - 4 guns per 1000 bayonets, in horse artillery - 6 guns per 1,000 sabers.

The Turks at that time had 2 guns per 1000 bayonets, and the cavalry had no artillery at all. Each gun had a supply of ammunition as part of one combat set, located in the limbers and charging boxes. The delivery was carried out by artillery limbers, which, during offensive operations, approached the troops. . In the Turkish campaign of 1877 - 1878, the Russian soldier again showed his valor, and the officers and generals - outstanding abilities. Russian artillery had a decisive influence on the entire course of the war. The first event that stunned Western Europe was the successful crossing of the Danube by the main forces of the Russian army at Ztsmnica, carried out in 3-4 days with minimal losses. Russian artillery skilfully secured this crossing, pinning down strong enemy groupings in the fortresses of Ruschuk and Nikopol and clearing the Danube of Turkish ships. In total, up to 100 siege and 100 field guns operating on a 160-kilometer front took part in ensuring the crossing of the Danube. The successful operation of the artillery was facilitated by a good supply of ammunition.

6 battles for Nikopol involved 1 ^ 6 field weapons, 33 siege weapons and 4 rapid-fire guns. The battles required a large number of shells. So, from June 25 to July 1, 1877, Russian artillery fired 3248 shells at the Ruschuk fortress, which ensured the blockade of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube.

A significant event was the military operations of the detachment of General Gurko on the Shipka Pass in Bulgaria. At first, Shipka had only 27 guns, while the Turks had 48. Turkish troops occupied commanding heights. However, they did not take the pass. By the end of August, there were already 55 guns and more than 15 thousand soldiers on the pass. Here the difficulty of supplying ammunition affected. On average, artillery had 130 shells per gun, the rest of the ammunition was in the rear. The struggle continued for four months, and the Turks, despite a number of obvious advantages, failed to capture the pass. Under very difficult conditions for the supply of ammunition, the Russian artillery spent 18,930 shells during the period of fighting on the pass, on some days the consumption exceeded 50 shells per gun. There were very few material losses, almost all damage was repaired at firing positions. In the history of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, the struggle for Plevna occupies a special place. It began in July 1877 and continued until December 10. The first attack on Plevna involved 40 guns, which used up 1,980 shells. The attack failed. Up to 170 guns participated in the second attack, but due to the poor organization of the assault, the Russian troops again failed.

For the third time, a decision was made to first take possession of Lovcha, a large stronghold south of Plevna. August 3, 1877 Lovcha was taken. The attack on Turkish positions was provided by 98 guns, which spent 5375 shells in one day, which averaged 58.5 shells per gun. The infantry used up 245 thousand rounds of ammunition - 14 rounds per rifle. The comparison needs no comment. During the third attack of Plevna, 424 guns were concentrated.

However, as a result of the inept use of artillery on September 7, only 152 guns fired, on September 8 - 214, on September 9 and 10 - 226 guns out of 424. The rest were in the second lines and were inactive. shells, which averaged 170 shells per gun. After that, the siege of Plevna began. By the end of the siege, the Russians had 349 guns in the battle line and 186 guns in reserve. The guns were serviceable, of good quality. December 10 Pleveysky garrison capitulated. Further, the Russian army crossed the Balkan mountains and put the Turkish army on the brink of disaster, which forced the Turkish government to request a truce. t. , January 6, 1878 in his order, referring to the soldiers, General Gurko wrote; “The passage through the Balkans is over.

You don’t know what to be more surprised at: your courage and courage in battles with the enemy, or your stamina and patience in enduring hard work in the fight against mountains, frosts and deep snow. Years will pass, and our descendants, having visited these childish mountains, will proudly and triumphantly say: “Russian troops passed here and resurrected the glory of the Suvorov and Rumyandev miracle heroes.” An important condition for the successful operations of artillery in the mountains was the provision of its shells. artillery supply successfully coped, despite the stretching of communications and lagging behind rears.Shells in sufficient quantities were accumulated in the preparatory period.Mobile parks were close to the troops.Each gun had stocks of shells in limbers and charging boxes.

The struggle for the sea was won by the Russian fleet - it was able to cover its shores and retain the main communications. At the same time, the Turks, who had a multiple numerical superiority, could not reliably protect even navigation along their own coasts, and the success of their operations off the Caucasian coast turned out to be temporary. However, wars are won not by defense and protection of communications, but by offensive actions - and the Russian naval command intended to move to them. Not being able to resist the Turks in a classic naval battle, the Russians decided to use the latest naval weapons - mines.

The birth of mine boats

By the 70s of the XIX century, sea mines were divided into fixed and mobile. The first were anchored under water at a certain depth and exploded either from their own percussion fuse or via an electric cable from the shore. They were first used in the Crimean War, were actively used during the American Civil War and are still used without fundamental changes.

Movable mines required a carrier - a small boat that hit the side of an enemy ship with a long pole with a mine suspended from it, or brought a mine to the enemy in tow. In Russia, experiments with mine boats began in 1862, when Major General Baron E. B. Tizenhausen proposed the design of a pole mine, which he called "mine ram". A mine with a charge of one and a half pounds of explosives on a pole 15 m long was tested on the gunboat "Experience" - it blew up the anchored schooner "Meteor". In 1868, in the report of the commission of Admiral E. V. Putyatin, who tested pole mines, it was already mentioned the need "immediately ... to develop the issue of the use of underwater mines by us against destroyers". By the mid-1870s, the Russian fleet was armed with about ten types of pole mines with a charge of 3.2 to 182 kg of gunpowder. Such mines were supposed to equip a variety of ships - from small boats to gunboats and even cruisers.

The first special mine boat, designed to operate with pole mines, was built in England in 1873 - it had a displacement of 7.5 tons and a speed of 15 knots, which was huge at that time. In Russia, such boats began to be ordered from the Byrd plant in the autumn of 1876, on the eve of the war with Turkey - they were armed with both pole mines and towed “winged” mines. The latter were less reliable and more difficult to use, but somewhat safer, since they did not require the boat to be brought close to the target.

Whitehead self-propelled mine

The main disadvantage of mobile mines was the extremely short distance for attack, which made the ships carrying these weapons extremely vulnerable not only to artillery, but even to rifle fire. This prompted the creation of a mine capable of reaching an enemy ship on its own. Such weapons were developed in different countries, but the English engineer Robert Whitehead, who worked in the workshops of the Austrian port of Fiume, achieved the greatest success - he was the first to create a reliable and technologically advanced hydrostatic device that allowed the mine to move steadily at a predetermined depth.

Luppis-Whitehead's "fish-shaped torpedo" was first tested in Austria in 1868. A year later, England bought a patent for the production of self-propelled mines, in 1872 a batch of these weapons was acquired by France, in 1873 by Italy and Germany. In Russia, Admiral A. A. Popov insisted on completing the development of the domestic self-propelled mine of the I. F. Aleksandrovsky system, so the contract with Whitehead was concluded only in March 1876. By the end of the year, the first three batches of torpedoes (20 pieces) were delivered to Russia, in 1877 - another 55 copies, in 1878 - 25. The new weapon was very expensive, so it was simply not issued for the war with Turkey.

Mine boats go to the Danube

At the end of 1876, a mass shipment of mine boats to the Danube began - they were supposed to operate only with pole and towed mines. Boats had to be delivered from the railway by carts, so they arrived on the Lower Danube only at the beginning of hostilities (in mid-April), and on the Middle Danube their concentration was completed in early June. From the composition of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, special detachments of sailors were allocated (Baltic - 445 people, Black Sea - 200 people), intended to staff the Danube River Flotilla. Already in November 1876, both detachments were sent to Chisinau at the disposal of the commander of the Russian army in Bessarabia.

The Turks kept a strong Danube squadron on the Danube under the command of Admiral Mehmet Arif Pasha, which was based on the Lutf-yu Dzhelil and Hivz-ur Rahman turret armored corvettes stationed in Tulcea. These were large seaworthy ships with a displacement of 2540 tons, protected by an armor belt up to 140 mm thick. Each of them carried two 229-mm and two 178-mm muzzle-loading guns, as well as one 120-mm breech-loading gun.

In addition, there were small river monitors Khizber and Seifi (404 tons, two 120-mm muzzle-loading guns), as well as five armored gunboats of the Feth-ul-Islam type (335 tons, two 150-mm muzzle-loading guns). Both monitors and the gunboat Semendire stood in the port of Sulin at the very mouth of the Danube, the rest of the ships were located higher up the river: in Machin - paddle steamers "Kiliji Ali" and "Arkadion", in Gabrovo - armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam", the wooden gunboat "Akkiya" and the paddle steamer "Khairedan". In Silistria there was a paddle steamer "Islahat", in Ruschuk - armored gunboats "Boportlen" and "Iskodra", wooden gunboats "Varna" and "Shefket-Numa". The armored gunboat Podgoritsa, the iron gunboat Sunna and the paddle steamer Nusretie were located in Vidin. In addition, the Danube squadron had 9 transport ships and two dozen small ships.

Turkish river monitor Khizber of the same type as Seifi, 1875.
B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923

The main drawback of the Turkish ships was the lack of horizontal armor - only Hizber-type monitors carried a 32-mm armored deck in addition to the 76-mm side.

The main bases of the Turkish squadron were located in the Sulinsky arm and the Machinsky branch of the Danube - out of sight of Russian observers from the left bank of the river. Together with the Danubian army of Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha and a chain of fortresses, the squadron was supposed to prevent the Russian and Romanian troops from crossing the Danube and invading Dobruja and Bulgaria. Thus, the success of the land campaign depended entirely on victory in the river war.

The beginning of the mine war

The fighting began on April 12 (according to the new style - 24) April 1877, when Russian troops entered Romania, formally vassal to the Ottoman sultan. By mid-May, almost the entire territory of Romania along the left bank of the Danube was occupied.

The Turks were not going to defend the northern bank of the Danube, but the very line of the river along the border with Bulgaria was covered by a chain of powerful fortresses: Vidin, Nikopol, Ruschuk, Turtukai, Silistra. The main crossing point was Zimnitsa, lying between Nikopol and Ruschuk - the main forces of the Russian army were pulled here. Assistance in forcing the river was provided by the Danube River Flotilla, which was based on steam boats deployed overland, armed with pole or towed mines.

The general course of hostilities in the European theater of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

At the same time, the Lower Danube Detachment as part of the 14th Infantry Corps acted against Dobruja in the lower reaches of the Danube. Back in April, to support it, a Black Sea detachment of ships was formed and deployed by sea to the Kiliya armo, consisting of 4 steam mine boats, 2 tugboats adapted for laying mines (“Explosion” and “Barrage”), as well as Romanian ships: one gunboat boats, two armed steamers and one steam launch.

Already on the night of 17 to 18 (from 29 to 30) April, the Black Sea detachment, consisting of the steamer "Barrage" and several rowing boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander Bekleshev, laid the first minefield of 9 automatic and 12 galvanic impact mines near Reni (at the mouth of the Prut River). min. On April 18 (30), two steam boats from the detachment placed a barrier of 9 galvanic impact mines on the Seret River below Brailov. On the afternoon of April 18 (30), a detachment from boats and rowboats placed a minefield of 5 galvanic mines in one line on the Seret River in front of the Barbosh railway bridge (later it was reinforced by a second line). To cover the barriers on the left bank of the Danube, large-caliber field batteries were installed.

First Russian victories

On April 29 (May 11) one of the most striking events of that war took place. From the lower reaches of the Machinsky branch, several Turkish ships headed by the battleship Lutf-yu Dzhelil left. Soon they exchanged fire with Russian field batteries near Brailov. During the skirmish, a 229-mm field mortar projectile hit the unprotected deck of a Turkish battleship. Cellars exploded on the ship, and it sank almost instantly, and the Turkish squadron hastily took refuge in the Machinsky sleeve. This accidental hit made a huge impression on Russian sailors - 229-mm mortars were considered such an effective weapon that they even tried to arm the battleship Peter the Great with them.

Turkish armored corvette "Lutf-yu Jelil".

However, the ships in the Turkish-controlled Machinsky sleeve still posed a serious danger, so on May 4 (16) a detachment of the Danube flotilla consisting of mine boats "Ksenia" (commander - Lieutenant Shestakov), "Dzhigit" (commander - midshipman Persin) and "Tsarevna" ( Commander - midshipman Bal), together with five rowing boats under the fire of Turkish ships, set up a barrage of 32 galvanic mines in two lines in the lower part of the Machinsky sleeve (above Brailov). On May 12 (24), Russian ships staged a demonstrative staging - in front of the Turks, sandbags were thrown into the water at the exit from the Machinskiy sleeve.

Mine boat "Xenia".

On the night of May 13-14 (from 25 to 26) May, Russian sailors won their first victory. A detachment of four mine boats ("Tsarevich", "Xenia", "Dzhigit" and "Tsarevna") left Brailov in the Machinsky sleeve to attack the parking lot of Turkish ships. At Machin’s boat, they found the Seifi monitor standing in the middle of the river, and to the left of it, the armored gunboat Feth-ul-Islam and the armed steamer Kiliji Ali. The boats deployed in two columns and attacked enemy ships under enemy fire. "Tsarevich" hit the monitor with a pole mine in the stern of the starboard side, and "Xenia" - in the left side under the tower. After the second explosion, "Safe" quickly sank.

The sinking of the monitor "Safe" at Machin on the night of May 13-14, 1877.

On May 27 (June 8), a detachment of ships consisting of the Romanian gunboat "Grand Duke Nikolai", as well as the mine boats "Tsarevich" and "Xenia", which left Gura-Yalomitsa to Girsova occupied by the Turks (now the Romanian city of Hirshova), met a Turkish monitor and attacked him. The monitor considered it best to retreat, and the boats pursued him all the way to Girsov in order to determine the zone of fire of the Turkish coastal artillery, after which they returned back. The next day, the same ships and the boat "Dzhigit" found two Turkish gunboats in the upper part of the Machinsky branch, which immediately retreated, opening the entrance to the sleeve. After that, Russian boats set up a minefield in the upper reaches of the Machinsky branch.

Because of the spring flood, the crossing of the Danube was scheduled for mid-July. Preparations for the operation began a month in advance: from 7 to 11 (from 19 to 23) June, minefields were set up on both sides of the planned crossing (between Sistovo and Nikopol). At the same time, on June 8 (20), a detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M. D. Novikov, consisting of 10 steam boats, met the Turkish military steamer Ereklik at Parapan, sailing from Ruschuk. The steamer opened shotgun fire on boats and boats with mines and in response was attacked by the boat "Joke" (commander - midshipman Nilov). The attack was unsuccessful - the electrical conductors to the charge of the pole mine were killed by bullets, and it did not explode, even hitting the side of the ship. Deciding not to tempt fate, "Ereklik" turned around and went to Ruschuk. As a result of this operation, the Turkish ships were separated and locked in their bases (Rushchuk and Nikopol). Interestingly, the artist V.V. Vereshchagin, who received a bullet wound in battle on June 8, was on the “Joke” as a volunteer.

Mine boat "Joke".
Naval Campaign magazine. 2011, №1

On June 11 (23), during the laying of mines by the boats of the Upper Danube detachment near Flamunda, the Turkish monitor "Podgoritsa" left Nikopol. The boats "Mina" (commander - midshipman Ahrens) and "Joke" tried to attack him, but were repulsed by grapeshot and rifle fire; the monitor also turned back.

On June 12 (24), in the fairway near Korabiya (above Nikopol), the rowboats of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov laid another barrage of 23 galvanic impact mines in two lines, and from 13 to 15 the barrier at Flamunda was reinforced with another line of 36 mines.

Forcing the Danube

The Lower Danube detachment was the first to begin operations, with the aim of diverting the attention of the Turks from the direction of the main attack. Early in the morning of June 10 (22), Russian troops began crossing the Danube at Galats and Brailov, where the Danube turns sharply towards the Black Sea. At the same time, a detachment consisting of the gunboat "Grand Duke Nikolai", the boats "Tsarevna" and "Bird" made a distracting exit to the Turkish batteries. As a result, the Galatsky detachment (two regiments) successfully crossed the Danube, occupied Budzhak and captured the Budzhak heights.

The main forces of Zimmerman's 11th Corps were crossing at Brailov that day. On June 11 (23), the boats "Tsarevich" (commander - Lieutenant Shestakov), "Bird" (commander - midshipman Arkas) and "Tsarevna" (commander - midshipman Bal) reconnoitered at Machin and found that the city had been abandoned by the Turks. On June 13 (25) Zimmermarn's corps occupied Galati, 14 (26) - Tulcea and Isacchu, 15 (27) - Brailov. On June 26 (July 8), Girsov was occupied by a strike from the north, after which the entire Machinskiy branch was under the control of the Russians. By the beginning of July, Russian troops occupied the entire Northern Dobruja, reaching the Chernavode-Constanta line. The Turkish Danube squadron was blocked at the mouth of the Danube - a hard-to-reach area between the Kiliya and Sulinsky branches.

Fighting on the Danube in 1877.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

On the night of June 14-15 (from 26 to 27) June, the main Russian forces began crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa opposite the city of Sistov. The first to force the river on iron rowing pontoons was a detachment of General M. I. Dragomirov. The Turks had about 4,000 people at the crossing point and could not offer serious resistance - all their forces were diverted to other areas and the defense of fortresses. A Turkish ship left Nikopol for the crossing (according to some sources, the Khivz-ur Rahman armored corvette), but the demonstration of the attack by the Peter the Great, Opyt and General-Admiral boats forced it to turn back.

By the end of June 15 (27), 30,000 people had already been transferred to the southern bank of the Danube. The construction of a pontoon bridge over the island of Hell began, which was completed in three days. Two weeks later, all four Russian corps were already on the Bulgarian coast.

Crossing of Russian troops across the Danube at Zimnitsa and its provision.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

On the night of June 16-17 (from 28 to 29) June, the barrier at Parapan on the main channel of the Danube was reinforced with another 25 mines, placed in a checkerboard pattern. Now the Turkish ships had no chance to break through from Ruschuk up the Danube. On June 18 (30), a team of guards sappers from rowboats set up a barrage of 42 galvanic mines in three lines off Vardin Island, and on June 19 (July 1) the barrage at Flamunda was reinforced by laying new mines from boats. These days, the Russian flotilla suffered the first failure: on June 17 (29) near Turnu Severin, the Ada steamer was overtaken by a Turkish monitor and flooded by the crew in order to avoid capture.

June 23 (July 5) Byala was taken, two days later - Tarnovo. On July 2 (14) Russian troops reached the Khankioi Pass, on July 5 (17) they occupied the Shipka Pass. The corps of Lieutenant-General N.P. Kridener began the siege of the Nikopol fortress - on the morning of July 3 (15), Russian troops began a bombardment, and in the afternoon they occupied several redoubts that covered the fortress. The assault was scheduled for the next day, but did not begin - early in the morning of July 4 (16), the Turkish garrison threw out a white flag. On the same day, on the Osma River near Nikopol, the river gunboats Podgoritsa and Iskodra, partially damaged by field artillery, were found with disabled boilers. The gunboats were repaired, included in the Russian Danube flotilla and renamed Nikopol and Sistovo.

Turkish river armored gunboat Feth-ul-Islam. The Iskodra and Podgorica belonged to the same type.
Naval Campaign magazine. 2011, №2

Fighting in the lower reaches of the Danube and the end of the campaign

From that moment on, the Turkish flotilla on the Danube was divided into three parts: above Nikopol; on the section from Ruschuk to Silistra (above Chernavode); in the lower reaches of the river (Sulinsky arm). Even the Turkish ships that retained their combat capability no longer posed a significant danger. On July 9 (21), the Russian detachment (the gunboat "Grand Duke Nikolai", the boats "Tsarevich" and "Bird") left Chernavoda up the Danube to reconnoiter the location of enemy troops retreating to Silistria and fought enemy ships near the village of Budzhaki; according to the reports of the crews, a fire broke out from the fire of a 10-pound bow gunboat on a Turkish ship, identified as a monitor.

After that, the activity of the river fleets finally moved to the lower reaches of the Danube, where the Turks had the most powerful ships, and most importantly, access to the sea through the Sulin. Here, the Russians needed at least to lock the enemy in girls, preventing him from rising higher, and, if possible, to attack the enemy and deprive him of striking power. For this purpose, on July 28 (August 9), a flotilla of captain-lieutenant Dikov, who was holding the flag on the armed steamer "Experience", arrived from Odessa to the Kiliya arm to help the Lower Danube detachment. On August 12 (24), "Experience", with the support of four mine boats, placed a barrier of 20 galvanic mines in two lines at the entrance to the St. George's arm.

In early September, Dikov's detachment was reinforced by ships that came from Odessa - the schooner "Voron", the steamer "Sister" and three mine boats. On September 27 (October), Dikov tried to attack Sulin, located at the very mouth of the branch, and covered by floodplains and swamps from land. The steamship "Experience", armed steam schooners "Voron", "Duck" and "Swan", as well as a mortar barge went down the Sulinsky branch to the third mile, where a minefield was set up by boats at night. The steamer "Kartal" and the gunboat "Sunne" came out to meet them. The fire of the schooner "Voron" (900 tons, three 153-mm guns) forced the "Kartal" to retreat to Sulin, and the gunboat "Sunne" (200 tons, 4 guns) ran into mines and sank. The Dikov detachment went even further and entered into a skirmish with the battleships Khivz-ur Rahman and Mukadem-i Khair. At 13:00, due to the creeping fog, the battle was stopped, and Dikov's detachment retreated up the river.

The battle of the Dikov detachment at Sulin on September 27–28, 1877.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

The next day, Dikov's detachment again descended to Sulin and, hiding behind a minefield, entered into a firefight with two Turkish monitors. Khivz-ur Rahman was hit by a 153-mm shell from the Voron schooner and retreated, after which Mukadem-i Khair also retreated to the mouth of the Danube.

At this, attempts to storm Sulin from the upper reaches of the Danube ceased. In January 1878, Chikhachev's detachment, which came from Odessa, made an unsuccessful attempt to attack Sulin from the sea, but this no longer had strategic significance - the Turkish fleet was inactive.

In the middle reaches of the Danube, clashes were also sporadic. So, on October 2 (14), a detachment of Lieutenant Dubasov, consisting of the gunboat "Experience" and four mine boats, tried to burn Turkish ships near Silistria with six fire-ships - the only case of the use of fire-ships in this war. One fire-ship was launched adrift on a patrol Turkish steamer, but to no avail. On November 30 (December 12), the Nikopol monitor exchanged fire with three Turkish ships near Mechka Island near Ruschuk, and also fired at the location of enemy troops.

"Grand Duke Konstantin" - the carrier of mine boats

The armed steamer "Grand Duke Konstantin" (in the past - one of the best liners of the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade) became the most active Russian cruiser of the war of 1877-1878. A huge merit in this belonged to his commander - lieutenant (later - captain of the 2nd rank) S. O. Makarov, later a famous admiral and shipbuilder.

However, Makarov, appointed to this position on December 13 (25), 1876 and personally involved in the re-equipment of the Konstantin, dreamed of turning it into a real strike ship capable of fighting not only transports, but also Turkish battleships. In his opinion, the main weapon of the cruiser was to be four mine boats - Chesma, Sinop, Navarin and Miner. The last three were ordinary ship's boats, and the Chesma was fast, reaching a speed of 12 knots (twice as much as the others). Armed with pole and towed mines, Makarov's boats were supposed to attack Turkish ships in harbors and in raids, where they were delivered by the seaworthy Konstantin.

Steamboat "Grand Duke Konstantin".
Naval Campaign magazine. 2011, №1

Alas, the first attack on the Batumi roadstead on the night of April 28-29 (May 10-11) was unsuccessful: Chesma was able to bring a towed mine under the stern of the Sultaniye Turkish yacht, but the electric fuse did not work. Exactly one month later, boats from the Konstantin tried to attack Turkish ships on the Sulina roadstead, but could not force the booms; the Chesma towed mine was generally entangled in this barrier. As a result, only two larger and faster destroyers No. 1 and No. 2 went on the attack (with a displacement of 6 and 24 tons, bought just before the war in England and Denmark, respectively). Both of them were able to blow up their mines at the side of the armored corvette "Idzhaliye" - alas, too early, so that the Turkish ship was not damaged. Destroyer No. 1 was damaged by rifle and grapeshot fire and sank, her entire crew was captured.

The next attempt to attack mine boats took place on the evening of August 11 (23) in Sukhum-Kale Bay. By this time, the Turks had already defended all their ports and anchorages with booms, but the Russian sailors used a new tactic: the Sinop boat brought its mine under the barrier and blew it up, after which the Navarin and Miner entered the harbor and attacked with towed mines a Turkish ship that turned out to be the Assar-i Tevfik armored corvette. One of the mines exploded at the side, the battleship received an underwater hole, but remained afloat and was taken to Batum for repairs.

It became clear to Makarov that pole mines, and even more so towed mines, were extremely unreliable weapons. If on the rivers with their narrow fairways the mines still had a chance of success, then on the high seas they turned out to be completely powerless. The boat could not keep up with the seaworthy ship, that is, it was possible to attack the enemy only in harbors protected by booms, patrol ships and artillery. Under these conditions, the chances of a mine boat to come close to the victim became illusory. Thus, a weapon was required that could hit the enemy from a distance of at least a few tens of meters - a self-propelled mine. There were already such mines in Russia, and Makarov, who was promoted to captain of the 2nd rank in September 1877, made every effort to obtain them. The boats "Sinop" and "Chesma" were equipped with new weapons. "Sinop" dragged a raft with a mine in tow, during an attack pulled it to the side and aimed it at the hull. On the Chesma, under the keel, a wooden pipe was arranged, into which the Whitehead mine was placed.

Torpedoes are in action

The first attack with self-propelled mines took place on December 15 (27), 1877. Late in the evening, "Grand Duke Konstantin" approached the Batumi raid and launched the boats into the water. The boom barrier "Chesma" and "Sinop" successfully overcame, without catching on anything. In the darkness of the southern night, three masts were found near the shore, and the sailors decided that this was a large three-masted ship, standing broadside to the shore. In fact, they were three armadillos, standing in a row astern to the shore. The fired torpedoes passed between them and ran ashore - the Turks later claimed that they had found them unexploded and even announced their serial numbers. However, according to the reports of the boat teams, one explosion did occur - perhaps one of the torpedoes hit the anchor chain and broke in two, the warhead fell to the bottom and exploded, and the shank with screws went on.

Failure did not discourage Makarov. On the next exit to the Caucasian coast, he decided to attack the ships off Batum again. On the night of 13 to 14 (from 25 to 26) January 1878, Chesma and Sinop again penetrated the Batumi raid. There were many ships here, including three ironclads, but the raid was illuminated by the moon, and the boat crews were strictly instructed to attack for sure. Therefore, they chose a detached patrol vessel as victims and fired torpedoes at it from a distance of 30–40 sazhens (64–85 m). Both torpedoes hit the target, the ship exploded and quickly sank, killing 23 Turkish sailors.

Later it turned out that a small gunboat "Intibah" with a displacement of 163 tons, armed with three 18-pound muzzle-loading guns, was sunk by torpedoes. The sunken ship was not of great military importance, but the explosion on the Batumi roadstead became a symbolic final chord of the war: on January 19 (31) a truce was signed in Adrianople.

Turkish gunboat "Intibah".
Naval Campaign magazine. 2011, №2

The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was not the first conflict in which mines were actively used, but it demonstrated for the first time that these weapons could be decisive in a naval war - this was also facilitated by the passivity of the Turkish fleet. As a result, this led to some exaggeration of the capabilities of mine boats as a means capable of neutralizing the superiority of the enemy in large ships. It was from 1878 that mass construction of carriers of torpedo weapons began all over the world - destroyers and destroyers.

Sources and literature:

1. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one. General Staff of the Navy, 1959
2. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one. Descriptions for cards. General Staff of the Navy, 1959
3. Combat chronicle of the Russian fleet: Chronicle of the most important events in the military history of the Russian fleet from the 9th century to the present. to 1917 M .: Military Publishing House, 1948
4. N.V. Skritsky. Corsairs of Russia. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007
5. V. Chubinsky. On the participation of sailors in the war with Turkey in 1877–1878. St. Petersburg, 1899
6. V. G. Andrienko. Round ships of Admiral Popov. St. Petersburg: Gangut, 1994
7. William Allen, Pavel Muratov. Battles for the Caucasus. History of wars on the Turkish-Caucasian front. 1828–1921 M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2016
8. Naval Campaign magazine. 2007, №1
9. Naval Campaign magazine. 2007, №2
10. V. V. Yarovoy. Steamboat "Grand Duke Konstantin" // Magazine "Gangut", 2001, No. 21
11. B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923. Conway Maritime Press, 1995

The Ottoman Empire was going through an acute financial, economic, socio-political and national crisis at that time. The once mighty military power, which made all of Europe tremble, was now an economically backward agrarian country with an extremely low level of productive forces. In fact, the country rapidly degraded and collapsed. Turkey was turning into a semi-colony of England, France and other great European powers. Istanbul was thrown into a financial noose and turned into a market for European goods and a source of mainly agricultural raw materials.

Agriculture was practically at the same level as several hundred years ago. Subsistence farming was preserved in the interior regions of Anatolia. The landlords owned the greater and better part of the land and robbed the tenant peasants in every possible way. The tax system, given to the tax-farmers, literally ruined the common people. Usury flourished. The transport network was minimal. The length of the railways of the Ottoman Empire in the 70s was only 1600 km. There was no highway at all, the dirt roads were in very poor condition. The industry was at such a low level of development that almost all consumer goods were bought in Europe (except for agricultural products). Turkey did not have enterprises in the steel industry and engineering. The mining industry was in a sorry state. Even the textile industry, once prosperous, fell into complete decline. Turkish businesses and artisans could not compete with European industry. Turkish corruption beat all records. Literally everything was sold and bought, including posts in the administrative apparatus, in the army and police, in the judiciary, etc. The port depended on foreign capital and loans. Foreign capital turned the empire into a market for European goods, subjugated Turkish trade and part of industry. The regime of capitulations to foreign goods suppressed the Turkish economy. At the same time, the Sultan's court and the government themselves were mired in waste and luxury, spending huge sums on entertainment, luxury items and the construction of magnificent palaces.

Political tensions persisted inside the country: the conservatives opposed the supporters of Western-style modernization. The national question sharply aggravated - the uprising in Crete, in Bulgaria, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war with Serbia and Montenegro. The Christian and Slavic provinces of the Turkish Empire in the Balkans tried to gain independence.

However, Porta still tried to play the role of a great power, at least in the Middle East and dreamed of regaining lost positions in the Northern Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and retaining the Balkans. Therefore, all available funds went to the army and navy.

Army

On the eve of the war with Russia, the Turkish armed forces were reorganized. The reforms went on for 30 years, from 1839 to 1869. The military reform plan was developed by a special commission. In 1869, he was approved and received the force of law. The new organization of the Turkish army was based on the principles of the Prussian landwehr system. The reorganization itself was carried out by Prussian instructors. According to the new law, military service extended to all residents of the Ottoman Empire between the ages of 20 and 29. In fact, military service extended only to the Muslim community. The Christian community, instead of annually exhibiting a certain contingent, was obliged to pay a monetary tax from each man.

The ground forces consisted of three parts: 1) field troops (nizam), 2) reserve troops (redif), 3) militia (mustahfiz). The Nizam was supposed to have 210 thousand people, of which 150 thousand were to be in permanent service, and 60 thousand (Ihtiat) - in reserve, to replenish the active army during the war. The number of the redif was determined at 192 thousand people and the militia - at 300 thousand people. As a result, Turkey could field 700-800 thousand people.

In peacetime, only weak personnel were kept in the redif, but stocks of small arms and uniforms were required by law to be at full strength during the deployment period. In wartime, it was planned to form from the redif, separately from the nizam, a certain number of battalions (camps), squadrons and batteries. The militia in peacetime did not have personnel and military supplies. The term of active service in the Nizam was set at 6 years, including the last 2 years in the reserve. In cavalry and artillery, the reserve time was set at 1 year. Persons who served in the nizam were enlisted in the redif for 6 years, and then in the mustahfiz militia for 8 years. The total length of service for those liable for military service in all three units of the ground forces was 20 years.

To complete the army, the entire territory of the Ottoman Empire was divided into six corps districts, which theoretically should have put up an equal number of battalions, squadrons and batteries. In fact, the Danubian and Rumeli districts were stronger, the Arabian and Yemeni districts were weaker than the others, and only the Anatolian and Syrian districts were approaching the average norm. The guards corps was recruited extraterritorially from all districts.

The highest military unit of the army was the corps, which consisted of 2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, an artillery regiment and an engineering company. In total, the Turkish army had 7 corps - 6 army and 1 guards. The division consisted of 2 brigades of 2 regiments each. The infantry regiments were 3-battalion, and the cavalry regiments were 6-squadron. Field artillery batteries had 6 guns each. 3 batteries were reduced to a battalion, and 4 battalions (3 foot and 1 horse) made up a regiment; while 3 battalions were attached to divisions, and the fourth was at the disposal of the corps commander. But in practice, this organization did not take root. As a rule, formations were formed from a different number of units and subdivisions. Even regiments and battalions were not homogeneous in composition.

The new organization of the Turkish army did not have time to settle down to the war with Russia. Thus, out of an annual call of 37,500 people, a significant part of the people in the lower classes did not enter due to financial difficulties and were transferred directly to the redif. As a result, the field army had significantly fewer people in its ranks than was supposed by the states, and the reserve and militia were filled with people who had practically no military training. As a result, of the 700 thousand trained troops that were planned to have by 1878, most of them had no military training. This shortcoming was aggravated by the fact that the adopted organization did not provide for the presence of reserve troops either in peacetime or in wartime. All persons who were called to redif and mustahfiz from among those who did not have military training were to receive it directly in those units where they were called. Also, to a large extent, the deployment of reserve artillery and cavalry in wartime remained on paper: there was a large lack of stocks of artillery and cavalry, it was difficult to create and train these troops in wartime, to find personnel for them.

Irregular troops were recruited in wartime from representatives of the mountain tribes subject to the Ottomans, in particular, Albanians and Kurds, as well as Circassians who moved to Turkey from Russia. They formed an irregular cavalry, carried out garrison service, and performed punitive police functions during the suppression of uprisings. Some of them were called “bashi-bazouks” (“daredevil”, “turretless”), and were attached to regular troops. Bashi-bazouks did not receive a salary and "fed" at the expense of civilians in areas where hostilities took place. Looting and terrible cruelty of the bashi-bazouks reached such an extent that they had to be appeased by regular Turkish troops.

The small arms of the Turkish army were represented by three systems of rifled guns loaded from the treasury, as well as various systems of outdated rifled and smoothbore guns loaded from the muzzle. The first and most advanced system was the single-shot American Peabody-Martini rifle of the 1870 model. The first batches of Henry-Martini rifles were sent exclusively to supply the British army, therefore, interested in modern weapons, Porta ordered rifles of the original Peabody model in the United States. The American Peabody-Martini rifle of the 1870 model was essentially no different from the English Henry-Martini, so they are often mixed. Single-shot rifle, caliber - 11.43 mm, weight - 3.8 kg (with a bayonet - 4.8 kg), rate of fire - 8-10 rounds / min, effective range - 1440, maximum range - 3600. Metal cartridge, unitary, weighed 50.5 g. According to ballistic data, this rifle was close to the Russian rifle of the Berdan system No. 2, but in some respects inferior to it. These guns were ordered by the Turkish government in the United States in the amount of 600,000 pieces, along with 40 million cartridges for them. By the beginning of the war, the Turkish army had 334,000 Peabody-Martini rifles, which accounted for 48% of all rifles loaded from the treasury of the Turkish army. Basically, modern Peabody-Martini rifles were in service with the troops fighting in the Balkan theater.

Partially, the troops were armed with a British single-shot Snyder-Enfield rifle: caliber - 14.7 mm, weight - 3.8 kg (with a scimitar bayonet - 4.9 kg), rate of fire - 7-8 rounds per minute, effective range - 550 meters , the greatest range - 1800 meters. The metal cartridge weighed 47.2 g; the cartridges were partly drawn, partly composite. The Snyder rifle was mostly purchased in England and the USA, some were converted at Turkish enterprises. 325,000 Snyder rifles were in service, which equaled 47% of all Turkish army rifles loaded from the treasury. This rifle system was armed with part of the Turkish troops in the Balkan theater and the vast majority of troops on the Caucasian front.

Rifle Snyder-Enfield

The third modern system was the American Henry Winchester-designed rifle with a 13-round underbarrel magazine, one round in the receiver and one in the barrel; all rounds could be fired in 40 seconds. The rifle was a carbine with a caliber of 10.67 mm, the effective range was 1040 m, the maximum range was 1600 m. The carbine weighed 4.09 kg, the cartridge was 33.7 g. % of all rifles of the Turkish army, loaded from the treasury. The Winchester rifle was used by the Turkish cavalry and part of the irregulars. Part of the reserve troops, the militia and irregulars were armed mainly with muzzle-loading guns of various systems. Egyptian troops (according to the states - about 65 thousand people) were armed with a rifle of the American Remington system loaded from the treasury. In addition, the Turks had a certain number of mitrailleuses of the Montigny system. Officers, cavalry and irregulars, in addition to guns (the officers did not have them), were armed with revolvers, sabers and scimitars.

Thus, in general, the tactical and technical data of the small arms of the Turkish infantry were at the level of the Russian army, but the aiming range of the Turks was somewhat higher. At the same time, the Turks had no problems with ammunition. Before the war, the Turkish Empire purchased a very significant amount of cartridges for all the systems of its small arms, loaded from the treasury (500-1000 cartridges per weapon, that is, at least 300-400 million cartridges). During the course of the war, the Porte replenished its stocks of cartridges with regular purchases from abroad, mainly from England and the USA.

Peabody Martini rifle

The field artillery of the Turkish army was equipped mainly with rifled and loaded from the treasury 4- and 6-pound (87 and 91 mm) steel guns with an initial projectile velocity of not more than 305 m / s and 3-pound bronze guns of the English Whitworth system. During the war, bronze guns began to be replaced by 55-mm steel German Krupp guns. Nine-centimeter steel Krupp cannons, fastened with rings, with a range of 4.5 km and an initial speed of 425 m / s, mounted on a gun carriage, which made it possible to give the barrel a large elevation angle and thus increase the firing range, at first there were few: in the Balkans, for example, there were at the beginning, only 48. The Turks had little of all field artillery - 825 guns. The shells were of three types: grenade, shrapnel and buckshot.

The fortress and siege Turkish artillery was well armed: it was armed with cast-iron smoothbore guns of 9 cm caliber and 28 cm howitzers; bronze smoothbore 9-, 12- and 15-cm guns; rifled and loaded from the treasury 12- and 15-cm guns, 15-cm howitzers and 21-cm mortars; steel, fastened with rings 21-, 23- and 27-cm Krupp guns; cast iron mortars 23- and 28-cm caliber, bronze mortars 15-, 23- and 28-cm caliber.

The Turkish army had a traditional problem: low tactical training, although the Ottoman troops were trained by English and German instructors. More or less, only the guards, who were trained by German specialists, were able to advance. The rest of the Turkish infantry was poorly prepared for offensive combat. The infantry was preparing to attack frontally, in dense chains with reinforcements following them. The reserves were kept away from the main forces. Bypasses of the enemy's flanks were rarely used, since the organization and preparation were poor and the troops could get upset during the maneuver. As a result, the formation and battle formations were maintained only at the beginning of the offensive, after which, in most cases, the troops huddled into a crowd. The infantry fired poorly due to poor shooting training. For a successful offensive, the Turkish army had neither staff officers, nor well-trained middle-level officers with serious combat experience, nor initiative infantry.

The main attention was paid to the defense, in which the Turkish infantry showed great perseverance. The Turkish infantry dug in well. Each battalion had a significant supply of entrenching tools. The Turkish infantry knew sapper business, fortifications were erected quickly and technically performed well. At the same time, the local population was massively used. The Turkish infantry was well supplied with ammunition and was not afraid to open fire on the advancing enemies from long distances, which strengthened their defense. The counterattacks of the Turkish troops were not successful, which is why their defense was mostly passive. Engineering and fortification art in Turkey was well developed. The empire had strong fortresses in the Caucasian and Balkan strategic directions.

Turkish artillery was best prepared. Turkish artillery fired from long distances, accurately fired a grenade, but the concentration of fire in artillery was poorly used, interaction with the infantry was not established. Worst of all was the regular cavalry - there were so few of them that they could not have any effect on the war. The irregular Turkish cavalry was completely unprepared for modern combat.

The command staff of the Turkish army, especially the highest, was extremely weak and poorly versed in military matters. Many top commanders were appointed under patronage and bought their posts. Pasha generals were mostly either foreign adventurers and rogues of all kinds (for example, Poles), or court dignitaries with minimal combat experience and military knowledge. There were very few people with a higher military education or real combat experience in the Turkish generals.

The high command was also weak. At the head of the supreme military administration was the sultan with a secret military council, which was created under him for the duration of the war. The Sultan and the Privy Council discussed and approved all the action plans of the Commander-in-Chief. The commander-in-chief, in addition, was obliged to reckon in all his actions with the minister of war (seraskir), as well as with the military council (dari-khur) attached to the minister of war. At the same time, the chief of artillery and engineering troops was not subordinate to either the commander-in-chief or the minister of war, being at the disposal of the sultan alone. Thus, the commander-in-chief was bound in the implementation of even his private plans and designs. The Turkish General Staff was also not an independent body. The General Staff consisted of 130 officers who graduated from the higher military school. These officers were mostly used for other purposes, since there were no headquarters in the full sense of the word in the Turkish army. Instead of systematic staff work, officers of the general staff often acted as personal advisers to the pashas and carried out their individual assignments.

Among the mid-level officers there were even many illiterates; only 5-10% of commanders graduated from military schools (military, artillery, engineering, military medical). Military education was weak, producing few officers. The rest of the infantry and cavalry officers were recruited from among the non-commissioned officers who had been promoted to officers, that is, those who had completed only a training team, in which it was not even necessary to be literate. The strongest in the Turkish army was the rank and file and junior command personnel, who were distinguished by discipline, endurance and perseverance in defense. At the same time, it is worth the fate that some commanders nevertheless gained combat experience during the war with Serbia and Montenegro.

Turkish military and naval industry was weak. The existing enterprises could not meet the needs of a large army (except for edged weapons), the quality of products was low. The main way to replenish the army's arsenal was to import weapons and ammunition from the United States and England. The main warships were also ordered abroad.

"Bashi-Buzuk" ("Albanian"). Painting by V. V. Vereshchagin

Fleet

Once a mighty maritime power, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its dominance in the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The energetic Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) tried to restore its former power. He adopted an impressive program for the construction of a steam and armored fleet, designed for foreign shipyards. So, in France in 1864-1865. built four battleships of the Osmanieh class. These were relatively large iron battery battleships. In 1868, the French built three battery-barbet battleships of the Assari Shevket type; In 1874, the British built "Messudieh" - the largest battleship of the Turkish fleet.

As a result, by the beginning of the war on the Black Sea, Turkey, with the help of England and France, created a fairly strong navy, which was many times superior to the Russian one. It consisted of: 8 armored battery frigates of the 1st-2nd rank - with a displacement of 4700 to 8000 tons, 8-16 guns of 7-9 dm caliber (only "Messudie" had 12 guns of 10 dm caliber); 5 armored battery corvettes of the 3rd rank - with a displacement of 2200-2700 tons, 4-12 guns, mostly also with a caliber of 7-9 dm; 2 double-tower armored monitors - with a displacement of 2500 tons, with 14 guns. The speed of most ships of the squadron reached 11 knots or was even slightly higher, the armor of most ships was 6 dm thick. True, Porta, having received a strong modern fleet, completely ruined the treasury, and could not redeem several ships built for it. Turkey also had the Danube Flotilla, which included armored corvettes, monitors, gunboats, steamboats and other ships, a total of 50 units (of which 9 were armored).

370 British sailors served on the ships of the Turkish fleet, of which 70 were officers. They occupied many senior command positions: Gobart Pasha - the head of the armored squadron, Montorn Bay - his assistant and chief of staff, Slimane - a mine specialist, etc. In quantitative terms, the Turkish fleet had an overwhelming superiority in the Black Sea. The command planned to actively use the fleet: to blockade Russian ports, to support troops on the Danube, on the coastal flanks of the Caucasian and Balkan fronts, to land troops to transport goods for the army. But the combat training of the crews was extremely low, as was the discipline. There were almost no practical voyages, there were no mine weapons on the ships, the mine business was in its infancy. An attempt to improve the situation by inviting foreign specialists did not help. Therefore, the Turkish fleet practically could not actively operate on the high seas.

With the outbreak of the war, the Turks, having an overwhelming superiority in naval forces and taking advantage of the almost complete lack of defense of the coast of the Caucasus, tried to establish their dominance in the Black Sea. Turkish ships fired on Poti, Ochamchira, Gudauta and Sukhumi. At the end of April - the first half of May 1877, the Turks landed amphibious assault forces in this area and captured it. This was the only success achieved by the Turkish armored fleet on the Black Sea in the war of 1877-1878.

In the Balkan theater, the Russian fleet ensured the crossing of the Danube for ground forces. As a result of the active actions of mine boats and coastal artillery, as well as the skillful use of mine weapons, the enemy suffered significant losses. Two armored ships, a gunboat, several armed steamers were sunk, and two gunboats were damaged. Thus, the Russian sailors managed to paralyze the actions of the Turkish military flotilla on the Danube and thereby ensure the offensive of the Russian army in the Balkan theater.

The antiamphibious defense and the system of protecting bases and ports on the coast between the mouth of the Danube and Kerch, created by Russian sailors, was so effective that the Turkish fleet did not even try to attack them. The blockade of bases and ports, announced by the Turks on the advice of the British on April 23, 1877, turned out to be ineffective and was actually thwarted with the transition of the Black Sea Fleet forces to active operations on enemy communications. Active offensive operations, albeit with limited forces and means (using only mine weapons and armed ships), the Russian fleet began in the very first month of the war and this paralyzed the Ottoman Navy. The combat operations of the armed steamships "Grand Duke Konstantin", "Vladimir", "Vesta", "Russia", "Livadia" and others on Turkish communications were carried out throughout the war. Despite the significant superiority of the enemy in forces, Russian ships boldly went to the coastal communications of Turkey and delivered surprise attacks on them. In the summer of 1877, on sea routes near the Anatolian and Rumeli (Asian and European) coasts, they destroyed several Turkish ships. Thus, Russian mine boats and hastily armed steamships paralyzed the activities of the rather powerful Turkish armored fleet.

Battleship "Osmanie"

Results

Thus, the organization and condition of the Turkish armed forces were in a better condition than during the Crimean War, but they were far from the condition of any of the major armies of the European powers. The new organization of the Turkish army did not have time to settle down to the war with Russia. There were virtually no permanent connections at the level of regiment - division - corps. Practically 6-10 battalions (camps) were united into a brigade, division or detachment. The battalion had a staff of 774 people, in fact, the size of the battalion ranged from 100 to 650 people, so that the company often did not exceed the number of platoons adopted in European armies.

The state of the high command and the generals was unsatisfactory, there was a great shortage of middle-level officer cadres, the provision of trained staff officers, artillerymen, cavalrymen, naval officers and other specialists. Weak staffing, lack of stock of horses, artillery spare guns, modern small arms of reserve troops, militia. The artillery had modern guns, but in insufficient numbers, in addition, there were not enough well-trained gunners. And the presence in the Turkish army of "long-range" steel Krupp guns could not give it a noticeable advantage, since there were few such guns. The Turkish military industry could not provide the Turkish army with weapons and played a third-rate role in equipping it with weapons (Ottoman troops were primarily armed by England and the USA), so it could not be compared with the Russian military industry. Combat training of the Turkish army and navy on the eve of the war of 1877-1878. was at an extremely low level.

At the same time, the Turkish army was armed with modern small arms, artillery, and the fleet - modern ships. In Turkey there were well-armed strong fortresses. As a result, the Turkish army was equipped with samples of small arms that were quite modern for that time and, on the whole, was on an equal footing with the Russian army, even slightly surpassing it in the supply of ammunition.

The Turkish fleet had complete superiority over the Russian Black Sea Fleet in terms of displacement, artillery power and the number of ships of 1-2 ranks, however, poor crew training (even with the participation of foreign military experts - the British), with the excellent training of Russian sailors, destroyed this advantage. The Turkish fleet was unable to seize dominance at sea and prevent the actions of the Russian army from the coastal flanks in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

As a result, the general condition and combat training of the Russian troops on the eve of the war, despite all its major shortcomings, was significantly higher than the state of training of the Turkish army. The Russian army had an undoubted superiority over the Turkish in everything except small arms, where the situation was approximately equal. Turkey could only rely on its own defense, the mistakes of the Russian command and the military-political pressure of the West on Russia.

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COURSE OF EVENTS

The impossibility of improving the position of Christians in the Balkans by peaceful means, the rise of national consciousness in the Balkan countries led to the fact that in April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. The Russian army crossed the Danube, captured the Shipka Pass, and after a five-month siege forced the Turkish army of Osman Pasha to surrender at Plevna.

The number of the Russian expeditionary force in the Balkans at the beginning of the war was about 185 thousand people, and by the end of the war it had reached half a million. The raid through the Balkans, during which the Russian army defeated the last Turkish units, led to the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war.

As a result of the war, the San Stefano Preliminary Treaty was concluded. However, its terms provoked a sharply negative reaction from the great powers, who feared the enormously increased influence of Russia in the Balkans. They forced Russia to revise the treaty, and it was actually replaced by the Treaty of Berlin signed at the Berlin Congress on June 1/13, 1878. even received certain acquisitions from the war, in which they did not take part. The statehood of Bulgaria was restored, the territory of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was enlarged. At the same time, Turkish Bosnia and Herzegovina retreated to Austria-Hungary.

Having occupied Tyrnov, General Gurko collected information about the enemy and on June 28 moved to Kazanlak, bypassing the Shipka Pass. In extreme heat and along mountain paths, the Advance Detachment traveled 120 miles in 6 days. Shipka's double attack from the north (July 5) and south (July 6) was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the news of Gurko's crossing over the Balkans had such an effect on the Turks that the detachment occupying Shipka left their excellent position, abandoned all their artillery on the pass and retreated to Philippopolis.

On July 7, Shipka was taken without a fight. We lost about 400 people and captured 6 guns and up to 400 prisoners at the pass. […]

By the evening of the 17th, Gurko's detachments came into contact with the enemy. On the 18th and 19th, a series of battles took place, for us, on the whole, successful. The 4th Rifle Brigade passed 75 versts in the mountains in a day on July 17-18. On July 18, near Yeni-Zagra, the riflemen shot down a Turkish detachment, capturing 2 guns and losing 7 officers, 102 lower ranks. On July 19, a stubborn battle took place near Juranly, where we lost 20 officers, 498 lower ranks, but killed up to 2000 Turks. Under Eski Zagra, the Bulgarian militia lost 34 officers and 1000 lower ranks, here lay the entire color of the officers of the Turkestan riflemen. However, we failed at Eski Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was routed. On July 19, Gurko's troops retreated to Shipka and Khanikioy. They risked being in a hopeless situation, but Suleiman did not pursue, carried away by beating the Bulgarian population, and we could save Shipka. This was the only, but a major positive result of the summer crossing of the Balkans: by holding Shipka, we separated the actions of all three Turkish armies. Gurko's detachment, weak in numbers, did everything it could and got out of its predicament with honor. […]

Having lost 19 days after the case near Eski-Zagra (when he could take Shipka almost without hindrance), Suleiman on August 7 with 40,000 with 54 guns approached the Shipka Pass. Radetsky's troops, who defended the Balkans, and in addition had the task of covering the left flank of the Plevna group and the right flank of the Ruschuk detachment, were scattered on a front of 130 miles from Selvi to Kesarev. On Shipka itself there were 4,000 people (the Orlovsky regiment and the remnants of the Bulgarian militia) with 28 guns. Having spent another day, Suleiman stormed the strongest part of the Russian positions on the pass on August 9.

Thus began the famous six-day Shipka battle. Attacks followed attacks, the camp followed the camp. Having shot their cartridges, tormented by severe thirst, the defenders of the "Eagle's Nest" - Orlovtsy and Bryantsy - fought back with stones and rifle butts. On August 11, Suleiman was already triumphant, but then at the decisive moment, like thunder from a clear sky, “Hurrah!” 4th Infantry Brigade, a lightning march passed 60 miles in forty-degree heat. Shipka was saved - and on these hot cliffs the 4th Rifle Brigade earned its immortal name of the "Iron Brigade".

The 14th division of General Dragomirov arrived here, Radetsky himself personally began to control the battle, and on August 13 the buglers of the Suleiman camps began to play the retreat. By the evening of August 9, we had 6,000 people, the storming Turks had 28,000 and 36 guns. On August 10, Radetsky moved reserves to Shipka; the Turks, repulsed the day before, fought artillery battles all day. August 11 was a critical day. The Russian position was covered from three sides. The 16th rifle battalion arrived in time at a critical moment on the croup of Cossack horses, rushing from a place with bayonets. On August 12, the 2nd brigade of the 14th division approached, and on August 13, the Volynsky regiment. Radetsky went over to the counterattack (personally led a company of Zhitomirians on bayonets). On August 13 and 14, battles were fought with varying success. Dragomirov was wounded, and the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 9th division, General Derozhinsky, was killed. Our damage: 2 generals, 108 officers, 3338 lower ranks. The Turks showed theirs in 233 officers and 6527 lower ranks, but in fact it is twice as much - in a letter to Seraskiriat, Suleiman urgently demanded 12,000 - 15,000 people to replenish the loss. In order to have an idea of ​​the conditions for the defense of Shipka, it is enough to note that water for our wounded had to be delivered 17 miles away!

RESTRICTIONS ON THE SEA

Since the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Makarov's energy, ingenuity and perseverance found new uses. As you know, by virtue of the Paris Treaty of 1856, Russia was deprived of the right to have a combat fleet in the Black Sea, and although this treaty was annulled in 1871, nevertheless, to create a strong military fleet on the Black Sea by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war did not have time and, apart from floating batteries, wooden corvettes and several schooners, had nothing there. Turkey, by this time, had a large fleet with strong artillery. On the Black Sea, she could use 15 battleships, 5 screw frigates, 13 screw corvettes, 8 monitors, 7 armored gunboats and a large number of small vessels.

The balance of power in the Black Sea was far from in favor of Russia. It was necessary, given the small number of naval forces, to find effective methods of dealing with the strong fleet of Turkey. The solution to this problem was found by Makarov.

CAPTAIN LIEUTENANT MAKAROV

At the end of 1876, the inevitability of war with Turkey became clear. Makarov was given command of the steamer "Grand Duke Konstantin". After a stubborn struggle, he carried out his idea to arm the ship with fast mine boats lifted on special davits, and put artillery on it from 4-inch rifled guns and one 6-inch mortar.

At first, the boats were armed with pole and tow mines, for the use of which it was required that the boat approached very close to the enemy ship.

The first attack with such mines was made on May 12, 1877 on a Turkish patrol steamer. The mine touched its side, but did not explode due to a malfunction of the fuse (as the study showed, 30% of the fuses did not explode due to their careless manufacture). The Sulina attack on June 9 also failed. On August 24, a mine attack was carried out on the Sukhumi raid: the Turkish battleship was damaged, but did not sink and was taken by the Turks in tow to Batum. Although there were self-propelled mines [torpedoes] of Whitehead in Nikolaev, they were released to Makarov only in July 1877, i.e. almost four months after the start of the war, believing that the mines, which cost 12,000 rubles apiece, were "too expensive to waste."

The torpedo attack, undertaken on the night of December 28, failed: the torpedoes did not hit the enemy battleship and ran ashore. But the next torpedo attack was successful. On the night of January 26, 1878, a Turkish patrol steamer was attacked and sunk in the Batumi roadstead.

Makarov's most brilliant deed was to distract the enemy battleship assigned to guard the detachment of Colonel Shelkovnikov (the latter had to retreat under pressure from superior Turkish forces along a narrow road that ran along the edge of a sheer cliff that towered over the sea). Makarov caused the battleship to pursue the Konstantin, and at that time Shelkovnikov, not noticed, led his detachment without any losses.

For the brilliant actions of the Konstantin steamer, Makarov received the highest military awards in his rank (George of the 4th degree and a golden weapon) and, moreover, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander, and then captain of the 2nd rank and was awarded the rank of adjutant wing.

SAN STEFANO PRELIMINARY PEACE TREATY

The Sublime Porte will have the right to use the passage through Bulgaria for the transportation of troops, military supplies and provisions along certain routes to areas outside the Principality and back. Within three months from the date of ratification of this act, in order to avoid difficulties and misunderstandings in the application of the said right, the conditions for the use of it will be determined, by agreement of the Sublime Porte with the administration in Bulgaria, by a special charter providing, among other things, for the military needs of the Sublime Porte.

It goes without saying that the aforementioned right extends exclusively to Ottoman regular troops, while irregulars - Bash-Bouzuks and Circassians - will certainly be excluded from it. […]

ARTICLE XII

All fortresses on the Danube will be demolished. From now on, there will be no more fortifications on the banks of this river; there will also be no warships in the waters of the Romanian, Serbian and Bulgarian principalities, except for ordinary stationary and small ships intended for the needs of the river police and customs administration. […]

ARTICLE XXIV

The Bosporus and the Dardanelles will be open, both in time of war and in time of peace, to merchant ships of neutral powers coming from or going to Russian ports. As a result of this, the Sublime Porte undertakes to no longer establish an invalid blockade of the ports of the Black and Azov Seas, as inconsistent with the exact meaning of the declaration signed in Paris

San Stefano preliminary peace treaty of San Stefano, February 19 / March 3, 1878 // Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856-1917. M., 1952 http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/FOREIGN/stefano.htm

FROM SAN STEFANO TO BERLIN

On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was signed in San Stefano. Under its terms, Bulgaria received the status of an autonomous principality. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained full independence and significant territorial gains. South Bessarabia, which had been torn away under the Treaty of Paris, was returned to Russia, and the Kars region in the Caucasus was transferred.

The provisional Russian administration that ruled Bulgaria developed a draft constitution. Bulgaria was declared a constitutional monarchy. Individual and property rights were guaranteed. The Russian project formed the basis of the Bulgarian constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in Tarnovo in April 1879.

England and Austria-Hungary refused to accept the terms of the San Stefano Peace. At their insistence, the Berlin Congress was held in the summer of 1878 with the participation of England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey. Russia found itself isolated and forced to make concessions. The Western powers categorically objected to the creation of a unified Bulgarian state. As a result, Southern Bulgaria remained under Turkish rule. Russian diplomats managed to achieve only that Sofia and Varna were included in the autonomous Bulgarian principality. The territory of Serbia and Montenegro was significantly reduced. Congress confirmed the right of Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In a report to the tsar, the head of the Russian delegation, Chancellor A.M. Gorchakov wrote: "The Berlin Congress is the blackest page in my official career!" The king noted: "And in mine too."

The Congress of Berlin undoubtedly did not embellish the diplomatic history of not only Russia, but also the Western powers. Driven by petty momentary calculations and envy of the brilliant victory of Russian arms, the governments of these countries extended Turkish rule over several million Slavs.

And yet the fruits of the Russian victory were only partly destroyed. Having laid the foundations for the freedom of the fraternal Bulgarian people, Russia has written a glorious page in its history. Russo-Turkish War 1877–1878 entered the general context of the era of Liberation and became its worthy completion.

Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M. from the beginning of the XVIII to the end of the XIX century, M., 2001. http://kazez.net/book_98689_glava_129_%C2%A7_4._Russko_-_ture%D1%81kaja_vojj.html

[…] ARTICLE I

Bulgaria forms a self-governing and tribute-paying principality, under the leadership of H.I.V. sultan; it will have a Christian government and a people's militia. […]

ARTICLE III

The prince of Bulgaria will be freely elected by the people and approved by the Sublime Porte with the consent of the powers. None of the members of the dynasties that reign in the great European powers can be elected prince of Bulgaria. In the event that the title of prince of Bulgaria remains unreplaced, the election of a new prince will be made under the same conditions and in the same form. […]

The following principles will be adopted as the basis of the state law of Bulgaria: The difference in religious beliefs and confessions cannot serve as a reason for the exclusion of someone, or the non-recognition of someone's legal capacity in everything that relates to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, access to public positions , official occupations and distinctions, or until the departure of various free occupations and crafts in any locality. All Bulgarian natives, as well as foreigners, are guaranteed freedom and outward celebration of all worship; also, no restrictions can be placed on the hierarchical structure of the various religious communities and on their relations with their spiritual heads. […]

ARTICLE XIII

To the south of the Balkans, a province is formed, which will receive the name "Eastern Rumelia" and which will remain under the direct political and military authority of H.I.V. Sultan on the terms of administrative autonomy. It will have a Christian governor-general. […]

ARTICLE XXV

The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. […]

ARTICLE XXVI

The independence of Montenegro is recognized by the Sublime Porte and by all those high contracting parties which have not yet recognized it. […]

ARTICLE XXXIV

The High Contracting Parties recognize the independence of the Principality of Serbia […]

ARTICLE LVIII

The glorious Porte cedes to the Russian Empire in Asia the territories of Ardagan, Kars and Batum, with the port of the latter, as well as all the territories between the former Russian-Turkish border and the next frontier line. […]

The valley of Alashkert and the city of Bayazet, ceded to Russia by Article XIX of the Treaty of San Stefano, are returned to Turkey. […]