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  • Warships of the 1st World War. Losses of ships in the first world war - russia

    Warships of the 1st World War.  Losses of ships in the first world war - russia

    Before the outbreak of the First World War, the great powers paid great attention to their naval forces, and large-scale naval programs were being implemented. Therefore, when the war began, the leading countries had numerous and powerful ones. A particularly stubborn rivalry in building up naval power was between Great Britain and Germany. The British at that time possessed the most powerful navy and merchant fleet, which made it possible to control strategic communications in the oceans, to link together numerous colonies and dominions.

    In 1897, the German Navy was significantly inferior to the British Navy. The British had 57 class I, II, III battleships, the Germans had 14 (4:1 ratio), the British had 15 coastal defense battleships, the Germans had 8, the British had 18 armored cruisers, the Germans had 4 (4.5:1 ratio). ), the British had 125 cruisers of classes 1-3, the Germans had 32 (4: 1), the Germans were inferior in other combat units.

    Arms race

    The British wanted not only to maintain the advantage, but also to increase it. In 1889, Parliament passed a law that allocated more funds for the development of the fleet. London's naval policy was based on the principle that the British Navy was to outperform the two fleets of the most powerful maritime powers.

    Berlin initially did not pay much attention to the development of the fleet and the capture of colonies, Chancellor Bismarck did not see much point in this, believing that the main efforts should be directed to European politics, the development of the army. But under Emperor Wilhelm II, priorities were revised, Germany begins the struggle for colonies and the construction of a powerful fleet. In March 1898, the Reichstag passed the "Law on the Navy", which provided for a sharp increase in the Navy. Within 6 years (1898-1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 armored cruisers, 17 armored cruisers and 63 destroyers. The shipbuilding programs of Germany were subsequently constantly adjusted upwards - in 1900, 1906, 1908, 1912. According to the law of 1912, the size of the fleet was planned to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines. Particular attention was paid to battleships: in the period from 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid in Germany annually (in previous years, two).

    In London, it was believed that German naval efforts posed a great threat to Britain's strategic interests. England intensified the naval arms race. The task was to have 60% more battleships than the Germans. Since 1905, the British began to build battleships of a new type - "dreadnoughts" (after the name of the first ship of this class). They differed from squadron battleships in that they had stronger weapons, were better armored, with a more powerful power plant, large displacement, etc.

    Battleship Dreadnought.

    Germany responded by building its own dreadnoughts. Already in 1908, the British had 8 dreadnoughts, and the Germans had 7 (some were in the process of being completed). The ratio of "pre-dreadnoughts" (squadron battleships) was in favor of Britain: 51 against 24 German. In 1909, London decided to build two of its own for every German dreadnought.

    The British tried to maintain their naval power through diplomacy. At the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, they proposed limiting the scale of building new warships. But the Germans, believing that only Britain would benefit from this step, rejected this proposal. The naval arms race between England and Germany continued until the First World War. By its beginning, Germany had firmly taken the position of the second military maritime power, overtaking Russia and France.

    Other great powers - France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, etc., also tried to build up their naval armaments, but due to a number of reasons, including financial problems, they could not achieve such impressive success.


    The Queen Elizabeth is the lead ship of the superdreadnoughts of the Queen Elizabeth series.

    The Importance of the Fleets

    The fleets had to perform a number of important tasks. Firstly, to protect the coast of countries, their ports, important cities (for example, the main purpose of the Russian Baltic Fleet is the protection of St. Petersburg). Secondly, the fight against enemy naval forces, the support of their ground forces from the sea. Thirdly, the protection of sea lanes, strategically important points, especially Britain and France, they owned huge colonial empires. Fourthly, to ensure the status of the country, a powerful navy showed the position of the power in the world informal table of ranks.

    The basis of the then naval strategy and tactics was a linear battle. In theory, the two fleets were supposed to line up and in an artillery duel to find out who was the winner. Therefore, the fleet was based on squadron battleships and armored cruisers, and then dreadnoughts (from 1912-1913 and superdreadnoughts) and battlecruisers. Battlecruisers had weaker armor and artillery, but were faster and had a longer range. Squadron battleships (battleships of the pre-dreadnought type), armored cruisers were not written off, but they were brought to the background, ceasing to be the main striking force. Light cruisers were supposed to carry out raids on enemy sea lanes. Destroyers and destroyers were intended for torpedo strikes, the destruction of enemy transports. Their combat survivability was based on speed, maneuverability and stealth. The Navy also included special-purpose ships: minelayers (set sea mines), minesweepers (made passages in minefields), seaplane transports (hydrocruisers), etc. The role of the submarine fleet was constantly growing.


    Battlecruiser Goeben

    Great Britain

    The British at the beginning of the war had 20 dreadnoughts, 9 battlecruisers, 45 old battleships, 25 armored and 83 light cruisers, 289 destroyers and destroyers, 76 submarines (most outdated, they could not operate on the high seas). I must say that, despite all the power of the British fleet, its leadership was very conservative. New items hardly found their way (especially those not related to the linear fleet). Even Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, a naval theorist and historian, author of the book “Naval Warfare, Its Basic Principles and Experience” (1891), said: “There is nothing that would show that the laws of naval warfare established long ago by any have changed in a way." The admiral substantiated the theory of "ownership of the sea" as the basis of the imperial policy of Britain. He believed that the only way to achieve victory in the war at sea was to create complete superiority in naval forces and destroy the enemy's navy in one pitched battle.

    When Admiral Percy Scott suggested that "the era of dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts was over forever" and advised the Admiralty to focus on development and the submarine fleet, his innovative ideas were sharply criticized.

    The general management of the fleet was carried out by the Admiralty, headed by W. Churchill and the First Sea Lord (Chief of the Main Naval Staff) Prince Ludwig Battenberg. British ships were based in the harbors of Humberg, Scarborough, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow. In 1904, the Admiralty considered relocating the main naval forces from the English Channel north to Scotland. This decision removed the fleet from the threat of a blockade of the narrow strait by the growing German Navy, and allowed for operational control of the entire North Sea. According to the British naval doctrine, which was developed shortly before the war by Battenberg and Bridgman, the basing of the main forces of the fleet in Scapa Flow (a harbor in Scotland on the Orkney Islands), outside the effective range of the German submarine fleet, should have led to a blockade of the main forces of the German fleet, which and happened during the First World War.

    When the war began, the British were in no hurry to meddle with the German shores, fearing attacks by submarines and destroyers. Main fighting deployed on dry land. The British limited themselves to covering communications, protecting the coast and blockade Germany from the sea. The British fleet was ready to join the battle if the Germans brought their main fleet to the open sea.


    british" big fleet".

    Germany

    The German Navy had 15 dreadnoughts, 4 battlecruisers, 22 old battleships, 7 armored and 43 light cruisers, 219 destroyers and destroyers, and 28 submarines. According to a number of indicators, for example, in speed, the German ships were better than the British. Much more attention was paid to technical innovations in Germany than in England. Berlin did not have time to complete its naval program, it was supposed to be completed in 1917. Although the German naval leaders were quite conservative, Admiral Tirpitz initially believed that it was "frivolous" to get involved in the construction of submarines. And dominance at sea is determined by the number of battleships. Only realizing that the war would begin before the completion of the battle fleet construction program, he became a supporter of unlimited submarine warfare and the forced development of the submarine fleet.

    The German "High Seas Fleet" (German: Hochseeflotte), it was based in Wilhelmshaven, was supposed to destroy the main forces of the British fleet ("Grand Fleet" - "Big Fleet") in an open battle. In addition, there were naval bases in Kiel, Fr. Heligoland, Danzig. The Russian and French navies were not perceived as worthy opponents. The German "High Seas Fleet" created a constant threat to Britain and forced the English Grand Fleet to be constantly in the North Sea region in full combat readiness throughout the war, despite the shortage of battleships in other theaters of operations. Due to the fact that the Germans were inferior in the number of ships of the line, the German Navy tried to avoid open clashes with the Grand Fleet and preferred the strategy of raids into the North Sea, trying to lure part of the British fleet, cut it off from the main forces and destroy it. In addition, the Germans focused on waging unrestricted submarine warfare to weaken the British Navy and lift the naval blockade.

    The lack of autocracy affected the combat capability of the German Navy. The main creator of the fleet was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849 - 1930). He was the author of the "risk theory", which argued that if the German fleet was comparable to the British in strength, then the British would avoid conflicts with the German Empire, because in the event of war, the German Navy would have a chance to inflict sufficient damage on the Grand Fleet for the loss of the British fleet supremacy at sea. With the outbreak of war, the role of the grand admiral fell. Tirpitz became responsible for building new ships and supplying the fleet. The "High Seas Fleet" was led by Admiral Friedrich von Ingenol (in 1913-1915), then Hugo von Pohl (from February 1915 to January 1916, before that he was chief of the General Naval Staff), Reinhard Scheer (1916-1918). In addition, the fleet was the favorite brainchild of the German Emperor Wilhelm, if he trusted the generals to make decisions about the army, then the Navy controlled himself. Wilhelm did not dare to risk the fleet in an open battle and allowed only a "small war" to be waged - with the help of submarines, destroyers, mine productions. The battle fleet had to stick to a defensive strategy.


    German "High Seas Fleet"

    France. Austria-Hungary

    The French had 3 dreadnoughts, 20 battleships of the old type (battleships), 18 armored and 6 light cruisers, 98 destroyers, 38 submarines. In Paris, they decided to focus on the "Mediterranean Front", since the British agreed to defend the Atlantic coast of France. Thus, the French saved expensive ships, because there was no big threat in the Mediterranean - the Ottoman Navy was very weak and connected by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Italy was neutral at first, and then went over to the side of the Entente, the Austro-Hungarian fleet chose a passive strategy. In addition, there was a rather strong British squadron in the Mediterranean.

    The Austro-Hungarian Empire had 3 dreadnoughts (the 4th entered service in 1915), 9 battleships, 2 armored and 10 light cruisers, 69 destroyers and 9 submarines. Vienna also chose a passive strategy and "defended the Adriatic", almost the entire war the Austro-Hungarian fleet stood in Trieste, Split, Pula.


    "Tegetthoff" in the prewar years. Austro-Hungarian battleship of the Viribus Unitis class.

    Russia

    The Russian fleet under Emperor Alexander III was second only to the British and French navies, but then lost this position. The Russian Navy received a particularly large blow during the Russian Japanese war: almost the entire Pacific squadron was lost and best ships Baltic Fleet sent to Far East. The fleet needed to be rebuilt. Several naval programs were developed between 1905 and 1914. They provided for the completion of 4 previously laid down squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers and the construction of 8 new battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. But by the beginning of the war, not a single program had been fully implemented (the State Duma also played its role in this, which did not support these projects).

    By the beginning of the war, Russia had 9 old battleships, 8 armored and 14 light cruisers, 115 destroyers and destroyers, 28 submarines (a significant part of the old types). Already during the war, the following entered service: in the Baltic - 4 dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, all of them were laid down in 1909 - Sevastopol, Poltava, Petropavlovsk, Gangut; on the Black Sea - 3 dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria type (laid down in 1911).


    "Poltava" during the First World War.

    The Russian Empire was not a backward power in the naval field. It even took the lead in a number of areas. In Russia, excellent destroyers of the Novik type were developed. By the beginning of the First World War, the ship was the best destroyer in its class, and served as a world model in the creation of destroyers of the military and post-war generation. The technical conditions for it were created at the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of the outstanding Russian shipbuilders A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov and G. F. Schlesinger. The project was developed in 1908-1909 by the shipbuilding department of the Putilov Plant, which was headed by engineers D. D. Dubitsky (for the mechanical part) and B. O. Vasilevsky (ship building part). At Russian shipyards, in 1911-1916, in 6 standard projects, a total of 53 ships of this class were laid down. The destroyers combined the qualities of a destroyer and a light cruiser - speed, maneuverability and rather strong artillery armament (4th 102-mm guns).

    Russian railway engineer Mikhail Petrovich Nalyotov was the first to implement the idea of ​​a submarine with anchor mines. Already in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, participating in the heroic defense of Port Arthur, Naleytov built a submarine with a displacement of 25 tons, capable of carrying four mines, at his own expense. He conducted the first tests, but after the surrender of the fortress, the device was destroyed. In 1909-1912, a submarine was built at the Nikolaev shipyard, which received the name "Crab". She became part of the Black Sea Fleet. During the First World War, the "Crab" made several combat exits with mine productions, even reached the Bosphorus.


    The world's first underwater mine layer - the submarine "Crab" (Russia, 1912).

    Already during the war, Russia became the world leader in the use of hydrocruisers (aircraft carriers), since this was facilitated by the factor of dominance in the creation and use of naval aviation. Russian aircraft designer Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, he worked since 1912 technical director plant of the First Russian Society of Aeronautics, in 1913 he designed the world's first seaplane (M-1) and immediately began to improve the aircraft. In 1914, Grigorovich built the M-5 flying boat. It was a two-seat biplane of wooden construction. The seaplane entered service with the Russian fleet as a reconnaissance and spotter of artillery fire, and in the spring of 1915 the aircraft made its first sortie. In 1916, Grigorovich's new aircraft, the heavier M-9 (sea bomber), was adopted. Then the Russian nugget designed the world's first seaplane fighter M-11.

    On Russian dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, for the first time, they used the installation system of not two, but three-gun turrets of the main caliber. In England and Germany, they were initially skeptical of the idea, but the Americans appreciated the idea and Nevada-class battleships were built with three-gun turrets.

    In 1912, 4 Izmail-class battlecruisers were laid down. They were intended for the Baltic Fleet. These would be the most powerful battlecruisers in the world in terms of artillery armament. Unfortunately, they were never completed. In 1913-1914, eight light cruisers of the Svetlana type were laid down, four each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. They were going to be put into operation in 1915-1916, but did not have time. Russian submarines of the Bars type were considered one of the best in the world (they began to be built in 1912). A total of 24 Bars were built: 18 for the Baltic Fleet and 6 for the Black Sea.

    It should be noted that in the pre-war years in the West European fleets little attention was paid to the submarine fleet. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, previous wars have not yet revealed their combat significance, only in the First world war their importance became clear. Secondly, the then dominant naval doctrine of the "high seas" assigned submarine forces one of the last places in the struggle for the sea. Dominance in the seas was to be won by battleships, having won a decisive battle.

    Russian engineers and artillery sailors made a great contribution to the development of artillery. Before the start of the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of caliber 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm. The production of three-gun turrets began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov factory F.F. Lender and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky became pioneers in the field of creating a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm.

    In the Russian Empire, before the war, three new types of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910, 1912). They surpassed similar torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, although they had a lower total weight and charge weight. Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes were created - the first such tube was built at the Putilov plant in 1913. He provided salvo fire with a fan, Russian sailors mastered it before the start of the war.

    Russia was a leader in the field of mines. In the Russian Empire, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers "Amur" and "Yenisei" were built, and the construction of special minesweepers of the "Zapal" type also began. In the West, before the start of the war, no attention was paid to the need to create special ships for setting and sweeping sea mines. This is also proved by the fact that in 1914 the British were forced to buy a thousand ball mines from Russia to protect their naval bases. The Americans bought not only samples of all Russian mines, but also trawls, considering them the best in the world, and invited Russian specialists to teach them how to mine. The Americans also bought Mi-5, Mi-6 seaplanes. Before the start of the war, Russia developed galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the 1908 and 1912 models. In 1913, they designed a floating mine (P-13). She was kept underwater at a certain depth due to the action of an electric navigation device. The mines of the previous models were kept at a depth due to buoys, which did not give much stability, especially during storms. P-13 had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of tola and could stay at a given depth for three days. In addition, Russian specialists created the world's first river mine "Rybka" ("R").

    In 1911, undercutting kite and boat trawls entered service with the fleet. Their use shortened the time of minesweeping, because the undercut and pop-up mines were immediately destroyed. Previously mines had to be towed into shallow water and destroyed there.

    The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio became a means of communication and control in combat. In addition, before the war, Russian radio engineers designed radio direction finders, which made it possible to use the device for reconnaissance.

    Given the fact that the new battleships in the Baltic did not enter service, besides the Germans had complete superiority in the forces of the battle fleet, the Russian command adhered to a defensive strategy. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to protect the capital of the empire. Minefields were the basis of naval defense - during the years of the war, 39 thousand mines were put up at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In addition, there were powerful batteries on the coast and islands. Under their cover, cruisers, destroyers and submarines made raids. The battleships were supposed to meet the German fleet if it tried to break through the minefields.

    By the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was the master of the Black Sea, since the Turkish Navy had only a few relatively combat-ready ships - 2 old squadron battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 8 destroyers. The attempts of the Turks before the war to change the situation by buying newest ships did not bring success abroad. The Russian command planned to completely block the Bosphorus and the Turkish coast from the beginning of the war, to support the troops of the Caucasian Front (if necessary, the Romanian) from the sea. The issue of conducting a landing operation in the Bosphorus region, to capture Istanbul-Constantinople, was also considered. The situation was somewhat changed by the arrival of the newest battlecruiser Goeben and the light Breslau. The cruiser "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the squadron battleships of the Black Sea Fleet would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" retreated, using its high speed. In general, especially after the commissioning of dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria type, the Black Sea Fleet controlled the Black Sea basin - it supported the troops of the Caucasian Front, destroyed Turkish transports, and attacked the enemy coast.


    Destroyer type "Novik" ("Ardent").

    Indefatigable

    The battlecruiser Indefatigable became the first English ship to die in the Battle of Jutland. During a duel of battlecruisers, the ship was hit by heavy shells from the German battlecruiser Von der Tann, causing an explosion of ammunition. Out of a team of 1019 people, only two survived, picked up by a German ship.

    Queen Mary

    The second British battlecruiser to die in the Battle of Jutland was the Queen Mary, which was lost just over 20 minutes after the Indefatigable. The ship received a combined salvo from the battlecruisers Derflinger and Seydlitz, which also caused an explosion in the artillery cellars. Of the team of 1275 people, 9 were saved.

    Invincible

    This battlecruiser was Admiral Hood's flagship at the Battle of Jutland. When Beatty's formation, which had already lost two battlecruisers in battle with the Germans, retreated to the main forces of the British fleet, Hood's detachment was the first to come to his aid. The fire of the Invincible severely damaged the German light cruiser Wiesbaden, which later sank. But then the lighting changed, and the ship became clearly visible to the gunners of the German battlecruisers. At 18.31, the ship received a hit in the main battery turret, which caused the explosion of the cellars. From the explosion, the ship broke in half, and since it sank at a depth of less than 30 meters, each half rested on the bottom, and the stern and bow remained sticking out above the water. For several years after the war, fishermen could see this terrible monument, until a storm overturned both parts of the skeleton. Admiral Hood, Captain 1st Rank E. L. Clay and more than 1000 people were killed; 6 survivors from the cruiser were picked up by the destroyer Badger.

    The German cruiser Blucher was a transitional ship between armored and battlecruisers. Due to a shortage of ships, she often took part in operations alongside newer battlecruisers. During the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915 with the English battlecruisers, the Blucher, which was the last in the German detachment, received several heavy hits and lost speed. The British preferred to finish off the lagging German ship and let the rest leave. After receiving from 70 to 100 shell hits, and then several torpedoes, the cruiser capsized and sank. The loss of the crew amounted to 792 people, 281 sailors were picked up by British ships.



    The French battleship was part of the Allied squadron, which was trying to break through the Turkish fortifications in the Dardanelles on March 18, 1915. The duel of coastal batteries and ships proved fatal for the latter. Bouvet received several hits that destroyed her forward gun turret and one of the masts. Then the battleship stumbled upon a mine, the explosion of which caused the detonation of ammunition. The ship sank within two minutes. Out of a team of 710 people, only about 50 were saved.

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    One of four ships of the King George V class. The first dreadnought in history to die in action. October 27, 1914, "Odeyshes", following for training artillery firing, at 08:05 ran into a mine, installed by the German auxiliary mine layer "Berlin". The captain tried to bring the sinking ship to the shore and throw it aground, but at 10:50 the engine room was flooded and the Odeishes lost speed. At 21:00, the Odeishes capsized, exploded and sank. A foreman on the Liverpool cruiser, located at a distance of more than 700 meters from the explosion site, was killed by shrapnel. This is the only human sacrifice at the death of the Odeishes.

    Irresistable

    The battleship Irresistable (Irresistible) was part of a series of eight British battleships built at the beginning of the 20th century. Participating in the attack by the allied squadron of the Dardanelles on March 18, 1915, the ship hit a mine and lost its course. The current carried him to the Turkish batteries, which finished him off and three hours later the ship went to the bottom. The loss of the team amounted to about 150 people. In total, from this series of battleships, in addition to the Irresistable, two more ships died in the First World War.

    The battlecruiser Inflexible picks up the crew of the cruiser Gneisenau

    The armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were the core of the German East Asia Squadron based in Qingdao, China. With the outbreak of the First World War, the German squadron went to sea so as not to be destroyed by superior enemy forces in the port. Off the coast of Chile, she defeated the English squadron of Admiral Craddock sent to search for her, sinking two old armored cruisers, but off the Falkland Islands she stumbled upon a much stronger enemy - Strady's squadron, which consisted of an armadillo, 2 linear, 3 armored and 2 light cruisers. In an unequal battle, both German armored and 2 light cruisers were destroyed. The Scharnhost perished along with the entire crew and Admiral Count Spee, while 680 of the Gneisenau crew died and 187 people were rescued.

    Saint Stephen

    The battleship "Saint-Istvan" (Saint Stephen) was part of a series of four dreadnoughts of Austria-Hungary of the Viribus Unitis type. He spent most of his service at the base of the Austrian fleet in Pole. On June 15, 1918, the main forces of the Austrian fleet went to sea to attack the Allied anti-submarine forces in the Otranto area. The operation failed, and at 3.25 the Szent Istvan received two torpedoes from the Italian torpedo boat MAS-15. The ship received a strong roll to starboard. Attempts to take her ashore and put her aground were unsuccessful, and at 0605 the ship capsized and sank. Of the 1094 crew members, 89 drowned along with the dreadnought, the rest were picked up by escort ships. After the war, the Italians put the MAS-15 boat on public display in Rome's Museo di Risorgimento, where it remains to this day.

    Viribus Unitis

    On October 31, 1918, during the collapse of Austria-Hungary as a single state, flags were lowered on the decks of the ships of the former Austro-Hungarian fleet, after which the fleet came under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav National Council. On the same day, the flagship of the former fleet, the Viribus Unitis, sank in the harbor of Pola as a result of a sabotage by the Italian combat swimmers R. Rosetti and R. Paolucci, who laid mines on board the battleship. Janko Vukovich Podkapelsky, captain 1st rank, part-time commander of the new Yugoslav fleet, refused to leave the ship and died with him, sharing the fate of almost 400 crew members. The question of whether the Italians knew that they were going to blow up, in fact, not an enemy battleship, but a ship of a completely different fleet, remains open to this day.

    The decade preceding the World War can be marked in the development of naval forces by three facts: the growth of the German military fleet, the restoration of the Russian fleet after its catastrophic defeat during the Japanese war, and the development of the submarine fleet.

    Naval preparations for war in Germany were carried out in the direction of building a fleet of large warships (7.5 billion marks in gold were spent on this in a few years), which caused strong political excitement, especially in England.

    Russia developed its fleet exclusively with active defensive tasks in the Baltic and Black Seas.

    The greatest attention was paid to the submarine fleet in England and France; Germany transferred the center of gravity of the naval struggle to it already during the conduct of the war itself.

    Comparative strength of the navies of the warring powers

    The comparative strength of the warring powers' fleets is given in the table. Vessels of old construction that have served for 10 years or more are not included in the table.

    To these naval forces, in favor of the Triple Alliance, the Turkish fleet should be added, which, however, consisted, however, in addition to several old battleships bought from the Germans, from 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers, which were in good condition.

    The distribution of the naval forces of both sides before the start of the war

    In the overall balance of the naval forces of the belligerent states, the British and German fleets dominated in terms of their power, a combat meeting of which was expected with special alarm throughout the world from the first day of the war. Their clash could immediately have very serious consequences for one of the parties. On the eve of the declaration of war, there was a moment when, according to some assumptions, such a meeting was included in the calculations of the British Admiralty. Starting from 1905, the British naval forces, until then scattered along the most important sea routes, began to be drawn to the coast of England as part of three "home" fleets, i.e. intended for defense british isles. During mobilization, these three fleets were combined into one "Big" fleet, which in July 1914 totaled 8 squadrons of battleships and 11 cruiser squadrons - in total, together with small vessels, 460 pennants. On July 15, 1914, an experimental mobilization was announced for this fleet, which ended with maneuvers and a royal review on July 20 at the Spitgad roadstead. In connection with the Austrian ultimatum, the demobilization of the fleet was suspended, and then on July 28 the fleet received orders to move from Portland to Scapa Flow (Strait) near Orkney off the northern coast of Scotland.

    At the same time, the German High Seas Fleet was cruising in Norwegian waters, from where it was returned on July 27-28 to the coast of Germany. The English fleet went from Portland to the north of Scotland not along the usual route - west of the island, but along the east coast of England. Both fleets passed in the North Sea in opposite directions.

    By the beginning of the war, the English Grand Fleet was located in two groups: in the far north of Scotland and in the English Channel near Portland.

    In the Mediterranean Sea, according to the Anglo-French agreement, Entente naval dominance was entrusted to the French fleet, which, as part of its best units, was concentrated near Toulon. His responsibility was to provide communications with North Africa. Off the island of Malta was an English cruiser squadron.

    British cruisers also carried the service of protecting sea routes in Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Australia, and, in addition, significant cruising forces were in the western Pacific Ocean.

    In the English Channel, in addition to the second English fleet, a light squadron of French cruisers was concentrated near Cherbourg; it consisted of armored cruisers supported by a flotilla of minecraft and submarines. This squadron guarded the southwestern approaches to the English Channel. IN pacific ocean Indochina had 3 light French cruisers.

    The Russian fleet was divided into three parts.

    The Baltic Fleet, immensely inferior in strength to the enemy, was forced to take an exclusively defensive course of action, trying at the Revel-Porkallaud line to delay, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy fleet and landing into the depths of the Gulf of Finland. In order to strengthen themselves and even out the chances of a battle, the equipment in this area of ​​\u200b\u200ba fortified mine position was planned, by the time the war began, far from being completed (or rather, had just begun). On the flanks of this so-called central position, on both sides of the bay, on the islands of Makilota and Nargen, batteries of large-caliber long-range guns were installed, and minefields were placed in several lines throughout the entire position.

    The Black Sea Fleet remained in the Sevastopol roadstead and was inactive, unable even to properly lay minefields at the entrance to the Bosphorus. However, one cannot fail to take into account the entire difficulty of the position of the Black Sea Fleet, not only in relation to the insufficiency of combat forces, but also in the sense of the absence of other operational bases, except for Sevastopol. It was very difficult to base on Sevastopol to observe the Bosphorus, and operations to block the enemy's entry into the Black Sea under these conditions were completely unsecured.

    The Far Eastern squadron - from its composition 2 light cruisers ("Askold" and "Zhemchug") tried to cruise off the southeastern coast of Asia.

    The German High Seas Fleet consisted of 3 squadrons of battleships, a cruiser squadron and a fighter flotilla. After cruising off the coast of Norway, this fleet returned to its shores, with 1 linear and cruising squadrons stationed at Wilhelmshafen in the roadstead, under the cover of the batteries of the island of Helgoland, and 2 other linear squadrons and a flotilla of fighters - off Kiel in the Baltic Sea. By this time, the Kiel Canal had been deepened for the passage of dreadnoughts, and thus the squadrons from Kiel could join the squadrons of the North Sea if necessary. In addition to the aforementioned High Seas Fleet, along the coast of Germany there was a defensive fleet of large strength, but from already obsolete ships. The German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" skillfully slipped past the English and French cruisers into the Black Sea, which later caused enough trouble to the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the coast. In the Pacific, German ships were part of their base - Qingdao, near Kiao-chao, and Admiral Spee's light squadron of 6 new cruisers was cruising near the Caroline Islands.

    The Austro-Hungarian fleet was concentrated on the raids of Paul and Catarro in the Adriatic Sea and was hiding behind the coastal batteries from the cruisers and minecraft of the Entente.

    Comparing the naval forces of both coalitions, the following can be noted:

    1. The forces of England alone outnumbered the strength of the entire fleet of the Central Powers.

    2. Most of the naval forces were concentrated in the European seas.

    3. The English and French fleets had every opportunity to act together.

    4. The German fleet could get freedom of action only after a successful battle in the North Sea, which it would have to give in the most unfavorable balance of forces, i.e. in fact, the German surface fleet was locked in its territorial waters, having the opportunity to undertake offensive operations only against the Russian Baltic Fleet.

    5. The naval forces of the Entente were the actual masters of all water spaces, with the exception of the Baltic and Black Seas, where the Central Powers had a chance of success - in the Baltic Sea in the struggle of the German fleet with the Russian and in the Black - in the struggle Turkish fleet with Russian.

     The table is taken from Wilson's book "Ships of the Line in Battle"

    August 11, 1914 Turkey let the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" through the straits to Constantinople, which were soon bought by the Turks. The receipt by the Turkish fleet of this reinforcement from Germany changed the entire strategic situation in the Black Sea: the presence of the Goeben more than doubled the strength of the Turkish fleet. "Goeben" was one of the newest battlecruisers, having no rivals among the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Due to its high speed (27 knots), it was practically invulnerable to obsolete battleships (which had a speed of 16 knots); the power of his artillery exceeded that of the two Evstafievs (the battleship of the Black Sea Fleet). Only the entry into service of dreadnoughts restored the situation, but the new ships of the Black Sea Fleet could enter service only a year later.

    warships of the world

    Edition of the almanac “Ships and battles”

    St. Petersburg 1997

    warships of the world

    On pages 1-4 of the cover there are photographs of light cruisers: “Munich” (1st page), “Bremen” 1906 (2nd page), “Magdeburg” (3rd page) and “Hamburg” (4- i p).

    Scientific - popular publication

    Those. editor S. N. Rednikov

    Lit. editor E. V. Vladimirova

    Proofreader S. V. Subbotina

    Development of German light cruisers of the First World War period

    At the end of the 19th century, Germany challenged England, which had been the strongest maritime power for two hundred years. To counter the British fleet, a powerful battle fleet was needed. But the battle fleet without reconnaissance is blind, and therefore the need arose for high-speed reconnaissance cruisers. In addition, Germany had already managed to acquire remote colonies, and cruisers were also needed to serve in them. But Germany did not have suitable ships for these purposes. There were either giant armored cruisers of the Hertha type, or weakly armed and poorly protected avisos.

    Thus, a new difficult task arose before the creators of the German fleet. Unlike Britain, where two types of cruisers developed in parallel

    - cruisers for servicing the squadron

    - Scouts and cruisers for service in the colonies in Germany decided to follow the path of creating a universal cruiser. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, it turned out to be economically profitable to focus on the development of one type of cruisers, and secondly, German officers and designers were well aware of the shortcomings of reconnaissance cruisers.

    Light cruiser "Kenigsberg"

    The ancestor of the Scouts was considered the Russian cruiser Novik, which was built in Germany. German experts considered this ship to be weak in combat, which was not compensated even by high speed. The first series of German universal cruisers were the Gazelle-class cruisers. They were followed by several more constantly improving series. Very soon, water-tube boilers and turbines appeared on cruisers. The improvement of turbines, the reduction in steam and fuel consumption made it possible to achieve a long cruising range and high speed, which increased over the period 1908-1912. from 25 to 28 knots.

    Another major technical improvement that was introduced on these ships is the transition to liquid fuel. Initially, oil was used as an additional fuel for coal-fired boilers, as well as for the operation of auxiliary boilers. Thanks to the use of liquid fuels, huge savings in weight and, as a result, an increase in interior space have been achieved.

    The armoring of ships also gradually improved. On cruisers of the "Magdeburg" type, an onboard belt appeared for the first time. True, in this respect the German cruisers were inferior to the British, but at the same time they had better horizontal protection.

    By the beginning of the First World War, the German cruisers had only one weak point - the artillery caliber, which was 105 mm, while the British cruisers were armed with 152 mm guns. The German admirals hoped that the smaller caliber could be compensated by the better combat training of the personnel, due to which it would be possible to achieve more hits and a higher rate of fire. The experience of the war showed that these calculations were not justified.

    For example, "Emden" in the battle near the Cocos Islands was the first to hit, but the multiple superiority of the cruiser "Sydney" in artillery did its job (side salvo "Sydney" - 295 kg, and "Emden" - 72 kg). The British retained an advantage in artillery on the newer cruisers as well. Thus, the weight of the Bristol volley, built in 1910, was 161 kg, and the Karlsruhe, built in 1912, was only 95 kg.

    After the first battles in Germany, they immediately developed a program for re-equipping cruisers with 150-mm guns. During the war, part of the obsolete German cruisers were withdrawn from the fleet, and by 1917 Admiral R. Scheer noted with satisfaction: "Both reconnaissance groups of light cruisers now consisted of approximately equivalent high-speed and modern ships." But it was already too late. Well-armed light cruisers did not have time to do anything remarkable.

    After the war, the famous German specialist Professor Evers assessed the experience of using German light cruisers in combat as follows: “Obsolete ships of this type, armored only in the underwater part, turned out to be little protected even from hits by medium and small artillery shells. In many cases, the surface part of the ship turned out to be completely destroyed by the explosion of shells, shrapnel impacts.Fires partially disabled the guns, making it impossible to maintain them.Often, the fire destroyed the shells lying ready for firing near the guns.The underwater part of the ships, on the contrary, thanks to the armor was well protected from shells.

    Thus, the light cruiser Leipzig, during a five-hour battle near the Falkland Islands, received, in addition to countless hits from 102-mm guns, at least 40 hits from 152-mm guns from the armored cruisers Cornwell and Kent. The shells caused heavy destruction and fires in the surface of the ship, but probably penetrated the armored deck only once. While the heavily armored (100 mm) conning towers proved to be quite reliable, the armored shields of the guns could not protect the servants from heavy losses, mainly due to the action of shrapnel. The newer cruisers, whose waterline and surface were covered with 50-75 mm armor, showed greater endurance, withstanding heavy fire from medium-caliber guns at close range, as was the case during the night phase of the Battle of Jutland.

    During the First World War (1914-1918), the enemy of the Russian Empire in the Black Sea was the German-Turkish fleet. And although the Young Turk government for a long time doubted with whom to fight and with whom to be friends and adhered to neutrality. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and intelligence, closely watched the internal political events in Turkey: the Minister of War Enver Pasha and the Minister of the Interior Talaat Pasha advocated an alliance with the German Empire, and the Minister of Marine, the head of the Istanbul garrison, Jemal Pasha, for cooperation with France. They informed the commander of the Black Sea Fleet A. A. Eberhard about the state of the Turkish fleet and army, their preparations, so that he could correctly respond to the actions of a potential enemy.

    Admiral A. A. Ebergard.

    With the outbreak of war (on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia), the government instructed Admiral A. A. Eberhard to avoid aggressive actions that could provoke a war with the Ottoman Empire, strengthening the arguments of the Turkish “war party”. The Black Sea Fleet had the right to start hostilities only by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (he was Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (junior) from July 20, 1914 to August 23, 1915), or according to the Russian ambassador in Istanbul. Although the Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905) showed the fallacy of such a position, when the Japanese fleet suddenly attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron and temporarily paralyzed its activities, which allowed the Japanese to carry out an unhindered landing of land armies. The imperial government, 10 years later, "stepped on the same rake", the fleet commander was bound by the directive of the government, the instructions of the high military command and could not implement all measures to increase the combat readiness of the fleet, including the possibility of a preventive strike. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet, although it was significantly stronger than the Turkish naval forces, was forced to passively wait for an enemy attack.

    Balance of forces: Russian Black Sea Fleet and German-Turkish Fleet

    Before the war, the Black Sea Fleet, in all respects, had complete superiority over the enemy: in the number of pennants, in firepower, in combat training, in the training of officers and sailors. It consisted of: 6 battleships of the old type (the so-called battleships, or pre-dreadnoughts) - the flagship of the fleet "Evstafiy", "John Chrysostom" (built in 1904-1911), "Panteleimon" (the former infamous "Prince Potemkin -Tauride", 1898-1905 built), "Rostislav" (1894-1900 built), "Three Saints" (built in 1891-1895), "Sinop" (1883-1889 built); 2 Bogatyr-class cruisers, 17 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 4 submarines. The main base was Sevastopol, the fleet had its shipyards in Sevastopol and Nikolaev. 4 more powerful modern-style battleships (dreadnoughts) were built: "Empress Maria" (1911-July 1915), "Empress Catherine the Great" (1911-October 1915), "Emperor Alexander III" (1911-June 1917 .), "Emperor Nicholas I" (since 1914, unfinished due to a sharp deterioration in the political, financial and economic situation after the February Revolution of 1917). Also, already during the war, the Black Sea Fleet received - 9 destroyers, 2 air transport (prototypes of aircraft carriers), 10 submarines.

    At the beginning of 1914, the exit of the Turkish fleet from the Bosphorus to fight the Russian fleet seemed like a fantasy. The Ottoman Empire had been in decline for almost two centuries, and by the 20th century, the processes of decomposition only intensified. Turkey lost three wars to Russia in the 19th century (1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1877-1878), turned out to be the winner in the Crimean War (1853-1856), but only due to an alliance with England and France ; already in the 20th century it was defeated by Italy in the war for Tripolitania (1911-1912), and in the Balkan war (1912-1913). Russia was among the top five world leaders (Great Britain, Germany, USA, France, Russia). By the beginning of the century, the Turkish navy was a pitiful sight - a bunch of obsolete ships. One of the main reasons for this is the complete bankruptcy of Turkey, there was no money in the treasury. The Turks had only a few more or less combat-ready ships: 2 armored cruisers Medzhidie (built in the USA in 1903) and Hamidiye (England 1904), 2 squadron battleships Torgut Reis and Hayreddin Barbarossa (battleships of the Brandenburg class, bought in Germany in 1910), 4 French-built destroyers (1907 of the Durendal type), 4 German-built destroyers (purchased in Germany in 1910, type "S 165"). Distinctive feature Turkish naval forces had an almost complete lack of combat training.

    It cannot be said that the Turkish government did not try to change the situation in its favor: in 1908, a grand fleet renewal program was adopted, it was decided to purchase 6 new-style battleships, 12 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines and a number of auxiliary vessels. But the war with Italy, two Balkan wars devastated the treasury, orders were disrupted. Turkey ordered more ships in France and England (interestingly, Russia's allies in the Entente, but they built ships for Turkey, a potential enemy of Russia in the Black Sea), so a battleship, 4 destroyers and 2 submarines were built in England. This replenishment could seriously change the balance of power in favor of the Ottoman Empire, but as soon as the war began, England confiscated the ships in favor of its fleet. Only the arrival from the Mediterranean Sea on August 10, 1914 of the two newest German cruisers: the heavy Goeben (called the Sultan Selim) and the light Breslau (Midilli), they became part of the Turkish fleet along with the crews, allowed Turkey to lead fighting in the Black Sea basin. The commander of the German Mediterranean Division, Rear Admiral V. Souchon, led the combined German-Turkish forces. The Goeben was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the Russian battleships would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, the Goeben left, using its high speed.

    Side Plans

    The main goal of the Black Sea Fleet was complete dominance in the Black Sea in order to reliably protect strategically important objects near the sea, cover the flank of the Caucasian army, and ensure the transfer of troops and supplies by sea. At the same time, disrupt Turkish shipping along its Black Sea coast. When the Turkish fleet appeared at Sevastopol, the Russian fleet was supposed to destroy it. In addition, if necessary, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing to carry out the Bosphorus operation - to capture the Bosphorus Strait, by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and landing units. But after the appearance of German cruisers in Turkey, the plans of the Russian command were confused, Admiral Souchon was not going to engage in battle with the main forces of the Russian fleet, but, using his speed, delivered pinpoint strikes and left before the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet approached.

    German cruiser Goeben

    In 1915, when the newest battleships of the "Empress Maria" type entered the fleet, the task was set before the fleet by all means to disrupt the supply of coal and other supplies to the Bosporus region and to provide assistance to the troops of the Caucasian Front. For this purpose, 3 ship groups were created, each of which was more powerful than the German cruiser Goeben. They had to, changing each other, constantly be on the Turkish coast and thereby fulfill the main task of the fleet.

    The strategic intent of the commander of the combined German-Turkish fleet, Rear Admiral Souchon, was to deliver a surprise attack almost simultaneously on the main base of the Russian fleet of Sevastopol, the ports of Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. To sink or seriously damage the warships and merchant ships located there, as well as the most significant military and industrial installations on the coast and, thereby weakening the Russian Black Sea Fleet, to achieve the possibility of complete superiority at sea. Thus, the German admiral planned to repeat the experience of the Japanese in 1904. But despite the success of the operation, the Russian fleet did not suffer serious losses, Souchon simply did not have enough firepower. If the Turkish fleet had been more powerful, the Black Sea Fleet could have received a severe blow, which would have sharply worsened the position of the Russian Caucasian Army and disrupted Black Sea communications.

    The beginning of hostilities: "Sevastopol wake-up call"

    Vice Admiral A. A. Ebergard received news of the departure of the German-Turkish squadron from the Bosporus on October 27. He took the Black Sea Fleet out to sea, and waited all day on the approaches to Sevastopol in the hope of meeting the enemy. But on the 28th, the headquarters of the fleet received an order from the High Command "not to seek a meeting with the Turkish fleet and engage in battle with it only in case of emergency." The Black Sea Fleet returned to the base and did not take any more active actions. Admiral A. A. Ebergard, although he acted on orders from above, but this does not relieve him of guilt for passivity, I think Admiral S. O. Makarov would not reckon with ranks if it was about the honor of the Russian fleet.

    Of course, the fleet command took action to prevent a sudden attack by the Turkish fleet. Reconnaissance was carried out, three destroyers were on patrol on the approaches to Sevastopol, the main forces of the fleet were in the base in full readiness. But all this was not enough. The command did not make any orders to prepare the forces of the fleet, including the Sevastopol fortress, to repel an enemy attack. The head of the security raids wanted to turn on the minefield, but A.A. Ebergard forbade this, as he was expecting the approach of the Prut mine layer. But the head of the raid nevertheless warned the artillery commander of the fortress about the possible arrival of an enemy squadron. And the coastal artillery more or less completed its task.

    As a result, the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task - it could not protect the Russian coast, missed the enemy fleet, which calmly went to the Bosphorus. On October 29-30, the German-Turkish fleet launched an artillery strike on Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia, Novorossiysk. This event was called - "Sevastopol wake-up". In Odessa, the destroyers Muavenet-i Millet and Gayret-i-Vataniye sank the gunboat Donets and shelled the city and port. The battle cruiser "Goeben" approached Sevastopol and for 15 minutes walked freely through our minefield, without opposition, shelling the city, port and ships that were on the outer roadstead. The electrical circuit of the minefield was turned off, and no one turned it on without orders. The Konstantinovskaya battery was silent, waiting for the German cruiser to enter the targeted square, but opening fire immediately hit the target three times. "Goeben" immediately gave full speed and retired to the sea. On the way back, he met the minelayer "Prut", who was waiting in Sevastopol with a full load of mines. Trying to save the Prut, three old destroyers on patrol (Lieutenant Pushchin, Zharky and Zhivuchy) went on the attack on the Goeben. They did not have a single chance of success, but the "Goeben" could not drown them, "dispersed in peace." Gunners "Goeben" easily beat off this attack. The commander of the mine layer, Captain 2nd Rank G. A. Bykov, flooded the ship, which is interesting, “Goeben” fired at it - 1 hour 5 minutes, at a practically unarmed ship. But it was a success, because the "Prut" was carrying most of the naval naval mines. The Breslau cruiser laid mines in the Kerch Strait, which blew up and sank the Yalta and Kazbek steamships. This is the great fault of the commander and his staff, especially the Supreme Commander, who, with his instructions, tied up the initiative of A. A. Ebergard. But in the end, the German-Turkish plan still did not work: the forces of the first strike were too dispersed, and there was not enough firepower.

    Thus Türkiye entered the First World War and the last war with Russia. On the same day, Russian ships began to march to the shores of the enemy. The fire of the cruiser "Kagul" destroyed huge coal storages in Zonguldak, and the battleship "Panteleimon" and destroyers sank three laden military transports. The Turks were amazed by such activity of the Russian fleet, they miscalculated, thinking to themselves that they had gained time, the Black Sea Fleet was alive and active.

    Fighting began on the Black Sea unexpectedly for the Russian Empire. The Black Sea Fleet was taken by surprise, and only the lack of sufficient firepower, the dispersion of forces, prevented the German-Turkish fleet from becoming the master of the sea. The main reasons for this are the fear of the high command itself to provoke a war with the Ottoman Empire and the lack of initiative of the command of the Black Sea Fleet.

    But as history has shown, for Russia, the war very often begins unexpectedly, but the Russians very quickly "enter" the process and intercept the strategic initiative from the enemy. The Black Sea Fleet did not take a “breather”, but immediately answered: on November 4-7, under the cover of battleships, destroyers lay mines (in total, during the war years, the Black Sea Fleet installed 13 thousand mines) near the Bosphorus, the battleship Rostislav, the cruiser Cahul and 6 destroyers fired at Zunguldak, destroying coal storage, 2 Turkish transports. On the way back, the squadron sank 3 Turkish minesweepers, more than 200 people were taken prisoner. On November 15-18, the Russian squadron goes out to search for enemy ships, shells Trebizond and meets the German cruiser Goeben on the way back.

    Battle at Cape Sarych (November 18, according to Art. S. 5th)

    The remoteness of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, from the Bosphorus did not allow the establishment of a permanent blockade of the Turkish fleet. The Russian squadron was forced to periodically return for repairs and rest. Since the "Goeben" was superior to any Russian battleship in firepower and speed, the Russian command had to keep the main forces together. The headquarters of the fleet believed that the German cruiser could move at a speed of 29 knots, but in reality, due to the impossibility of high-quality repairs in Turkey, the speed of the Goeben did not exceed 24 knots. For example: the flagship of the Russian squadron "Evstafiy" could go at a maximum speed of 16 knots, the cruiser "Cahul" - 23 knots. But the Russian squadron had one interesting novelty - before the war, the firing of a formation of ships at one target was worked out.

    On November 17, Goeben and Breslau went to sea in order to intercept Russian ships and, if the outcome was favorable, attack. On the same day, Admiral A. A. Ebergard received a message from the Naval General Staff about the Germans going to sea. But the lack of coal did not allow the search to begin and, increasing vigilance, the squadron moved to the Crimea. The collision took place on the 18th, about 45 miles from Cape Khersones, near Cape Sarych. At 11.40 an enemy ship noticed the Almaz cruiser, which was in reconnaissance, at the same time a radio intercept was made. Russian ships reduced the intervals between themselves, the destroyers pulled up to the main forces. Then the Almaz, which was in reconnaissance, and the cruisers Cahul, Memory of Mercury, were recalled.

    cruiser "Diamond"

    Due to heavy fog and smoke, which was walking ahead of the flagship, the battle was reduced to a shootout between "Goeben" and "Evstafiya" (captain of the 1st rank V. I. Galanin). Senior artilleryman V. M. Smirnov, who directed the fire of the brigade of battleships (he was on the "John Chrysostom"), could not accurately determine the distance to the enemy ship, so the shells from the other battleships flew with a flight. The battle lasted only 14 minutes, Russian ships (from 34-40 cables, 6-7 km) fired 30 shells of the main caliber. The Russian gunners "Evstafiya" hit the target from the very first salvo, the 12-inch "hotel" breaking through the 150-mm armor of the German, caused a fire in the aft casemate of the left side. It was a success, usually even good gunners (like the Germans) hit from the 3rd volley. The Goeben changed course and returned fire. Soon the Germans realized that the Russians had taken into account the bloody lesson of Tsushima, in 14 minutes of the battle the Goeben received 14 hits, including 3 and 305 mm shells. He took advantage of his superiority in speed and, while the other Russian battleships did not take aim, went into the fog. The duel with the outdated Russian hero did not cost the Germans cheaply - the total losses were from 112 to 172 people (according to various sources). But the "Evstafiy" also suffered losses, out of 19 280 mm shells fired by the German cruiser, four (4) hit the Russian battleship. The flagship lost 58 people (33 dead, 25 wounded).

    What conclusions could be drawn after this fleeting battle? Firstly, a brigade of old battleships could well withstand a new type of battleship (dreadnought). One battleship will be defeated, but in combination they represent a formidable force if the crews are well trained, which was confirmed by the battle on May 10, 1915. Secondly, the battle showed the good training of the Russian gunners, but the mediocre high command of the squadron - A. A. Ebergard could not organize a combined attack of his forces.

    13 (26) December "Goeben" was blown up by 2 mines near the Bosphorus Strait, the area of ​​​​the hole on the left side was 64 square meters. meters, and the right - 50 square meters. meters, "drank water" from 600 to 2000 tons. For repairs, specialists from Germany had to be called in, restoration work was basically completed by April 1915.
    At the very end of 1914, 5 German submarines ("UB 7", "UB 8", "UB 13", "UB 14" and "UB 15") crossed into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, and this complicated the situation.

    1915

    Consistently, the Black Sea Fleet got rid of shortcomings. For reconnaissance of Turkish routes, destroyers, hydroaviation began to be used, the effectiveness of the actions of agents was increased. But still, the absence of a base in the southwestern part of the sea did not allow for a complete blockade of the Turkish forces. From the beginning of January to the end of March 1915, the Russian squadron made 9 campaigns to the enemy shores, artillery strikes were made on Zunguldak and Trebizond. Dozens of steamships, sailing ships with military cargoes were sunk. Russian submarines began to patrol the area of ​​the Bosphorus. The Batumi detachment of destroyers was created - the 5th division ("Enviable", "Treasured", "Sounding" and "Sharp-sighted"). On March 28, the Black Sea Squadron for the first time fired and bombed (Nicholas I hydroair transport with 5 seaplanes) on the fortifications of the Bosphorus. Ports in the region of Kozlu, Eregli, Zunguldak were also fired upon.

    The plan of the Odessa operation and its failure

    Admiral V. Souchon decided to take advantage of the fact that the Goeben was largely restored and strike back - at Odessa. Why choose Odessa? It was in Odessa that the Russian landing force could concentrate to capture the Bosphorus, therefore, by destroying the transports, Souchon thwarted the plans of the Russian command and at the same time showed that the Turkish fleet was alive and combat-ready. The Ottoman Empire at that moment could have been defeated due to an attack from 3 directions: on February 18, the Anglo-French fleet attacked the Dardanelles, the Dardanelles operation began; the Russian fleet bombards the Bosporus and prepares a landing army in Odessa, and the capture of Constantinople-Istanbul by the Russians has been a nightmare for the Turks in recent decades. And at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, Russian troops destroyed the 3rd Turkish army near Sarykamysh, the path to Anatolia was open. And here there is an opportunity to eliminate the threat from one direction. The operation plan was quite simple: "Goeben" and "Breslau" cover the attack forces from Sevastopol, the cruiser "Medzhidie" and "Hamidie" with 4 destroyers at that time shelled Odessa, destroying the landing transports. The plan of the Turks was doomed to success. However, the case was spoiled by Russian minefields. The Russian Empire at that time was the world leader in the field of mine weapons. The Turks and Germans clearly underestimated the mine danger. For which they paid.

    The commander of the operation was the German captain of the Medzhidie cruiser - Byuksel. On April 1, the Turkish detachment left the Bosphorus, on the night of the 3rd it was in the Odessa region. The detachment somewhat lost its course at night and came ashore about 15 miles east of the intended point. Byuksel changed course and moved west towards Odessa. He planned to start shelling from the north, then shifting to the south and southeast to continue shelling. Ahead were destroyers with trawls to search for mines. Behind them exactly in the wake of the cruiser. Suddenly, at 6.40, the Medjidie was blown up, the explosion occurred on the port side, the cruiser began to sink quickly with a roll to the port side. He did not drown completely, the depth was too shallow. The Turks threw out the shutters of the guns, destroyed the radio, the destroyers removed the crew. At 7.20 one of the destroyers torpedoed the cruiser in order to completely flood it. The Turkish detachment retreated. The Russian fleet left Sevastopol and attacked the German cruisers, who did not accept the battle and disappeared. Interestingly, the enemy was discovered for the first time with the help of seaplanes.

    On June 8, 1915, the Medzhidie was raised, in Odessa they carried out an initial repair, then a major overhaul in Nikolaev, it was re-equipped and a year later, in June 1916, it became part of the Black Sea Fleet as the Prut. As part of the fleet, he participated in several operations, in May 1918 he was captured by the Germans, transferred to the Turks, and there, thanks to Russian repairs, he was in the service of the Turkish fleet right up to 1947.

    Plan of the Bosphorus operation

    After Crimean War(1853-1856) in the Russian Empire planned various options for waging war with the Ottoman Empire. After Russian-Turkish war 1877-1877 it became finally clear that only ground forces can win only at the cost of heavy losses, resource costs and loss of time. Too much distance from the Danube and the Caucasus to Istanbul, moreover, protected by strong fortresses.

    Therefore, with the revival of the Black Sea Fleet, the idea of ​​​​conducting the Bosphorus operation arose. With its help, it was possible to decapitate the old enemy with one blow and realize the age-old Russian dream - to return the ancient Tsargrad-Constantinople to the bosom of the Orthodox world. To implement this plan, a powerful armored fleet was needed, an order of magnitude stronger than the Turkish naval forces. The fleet has been built since 1883, battleships of the Empress Catherine the Great type were laid down, a total of 4 ships were built (Chesma, Sinop, George the Victorious), and two of them participated in the First World War - Sinop and George Victorious." In addition, the destroyer fleet and the Volunteer fleet (for the transport of troops) were intensively developed. In the event of a war, these battleships would be quite enough to eliminate the Turkish fleet. They were built to perform two tasks: 1) squadron combat; and 2) destruction of coastal fortifications, suppression of enemy batteries.

    But the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War pushed those plans aside. The task of reviving the fleet came to the fore. But until the appearance of the "Goeben" with the "Breslau" in Turkey, theoretically the Black Sea Fleet could carry out this operation, there were enough forces.

    After the allies launched the Dardanelles operation, the Russian fleet systematically carried out demonstrative actions against the Bosporus. If the British were successful in the Dardanelles, the Black Sea Fleet should have taken the Bosporus. Russian troops were drawn to Odessa, a demonstrative loading was carried out on transports. Eager activity created the appearance of preparing a large-scale landing operation. Although before the commissioning of new battleships, it would hardly have brought success. And the German offensive of 1915 did not allow the allocation of large forces for the operation.

    A real opportunity appeared only in 1916: the Caucasian Front carried out a successful Erzurum operation, the Southwestern Front successfully defeated the Austro-Hungarians, German troops tried to defeat the Anglo-French armies in the West. The Russian command had reserves for the operation. 2 newest battleships were put into operation, this neutralized the Goeben. The operation was planned to begin in 1917, but the February Revolution threw the empire into the abyss of anarchy and civil war. The dream of Russian Slavophiles never became a geopolitical reality - Tsargrad did not become the third capital of the Russian Empire.

    From March 28 to May 10, the Russian fleet fired on the Bosphorus 4 times. At the same time, 2 battleships fired at coastal fortifications, 3 covered from the sea. On May 10, Goeben attacked ships under cover (Evstafiy, John Chrysostom and Rostislav). Neither side was successful when the 4th Russian battleship Panteleimon entered the battle and immediately made three hits with 305-mm shells, the Goeben was not badly damaged, but realizing that superiority was on the side of the enemy, he left. The shootout itself lasted only 23 minutes.

    On September 3, Bulgaria took the side of Germany. In September 1915, when 2 new battleships of the Dreadnought type entered the Black Sea Fleet, 3 brigades of ships were created, each more powerful than the Goeben. 1st in the composition: dreadnought "Empress Maria" and cruiser "Cahul". 2nd in the composition: dreadnought "Empress Catherine the Great" and cruiser "Memory of Mercury". 3rd in the composition: battleships "Evstafiy", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon". The battleships "Three Saints" and "Rostislav" made up a combat-ready reserve. Organizationally, the dreadnoughts "Empress Maria", "Empress Catherine the Great" and cruisers of the "Cahul" type were consolidated into the 1st brigade of the fleet, and the battleships "Evstafiy", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon" - into the 2nd brigade of battleships of the Black Sea fleet.

    In general, since that time, the Russian fleet has received complete superiority, it has constantly shelled the enemy coast. With the advent of new submarines in the fleet, including the Crab-type minelayer, it became possible to cross enemy communications with the help of them. At the beginning, the submarines used the positional method - they took a position and were on duty, waiting for an enemy ship. From the summer of 1915, the cruising method was used, when the boat patrolled in a certain area, replacing each other in turn. The novelty of the Russian fleet was the interaction of submarines and destroyers. This method justified itself, increased the effectiveness of the blockade of the Bosphorus and the coal districts in Turkey. Aerial reconnaissance also developed rapidly, Russian naval pilots were among the world leaders in this field.

    1916

    In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet consolidated its superiority and almost completely controlled the sea. Three brigades of battleships were formed, destroyer forces were actively operating, submarine forces and naval aviation were increasing their combat experience. Conditions were created for the Bosphorus operation.

    In 1916, evil fate threw up several unpleasant "surprises": on August 14 (27) Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, but since its armed forces were of very dubious combat effectiveness, they had to be strengthened by Russian troops, the Black Sea Fleet also assisted sides of the Balkan coast and the Danube. The submarine threat to the fleet increased, the German submarine forces in the Black Sea grew to 10 submarines. The Black Sea Fleet did not have anti-submarine protection, so it had to be created on the outskirts of Sevastopol.

    In 1916, the fleet simultaneously performed several important tasks:
    1) continued to block the Bosphorus Strait;
    2) regularly supported the right flank of the advancing Caucasian front;
    3) assisted the troops of Romania and the Russian units stationed there;
    4) continued to disrupt enemy sea communications;
    5) protect their bases and communications from enemy submarine forces, his cruising raids.

    The main link was considered the blockade of the strait, which was of great military and strategic importance. Using the mine experience of the Baltic Fleet, it was decided to close the Bosphorus with mines. From July 30 to August 10, a minefield operation was carried out, 4 barriers were set up, in total about 900 mines. Until the end of the year, 8 more mine installations were made, with the task of strengthening the main barrier and blocking coastal waters - to interfere with small ships and submarines. In total, 14 mine chains (about 2200 mines) were delivered during the war. To protect the minefields from minesweepers, a patrol of destroyers and submarines was established; from the end of summer, mainly submarine forces were on duty. In the minefields, the enemy lost several warships, submarines, 10 transport steam and sailing ships. The mine blockade disrupted Turkish shipping, the Ottoman capital began to experience difficulties in supplying food and fuel. But a complete blockade of the Bosphorus was still not achieved.

    Assistance to the actions of the Caucasian Front was of a large-scale nature, it was constant and played an important role in carrying out offensive operations, for example Trebizudskaya. The fleet supported the ground forces with artillery, landed diverting assault forces, sabotage detachments, covered them from a possible strike from the sea, and supplied supplies and reinforcements. Transportation of troops and supplies was carried out by a special transport flotilla (in 1916 - 90 ships).

    So at the beginning of 1916, the Batumi detachment of destroyers was reinforced, with 2 gunboats ("Donets", Kubanets"), 2 destroyers ("Strict" and "Swift"). To help in the Erzurum operation, the battleship " Rostislav" and destroyers "Lieutenant Pushchin", "Zhivoy".

    Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet

    The Russian Empire was one of the world leaders in the theory of the use of aircraft at sea and the construction of seaplanes. Back in 1910, the famous Russian test pilot L. M. Matsievich wrote about the importance of using aircraft in maritime affairs and the construction of seaplanes. In 1911-1912. he was supported by the inventor D. P. Grigorovich. Work on hydroaviation in Russia kept pace with other leaders in the field of aircraft construction: the first French seaplane by A. Faber in 1910; American plane G. Curtis; and the Russian Gakkel-V in 1911.

    After the plane of Ya. M. Gakkel, in 1912, the planes of I. I. Sikorsky were created. However, the Naval Ministry did not support the good initiative of Russian inventors in 1911-1913. seaplanes of American and French brands were purchased.

    Since 1913, a wider construction of domestic seaplanes has been developed. The main role in that matter belonged to Russian designers, and not to the state. They were able to quickly create projects for naval aircraft that surpassed foreign ones and soon forced them out of Russian naval aviation. These devotees are Grigorovich, Willish, Engels, Sedelnikov, Friede, Shishmarev, as well as the design bureau of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works and the Aviation Test Station. Up to 15% of aircraft produced in Russia were for water purposes, this was not the case anywhere in the world.

    At the beginning of the war, there were 8 seaplanes on the Black Sea, based on the Curtis type. The head of the Fleet Communications Service was Senior Lieutenant Stakhovsky. Aircraft were based at the station of the 1st category in Sevastopol (Kilen Bay), stations of the 1st category were built in Ovidiopol, Ak-mosque; stations of the 2nd category - Zolokarakh and Klerovka. Before the war, 3 and then 24 observation posts were created, from the Danube to Batum. This made it possible to quickly transfer aircraft along the entire Russian coast of the Black Sea. At the end of 1914, hangars from Ovidiopol and the Ak-mosque began to be transferred to the Round Bay in Sevastopol, and in May 1915 an aviation station was opened.

    From August to the end of October 1914 (before the start of the war with the Ottoman Empire), they managed to complete the deployment of air units, train personnel, and develop some tactics. It became clear that aircraft could be used to detect naval mines and enemy submarines.

    With the outbreak of war in the Black Sea Fleet, two steamships were rebuilt into aircraft "wombs": "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Alexander I"; then the hydro cruiser "Romania" joined them. They could carry 6-8 aircraft. In addition, a 1-n hydroplane was placed on the Almaz cruiser.

    The first experience of using naval aviation took place on March 24, 1915: the Russian squadron made a trip to Rumelia (a region of Turkey in Europe), the squadron included Nicholas I with 4 aircraft. They planned to use them for aerial reconnaissance, but then they were used for a bombing attack on coastal targets. This was the first experience of the operation of Russian naval aviation off enemy shores. On March 27, 1915, a squadron with the participation of already 2 air transports (cruiser Almaz, Nikolay), the aircraft reconnoitered the strait and found that capital ships no, they dropped 3 bombs on coastal fortifications and a destroyer.

    By April 1915, the squadron grew to 18 aircraft, in April 5 FBA seaplanes arrived, from May the old Curtis aircraft began to be replaced by designer D. P. Grigorovich's M-5 seaplanes.

    On May 3, Russian seaplanes made the 1st raid on the capital of the Ottomans - Istanbul. These actions showed that aviation was beginning to play an important role not only for reconnaissance, but also for attacking operations. By the end of the year, combat training and the interaction of aircraft and ship crews were being improved. In October 1915, the Russian squadron made a trip to the coast of Bulgaria, Varna, Evksinograd were fired on, and on the 25th an air raid was made.

    On January 1, 1916, the Black Sea Squadron had: 30 officers, 371 other personnel, 30 aircraft, 2 air transport and the Almaz cruiser. At the end of the year, another Romanian air transport entered service. The Black Sea detachment consisted of the 1st and 2nd ship detachments (on the "Nikolai" and "Alexander" - 13 pilots), the hydro-aviation detachment of the Caucasian Front (8 pilots), the training and combat unit in the Round Bay (5 pilots), the formation of a detachment of airships began .

    On January 8-15, exercises were held, aerial photography, reconnaissance, and bombing techniques were practiced. On January 24, the Russian squadron approached Zunguldak. The Zunguldak coal district was the second most important area of ​​influence of the Russian fleet (after the Bosphorus). Due to the underdevelopment of the railway network, coal was transported mainly by sea. Usually only ships attacked it, the pilots were tasked to bomb the ship, the port, power plant, and railway were secondary targets. Although the pilots were hindered by heavy clouds and anti-aircraft fire, they were able to drop 18 large and 20 small bombs, set fire to and drowned a 7000-ton steamer and several ships, destroyed the building of the railway junction, and set fire to several mines.

    A similar operation was carried out on August 25 against the Austro-German forces in Varna, but this time the enemy put up strong resistance, when the squadron left, it was attacked by enemy aircraft that dropped several dozen bombs.

    Another task for hydroaviation was to assist in large-scale landing operations. In April 1916, both air transports are involved in escorting a transport flotilla of 27 ships from Novorossiysk and Mariupol to the Rize region. Aircraft covered the landing troops from the air and carried out anti-submarine protection. A month later, "Alexander" participated in the landing at Trebizond. At the beginning of December 1916, the squadron included 45 M-5 seaplanes (reconnaissance, artillery fire spotter), 45 M-9 (heavy seaplane for bombing coastal targets and ships), 10 M-11 (the first in world (!) fighter seaplane) all Russian-made, designer D. P. Grigorovich.

    In the order for the fleet, the tasks of naval aviation were defined:
    1) attack of enemy ships, its bases and coastal fortifications;
    2) combating enemy air forces;
    3) anti-submarine warfare;
    4) surveillance and aerial reconnaissance;
    5) protection of the fleet at sea from enemy aircraft and its submarines;
    6) adjustment of the artillery fire of ships.

    By the beginning of 1917, the strength of naval aviation had grown to 110 aircraft; in the summer, 8 land fighters ("Nieuports") arrived. The Black Sea air division was formed - the 1st brigade included 4 ship detachments (then 6), the 2nd brigade included 13 land-based detachments. In March 1917, a grandiose operation to capture the Bosphorus was to begin, more than 150 seaplanes were supposed to support it from the air, but the death of the empire destroyed the plans for this operation. After the February Revolution, "Alexander" was renamed "Republican", and "Nikolai" in "Aviator". On May 24-27, the Aviator made its last trip to aerial photography and the bombardment of Sinop. Further activities of the naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet ended in connection with the outbreak of the Civil War, the pilots were scattered by fate on different sides of the front.

    The mystery of the death of the battleship "Empress Maria"

    The Russo-Japanese War revealed a number of significant shortcomings of the Russian fleet, the battleships were outdated. England is building a new battleship "Dreadnought", but Russian inventors are not inferior to the world's advanced developments. Russian shipbuilders built battleships ("dreadnoughts") according to the plan of I.G. Bubnov and A.N. Krylov, which in many respects surpassed the English prototype. In 1909, the ships Sevastopol, Gangut, Poltava and Petropavlovsk were laid down at the Baltic shipyards.

    ship of the line Empress Maria

    The linear placement of 12 305-mm guns, in three-gun turrets, made it possible to shoot from both sides simultaneously with all guns. The salvo weight of one of the first English battleships of the new type "Vengard" was 3003 kg, on the "Sevastopol" it reached 5650 kg. In one minute, the Russian battleship fired up to 11.5 tons of metal and explosives. The main armor belt was 225 mm thick. For the Black Sea Fleet in the Nikolaev shipyard in 1915-1917, according to the project "Emperor", the battleships "Empress Maria", "Emperor Alexander III" and "Catherine II" were built. The 4th dreadnought "Emperor Nicholas I" was laid down in 1915, but due to revolutionary events it was not completed.

    On June 25, 1915, the battleship "Empress Maria" left the port of Nikolaev and headed for Sevastopol under the protection of the squadron. This day has become a holiday for shipbuilders and for the entire Black Sea Fleet. On October 13-15, 1915, the battleship covered the actions of the 2nd battleship brigade in the Zunguldak region. 2-4, 6-8 November 1915 covered the 2nd brigade from the sea during the shelling of Varna and Evksinograd. From February 5 to April 18, he assisted the Trebizond operation. During the hostilities, it became clear that the battleships of the "Empress Maria" type justified the hopes placed on them. During the first year of service, the ship made 24 military campaigns, sank many Turkish ships.

    In the summer of 1916, by decision of the Supreme Commander (Emperor Nicholas) of the Russian Army, the Black Sea Fleet was headed by Vice Admiral Alexander Kolchak. The admiral made the "Empress Maria" the flagship of the fleet and systematically went to sea on it. Having laid a glorious initiative, in the autumn of 1916 the battleship was put in the Sevastopol raid for preventive maintenance. And this autumn became fatal for the "Empress Maria". The morning of October 7 (20), 1916 did not portend trouble, an ordinary day began. Over the North Bay, a wake-up call was given to the crews of the ships every day. On the battleship, everything went according to a certain routine. Suddenly, at 6.20 a powerful explosion shook the neighborhood, then 15 explosions lasting about another hour. Frightened Sevastopol residents ran out onto the embankment and witnessed a terrible picture. Standing on the roads in his native bay, the battleship "Empress Maria" was dying. The ship listed to starboard, capsized and sank. The wounded were located right on the shore and first aid was provided here. Black smoke hung over the city. By evening, the extent of the disaster became known: 225 sailors died, 85 were seriously injured, the most powerful ship of the Black Sea Fleet died.

    The tragedy shook the entire Russian Empire. The commission of the Naval Ministry, headed by a combat officer (participant in the defense of Port Arthur), member of the Admiralty Council, Admiral N. M. Yakovlev, took up the cause of the death of the ship. A well-known shipbuilder, one of the authors of the project of the Black Sea battleships, an associate of Admiral S. O. Makarov, academician A. N. Krylov, also became a member of the commission, who drew up a conclusion that was approved by all members of the commission.

    Three main versions of the death of the battleship were put forward:
    1. spontaneous combustion of gunpowder;
    2. negligence in handling fire or gunpowder;
    3. malicious intent.
    The commission leaned towards the second version (negligence), since the gunpowder was, in the opinion of all the gunners of the battleship, of high quality. As for malicious intent, even by establishing violations in the rules for access to artillery cellars and a lack of control over the workers who were on the ship. For example: the head of the ship's weapons, Prince Russov, pointed out that the hatch to the powder magazine was not locked at all and was not guarded. The commission considered this version unlikely. As a result, none of the hypotheses put forward by the commission found sufficient facts to confirm.

    Also, the Sevastopol Gendarme Directorate and the counterintelligence of the Main Headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, created at the initiative of the sailors at the end of 1915, were engaged in investigating the causes of the explosions. But they were also unable to reach true reason death of the flagship. Revolutionary events finally stopped the investigation.

    German trace: already in the Soviet period, it became clear that Germany was closely watching all the changes in the Russian fleet, including the new dreadnoughts. And in Germany, they understood how dangerous the operation "Tsargrad" (Bosphorus operation), where the battleships had to play a very important role. In 1933, during the investigation of sabotage at the Nikolaev shipyard, the Stalinist Chekists exposed the German intelligence network headed by V. E. Verman. The purpose of the organization was to disrupt the shipbuilding program of the military and merchant fleet of the USSR. The investigation revealed many interesting facts, rooted in pre-revolutionary period. Verman himself was an experienced reconnaissance officer (he was a senior electrical engineer), he began his career back in 1908, when a large-scale program for the restoration of the Russian fleet began. The network covered everything big cities Black Sea region Special attention it turned out to Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk. During interrogation, Wermann said that German intelligence was planning a sabotage on the battleship, and the saboteur Helmut von Stitthoff led the group. He was considered the best specialist in the field of mining and undermining ships. In the summer of 1916, Helmut von Stitthoff began working at the Nikolaev shipyard as an electrician. It was planned to blow up the battleship right at the shipyard. However, something went wrong, Stitthoff urgently turned off the operation and left for Germany. But the Verman group continued to work independently and did not curtail its activities, it had the opportunity to access the battleship. After an unsuccessful attempt to undermine the warship "Empress Maria" by Helmut von Stitthoff, the command was transferred to the next task. During this period, British intelligence (a certain Haviland) tried to recruit him.

    Helmut von Stiethoff

    In 1942, the honored German saboteur Helmut von Stitthoff was shot by the secret police (Gestapo). The trace leading to the unraveling of the death of the battleship "Empress Maria" was erased.

    1945 - Koenigsberg, a German archive was found in a destroyed house by Soviet soldiers. An album was found there, in which there was a whole series of photographs of the battleship "Empress Maria", one of the photographs depicts the moment of the explosion. It seems as if someone knew in advance the time and place of the sabotage and carefully filmed everything.

    English trace: on the night before the death of the giant, Commander Voronov was on duty at the main tower. His duties were: inspection and measurement of the temperature of the artillery cellar. This morning, Captain 2nd Rank Gorodyssky was also on combat duty on the ship. At dawn, Gorodyssky ordered his Voronov to measure the temperature in the cellar of the main tower. Voronov went down to the cellar and no one saw him again. And after a while the first explosion thundered. Voronov's body was never found among the bodies of the dead. The commission had suspicions about him, but there was no evidence and he was recorded as missing.

    But recently, new information has appeared: the English writer Robert Merid, who has long been involved in the mysterious death of the battleship, undertook his own investigation. And from it we learn very interesting (and shameful for the "ally" of the Russian Empire) information. The lieutenant of British naval intelligence served in Russia from 1914 to 1916, a week after the explosion he left Russia and arrived in England as a lieutenant colonel. After the end of the war, he retired and left the country. After some time, he appeared in Canada, bought an estate, began to equip it, lived the ordinary life of a rich gentleman. And in 1929 he died under strange circumstances: in the hotel where he spent the night there was a fire, everyone was saved (including a woman with a small child and a paralyzed old man in a wheelchair), and the military officer could not escape from the 2nd floor.

    This begs the question - who was disturbed by the colonel in the deep periphery of world processes, being retired. Research of photo archives led to unexpected results - British intelligence lieutenant colonel John Haviland and the gunner of the battleship "Empress Maria" Voronov are one and the same person. The same Voronov who disappeared on October 7, 1916 at the time of the explosion of the battleship Empress Maria. It is also interesting that shortly before his death, some Russian immigrants attempted on him, and among them was the former electrician of the battleship Empress Maria, Ivan Nazarin. Maybe they also got on the trail and tried to somehow avenge their ship!?

    To summarize, in any crime, motive and opportunity are important. German intelligence had both motive and opportunity. By destroying the battleship, they helped their ally (the Ottoman Empire), disrupted the Bosphorus operation, and dealt a heavy psychological blow to their main enemy. Yes, and there was a possibility: unfortunately, the Security Service was not developed in the Russian Empire, any agent of the German intelligence network (and more than one) could penetrate the battleship under construction, and since he could work there, he could carry the “hellish machine”. Anyone familiar with the realities of Soviet-Russian factories will confirm this: you can take something out or bring it in.

    The British Empire was an ally of Russia in that war, but from the course of history it is known that in it one of the first appeared a powerful reconnaissance and sabotage service, and Britain was an old enemy of the Russian Empire. The motive for the destruction of the battleship? The English elite thought with horror about the day when "Oleg's shield" would again be nailed to the gates of Constantinople. This would be the day of the collapse of the age-old machinations and intrigues of England against Russia. The Straits were not to be taken by the Russians at any cost. The possibilities of British intelligence in Russia were no worse than those of Germany, and besides, England often did its business by proxy. Perhaps the battleship was destroyed by the forces of the German intelligence network, but under the leadership of the British. Yes, and the cover is good, who is to blame (?) - the Germans!

    On the resignation of Admiral A. A. Eberhard (July 1916)

    In the summer of 1916, Admiral A. A. Ebergard was replaced by Admiral A. Kolchak. The reasons for this event are not the failures and mistakes of Eberhard, but rather a tribute to court circles and public opinion.

    Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak

    A. A. Eberhard did not listen to the opinion of the greats of this world, acting on the basis of the interests of the Black Sea Fleet, aroused their anger and Emperor Nicholas decided to compromise. Eberhard went into honorary exile in the Council of State, and was replaced by a young admiral who continued to do what the fleet had done before him.

    This story began from the very beginning of the war, when the German cruisers entered the straits (August 10, 1914), the Ottoman Empire was then a neutral country and did not have the right to let warships through the straits. A. A. Eberhard decided to go with the whole fleet to Istanbul and demand their access to the Mediterranean Sea, where the English squadron was waiting for them. In case of refusal, he wanted to attack them right on the raid, where their advantage in speed disappeared. This plan was Russian in spirit, in the best traditions of F. F. Ushakov and P. S. Nakhimov. But the government categorically forbade doing this, they still hoped that Turkey would not enter the war.

    Even when the German-Turkish fleet went to sea, obviously not for a walk, Eberhard was restrained by orders not to "provoke" the enemy. As a result, we received the “Sevastopol wake-up call”. But here, too, the admiral did not comply with the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich), about the main task - "defending his own shores" and immediately responded by marching to the shores of the enemy. The admiral understood that the only way to defend his shores was to eliminate enemy ships from the Black Sea. The best defense is an attack. At Headquarters, not everyone understood this, and it even came to direct insults by the "great" prince of the admiral. But the admiral apparently understood that there was only one Motherland, and there were many fools, and continued to do his job. On November 18, 1914, German Admiral Souchon tried to intercept Eberhard, who was returning from the shelling of Trebizond. “Intercepted”, but received “on the nose”. Since then, Souchon was no longer looking for a fight with the entire Russian squadron, but limited himself to tactics according to the pirate principle - “Hit and leave.” Soon the "Goeben" was blown up by a Russian mine near the Bosphorus and was out of action for several months.

    At the beginning of 1915, new fast destroyers of the Novik type began to enter the fleet. This made it possible to launch constant attacks on the coast of Turkey, destroying enemy transports, destroying his shipping.

    "Goeben" after the repair resumed raids on the Russian coast. These sorties brought minimal damage, but very irritated the St. Petersburg world. In addition, 1915 was a very difficult year for Russia, the initial patriotic frenzy came down, difficulties piled up. Creeping talk began about the "treason of the German admiral", although his family was of Swedish origin. The command demanded to protect its shores, while Eberhard continued to destroy the enemy's naval forces.

    The second battle of Russian battleships with the "Goeben" near the Bosphorus (May 1915) was also in favor of A. A. Ebergard. The German-Turkish fleet was unable to prevent several landings in 1916. The Black Sea Fleet confidently controlled the sea, which, as in the old days (under the first Ruriks), again became Russian. But Petrograd heard little about the small victories of the Black Sea Fleet, which prepared the general Victory with small bricks. Dirty talk continued about the passivity and mediocrity of the admiral; that the Germans are in charge of the sea, apparently some forces sponsored some of the newspapers.

    At the end of May 1916, Russian battleships shelled Varna, from the sea they were covered by the Empress Maria. The English Admiral Phillimore, who was present at the Panteleimon, called, after this campaign, the Russian battle fleet: "the best combat unit in the world." This campaign coincided with the increased activity of the German submarine forces, and on July 4, 1916, the Goeben fired on Tuapse.

    This was the last straw, A. A. Eberhard was replaced by A. Kolchak. But, interestingly, he did the same thing as A. A. Ebergard: he continued to mine the exit from the Bosphorus (Goeben, 6 German submarines were blown up again) in order to block Turkish forces; Russian destroyers and submarines tormented the Turkish coast with their cruising operations. One of the reasons for the appointment of Kolchak was that it was believed that he was a specialist in landing operations and mines.

    And from the end of 1916, there was a systematic preparation for the "Operation Tsargrad": there were trainings for landing and landing, constant reconnaissance exits to the Bosphorus, the coast was carefully studied, and aerial photographic reconnaissance was carried out. Kolchak had every chance to go down in the history of the empire as a hero who hoisted the Russian banner over the ancient capital of the Christian world.

    Literature

    • Kozlov D. Yu. "Strange War" in the Black Sea (August-October 1914). - M.: Quadriga, 2009. - 223 p. - ISBN 978-5-904162-07-8
    • Zolotarev V.L., Kozlov I.A. Russian navy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.. - M.: Nauka, 1988. - 208 p.