Alexander Olegovich Morozov was born on January 1, 1959 in Moscow. In 1976 he entered the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University. In 1981-1985 studied at the evening department of the philosophical faculty of Moscow State University. Since 1976, he has been a freelance correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda. In 1977, he was a correspondent for the magazine Cultural and Educational Work. In 1978-1989 worked in "Pionerskaya Pravda", "Teacher's Newspaper", "Club and Amateur Art" magazine, in the Moscow University Publishing House. 1988-1990 - editor-in-chief of the samizdat magazine "Paragraph".

In 1989-90. headed the Daily News Service (SEN) at M-BIO, which at the same time was the Moscow office of the newspaper of the Popular Front of Latvia "Atmoda". In 1989-90. He was a member of the editorial board of the Panorama newspaper. 1995-1996 - Editor of the Orthodox news agency "Metafrasis". 1996-2000 - Author of a series of articles on state-church relations in "NG-religions". In 2000-2001 he worked at the Main Directorate domestic policy Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. In 2000-2001 - Fellow of the Effective Policy Foundation.

Co-founder of the Guild of Religious Journalism (2000), editor of the Russian News Agency Orthodox Church(TV programs "Orthodox", "Canon"), executive secretary of the newspaper of the Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate "Church Bulletin" (2001-2003), columnist for the Internet portal "Religion and Mass Media" (2003). Head of Information Service of the Guild of Religious Journalists. Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Center New policy". In 2010-2011 regular contributor to OpenSpace.ru, Russian Journal. A sincere supporter of the onset of bright times. Currently, he is the editor-in-chief of the Russian Journal.

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Alexander Olegovich MOROZOV: interview

Alexander Olegovich MOROZOV (born 1959)- journalist, political scientist: | | | | .

ERRORS AND WARS, FATES AND TEXTS OF THE CHURCH MEDIA

Preparing for a meeting with Alexander Morozov, director of the UNIQ media research center, I was in the mood for the harshest criticism of modern Orthodox media. Because Morozov knows how to criticize publicly and harshly, and having many years of work in church journalism behind him, he will not leave a stone unturned. However, having come for criticism, I left with a holistic picture, yes, very personal and somewhat subjective, of the entire process of development of church journalism over the past 20 years.

Church Nineties

Alexander, when do church journalistic nineties begin for you?
- For me, church journalism began rather late - in 1995, when I met Sergei Chapnin after a five-year break. We knew him in the late 80s, when my friends and I published the samizdat magazine Paragraph, and Serezha had just returned from the army and rushed into Moscow life with great energy. In the early 90s, he was restoring the church in Klin.

In 1995 we met and he told me that he had an idea to make an independent news agency for religious news. The concept was that it should not be a "synodal" (ie official agency), but Orthodox, of course. And at that time, after all, there was almost nothing. "Radonezh" started in 1995 in the spring, as I remember. "Blagovest-info" - also, in my opinion, in 1995. There were some diocesan newspapers. Official news of the DECR. Well, Senin and Dushenov. Vlad Tomachinsky, then a layman, made the parish newspaper "Tatiana's Day" at Father Maxim's. I remember that it then looked almost like samizdat of the 80s, released on a rotator.

- Did the idea of ​​"Metaphrasis" belong to Sergei Chapnin?
- No. Ilya Kuvakin came to us with her. The Moscow world is very small. Sometimes - paradoxically cramped. Ilya worked at the Postfactum agency as an editor. Gleb Pavlovsky. Kuvakin there began to make lines "religious news". But as soon as he started, as "Postfactum" suffered some kind of financial fiasco and fell apart. Kuvakin, as I remember, turned to his university friend - Oleg Solodukhin (now vice president of the KROSS company). And together they found funding. Like everything else in the 90s, in the era of early capitalism, funding was somehow "left". The investor agreed to establish a religious news agency if we simultaneously set up an industry bulletin about the diamond industry.

In short, we set to work with great energy and dedication. The project worked out. There was already a large subscription from the dioceses, from our parishes abroad and from the Local Churches. We made an English version. There was a network of correspondents in the regions.

- Why did Metaphrasis close if it was such a strong agency?
- "Metaphrazis" died exactly one year later due to the fact that funding was lost. Looks like the diamonds are gone. Serezha tried to find funding, but it did not work. I left these cases, and Chapnin found funding a little later. But he began to create a new resource - "Sobornost", and did this resource until 2000. So, he met the Bishops' Council in 2000 as the editor-in-chief of Sobornost.

- "Sobornost" - has remained in the broad public consciousness not just as an independent, but as a rather oppositional publication. Is it really true?
- For "Sobornost" I followed half an eye. It cannot be considered as an opposition publication, because then the question arises - what could it be in opposition to?

Yes, Sobornost tried a very difficult move. Is it possible to discuss the conflict in a church publication? It is clear that Chapnin did not set himself the goal of fanning conflicts. It was just such an important issue. Here is the conflict. And it has even spilled over into the secular press. Is it possible to talk about him in church? And how, at the same time, to maintain loyalty to the hierarchies, and “blessed are the peacemakers,” and at the same time not to sit - well, already full of water in your mouth, as if nothing was happening at all. Sobornost covered both the conflict at the St. Petersburg Theological Seminary-Academy under Bishop Konstantin and the situation with Bishop Nikon in Yekaterinburg. I think it was a nerve-wracking but important experience...

Probably, in Chisty Lane, such attempts were sometimes perceived painfully. Well, now that everyone here has blogs, LiveJournal, networks, it doesn’t seem to be something very bold at all.

- At the beginning of the 2000s, you came to work for the Moscow Church Herald ...
- Yes, in 2001 Chapnin called me and said that His Holiness the Patriarch had given his blessing to make the Church Bulletin. I rejoiced at this circumstance, because Sergei worked with great energy for five years, and both Metaphrasis and Sobornost had a readership. I found my own style, my own way of presenting information - quite ecclesiastical, and at the same time modern.

In the end, as I understand it, His Holiness simply asked: “But these people who do all this, are they ours at all?” - "Yes, ours" - "Why don't they do it right here?"

It was obviously a thankless task to remake the Church Herald, because it was an official church publication, and it was impossible to step over the restrictions that were originally there. But the more interesting it was to create a different face for him. We did it.

- So, you start working in the Publishing Council of the Russian Orthodox Church ...
- The publishing council had a long and very interesting history. At the end of Soviet rule, under Vladyka Pitirim, there were, in my opinion, about three hundred full-time employees working there - a powerful center Orthodox culture. Then there was Vladyka Tikhon, and when we arrived, the leader was Archpriest Vladimir Siloviev, no doubt a very delicate and calm person. He took a very correct position towards us, the best possible: you - church people, you know what you are doing, I will not interfere, do your job, but there will be a fatal mistake - it is your own fault.

Making a newspaper was difficult. I don't think it's easy now - in the early 1900s.

- Why is it difficult?
- Mainly due to the fact that the circle of qualified and well-written church authors is very small. The problem is also in the fact that many people who write well after going to church, abruptly, as it were, “gloomed”. And stylistically it began to turn not even into archaism - archaism could even be something stylish, but into some official language. One might say, some kind of semi-Soviet. And it was absolutely impossible to break through this pious muttering. It is clear that it is appropriate at the level of the parish newspaper for pensioners. 14 pin so you can see without glasses. But we still wanted the official newspaper of the Moscow Patriarchy to have a different face.

- What happened in the field of Orthodox journalism?
- The situation after all quickly changed. The 90s were the years of economic recovery. The abbots, the episcopate were still sitting in complete ruin, everyone was busy restoring churches. Create Sunday school was a problem. The diocese was able to make a newspaper, well, at best, at the level of a factory large-circulation newspaper. Therefore, some traces of professional efforts were immediately evident, and there were less than a dozen publications throughout the country.

I remember that a group of professional journalists was doing "Orthodox Siberia" (I think in Novosibirsk or Omsk?). Even just a slight increase in the level of printing was perceived as an achievement. In the same years, at the very end of the nineties, the efforts of the Tatyana's Day newspaper were noticeable. Some kind of life was going on there all the time, a young editorial board gathered, there were interesting ideas. "Radonezh" - although they were at war with us all the time - was professionally done not bad at that time. There was a variety of topics, round tables, polemical materials.

"Thomas" in those days was, of course, not the same as today, much weaker. But at the same time, his concept was already noticeable in it - this is a lay magazine. It was a very correct idea. The line of inclusion of various laity, who may not live a very intensive church life, but at the same time they are children of the Church and are engaged in something important, and their positions are interesting. It was good idea, which later received a continuation, so that as a result, "Thomas" became a deservedly very noticeable project.

The 1990s were very different from the 2000s. At that time, the radical press - Russkiy vestnik, Orthodox Rus' - had much more weight. Metropolitan John (Snychev) died in 1995, but some of the fading radiance of this St. Petersburg ultra-conservative group persisted. The end of the nineties is also a heavy controversy around the canonization of the royal family.

Then an avalanche of exciting thoughts about the canonization of Prince Sergei Alexandrovich, about the canonization of Rasputin went through Orthodox Rus' and through the Russkiy Vestnik. I remember somewhere there was an article about the holiness of Chapaev, etc. Simultaneously with these two publications, the Russian House magazine was also noticeable, which was very widely distributed. It also had a lot of fantasies and all sorts of "search".

All this was very amusing and interesting background. Of course, in the 2000s, this all subsided to a large extent, because. some new church generations entered into life.

- Then there is a "NG-religion" ...
- Yes, "NG-religion" was a very bright project under Max Shevchenko. Maxim created a situation of controversy very qualitatively, and everything was very correctly built with him: the opinions of different sides clashed - not only Orthodox, but also Islam and Protestantism. Max Shevchenko was an excellent editor-in-chief of NG-Religion, because he had a real, lively interest in religious topics and religious life. Unlike next editor Mark Smirnov, the man interesting biography, but, it seems to me, who has completely lost any interest in religious life in general, which is why his publication was at the level of some unaddressed encyclopedia.

In the 90s - and even in the 2000s - if we talk about Orthodox journalism, we cannot but talk about Andrey Pisarev. In the early 1990s, he moved from the editorial office of the literary and artistic programs of ORT to directly church topics. And he created whole new formats that didn't exist before. And an Orthodox talk show, and an Orthodox TV calendar, and a reportage program, and live broadcasts from Easter and Christmas patriarchal services. Now many have forgotten this, but at the peak, I remember, he organized a screening of the Christmas service with live broadcasts of special correspondents from the cathedrals of several CIS countries.

In 2000, together with Vladimir Zhelonkin, he came to lead the Muscovy channel, then Nikolai Derzhavin and Dmitry Mendeleev, Olga Lyubimova, Roman Toloknov, Gleb Pyanykh, Ekaterina Shergova came on the air of the channel - many talented people.

The image of Orthodoxy

Here I recently read something about the Church in Olshansky’s blog ... Olshansky creates a baroque image of Orthodoxy - the domes are shining, the bells are ringing, the governor went to the watering place in a carriage, the bees are buzzing, everything is so cute ... Rozanov perfectly saw this baroque image and accurately assessed it: on the one hand, the bees buzz, the bells ring, on the other hand, the priest drinks or beats his mother ...

Now, in your opinion, the baroque image of Orthodoxy has won in modern Orthodox church journalism?
- No, I do not think so.

You can say this: in the nineties there were two images of Orthodoxy. One image was a kind of patriotic baroque, a kind of semi-communist Orthodoxy, which was mixed in with a somewhat gloomy pathos - Russian weapons, princes and the like. This was the first generation of church-going party activists, and it looked and perceived life a little gloomily. This is the image of the Russian House.

The second image was the image of early missionary Orthodoxy, politically sharpened. But it was sharpened not in the direction of the patriarchal baroque retro, but in the direction of the fact that today it is necessary to invade, fight, fight. Kirill Frolov went on a new campaign every day - one war, another ...

In the 2000s, such a “personalistic” Orthodox journalism appeared - largely thanks to the efforts of Leigoda and Chapnin - as leaders of their editorial offices. Very many people started talking about themselves in the context of faith.

Yesterday I read an interview with Dr. Lisa Glinka and thought how well she speaks, how simple. She does not need to say any special words of loyalty in relation to the Church. She simply lives and is guided by faith, and it is clear that for her this is not a newly acquired and unlived-in faith, but already a calm, mature experience. Experience with your language. You read and see that faith is settled, but at the same time it remains constantly problematic. Otherwise, it cannot be.

Because "church triumphalism" - if it is appropriate, then only at the level of "social collectives", with the military inspiration of squads and ambush regiments. And at the level of one soul turned to God, faith is always a question, not an answer. A question, not a triumphalist statement. Faith always problematizes a life situation. And it is very good that there are different people who talk about their religious experience.

So I don't think that baroque prevailed in Orthodox journalism. The problem, perhaps, lies elsewhere. There are few authors in the fact that apologetics remains weak. And we are all waiting, waiting for some new generations to come out of the Tikhon Institute, out of the Lavra. With an already deeper cultural base. And one remains. Andrey Kuraev. It's been too long.

- You were the organizer and leader of the Guild of Religious Journalism.
- Yes, there was such, now forgotten, and, in general, a completely insignificant project. The fact is that at that moment the Kremlin project "Media Union" was being created as an alternative to the union of journalists. Due to the fact that at that time I was friends with Sasha Shchipkov, a religious dissident and a freelance correspondent for some Western agency. Both of us were the authors of NG-religion, and participated in the preparation of the first conference of the Media Union. Then the idea arose to create a religious journalism section, and we created it. It should be noted that for a year she did nothing. Its only result was that at that time it was possible to quickly receive federal grants. But this was also due to the fact that the Religion and Mass Media portal was created and the fact that we all worked in the Media Union.

I think that in 2004 "Religion and the Media" was of great interest, there were a lot of interesting things. Both I and Kyrlezhev were observers there for half a year.

The collapse of expert journalism

Is it correct to talk about the phenomenon of Orthodox journalism, or is it just a particular version of religious journalism in general?
Well, the answer to that question depends on who is asking it. "Religious journalism" is something that exists as a "rubric" for, say, the Federal Media Agency. That is, a certain set of publications of confessions. But, of course, for the confessions themselves, this rubric is hardly of any value. This identity means nothing. Well, except that the UN will bring together some one-day congress of chief editors of newspapers of all faiths. But this will also be held under the section "people's diplomacy", "peacekeeping", "for peace, against violence and general poverty."

What happens to religious themes in the secular press, in your opinion? You wrote about this interestingly in the middle of the 2000s. What has changed since then?
- I would say that today's journalism about religion is simply in an incomparable crisis in comparison, for example, with Shevchenko's NG-religion. Expert journalism simply does not exist. Some new young generation of religious scholars has come. They write some exquisite texts on the topic "Batman as a religious type." But no one can write a coherent article about possible candidates for the papacy after the departure of Ratzinger. Probably, the old man Kyrlezhev still can.

The Russian Journal sometimes publishes texts about religion, which at the end of the 1990s simply no one would publish, because it is “just nonsense”. European or American significant public discussions with a religious context are no longer overlooked.

But on the other hand, young religious scholars can be understood. They go to cultural studies, where they can fit their research into the foreign academic environment. And run away from here. Because here, perhaps, no one else needs to know which of the Italian cardinals can become a successor and how American sociology studies the position of religious communities in Obama's election.

The problem is in the emphasized non-confessional nature of religious studies, they say, it is possible to be high-quality religious scholars only if we take out any religiosity for ourselves?
- It seems to me that the matter here is completely different. What interests the young religious scholar Kostylev, for example? He is occupied not with real problems, not with faith in today's world, but with far-fetched scholastic problems of the boundaries of religious studies, and all his energy is spent on this nonsense. And the wonderful Ivar Maksutov chose for himself a completely fashionable postmodern theme of interpreting film images. Yes, of course, this problem exists, but it is suitable for sometimes writing articles on OpenSpace, in Pushkin, or in Afisha. And to make this an expert portal about religion in modern world impossible.

Take the process of the Rhodes conferences that has suddenly begun, the preparations for the Pan-Orthodox Council. I no longer understand whether anyone from a secular audience can clearly and competently describe in the media what the matter is. And this despite the fact that we are talking about the mainstream, about the most important event, which has a projection into both public and state life. And what happens to the Anglicans? Yes, no one can describe it in a meaningful way. Ten line shocking news reports. Transfers from local agencies. Since everything is taken out of context, the reader's hair just stands on end and that's it.

- Are there development prospects?
- Russia is a very small country, and there is not much in it. It is very large, of course, and spread out very widely, but for each "department of life" there are only a few sane people. It is very difficult to find (grow, carve) each next one.

What development prospects can there be if for this whole small country (five times smaller than India in terms of population) there is only one highly qualified journalist who writes in English, Orthodox, who knows the topic well - Andrey Zolotov (RIAN).

There are two and a half "professors of theology" who, without the risk of complete disgrace, can be sent to joint debates with Catholic theologians in Italy ...

And there is one apologist - Deacon Andrey Kuraev. Legoyda, Chapnin and beyond - all one by one.

You wrote that the media deliberately create a distorting space for religious topics: the media demand from the Church a public position, moral assessments, but when she pronounces them…
- Yes, there is a problem. And it hasn't softened in two decades. The media expect a moral assessment from His Holiness the Patriarch, and he gives it. But this assessment sounds very weak. If, relatively speaking, we go out and say that forest fires are sent to us for our sins, then a certain part of the believers already understand this, while the rest will only laugh.

Whatever one may say, the Church is in the position of reacting. Insulted - we answer. For example, some madmen dug into the dungeon in Penza, and then we began to talk about what last days although they will come, but not in this way.

Now the system of secular media is already so arranged that it will never create such a corridor for religious assessment in which the sound would be adequate. Whatever one may say, entering some platform of secular journalism, a church person involuntarily takes not an ethical, but an ideological position.

I think that Patriarch Kirill understands all this very well, but the problem is that it is very difficult to prepare so many people who could not answer, but be the first to raise a problem, the first to puzzle society. Often a claim church journalists that the Church reacts according to the state agenda. They announced the fight against corruption, and then we start talking about corruption.

Is there a general decline in interest in the topic of religion? In terms of the degree of influence, "NG-religions" were sensational, now one can hardly see such interest in any publication about religion - whether secular, Orthodox ...
- There are two related reasons. The first reason lies in a certain uniqueness of people and positions. No one over the years wanted, like Max Shevchenko, to make the religious theme nervous. He was really interested in these bizarre concepts that arise among believers, he was interested in the fact that today's concepts are sewn deep into history. They did not appear today, but were before, they were placed at the Ecumenical Councils.

Max was accused of Islamophilia. His attitude was determined by the fact that he saw in Islam the so-called hot religion. But that's how it is.

The second significant point is Putinism: in the zero years there was no longer a request for such a discussion. At the beginning of the 2000s, the authorities built relations with the Patriarchate, and they had to work on the agenda. And according to the "agenda" it was no longer supposed to debate who the Salafis were, how Adventists live there on the Oka.

In what direction do you think the information policy of the Church should develop today? What to do, what to work on, what not to do?
- The story of faith is persuasive through personality. Through the image of a person acting in the world. Through the history of his churching, through the history of some trials, his own doubts, through the way he problematizes his life experience connected with this for himself. This is, to a large extent, promising, because it gives other people the opportunity to relate their lives to this life experience.

This is one side of the issue. And the other is to train well-written church historians who would be able to clearly and simply explain jurisdictional conflicts loaded with a large context, and so on.

And the most important thing is that the Orthodox must gradually overcome the "defencist-triumphalist style." It is hard to read: either we defeated everyone, then, on the contrary, they spread rot on us all, we are alone here. Since our ill-wishers give us so much trouble, then all the same, proceeding from a repentant consciousness, this is sent to us for some sins. And where unity is broken, there is no point in rejoicing intemperately today, and mourning tomorrow.

Because where unity is not preserved, there is no easy way back.

- Alexander, thank you very much!

Alexander Olegovich MOROZOV: quotes

Alexander Olegovich MOROZOV (born 1959)- journalist, political scientist: | | | | .

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...Orthodoxy is something so universal that it can accommodate the most diverse human experience. But it also enables a person to understand his life experience with such a power of frankness and integrity that there is little that can compare with this.

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The state can ban the party, dissolve the trade union. But he cannot dissolve the ROC.

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it must be remembered that for those who believe - in last minute history - there will be no state, no business, no nations, no football teams, no social hierarchies, no Gazprom and Norilsk Nickel, but only "church people", i.e. Church standing before the Lord. And in this perspective, the question of salvation is for each individual soul. The question of salvation by entire organizations, trade union committees or military units, it seems, was not raised in the Gospel.

Alexander Olegovich MOROZOV: articles

Alexander Olegovich MOROZOV (born 1959)- journalist, political scientist: | | | | .

DISPUTES ABOUT THE CHURCH THAT WILL NEVER QUIET

The current excitement around the Orthodox Church, on the one hand, attracts a lot of attention to it, on the other hand, it leaves in the shade issues that require no less lively discussion. There are people who painfully dislike the Russian Orthodox Church. This is in the nature of a phobia. Complete denial of everything. You say: "Well, but how many people are in the temples." The answer will be: "Everyone is pretending, hypocrites." Well, "each bast in a line." And it merges with the state, and the priests enrich themselves, etc. and so on.

Beneath this, as a rule, lies a high moral demand. To a person, the whole world seems immoral, lying in evil, and in relation to the Church, he would expect that she would be the bearer of absolute moral purity. And he does not see this. Moreover, he does not see so much that even if he appeals to the simple. You will ask: well, you will agree that there are good and bad people everywhere, are they also in the Church? The answer will most likely be this: yes, there are no good people there, a good person will not go there at all.

But it's a phobia. And there are ideological opponents. Today there are two large groups of them in Russia. First, consistent Marxists. It is enough to look at the blog of Daria Mitina, a former State Duma deputy from the Communist Party, and now an activist of the Left Front, and you will see that there are still real fighters. She mercilessly stigmatizes Zyuganov for "tricks with God." The real left is supposed to be an atheist, because religion is, whatever one may say, but "opium", a repressive instance. Young Marxists convict the Communist Party of the Russian Federation that it is already a “national-patriotic party”, and not at all a leftist one. Well, national patriotism is, of course, friendship with the Church.

The second group are scientists-atheists. These are natural scientists who, like Laplace, "do not need the hypothesis of the existence of God." There are many. They, as a rule, go about their own business and do not get involved in the affairs of the Church in general, but actively resist only in matters of education - against the DIC and against theology as a science.

But there are also more complex figures, such as, for example, Professor of Moscow State University, philosopher Valery Kuvakin, who heads the atheist movement and the Common Sense magazine. In one of the radio broadcasts, he made it clear that atheism is a search, a problem. This is "standing in the wind". He seems to be exclaiming: Convince me! I'm ready to be convinced. But so far, however, there is nothing convincing. He read a lot - and Berdyaev, and Bulgakov, and Thomas Aquinas, and Pavel Florensky. But not convinced...

The Religion of Paradox

How many Orthodox in Russia? Nobody knows for sure. But a lot. There are probably at least 80 million people baptized in the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The attempts of some sociologists to establish which of them believe "correctly", "as it should" are completely hopeless. If you try to establish exactly - as it should be in full - then it turns out that only a person who graduated from the Theological Academy is suitable for believers. But since a person who has opened his heart to God is “always on the road” and the spirit of God rests wherever he wants, religious life is filled, as it should be, with various paradoxes.

For example, Diomede graduated from the Academy and even a bishop, but on you he took and cursed the late Patriarch Alexy and declared his place vacant. Or some quiet bum lives under the stairs, and this, perhaps, is Alexy - a man of God. And he will later be revered as a saint until the end of time.

Sometimes the searching mind falls into confusion: why do they believe there, being so different? And how does it happen that even a robber sitting in prison believes. And a field hospital nurse. And a surgeon who sees death under the knife every day. And a paratrooper who is obliged to shoot to kill without hesitation... How is it that a pacifist, an officer, an ardent nationalist, and a cosmopolitan are praying at the Sunday service...

There is no point in talking about the foundations of faith. It is only clear that Orthodoxy is something so universal that it can accommodate the most diverse human experience. But it also enables a person to understand his life experience with such a power of frankness and integrity that there is little that can compare with this.

What Christians believe remains as incomprehensible, mysterious and irrational as it was two thousand years ago. Saints, ascetics of the faith, theologians, spiritual writers - they all left behind thousands of volumes. These words, of course, help the believer to navigate the world, but still, everyone stands alone with the Revelation, trying on himself, his life path, his future to what is said in the Gospel.

There is a famous saying: “There are no atheists in foxholes.” From the point of view of a Marxist, it means that fear gives birth to faith. This, of course, is not true. Because the trenches believe and the fearless. The meaning of this phrase lies in the fact that in conditions of risk and trials, a person is more acutely aware of the limitations of the rational. Beyond rational understanding remains a vast ocean of something else.

But even without any war, for a Christian, life is full of endless internal dispute. The paradox lies in the fact that a believer perceives the world even more acutely and problematically than an atheist. The Russians know this well, because Dostoevsky and Leskov wrote about it. In other words, faith is a troublesome matter for man.

80% souls living in the state

An even more troubling thing is the clash of state and church. The school is not spared the need to inculcate patriotism, and the textbook contains many examples of the symbolic unanimity of the priesthood and the princes. Sergius of Radonezh blessed Dmitry Donskoy, Patriarch Hermogenes turned out to be the head of the nation in the absence of a legitimate sovereign and was forced by the Poles to capitulate, refused and was put to death.

Meanwhile, in the 15th-18th centuries, the struggle between the Kingdom and the Priesthood was as dramatic as in medieval Europe. This fierce fight ended, as is known, with the fact that Peter I abolished the patriarchate altogether, beheaded the Church, and subordinated the top of the episcopate to his close official. This post of Chief Prosecutor of the Synod lasted until 1917. And here times are even more difficult for the Church than during the synodal period.

Although between the two revolutions it was possible to hold a council, at which the patriarchate was restored, mass executions of priests began already in 1918, and then a course was taken to eradicate religion altogether, as prejudice and anachronism.

What is the reason? Why did even Catherine II, who sincerely loved the liturgy, or the devout Nicholas II, restrict the Church, while the Bolsheviks expected to get rid of it altogether before the Second World War?

The answer is simple. The church is huge social organism. The Church, as a social factor, is present everywhere, and although her power is only power over souls, it is 80% of the souls living in the state. And this makes the episcopate a rather serious political force.

Indeed, without the Church, for many centuries, a legitimate supreme power was also impossible. The Church crowned, i.e. made any seizure of power or change of dynasties legal. That is why, by the way, many monarchists in 1917 did not recognize the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II from the throne, believing that he could not voluntarily dispose of the anointing to the kingdom, which meant in those days no less than inheriting the throne from his father.

The civil authorities never forgot that the higher hierarchs could curse a civilian military leader or king. And this anathema could have been fatal for him.

And in Russian history there are dramatic episodes of the struggle for power between the state and the church. Ivan the Terrible killed the Moscow metropolitan. Patriarch Nikon wanted to completely subjugate Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, but as a result he lost and was sent into exile. Nicholas II refused to restore the patriarchate, despite the requests of the episcopate, who tried to achieve the cancellation of the decision of Peter I. Lenin wanted the complete destruction of the priesthood as a class, and Stalin - already during the war years and after - wanted to keep the church on a short leash.

There was a moment in the history of the Russian Church in the 20th century when its existence was threatened. Canonically, the existence of the church requires the presence of three bishops. And twice in the 20th century the situation developed in such a way that the surviving bishops, afraid of being left with fewer than three, began to ordain in secret, in the hope that the underground bishops would someday be able to come to light and the church would be saved.

Confused at the Butovo training ground

The word "secularization" in its original sense meant the taking away of church property in favor of the state. The division of church money was in all European countries in different years. In Russia between Tatar yoke and Peter I it was big problem. The church grew rich by itself thanks to donations and wills. Dying alone, without loved ones, every person bequeathed his property to the Church, so that she would pray for him until the Last Judgment. As a result, the Church accumulated such colossal resources that no monarch could look at without envy. Yes, and in the church itself, the dispute never subsided, whether property is needed, whether the monks are saved in rich monasteries, or their prayer is an empty formality.

Ascetic movements flared up from time to time demanding to leave everything and leave the world, go to the forests, to the islands, as far as possible, so that nothing would interfere with preparing for the second coming of Jesus Christ. In this impulse, the Russian monks mastered Solovki and Valaam.

This purifying ascetic will shook the Church, but could never win the final victory. And there were reasons for this. Christ did not order to leave the world at all, but on the contrary, he insisted on the universality of his preaching about salvation, about the transformation of man and the world. And this means that the Church had to remain in the world in order to continue repeating the words of the apostle: I came to be all among all and to save a few.

There is such a point of view that the Russian Church was subjected to unthinkable persecution in the 20th century, because it was very guilty in the 19th century. Allegedly in the 19th century, churchmen, belonging to the "ruling class", fell, along with the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, under the ax of popular anger. Of course, this "matrix" was inherited from Soviet textbooks and continues to fade away quietly. Today, studies of historians show that in the 19th century, most of the families of priests were extremely poor, they were on the lower floors of the social hierarchy. And if the peasantry had some kind of hatred for the landlords, then there was none for the priests. The destruction of the priesthood was a deliberate program of the Bolsheviks, who set themselves the goal of creating a "new man."

The "re-created man" project, as you know, failed. And now it is difficult for new generations to comprehend why tens of thousands of priests were shot. Today we stand in great confusion at the Butovo training ground. Let's see what our children will say about this when they become mature people.

Church is us

Why the Church? Does she need? Is it possible to do without it? Would it be better without her? Few people ask such questions today. The answer seems obvious, but the question itself is ridiculous. It exists, it is irreplaceable. In fact, the Church is who we are. People baptize their children, bury their loved ones, pray for health and repose, go on pilgrimages. Is it just a ritual, a tribute to family tradition? No.

Over the past twenty years, millions of people, including very young people, have entered the church life. They know that the Lord is invisibly with them at every Liturgy, Communion connects each of them with him and with each other. Each of them knows that the heart is not just a pump on the left side of the chest, but a kind of organ for understanding the world, given to man in order to contain knowledge of the unthinkable.

The core of Christianity remains undamaged in the Church - it is a universalist (for the whole world that does not exclude anyone and at the same time does not give anyone preferences) preaching of salvation through repentance, through an inner conversion to God. Only by prayer and in the hope of gaining grace does this special consciousness live and embrace the world. As it turned out, it did not become archaic even in the era of the collider and genome decoding. This consciousness is humble and at the same time sharply questioning, seeking and at the same time self-confident.

Can the world do without the Church? Probably, maybe. But this, most likely, will no longer be the world of people.

Churching politics?

Russia according to the Constitution is a secular state. There are many different people in the Orthodox environment. For example, monarchists. Seriously, these people hope that one day the Zemsky Sobor and the election of a new tsar will become possible. Or, for example, the writer Dmitry Volodikhin believes that the Church should do business as much as possible, become a powerful economic entity and, in the end, show the world some other economy that will be based on the spirit of love and justice, and not greed and deceit. There are Russian nationalists who would like the ROC to become a political instrument of segregation, i.e. was used to justify the ethnic superiority of the Slavs over other peoples of Russia. There are people who are close in spirit to the Penza recluses. And many, many others.

And to all of them - fortunately they are baptized in Orthodoxy - the Church reminds them that they should take their fantasies into brackets and read the Gospel, pray, do good deeds and think more about their own sin. And less about the arrangement of the world in accordance with their own social ideals. “There is no need for leaflets and demonstrations. We must pray."

There are figures such as, for example, a veteran of the Orthodox social movement Valentin Lebedev (editor of the journal Pravoslavnaya Beseda), who have long cherished the dream of a Christian party in Russia, much like the CDA-CDU in Germany. In this case, it would be possible to speak of the "churching of politics", i.e. that political life was, as it were, saturated with the Christian understanding of the world. But in almost twenty post-Soviet years, such a party has not appeared. Probably not by accident.

Be that as it may, Russia will remain a secular state for the foreseeable future. At the same time, as today, the highest civil authorities will consider the ROC as a "respected and independent partner." And a special partner. It is important to understand that in the legal sense, this is a special partner. The state can ban the party, dissolve the trade union. But he cannot dissolve the ROC.

But the penetration of the ROC into the state has certain limits. In Russia, it is impossible to imagine that the hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church would become, for example, the head of state, as was the case, say, in Cyprus in the middle of the 20th century.

The state will proceed from the fact that the Constitution protects the rights of both believers of different faiths and atheists. Of course, this defense always has the character of struggle, tension, mutual pressure. It can not be in any other way. Not only here, but all over the world, religious communities in nation-states are striving to expand their powers, their public presence. Muslim girls in France are demanding to be allowed to wear headscarves, atheists are demanding the removal of Catholic crucifixes from schools, Dutch intellectual radicals are publishing caricatures of Mohammed. Catholic public organizations bring out several hundred thousand demonstrators against abortion and gay marriage in Spain, and yet the Spanish government passes laws against the will of the Spanish episcopate.

All this exists in today's Russia: disputes about the military-industrial complex, about whether there can be priests in the army, shocking actions by contemporary artists who want to “hurt the feelings of believers” and cause a scandal with great resonance, responses from Orthodox youth.

Looking at all these fights in Russia, Europe and America, most often you think not about who is right, but about how terrible fanaticism is.

After all, “liberal fanaticism” sees in the Church only a spiritual repressive authority, while the community of believers considers them mentally ill people. From the point of view of dogmatic liberals, the Church is only a social organization that strives for power, imposes moral restrictions, disfigures consciousness, and suppresses creativity.

Religious fanaticism is no less painful. It makes no sense to talk in detail about his suffocating atmosphere, about the fact that he does not recognize any manifestations of secular culture, even its high achievements. The words that the Church is a “little flock” and that the Lord will judge the living and the dead are understood here as the basis for judging ourselves already today, and thinking of ourselves as some kind of representatives of God on earth.

Will the Church save Russia?

They will build churches, ordain priests. The ROC will do a lot of theological education. The fundamentals of Orthodox culture will be taught in Central and Southern Russia in high school- where there are no objections from parents and teachers. Although this subject will be called "spiritual and moral culture." Some lyceums will teach simply "ethics". This is exactly what they do in Germany. Parents have the right to choose what will be taught to their child - "ethics" or "religion".

In 2008, a debate over whether academic titles could be awarded for work in a subject like "theology" ended in a victory for academics who opposed it. But in the end, a compromise will be found, which is being proposed by the Ministry of Education today. For theologians and a number of other specialists, there is some equivalent of the status of "doctor of science", but this status will be called something else.

Will there be priests in the army? It is unlikely that this will be legalized. But the fact that the priests will be where the commander of the unit or in units in combat conditions wants it is certain. Because believers have rights. We see American chaplains in the troops, the prayers of soldiers and officers of many other armies before a combat mission.

“Will the Church Save Russia?” one of my friends asked me recently. If you answer this in a social, everyday plane, then it is unlikely. Russia in a different situation can be saved by "the army and the navy" - its "only allies", as our politicians like to say these days. But it is not necessary to equate the Church with the army and navy.

You just need to remember that for those who believe - at the last minute of history - there will be no state, no business, no nations, no football teams, no social hierarchies, no Gazprom and Norilsk Nickel, but only "church people", i.e. Church standing before the Lord. And in this perspective, the question of salvation is for each individual soul. The question of salvation by entire organizations, trade union committees or military units, it seems, was not raised in the Gospel.

Interview of a political scientist and publicist, editor-in-chief of the Russian Journal ALEXANDER MOROZOV to the Ukrainian edition of Realnaya Gazeta.

– Alexander Olegovich, in recent texts you describe Russia of “Putin’s third term” as a completely new reality – the transition from “postmodernist dictatorship” to dictatorship “in all seriousness”, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine also fits into this turn. What processes led to this? Why did it happen this way?

– There are two explanations for why this happened – both have their share of truth. The first circumstance lies on the surface, and all political scientists know this - this is the natural aging of an authoritarian, personalistic regime. This is how the regimes of Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain grew old. The regime begins to transform, this is also connected with generational issues - after the first, “revolutionary” generation, the next one comes, and it is more vicious and cruel.

The second explanation is common in Moscow political circles among high-ranking officials. Russia has completed 20 years of post-Soviet transit, Putin is trying to reposition Russia.

– At the same time, the Kremlin now actually speaks in the vocabulary of the neo-imperialists Prokhanov and Limonov…

- Precisely, before marginal circles sent messages that it was necessary to revise the entire architecture of world politics, the role international organizations. At the same time, it was believed that the Kremlin is rationalistic and operates within the framework of global capitalism, the world system of international relations, in general, according to its rules. Now it is clear that the Kremlin is voicing this strange marginal philosophy, threatening to withdraw from various international obligations, thereby bringing down the world order.

Perhaps there was such a development of events: Russia becomes the head of the "conservative international" and presents itself as part of right-wing Europe. In principle, the West was ready for this scenario. But here in the Kremlin they went for the annexation of Crimea, creating a situation that no European right can recognize. Both the Christian Democrats and the European People's Party condemned the actions. This means that Putin's project is no longer a conservative European one, but a kind of one-sided project of revising one's own status. I hope that Putin, as the head of state, is aware of all the risks of such a turn.

– In general, how conscious is Putin's policy? How does he form this new ideology of his?

– The ideology has matured as a result of his 15-year reign. He is already a very experienced leader, the first level of world processes, and he does not like the role that Russia plays in them. And he wants to win her over. Can he do it? In my opinion, there is no, in any case, such a "redealt of cards", in response to which the West will not collapse, but rather strengthen. The Western elites will not take the path of accepting Russia's conditions, but rather the path of building a guard wall around it.

- Maybe this is Putin's goal: to isolate himself from the world and rule like Stalin, without regard to the world community?

- There is such a version, but its reality would mean that Putin is sick, and then it would be worth listening to the interpretation of Gleb Pavlovsky that we are dealing with a special psychology. Closing in on his ideas, the personality of such a ruler feels more comfortable in autarchy than in the free world. This is the most terrible scenario for Russia, cut off from the world, it will degrade psychologically, socially and culturally at a rapid pace.

- In such a scenario, Putin's elite will also have to rebuild. After all, earlier its great-power-conservative rhetoric was at odds with its own way of life (capital in the West, integration into the life of the cosmopolitan world elite). Will this "closing of Russia" cause a revolt of the elites?

- No, it won't. Because Putin is conducting a bloodless purge. He invites everyone who does not want to remain in the autarky system to leave. As a result of such a policy, a critical mass of a discontented elite will never form. Chirkunov and Kokh, for example, have already left. And these are the people who were sponsors of liberalization and modernization programs in Russia. We are accustomed to measure by the standards of modern states, where the suppressed part of the elite is grouped inside the country to protect their interests (as in Egypt or Turkey). But we live in a post-society situation where those who are dissatisfied simply leave. Now in Russia there are practically no stories about raiding, people voluntarily go into cash when they come to them with offers from Chekists.

And for those who want to stay with Putin on the boat, he offers to take capital from the West, to voluntarily take on restrictions on the departure of relatives and transactions. He wants to create a new team, a new "Order of the Sword" to replace the old one, represented by the "Ozero" cooperative. And he creates a new loyalty through these restrictions on communication with the outside world.

- Doesn't this scheme work in relation to Ukraine - Putin is trying to cut off territories from Ukraine that are ready to live according to his new rules - Crimea, Donbass, and offering the rest of Ukraine to symbolically go into the cache, dropping the ballast, go to Europe?

- No I do not think so. Putin's policy towards Ukraine will be much tougher. He will try to take away what can be taken away - already Crimea, and part of the South-East. In relation to the rest, he plans to repurchase the business and gain economic control. Unfortunately, he has a good chance of doing so. If the situation in Ukraine is brought to a permanent crisis, then doing business here becomes a risky business. With the help of shadow negotiations, 10-15 largest oligarchs can be pushed to leave the site. At the same time, it will be difficult for them to sell their assets to the West, since no one wants to invest in the territory of constant conflict. Putin's group of oligarchs will have the opportunity to buy assets. And then exercise political control through economic levers. We see this in Germany, where there is a powerful pro-Russian lobby.

Now the Ukrainian political class faces a huge historical challenge, it is greater than the loss of Crimea or Donbass. The Kremlin has amassed vast resources by ostentatiously throwing away billions of dollars, showing that it can buy everyone and everything.

– What can be opposed to Putin's policy in Ukraine?

- In Crimea, we saw a very cold and sophisticated mechanism of KGB meanness, which is difficult to resist. Such a system cannot be overcome with the help of sincerity and openness, which were demonstrated by Maidan in Ukraine or Bolotnaya in Russia, it turns them into some kind of defect. People in the Kremlin, possessing the psychology of intelligence officers, do not believe in any sincere revolutions, ideological impulses, public politics, according to their vision, everything can only be organized, inspired. Either we organized, or the West, our agents against foreign agents. This is the tragedy that such a system can only be replayed on its own field of secret war. The Kremlin uses the tactics of saboteurs, "little green men", constantly lies, and when the other side says - how can you lie like that, he laughs. Yes, we are scouts.

Even the Soviet government in the Brezhnev era, for all its vileness, did not stoop to this level. She had an ideological regulator that limited the actions of the KGB, so such a policy was always combined with an appeal to universalist values. And the experience of Crimea shows that they wanted it and took it away.

- Donbass is waiting for the same fate?

- Donbass is waiting for the "Bosnian scenario": while formally remaining part of Ukraine, it will autonomize to the state of Transnistria in Moldova. It is not necessary to annex the territories of the East, it is enough to create a "gray zone", it will have a radioactive effect on the rest of Ukraine.

– Many people are now saying that it is better to cut off the Donbass in order to save the rest of Ukraine…

- This will be a meaningful step only if the Ukrainian elite has built a European consensus. The point is not to cut off the Donbass, because then it will be possible to cut off further. The only way to give up Donbass is to receive guarantees from the European Union and NATO that they will immediately enter the new borders, now, and not sometime in the indefinite future.

– There is also a feeling that the current anti-terrorist operation in the Donbass is in the nature of an “agreement” with the Kremlin. There is such an imaginary war in which not only Moscow, but also Kyiv is interested.

- In fact of the matter. There are no guarantees that the Ukrainian elite is sufficiently patriotic, that it has a consolidated core that would not yield under any circumstances. Any society is corrupt - in Poland, in the Czech Republic, and in the Baltic countries - but there the elites have a limit that they cannot cross. With all the love of freedom of the Ukrainian establishment, it is clear that all its leaders have personal strategies. And this means that at any moment the leader, due to personal gain, can change his position. If something like a gentry assembly of the 200 richest families arose here, which would firmly come out with a single position and call on Europe for help, that would be a different matter. But for now, every family is for itself. This also applies to Ukrainian society, which chooses the strategy of individual survival.

- Can we say about the eastern part of the elite, primarily about the Akhmetov group, in whose fiefdom the main battles are taking place, that it is already completely on the hook of Putin? Like people who made capital in the 90s, they must calculate the situation, understand that the Kremlin will take everything from them.

“They are calculating, they are preparing. They think typologically, like the Russian oligarchs. It was in the 90s that they fought in such a situation, and in the 2000s they began to accept the proposed conditions and leave. If Akhmetov has a hopeless situation, he will give the business to some conditional Vekselberg, without waiting for the situation that happened to Khodorkovsky.

– Where is the limit of the expansion of the Russian space of influence?

- It passes along the borders of NATO. In hindsight, it is clear that those who managed to join this organization are happy. A new Roman rampart runs along this line, which separates civilization from barbarism. And this is the great tragedy of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, at the very beginning the Western elite followed its course with excitement, but then the desire to fence off the new barbarians began to dominate in the West - let them eat each other as they want. They will not interfere. Under these conditions, there is no good future for either Ukraine or Russia. These territorial acquisitions, they are not for Russia, but for Putin's criminal group, which is engaged in raiding on an international scale and is building an autarkic economic model. And now it is important that both Russian and Ukrainian society appeal to the West, to its public opinion. After all, on the one hand, there is a beating of a weaker country, on the other hand, the degradation of Russian society itself, swelling with triumph, turning before our eyes into a kind of German society of the 30s of the last century. If the West does not point Putin to clear limits beyond which it is impossible to go, then he will not be stopped, and the world may reach a nuclear war. Now the West does not have such a plan; a long-term situation of uncertainty persists.

US Senator John F. Kennedy, who recently visited Russia with a delegation from the US Congress, said upon his return that dealing with the Kremlin is like "dealing with the mafia": "There is no political philosophy in Russia. It's like asking what the mafia's political philosophy is. Their philosophy is money and power. That's Putin's philosophy. hold back," the senator added.

The Kremlin, which had previously portrayed the visit of the American delegation in very favorable terms, reacted to Kennedy's words. press secretary Russian President Dmitry Peskov called the senator's statement a manifestation of "stereotypes" and "Russophobia". "We don't wear rose-colored glasses and are well aware of how the American political establishment is captivated by stereotypes and under the most terrible Russophobic pressure," Peskov said, noting that he "difficult to understand such words" because he did not know "in what context they were said."

At first, the Kremlin said they were "very satisfied" with the visit of the American delegation, but its members later said that none of the meetings in Moscow were easy or pleasant, and the Kremlin distorted the essence of the discussions, during which the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbass, the conflict in Syria and Russian interference in the American elections were discussed.

In a few days there will be another attempt at US-Russian dialogue, this time between the presidents. Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin will meet in Helsinki on July 16.

On the eve of the summit, journalists from the White House pool asked Trump whether the United States could recognize Crimea as Russian. He responded with something along the lines of "We're going to have to see." White House press secretary Sirah Sanders, however, quickly clarified the president's comment, saying: The United States does not recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea and will not lift sanctions until the peninsula is returned to Ukraine.

The policy of total trolling

Political scientist Alexander Morozov, assessing the state of the Kremlin before the meeting between Putin and Trump, calls him nervous:

- There is tension because of the World Cup, there were big worries about how it will pass. A meeting with Trump is being prepared, and its agenda is not simple, it is not a fact that the meeting will turn out the way the Kremlin would like. The entire large package of claims against Russia from the West has not disappeared, despite some apparent improvements or opening opportunities. There is the OSCE, PACE, the decision of the US Congress on sanctions against individuals and companies, and so on. It seems to me that the Kremlin understands the situation very well, but it is faced with the task of achieving some kind of diplomatic breakthrough, for this every opportunity is used. But at the same time, the Kremlin itself understands that these efforts are almost ineffective, and it will not reduce the rhetoric, including those associated with "Russophobia", with accusations against the political leadership of Western countries. These two processes are not related. The Kremlin, of course, will not stop trying to blow a hole in public diplomacy, showing its own audience that there are forces in the West that are "for us" - this is the Kremlin's favorite phrase. What the Kremlin is doing can be called a policy of total trolling against the West: this includes hacker attacks, the actions of Russia Today, work with far-right, ultra-left deputies in the European Parliament, parliaments European countries. This is a wide panorama of the total trolling of the West.

The Kremlin acts extremely dirty in many matters

At the same time, when it seems to the Kremlin that there are some diplomatic breakthroughs or changes in its favor – ​there are publications that sanctions will soon be lifted or that there may be a deal – then insoluble problems will soon surface that will not go away: the annexation of Crimea, there will be a trial for the Boeing. During the year there was a media wave about doping, which was extremely painful for Russia. Due to the fact that the Kremlin acts extremely dirty in many matters, it has a very rude, greedy policy, it is clear that some new scandal of this kind will break out soon - this is due to the style of the Kremlin itself. It's good that the Skripals survived, and this whole story is not as terrible as the Litvinenko case. But then we must be wary of some new episode, because the structure of the Kremlin's actions is not trivial. We believe that there is a concrete political solution, and it is being implemented. But the word "Kremlin" is some kind of idea of ​​​​action on the principle of a swarm. These are a kind of partisan detachments that operate in the hostile territory of the West. They often act independently, coordinate in no known way, and their actions sometimes deal an untimely blow to the Kremlin itself.

Putin's Prigogine is an independent partisan

We often think: how can this be? Suppose a meeting is being prepared that should lead to important economic decisions, and suddenly an outrage like the preparation of a coup in Montenegro is revealed. When you look at this, you understand that inside the Kremlin there are a lot of some small partisan entities that operate largely independently. Putin spoke directly about this several times. He was asked: are these your actions? He answered: no, Prigozhin is not us, this is not a state, a person has such a business. ( We are talking about businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is believed to be in Putin's circle. His company was accused of interfering in US elections. Putin later said in an interview: "I know such a person, but he is not among my friends ... There is such a businessman ... He is not a government official, we have nothing to do with him." - Approx.) That is, for Putin, Prigogine is an independent partisan. Recently, Prigozhin announced recruitment for a new site that is entirely devoted to negative information about life in the United States. On the one hand, [the Kremlin] needs to sort out relations with Trump, and on the other hand, a site is being created that will undoubtedly have an impact. This strange swarm does not go anywhere; Putin has it all the time in different directions, from some kind of paramilitary detachments to media actions.

Nord Stream is an important thing

- It has an economic explanation. The Kremlin, of course, needs something from the West. The first is to maintain a certain economic interaction. Nord Stream is an important thing. Any restrictions on arms exports are quite sensitive to the Kremlin. He is fighting here by any means - corruption, lobbying, political measures to preserve the possibility of economic interaction. It acts quite flexibly, creating a giant machine to circumvent sanctions, transferring assets from dangerous areas to less dangerous ones, and so on. And the other side that the Kremlin would like from the West (this has been discussed a lot, but no one can answer what form it should take) is that, as Putin says, Russia's grown political global weight is somehow recognized in the structure of international organizations, on the international arena. It is not entirely clear in what form this can be expressed, but the Kremlin insists on it. He is dissatisfied with his position in international structures, refuses to pay contributions to a number of European organizations, contemptuously treats major international forums, Davos, and the G7 meeting, believing that these consultations mean nothing. The Kremlin is betting on bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the Kremlin demands recognition of the form of sovereignty that Putin preaches as inherent in Russia and important for Russia. At the same time, the Kremlin brought to the fore people that they do not recognize the established language and style of international diplomacy, speaking from a position that far exceeds the arrogance of the representatives of the Soviet Union in diplomacy. At the same time, Russia wants to be recognized as not just a partner within international structures, but as a significant figure.

Crimea in your pocket

I must say that Putin has a bad situation in general - the problem is largely that he has Crimea in his pocket. The obvious framework of the meeting with Trump is that Putin has already taken his own before the start of the bargaining, and this is his own - Crimea. Crimea is a heavy brick in his pocket during any further negotiations, because he is in a position where in any negotiations he must continue to pay for the Crimea taken. No one knows how much this Crimea is worth, but it is obvious that its price can be very high. And the US sanctions in April showed that if, say, the United States decides to pursue a policy of consistent pressure, then three or four such strikes, like the April strikes on Russian companies, will create difficult, very difficult problems for Putin. In this sense, he is in a bad situation.

According to him, Alexei Navalny managed to show that he is capable of independent actions, and that it is difficult for the Kremlin to drive him into a narrow corridor. Looking ahead to next year's presidential elections in Russia, he argues that they will be difficult.

Nevertheless, A. Morozov does not hide his pessimism: "But it should be noted that one should not deceive oneself and associate some special optimism with the awakening of youth."

- How can you characterize the events of June 12 in Russia? What was the main thing, in your opinion?

First of all, it must be said that it is not as easy to assess this as it seems at first glance. Because, on the one hand, this is just another step in the presidential election campaign that is being waged. Everyone understands that he is in a hopeless situation, deprived of the opportunity to participate in public politics, to be elected, but at the same time he is trying to lead interesting game, which by and large aims to overshadow the fourth term and the 2018 presidential election. And here Navalny achieved some results, because once again he showed that he is capable of absolutely independent actions, that it is difficult for the Kremlin to drive him into a narrow corridor.

- Is it getting more difficult or generally difficult?

It becomes more difficult, but the ball is always on the side of Navalny, he retains the initiative, creating a situation of chaotic reaction for the Kremlin.

- I got the impression that during these protests, Navalny's figure was far from being the main one.

Yes, this is one side. The second side is that on March 26 everyone understood that some new youth configuration had taken place in response to Navalny's revelations. All this network activity, 20 million views of his video - this is a very wide coverage. And on March 26, it became clear that new contingents and audiences were drawn into politics.

Your words refute the assertions of some analysts and publicists that a whole generation has grown up that has seen nothing but Putin. Now we see that this generation still wants something different.

This is the second important point, it can be accurately fixed. These are young people of 18-20 years old, and it is impossible to expect people of this age to explain their motivation like fifty-year-old political scientists. It is clear that these young people are confused in words, but in what they say, one theme is heard in general, which is certainly true. It lies in the fact that these young people are tired of the official, bureaucratic, senile political and generational layer. They see some terrible people who are not in politics, but in life in general old men who represent some terrible image of the future. The youth is hearing that some old priests up there are demanding a new morality, the warriors are demanding new war, here you can see that these guys at the top have seized all the money in the country and are not going to share it in any way, and there will be no justice for the new generations.

- A kind of France in 1968?

This is true. It seems to me that Andrei Loshak correctly described the atmosphere on Tverskaya, when young people first chant "Russia without Putin", and then immediately jokingly "Estrada without Agutin." But it should be noted that one should not be deceived and associate some special optimism with the awakening of youth. First, it is not at all clear which way it will go. On Tverskaya it was clear that the young people who came were, as they say in Russia, botany students. Unlike the protests of 2008 and 2011-2012 in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Then there were a lot of politicized youth from various anarchist, right-wing organizations. Here it was clear that it was not football fans, not politicized groups, but "bespectacled students" with Russian flags. In general, their life feeling of their future really completely coincided: June 12 is the day of Russia, and they want to claim that this is their Russia and their future.

Don't you have the feeling that June 12 put the authorities in a dead end? Did the authorities expect this, and, therefore, is Navalny's isolation not everything?

Of course not. The authorities have prepared very well for five years. This is clearly visible: the special forces are well equipped, trained, they carry out logistics and measures to dismember the crowd much better. All this is much more thought out than before. In this sense of the word, the authorities do not have to be afraid of this environment, these young students seriously. That is why it seemed to me and many other people of the older generation that the dispersal was carried out too harshly in relation to such a contingent. When the decision was made, a very archaic type of dispersal began.

- In Ukraine, as you know, such dispersal ended with the Maidan ...

Quite right. This time, the dispersal was an erroneous, inadequate decision by the authorities. Also, one should not forget that such an action is held for the first time on Independence Day, and, of course, it very sadly resembles the events in Minsk. Because the Belarusian opposition, back in 2011, tried to make Independence Day a day of resistance to the state dictatorship, a protest against the necrosis political life. There are a lot of shots in which the Belarusian security forces in a tough form screw the townspeople. And here we have the same sad situation. It was evident that our government was Lukashenized further. She may be trying, but she does not know how to act, what to do with this discontent that has arisen.

Protests took place not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg, they were also in the regions. The federal channels are silent about this, Putin is participating in the planned events in the Kremlin. Everything goes on. How to compare all this? It seems that everything happens at the same time, but from the point of view of news on TV channels, it seems that these protests do not exist in the country?

Just like in 2011, one can say that the authorities are reacting inadequately. What is the fight for, or rather, what can political leaders like Navalny and others achieve? At best, they can lead to the fact that there will be some kind of faction in parliament. In general, it is obvious that the systemic forces enjoy great support, some people continue to vote for the communists, state employees - for United Russia. There is no catastrophic threat from this small urban traffic.

Sociologists say that in large cities with a population of over a million, 20% of voters would vote for, relatively speaking, Navalny's party. These are people for the most part - people of free professions who are not bound by corporate loyalty, budget, etc. So, all this environment should be given representation in parliament for a long time and nothing dramatic will happen. Instead, it stubbornly chooses the strategy of accusing these people of “orangeism”, the intention to undermine the entire system as a whole, and in doing so, the Kremlin is radicalizing the situation. The youth is already on the rise. If in 2011 the regional protest was weaker than in Moscow, now it is already clear that in the regions in large cities the number of people entering the rallies is growing.

- Is it possible to say that protests in the regions are much more dangerous for the current system?

In some sense of the word, of course, more dangerous. If in big Moscow, where there are a huge number of state employees, the authorities can convincingly lead a million people to an alternative rally, then if we take the rest of the cities, there is a different atmosphere. It is useless for the authorities to organize counter-rallies there. In addition, it must be said that in the regions and many cities social tension is experienced more acutely than in Moscow or St. Petersburg.

- The situation now does not resemble the beginning of the twentieth century before the revolution?

No. Of course, there are some similarities, but they are very distant. Still, the main factor there was the war, besides, an important difference is that then there was a huge amount of the agrarian population, which is not now. But the problem is rather elsewhere. It remains unclear how the Kremlin wants, on the one hand, to remain a modernized economy, and on the other hand, to crush the generation that should be the engine of this development. For any observer, this is an unresolvable contradiction. If you want to further modernize, even if in the format of a Eurasian state, then this cannot be done relying on the most archaic groups of society: officials, conservative forces of the church, and so on. This doesn't happen. This controversy is the main plot of the 2018 presidential campaign.

In your opinion, do the authorities understand what they are dealing with now, if we talk about protests? If fear about it?

The authorities are extremely self-confident. This can be seen from the way Sobyanin acts in relation to the townspeople, and Putin on the line on June 15, probably, will not even talk about it. This does not exist, they do not want to see this problem, they are sure that they have a great support, that they have reserves in their hands. They are convinced that for 15 years they have prepared legislatively, in the legislation they have taken Big changes to fight political protest. They believe that in an emergency they will be able to control the Internet, they have prepared the National Guard, the troops. But it seems to me that this is some kind of wild policy, because I know many Moscow families whose children left on March 26 and left on June 12. These are families that are very rooted, have lived all their lives here and do not want to leave Russia. They support their children, share their views. All these families will deeply condemn the harsh actions of the authorities against students.

- Was the action of intimidation on the part of the authorities a success?

Already on June 12, in the evening, it was clear how a new stream of talk broke out about the need to leave, which is no longer possible. People began to think that children should be sent from Russia to study in other countries. There is a sad and endless movement of Russia and the Kremlin towards equalization with regimes like the Belarusian or Azerbaijani.

- What would you call the main result of the protests?

The main thing is that no matter how the political regime tries to create a mind control machine with the help of television and the so-called educational work, it is still clear that in response, society spontaneously develops actions similar to the actions of the body's immunity. The main thing here is to demonstrate that you will not be able to stop the growth of civic consciousness with this whole system of brainwashing.

- At the same time, it is interesting that the heroes of the demonstration were not opposition leaders, but ordinary Russians

Maybe Navalny would have become a hero if he had not been detained at the entrance, but since he was detained, and after the protests of 2011-2012, the protest movement was largely decapitated, 5-6 active people remained in Russia. And in this sense, there is no big role for the old Solidarity or Parnassus.

- The authorities are ready for the 2018 elections, will they be difficult?

Elections will be difficult. It must be said here that Navalny still commands great respect, because he really shows that there are people who did not vote for a third term for Putin and are strongly opposed to a fourth term, because it will simply be the death of Russian life and politics. He and all of us, unfortunately, cannot change and somehow influence the fact that Putin refuses the fourth term, so that some process of renewal begins in the right direction. But it's important to at least demonstrate it. And Navalny is an important link in this sense. He shows quite fearlessly that people do not agree with the fourth term.

Many leading Russian intellectuals came to Kyiv as part of the large congress “Ukraine-Russia: Dialogue”, organized on the initiative of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Among them is Alexander Morozov, publicist and political scientist, editor-in-chief of one of the most important intellectual projects in Russia over the past two decades, the Russian Journal. The RG correspondent talked with Mr. Morozov about Putin's ideology, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and the future of our countries

– Alexander Olegovich, in recent texts you describe Russia of “Putin’s third term” as a completely new reality – the transition from “postmodernist dictatorship” to dictatorship “in all seriousness”, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine also fits into this turn. What processes led to this? Why did it happen this way?

– There are two explanations for why this happened – both have their share of truth. The first circumstance lies on the surface, and all political scientists know this - this is the natural aging of an authoritarian, personalistic regime. This is how the regimes of Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain grew old. The regime begins to transform, this is also connected with generational issues - after the first, “revolutionary” generation, the next one comes, and it is more vicious and cruel.

The second explanation is common in Moscow political circles among high-ranking officials. Russia has completed 20 years of post-Soviet transit, Putin is trying to reposition Russia.

– At the same time, the Kremlin now actually speaks in the vocabulary of the neo-imperialists Prokhanov and Limonov…

– Precisely, before marginal circles sent messages that it was necessary to revise the entire architecture of world politics, the role of international organizations. At the same time, it was believed that the Kremlin is rationalistic and operates within the framework of global capitalism, the world system of international relations, in general, according to its rules. Now it is clear that the Kremlin is voicing this strange marginal philosophy, threatening to withdraw from various international obligations, thereby bringing down the world order.

Perhaps there was such a development of events: Russia becomes the head of the "conservative international" and presents itself as part of right-wing Europe. In principle, the West was ready for this scenario. But here in the Kremlin they went for the annexation of Crimea, creating a situation that no European right can recognize. Both the Christian Democrats and the European People's Party condemned the actions. This means that Putin's project is no longer a conservative European one, but a kind of one-sided project of revising one's own status. I hope that Putin, as the head of state, is aware of all the risks of such a turn.

– In general, how conscious is Putin's policy? How does he form this new ideology of his?

– The ideology has matured as a result of his 15-year reign. He is already a very experienced leader, the first level of world processes, and he does not like the role that Russia plays in them. And he wants to win her over. Can he do it? In my opinion, there is no, in any case, such a "redealt of cards", in response to which the West will not collapse, but rather strengthen. The Western elites will not take the path of accepting Russia's conditions, but rather the path of building a guard wall around it.

- Maybe this is Putin's goal: to isolate himself from the world and rule like Stalin, without regard to the world community?

- There is such a version, but its reality would mean that Putin is sick, and then it would be worth listening to the interpretation of Gleb Pavlovsky that we are dealing with a special psychology. Closing in on his ideas, the personality of such a ruler feels more comfortable in autarchy than in the free world. This is the most terrible scenario for Russia, cut off from the world, it will degrade psychologically, socially and culturally at a rapid pace.

- In such a scenario, Putin's elite will also have to rebuild. After all, earlier its great-power-conservative rhetoric was at odds with its own way of life (capital in the West, integration into the life of the cosmopolitan world elite). Will this "closing of Russia" cause a revolt of the elites?

- No, it won't. Because Putin is conducting a bloodless purge. He invites everyone who does not want to remain in the autarky system to leave. As a result of such a policy, a critical mass of a discontented elite will never form. Chirkunov and Kokh, for example, have already left. And these are the people who were sponsors of liberalization and modernization programs in Russia. We are accustomed to measure by the standards of modern states, where the suppressed part of the elite is grouped inside the country to protect their interests (as in Egypt or Turkey). But we live in a post-society situation where those who are dissatisfied simply leave. Now in Russia there are practically no stories about raiding, people voluntarily go into cash when they come to them with offers from Chekists.

And for those who want to stay with Putin on the boat, he offers to take capital from the West, to voluntarily take on restrictions on the departure of relatives and transactions. He wants to create a new team, a new "Order of the Sword" to replace the old one, represented by the "Ozero" cooperative. And he creates a new loyalty through these restrictions on communication with the outside world.

- Doesn't this scheme work in relation to Ukraine - Putin is trying to cut off territories from Ukraine that are ready to live according to his new rules - Crimea, Donbass, and offering the rest of Ukraine to symbolically go into the cache, dropping the ballast, go to Europe?

- No I do not think so. Putin's policy towards Ukraine will be much tougher. He will try to take away what can be taken away - already Crimea, and part of the South-East. In relation to the rest, he plans to repurchase the business and gain economic control. Unfortunately, he has a good chance of doing so. If the situation in Ukraine is brought to a permanent crisis, then doing business here becomes a risky business. With the help of shadow negotiations, 10-15 largest oligarchs can be pushed to leave the site. At the same time, it will be difficult for them to sell their assets to the West, since no one wants to invest in the territory of constant conflict. Putin's group of oligarchs will have the opportunity to buy assets. And then exercise political control through economic levers. We see this in Germany, where there is a powerful pro-Russian lobby.

Now the Ukrainian political class faces a huge historical challenge, it is greater than the loss of Crimea or Donbass. The Kremlin has amassed vast resources by ostentatiously throwing away billions of dollars, showing that it can buy everyone and everything.

– What can be opposed to Putin's policy in Ukraine?

- In Crimea, we saw a very cold and sophisticated mechanism of KGB meanness, which is difficult to resist. Such a system cannot be overcome with the help of sincerity and openness, which were demonstrated by Maidan in Ukraine or Bolotnaya in Russia, it turns them into some kind of defect. People in the Kremlin, possessing the psychology of intelligence officers, do not believe in any sincere revolutions, ideological impulses, public politics, according to their vision, everything can only be organized, inspired. Either we organized, or the West, our agents against foreign agents. This is the tragedy that such a system can only be replayed on its own field of secret war. The Kremlin uses the tactics of saboteurs, "little green men", constantly lies, and when the other side says - how can you lie like that, he laughs. Yes, we are scouts.

Even the Soviet government in the Brezhnev era, for all its vileness, did not stoop to this level. She had an ideological regulator that limited the actions of the KGB, so such a policy was always combined with an appeal to universalist values. And the experience of Crimea shows that they wanted it and took it away.

- Donbass is waiting for the same fate?

- Donbass is waiting for the "Bosnian scenario": while formally remaining part of Ukraine, it will autonomize to the state of Transnistria in Moldova. It is not necessary to annex the territories of the East, it is enough to create a "gray zone", it will have a radioactive effect on the rest of Ukraine.

– Many people are now saying that it is better to cut off the Donbass in order to save the rest of Ukraine…

- This will be a meaningful step only if the Ukrainian elite has built a European consensus. The point is not to cut off the Donbass, because then it will be possible to cut off further. The only way to give up Donbass is to receive guarantees from the European Union and NATO that they will immediately enter the new borders, now, and not sometime in the indefinite future.

– There is also a feeling that the current anti-terrorist operation in the Donbass is in the nature of an “agreement” with the Kremlin. There is such an imaginary war in which not only Moscow, but also Kyiv is interested.

- In fact of the matter. There are no guarantees that the Ukrainian elite is sufficiently patriotic, that it has a consolidated core that would not yield under any circumstances. Any society is corrupt - in Poland, in the Czech Republic, and in the Baltic countries - but there the elites have a limit that they cannot cross. With all the love of freedom of the Ukrainian establishment, it is clear that all its leaders have personal strategies. And this means that at any moment the leader, due to personal gain, can change his position. If something like a gentry assembly of the 200 richest families arose here, which would firmly come out with a single position and call on Europe for help, that would be a different matter. But for now, every family is for itself. This also applies to Ukrainian society, which chooses the strategy of individual survival.

- Can we say about the eastern part of the elite, primarily about the Akhmetov group, in whose fiefdom the main battles are taking place, that it is already completely on the hook of Putin? Like people who made capital in the 90s, they must calculate the situation, understand that the Kremlin will take everything from them.

“They are calculating, they are preparing. They think typologically, like the Russian oligarchs. It was in the 90s that they fought in such a situation, and in the 2000s they began to accept the proposed conditions and leave. If Akhmetov has a hopeless situation, he will give the business to some conditional Vekselberg, without waiting for the situation that happened to Khodorkovsky.

– Where is the limit of the expansion of the Russian space of influence?

- It passes along the borders of NATO. In hindsight, it is clear that those who managed to join this organization are happy. A new Roman rampart runs along this line, which separates civilization from barbarism. And this is the great tragedy of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, at the very beginning the Western elite followed its course with excitement, but then the desire to fence off the new barbarians began to dominate in the West - let them eat each other as they want. They will not interfere. Under these conditions, there is no good future for either Ukraine or Russia. These territorial acquisitions, they are not for Russia, but for Putin's criminal group, which is engaged in raiding on an international scale and is building an autarkic economic model. And now it is important that both Russian and Ukrainian society appeal to the West, to its public opinion. After all, on the one hand, there is a beating of a weaker country, on the other hand, the degradation of Russian society itself, swelling with triumph, turning before our eyes into a kind of German society of the 30s of the last century. If the West does not point Putin to clear limits beyond which it is impossible to go, then he will not be stopped, and the world may reach a nuclear war. Now the West does not have such a plan; a long-term situation of uncertainty persists.

Interviewed by Konstantin Skorkin