Luga defensive line. Luga defensive line Encirclement of the Luga Group of Forces

To cover the troops of the group from the air, aviation from the entire Northern Front was involved under the command of Major General Aviation A. A. Novikov.

By July 9, the Luga task force occupied the eastern and central defense sector from the city of Luga to Lake Ilmen. The area on the lower reaches of the Luga River remained unoccupied, on which the troops had just begun to advance.

The actions of the North-Western and Northern fronts were coordinated by the High Command and the headquarters of the troops of the North-Western direction. So, in order to improve the operational leadership of the troops, the High Command of the North-Western direction from July 14 transferred the 41st Rifle Corps of the 11th Army and the entire 8th Army to the Northern Front.

During the 18 days of the offensive, armored and motorized enemy troops crossed the line along the Western Dvina and occupied the Pskov fortified area. It became clear that Army Group North intended to strike with its main forces across Luga to Krasnogvardeysk (now Gatchina), in order to then take Leningrad on the move and link up with the Finnish troops.

A very disturbing time has come for Leningrad. The Luga fortified position was not yet ready. The Narva and Kingisepp directions were covered by the 191st Rifle Division. The 70th, 111th, and 177th Rifle Divisions were just advancing into the combat area, while the people's militia divisions were generally in the formation stage. In this situation, the Military Council of the Northern Front decided to reinforce the Luga direction to transfer the reserve 237th rifle division from the Petrozavodsk direction, and 2 divisions of the 10th mechanized corps from the Karelian Isthmus (corps commander Major General I. G. Lazarev, military commissar brigade Commissioner S. I. Melnikov, Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel D. I. Zaev). It was risky, as the northern sector of defense was weakened, but there was no other way out.

Tank and motorized formations of German troops after the capture of Pskov did not wait for the approach of the main forces of the 16th and 18th armies, but resumed the offensive: the 41st motorized corps on Luga, and the 56th motorized corps on Novgorod.

Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the 90th and 111th Rifle Divisions withdrew with fighting to the forefield of the Luga defensive zone and on July 12, together with the 177th Rifle Division, stopped the advance of the enemy. An attempt by two tank and one German infantry divisions to break through to the city of Luga in this direction was not successful.

On July 10, two tank, motorized and infantry divisions of the 41st motorized corps of the 4th tank group of German troops, with the support of aviation, attacked parts of the 118th rifle division north of Pskov. Having forced her to retreat to Gdov, they rushed to Luga from another front. A day later, the Germans reached the Plyussa River and started a battle with the covering forces of the Luga Operational Group.

The 191st and 177th Rifle Divisions, the 1st People's Militia Division, the 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade, cadets of the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov and the Leningrad Rifle and Machine Gun School managed to take up the defense in the Luga position. The 24th tank division was in reserve, and the 2nd division of the people's militia was advancing to the front line.

Formations and units defended on a wide front. Between them there were gaps of 20-25 km, not occupied by troops. Some important areas, such as Kingisepp, turned out to be undisguised.

The 106th Engineer and 42nd Pontoon Battalions set up anti-tank minefields in the foredfield area. Intensive work was still carried out at the Luga position. Tens of thousands of Leningraders and the local population took part in them.

The German divisions, approaching the forefield of the Luga defensive position, ran into stubborn resistance. Day and night, hot battles did not subside. Important settlements and centers of resistance changed hands several times. On July 13, the enemy managed to wedge into the supply zone, but on the morning of the next day, the forward detachments of the 177th Rifle and units of the 24th Panzer Division, supported by powerful artillery fire, knocked him out of the forefield and again took up positions along the Plyussa River. The artillery group of Colonel Odintsov played a major role in repelling the onslaught of enemy tanks. One howitzer battery of senior lieutenant A. V. Yakovlev destroyed 10 enemy tanks.

The German command decided to change the direction of the main attack. The main forces of the 41st Motorized Corps were ordered to move to Kingisepp. Covertly, along country and forest roads, German tank and motorized units at a fast pace began to bypass the grouping of troops of the Northern Front, located in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Luga. Soon they reached the Luga River, 20-25 km southeast of Kingisepp. On July 14, the advance detachment of the Germans crossed the river and created a bridgehead on its northern bank near the village of Ivanovskoye.

The maneuver of the main forces of the 4th Panzer Group from the Luga to the Kingisepp direction was timely discovered by reconnaissance of the front. At the same time, the reconnaissance group of V. D. Lebedev, which operated behind enemy lines, especially distinguished itself. She reported on the intensive movement of German tanks and motorized columns from Strug Krasny and Plyussa to Lyady and further to the Luga River. The regrouping of German troops was followed by our air reconnaissance. The front command took urgent measures to cover the Kingisepp sector. The dispatch to this direction of the 2nd division of the people's militia, formed from the volunteers of the Moscow region of Leningrad and the tank battalion of the Leningrad Red Banner Armored Improvement Courses for commanders, which began to form hastily on July 15, 1941, was accelerated.

The aviation of the front began to strike at the enemy's crossings and at his approaching columns. For this, the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the 7th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Corps were also used, operationally subordinate to the Front Air Force Commander, Major General A. A. Novikov.

On July 14, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction K. E. Voroshilov, together with the commander of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, arrived in the Kingisepp area, where units of the 2nd division of the people's militia tried to "knock down" German troops from the captured bridgehead on the Luga River . The militias were supported by the consolidated tank regiment LKBTKUKS and a separate tank battalion of KV tanks.

The consolidated tank regiment began to form on the night of July 15, according to the order of Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, consisting of 19 KB tanks and 36 armored vehicles. To do this, the entire materiel of LKBTKUKS was ordered to be transferred to the Weimarn station. 7 KB tanks under the command of Major Pinchuk by rail moved to the Weimarn area at 10.30 on July 15, 1941. At 12.20, a company of armored vehicles from the Izhora plant arrived there, the second company of the BA was understaffed at the plant with a readiness period of 15-18 hours on July 15. The tank company (9 T-26s, 5 T-50s), which arrived by 14:00 on 15 July, had not yet been fully formed.

On July 16, 1941, all combat vehicles from the LKBTKUKS, together with the teaching staff, were concentrated in the area of ​​the Weimarn station. As of July 16, the consolidated regiment had 10 KB, 8 T-34s, 25 BT-7s, 24 T-26s, 3 T-50s, 4 T-38s, 1 T-40s, and 7 armored vehicles. Apparently, with the arrival on July 17 of 6 KB tanks of the 1st Panzer Division, which were transferred by railway transport with the involvement of the KB company of the combined TP, a separate tank battalion of heavy KB tanks was formed, which was commanded by Major Pinchuk.

From July 16 to July 21, the LKBTKUKS regiment and a separate KB tank battalion were used in battles in the Kingisepp area. The tanks were thrown into battle on the move, attacked the enemy head-on, without reconnaissance, without the support of infantry and artillery, and suffered a complete fiasco - the enemy's bridgehead could not be eliminated.

But in general, in mid-July, German troops were detained at the Luga line. Neither in the area of ​​​​Kingisepp, nor in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Bolshoi Sabek (the defense section of the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov), nor in the Luga fortified position (the defense section of the Leningrad Military Engineering School) German troops failed to break through.

From mid-July, tank units of the 1st and 10th mechanized corps, as well as armored trains and trolleys, began to be involved to support the actions of the Luga Operational Group.

The 1st Panzer Division (without the 2nd Panzer Regiment) from the 1st Mechanized Corps, urgently transferred from the Kandalaksha direction, completed its concentration in the area of ​​​​the village of Roshal (Korpikovo, Proletarskaya Sloboda) on July 18, and then for another two weeks, depending from a changing situation was thrown from one direction to another.

The remaining parts of the division, on the basis of the order of the commander of the Luga operational group, from July 20 began to move to a new assembly area - Kikerino-Volosovo station, where they concentrated by noon the next day. Armored trains of 60 BEPO also pulled up there, and armored tires guarded the bridges in Kingisepp. On July 22, by order of the commander of the North-Western Front, a transition began to a new concentration area - Bolshiye Korchany, Pruzhitsa, Ilyesha, Gomontovo. The concentration ended on the night of July 22, and the division was placed at the disposal of troops in the Kingisepp area (ambushes were organized there from tanks and armored vehicles in the directions of a possible breakthrough of German units, at the same time, a company of BT tanks was sent to the command of the commander of the 8th Army by order of the commander of the Northern Front -7 consisting of 10 vehicles with 10 transport vehicles and a supply of equipment necessary for combat. Note. ed.).

On July 31, on the basis of a combat order from the commander of the Northern Front, the 1st Panzer Division from the occupied area was again transferred to a new concentration area - Korostelevo, Skvoritsy, Bolshiye Chernitsy, where it organized defense from the western, southwestern and southern directions.

On July 8, units of the 24th Panzer Division from the 10th Mechanized Corps, on the basis of an oral order from the corps commander, were transferred to a new concentration area: height 60.5, Lake Sosovo, Starye Krupeli, height 61.1, where they were supposed to prepare defenses for turn: height 60.5, Shalovo, Lake Sosovo and be ready for counterattacks in the direction of settlements - Starye Krupeli, Shalovo, the northern outskirts of Luga; Shalovo, Zherebut, Beloe; Middle Krupel, Big Isori and further to the east.

The next day, parts of the division continued to conduct defensive work. By that time, on the basis of the order of the Military Council of the Northern Front, the 48th tank regiment of the division was disbanded, its materiel and personnel went to resupply the 49th tank regiment. 16 flamethrower tanks from the 21st Panzer Division also arrived there. The regiment was engaged in understaffing and restoration of materiel. The 24th Howitzer Artillery Regiment took up a divisional order of battle: the 1st Division - at a firing position in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Starye Krupeli, the 2nd Division - at a firing position in the area of ​​\u200b\u200ba nameless lake near the village of Sredniye Krupeli. The 24th Motorized Regiment entered the defense area - Shalovo, Sosovo Lake and began defensive work at the line: height 82.6, Shalovo, Chernoye Lake, Sosovo Lake and the bridge across the Luga River south of the village of Zheltsy.

On July 10, units of 24 TD (118 BT-2-5, 44 BA-10-20 on July 11, 1941) continued to carry out engineering work in their areas of location. During the day, the right flank of the 49th tank regiment southwest of Shalovo was repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft. As a result of the raids, 6 people were killed and 32 wounded. On the evening of July 11, an enemy air raid on a forest 500 meters southeast of the settlement of Dolgovka destroyed 35 boxes of RGD-31 hand grenades and burned 3,500 flares.

The next day, parts of the division, in pursuance of the order of the Military Council of the Northern Front, formed fighter groups to fight enemy tanks. In the morning, a reconnaissance group was sent in the direction of Ludon with the task of establishing the composition and actions of the enemy in this direction, and the next day an oral order was received from the corps commander to form a maneuver group of 10 microns for action in the Pskov direction. By evening, such a group under the command of Colonel Rodin was created. The group included: the 2nd battalion of the 49th tank regiment (32 BT tanks), the 1st battalion of the 24th motorized regiment, one battery of 122-mm guns (4 guns), a platoon of anti-tank guns of the 24th motorized regiment (two 76.2 mm guns), 3 anti-aircraft machine gun mounts from the 24th artillery regiment. At 18.20, the maneuvering group set out along the route: Luga, Zhglino, Gorodets, Poddubye, Bor, with the task of striking in the direction of the settlements of Milyutino, Nikolaevo, to knock out the enemy on the southern bank of the Plyussa River and ensure that our units occupy the line along the Plyussa River from the settlement of Plyussa to Zapolya. By 23.00 the group concentrated in the forest south of the village of Bor. By this time, the barrier detachments from the 483rd Infantry Regiment retreated under the influence of the enemy - the 1st Battalion of the 483rd Infantry Regiment to the Gorodishche region, the 2nd Battalion in disarray to the Poddubye region, the 3rd Battalion to the Meriga region. During the night, the battalions were put in order for joint operations with the maneuver group. The group commander personally coordinated the issues of interaction with the commander of the 90th Infantry Division.

On the morning of July 14, a group of Colonel Rodin launched an offensive in two directions: through the villages - Sheregi, Zapolye, Milyutino and Lyubenskoye, Zalisenye, Plyussa. The first group fought in the village of Kritz, where they were detained by anti-tank guns and mortars from the Milyutino area. The second group met a German motorcade - up to 160 tarpaulin-covered vehicles, 15 tanks and 50 motorcyclists. With a blow to the flank, the group broke the column into two parts: one - followed under the fire of the group to Plyussa, the second - turned back to Milyutino and was met by the fire of Soviet tanks from Lyubensky. As a result of the battle, an 8-ton vehicle was destroyed and an enemy tank was hit. The first group fought until 20.00 in the area south of Sherega, where they met 4 heavy German tanks and up to an infantry company. Subsequently, the movement of the group was suspended by German artillery and mortar fire, and it went on the defensive. In the forest area northeast of Sherega, the group lost 5 tanks knocked out by German artillery and 23 people killed and wounded. The second group, fighting in the Lyubenskoye area, entered the forest 500 meters north of the Sheregi settlement. During the day, the group conducted reconnaissance in combat in the direction of the settlements of Maymeskoye, Katorskoye, where, as a result of the battle, 2 BA-10 vehicles were hit by German artillery fire and burned down and 2 officers died.

By decision of the commander of the maneuver group, the units occupied a defense line along the southern edge of the forest north of the village of Sheregi, along the northern slopes of the ridge northeast of it, and received the task of preventing the enemy from further advancing along the road to Luga.

The next day, German units operated in front of the group's front as part of the 489th Infantry Regiment, supported by 4 heavy tanks and up to 2 heavy artillery battalions. The maneuver group continued to hold the Gorodishche-Sheregi line. The neighbor on the right - the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 483rd rifle regiment withdrew to the village of Kreni, exposing the right flank of the group. During the day, the group repeatedly counterattacked in the direction of the settlements of Gorodishche and Gorodenko. As a result of counterattacks, the enemy was driven out of the village of Gorodishche. During the battle, a German officer and one soldier were killed and remained in the territory occupied by the maneuver group, 3 anti-tank guns with full ammunition (two active) were captured, one enemy tank and 3 tanks were destroyed. However, the group also lost 17 BT-5 tanks (irretrievably), 2 BA-10 and BA-20 armored vehicles, 24 people killed and 37 wounded in 2 days. The reconnaissance group from the 24th motorized regiment carried out reconnaissance in the direction of the settlements of Sitenka, Krasnye Gory, Zakhonye, ​​Sara Gora. At 17.30 reconnaissance group No. 1 went to the villages of Fields and Shlomino, but did not find the enemy. Reconnaissance group No. 2 conducted reconnaissance in the direction of the settlements of Luga, Vedrovo, Andreevskoye, Naviny, reached the village of Belaya Gorka, but also did not detect the enemy.

On July 16, the maneuver group firmly held the defensive line - the northern outskirts of Gorodenka, the northern part of Gorodishche and the northern outskirts of Sherega. During the night and in the morning, reconnaissance was conducted from the maneuvering group in the direction of the settlements of Sheregi, Malyye Sheregi, Kritsa, but the enemy was not detected. Trophies were picked up by reconnaissance: a heavy machine gun, 2 mortars, 3 bicycles. From noon, the Germans began shelling the village of Bor, and from 16.00, under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, they launched an offensive against it, apparently intending to press the maneuver group against the lake with a swamp, bypassing it from the rear. The group commander decided to counterattack the enemy from the village of Gorodishche. With two infantry companies with tanks, the group attacked the village, as a result of which the Germans retreated in disarray, losing up to 30 people killed and wounded, several German soldiers were captured.

In the direction of the Sheregi settlement, a group of 2 platoons attacked the enemy with a force of up to a company. As a result of a fierce battle, 3 German officers and one private were captured, 2 anti-tank guns, one heavy machine gun, 2 mortars and 20 boxes with machine-gun belts were captured.

By the end of the day on July 17, the onslaught of the German units intensified, and the maneuver group, under the influence of strong artillery and mortar fire, withdrew to a new line - nameless heights north of the village of Bor. The neighbor on the right - the 3rd battalion of the 483rd rifle regiment occupied the village of Bolshoi Luzhok, the 1st battalion - Kulotino, the 2nd - Small Ozertsy. The neighbor on the left, the 173rd Rifle Regiment, took up a line along the southern edge of the forest north of the swamp near the Ogar tract. Reconnaissance was carried out in three directions: reconnaissance group No. 1 - Krasnaya Gorka, Sara Gora, Osmino, reconnaissance group No. 2 - Vedrovo, Noviny, reconnaissance group No. 3 - Poddubie, Bor, Sheregi. In the course of an active search, reconnaissance group No. 1 in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Lyubochozhye "captured the enemy's headquarters bus with documents and a captured non-commissioned officer."

The next day, the maneuver group, conducting containment battles, firmly held the defense line along the nameless heights a kilometer south of the village of Bor and in the forest northwest of it. Intelligence was sent from the division in the same three directions. Reconnaissance group No. 1, together with the partisans, fought in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Sara Gora.

Then, for another day, the maneuverable group fought for the capture of the settlements of Gorodishche and Lyubenskoye. As a result of the battle, the 1st battalion of the 24th motorized rifle regiment reached the southern edge of the forest, 700 m north of the village of Gorodishche and southwest of the edge of the forest, 500 m northwest of the village of Sheregi. The enemy, with a strength of up to 2 battalions, reinforced with artillery and mortars with a well-organized fire system, did not allow them to leave the forest. The infantry suffered heavy losses. Support artillery was inactive during the offensive. The group, having only 2 tanks and up to 2 companies of infantry, without artillery support, was forced to retreat to the old lines of defense. During the day, the group destroyed an anti-tank gun, 10 firing points and captured a German staff vehicle with documents belonging to the 3rd division of the 615th artillery regiment. The chief of staff of this division was also taken prisoner.

At this time, on the orders of the headquarters of the Luga operational group, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of the division (without one battalion) concentrated in the area of ​​​​the Tolmachevo station for loading into echelons, where it waited for the rolling stock. However, at 20.30, a verbal order was received from Major General Lazarev - to form and send a mobile group to the Sara Gora area with the task of encircling and destroying the enemy grouping that had broken through near the settlement of Osmino. On the basis of the order received, the loading of the regiment was suspended. At midnight, a group consisting of the 24th motorized regiment (without one battalion) in vehicles, the 3rd battalion of the 49th tank regiment, the 1st division of the 24th artillery regiment and the operational group of the headquarters of the 24th tank division under the command of Colonel Chesnokov acted in the direction of the settlement Sara Gora.

During this period, new materiel was delivered to the 24th Panzer Division from the factories of Leningrad. Basically, these were tanks of new models - KB and T-50. They were immediately introduced into battle, and their presence was not always taken into account in separate documents.

By the morning of July 20, the group reached the forest area east of the village of Sara Gora, 2 km from the mark 82.7. By this time, a mobile detachment consisting of a rifle company from the 24th motorized regiment, one tank company from the 49th tank regiment under the command of Major Lukashik occupied the northwestern edge of the forest east of the village. However, at the same time, an order was received to return the 24th motorized regiment to the loading area at the Tolmachevo station.

At 16.00, the mobile detachment, supported by the artillery battalion of the 24th artillery regiment, went on the offensive in the direction of the village of Osmino and by nightfall occupied the northern edge of the forest 700 m southeast of the village, losing 2 T-50 tanks (exploded by mines) and 2 armored vehicles BA-10 (hit by artillery fire and burned out).

The next day, in the morning, a group consisting of one rifle company, a company of traffic controllers and a tank company, with the support of an artillery battalion, continued the offensive in the direction of the village of Osmino, but under heavy barrage artillery and mortar fire from German units, it was forced to retreat to its original position, while losing one tank, which was blown up on a land mine and burned down along with the crew.

On July 22, a group under the command of Colonel Chesnokov went on the defensive along the southern bank of a nameless stream at the turn of the path leading to Osmino and nameless heights 800 m east of the village of Psoed. The group received the task - to prevent the enemy from moving from the villages of Osmino and Psoed to the village of Sara Gora and to destroy the German units that broke into the western outskirts of the village with a counterattack of tanks from the forest east of the Sara Gora settlement.

On the night of July 23, an order was received from the headquarters of the Luga task force to withdraw the mobile group from the battle and concentrate it in the former area - Shalovo, Starye Krupel. Leaving cover under the command of Major Lukashik, consisting of one rifle company, a company of traffic controllers, a tank company and an artillery battery of 122-mm guns, the group set out from the area of ​​​​the village of Sara Gora and concentrated in the evening in the area indicated to it. The cover left by the group firmly held the occupied line of defense for another week.

During the period of active battles of the 10th MK maneuver group, the 10th mechanized corps itself was disbanded by order of the Federation Council No. 1/34431 of July 18, 1941. The management of 10 microns was disbanded, parts of the corps were received for staffing other parts. There are 24 left. On July 24, the 24th TD had 8 BT-7s, 78 BT-5s, 3 T-26s, 14 flamethrower tanks, 10 BA-10s, 2 BA-20s.

In the same period, on July 23, 1941, in order to improve the command and control of the troops of the Luga Operational Group, the Military Council of the Front divided it into 3 independent sectors - Kingisepp, Luga and Eastern, subordinating them directly to the front.

The troops of the Kingisepp sector under the command of Major General V.V. Semashko received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from the south along the Gdovskoye highway to Narva and through Kingisepp to Leningrad. The formations of the Luga sector (headed by Major General A.N. Astanin) blocked all roads that led to Leningrad from the southwest. The Novgorod direction was defended by the troops of the eastern sector, commanded by Major General F. N. Starikov. At the direction of the Headquarters, from July 29, 1941, the sectors began to be called sections.

On July 24, the Germans, up to an infantry motorized regiment with tanks, moved in three columns through Velikoye Selo in the direction of the settlements of Shubino, Dubrovka and Yugostitsy. Tanks and artillery were distributed in columns. By 07.10, the German units concentrated in the area of ​​the villages of Yugostitsy and Navolok, having up to 80 tanks (mostly light tankettes) and up to an infantry motorized regiment on trucks and motorcycles. By this time, the German mobile detachment had reached the northern outskirts of the Solntsev Bereg state farm. On the basis of a verbal order from the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps, the 49th Tank Regiment was given the task of encircling and destroying the enemy in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Yugostitsy, Velikoye Selo, Navolok, attacking in three directions.

The 1st battalion of the regiment under the command of Captain Pryadun set out at 7.30 in the direction of Bor, Bolshie Toroshkovichi, Yugostitsy. Two KB tanks and a platoon of BT tanks - in the direction of Bor, the Solntsev Bereg state farm and further to Navolok. The tank company of the 3rd battalion (15 tanks) under the command of Colonel Chesnokov set out at 10.30, acting in the direction of the settlements of Luga, Malaye Kanazerye, Velikoye Selo.

The group of Captain Pryadun, consisting of 10 tanks, reached the village of Lunets at 16.20 and launched an attack on the village of Yugostitsy, where they were met with strong anti-tank and mortar fire. The group lost 4 BT tanks from German anti-tank artillery fire and was forced to withdraw into the forest a kilometer east of the village of Lunets. With their fire, the group destroyed two anti-tank guns, one armored vehicle and one armored tank, losing 9 people killed and 3 wounded.

The second group (with KB tanks) attacked the Germans in the area of ​​the Solntsev Bereg state farm, destroyed two 75-mm cannons, 2 medium tanks, losing one KB tank knocked out (disengaged under its own power). Another KB tank, continuing to fight until the ammunition was completely used up, was surrounded by German soldiers and burned along with the crew. Another BT tank burned down, hit by anti-tank artillery.

The group of Colonel Chesnokov concentrated in the evening 500 meters west of the village of Zarechye, and after reconnaissance went on the attack on Zarechye and Velikoye Selo. By 23.00, the group took possession of the Great Village and went on the defensive. During the attack, 2 motorcycles and one wheeled vehicle were captured.

The next day, a group of Captain Pryadun, in cooperation with an infantry company from the 235th Infantry Division, with the support of the first division of the 24th Artillery Regiment, captured the settlement of Yugostitsy by the end of the day. At the same time, the group destroyed one anti-tank gun and one German truck, losing 2 tanks knocked out (one of them burned down) and 2 tanks were damaged. Colonel Chesnokov's group, after capturing Velikiy Selo, repelled enemy attacks from the village of Shubino three times during the day. However, at 1500 the Germans opened heavy artillery fire on Velikoye Selo and Zarechye and set fire to the villages. The group, having no infantry and supporting artillery, was forced to retreat to the village of Cheklo and take up defense along the eastern edge of the forest 300 m to the west of it, having by that time 9 BT tanks, 9 T-26 tanks and one wrecked KV tank. As a result of the battle, the group knocked out 3 enemy trucks and 2 motorcycles, while losing 4 tanks (of which 2 were burned), 6 people were killed and 10 were wounded.

By the evening of July 26, a group of Colonel Chesnokov moved to the area where the 1st tank battalion was located in the village of Yugostitsy.

On the night of July 27, a combat order was received from the headquarters of the 41st Rifle Corps on the allocation of the 1st Battalion of the 49th Tank Regiment in the amount of 22 tanks to reinforce the mobile group of Colonel Rodin, 3 batteries of the 24th Artillery Regiment were also allocated there.

The German units, according to the prisoners, were advancing with the 489th Infantry Regiment, supported by 2 artillery battalions, in the direction of the settlements of Gorodishche and Bor. From July 14 to July 20, the mobile group of Colonel Rodin fought with varying success in the area of ​​Gorodishche and Shirega. As a result of counterattacks, up to a motorized regiment of German infantry was defeated and 6 anti-tank guns, 2 shortwave stations, 25 bicycles, one staff car, a heavy machine gun and a large amount of ammunition were captured. 3 German officers were also captured there. The group lost 15 BT tanks burnt out by artillery fire, 8 BT tanks and one T-28 destroyed. 9 command and 45 junior and enlisted personnel were killed. Wounded from the command staff - 10 people, junior and enlisted personnel - 202 people. In addition, 4 armored vehicles burned down, and the group left 144 rifles, 21 light machine guns, and one heavy machine gun on the battlefield.

From July 20 to July 27, the mobile group fought containment battles with superior enemy forces at the turn near the settlements of Bor, Poddubye, Berezitsy, Ryuten, Zaozerye. On July 27, German units pushed the group's units to the line of Ryuten, Meltsevo, Cherevishe and captured the village of Serebryanka. By morning, the mobile group received reinforcements from the 1st Battalion of the 49th Tank Regiment in the amount of 22 armored vehicles and began to prepare for the offensive.

On the evening of July 28, the 1st tank battalion began to advance in the direction of height 13.3, the village of Serebryanka. At the same time, the 1st Rifle Battalion advanced in the direction of individual houses south of this settlement. The group met up to a battalion of Germans with 8 anti-tank guns and flamethrowers. It was not possible to take the settlement, and our troops withdrew to the height of 113.3.

On July 29, German units occupied the villages of Volosovichi, Nikolskoye, Ryuten and attacked along the Luga highway. By evening, the German column "head" reached the village of Bunny. The mobile group consisting of the 1st battalion of the 24th motorized regiment (without one company) and the 1st battalion of the 49th tank regiment (12 tanks) concentrated in its original position in the area of ​​height 113.3, 2 km southeast of the village of Serebryanka . The group was tasked with a strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of the village and further on the villages of Enemies and Ilzhe-2, in cooperation with units of the 111th Infantry Division, to surround and destroy the enemy in the area of ​​the village of Enemies, followed by access to the village of Staraya Seredka. Artillery of the 1st Battalion of the 24th Artillery Regiment by 22.00 took up firing positions in the area of ​​the specified village.

The units of the mobile group, fighting in the area of ​​​​the villages of Serebryanka and Novoselye, by the morning of July 30, under the influence of superior enemy forces, retreated to the line near the village of Lopanets and the heights to the west of it, where they took up defense with the front to the south and west. On the night of July 30, the 1st company from the 483rd Infantry Regiment, operating to its right in the Ilzhe region, withdrew to the area of ​​​​the village of Novaya Seredka. The units of the 483rd Rifle Regiment operating to the left of the mobile group retreated there without an order, leaving the left flank of the mobile group open. On the same night, an oral order was received from the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps to withdraw the mobile group to the area where the division was concentrated near the settlements of Shalovo, Starye Krupeli, and by 16.40 the order was carried out.

As a result of two days of fighting in the area of ​​​​the village of Serebryanka, Novoselye, the group lost 3 tanks knocked out and 6 people killed, including the battalion commander Captain Bochkarev, 33 people were wounded and 28 went missing.

On July 31, units and subunits of the division concentrated during the day in the area of ​​​​Sredniye Krupel, Shalovo and carried out defensive work in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bits location: the 49th tank regiment, 1.5 km southwest of Shalovo; The 24th Artillery Regiment took up a divisional order of battle: the 1st Division in a firing position in the forest 500 meters northeast of the village of Kryuchkovo, the 2nd Division - in a firing position in the forest 500 meters from the village of Smychkovo, the headquarters of the regiment - in forest 100 meters west of the pig farm. The 24th reconnaissance battalion was located in the area of ​​​​the village of Toshiki, and the 34th pontoon-bridge battalion was in the forest 2 km east of Starye Krupel. Its subdivisions carried out work on the construction of a ford across the Luga River in the area of ​​​​the Tolmachevo station and equipped shelters in their area. The rifle battalion was located in the forest east of Lake Zelenoe and during the day put itself in order. In the evening, a group of Major Lukashik arrived in the area where their units were located.

Car brand	Availability as of 06/22/41	Losses from 22.06 to 1.08.41	Combat-ready on 1.08.41.
Sent for repair	Dead Losses	knocked out
Requires a major overhaul	Require ongoing repairs
KB	6	2	1	—	—	3
T-34	—	—	—	—	—	—
T-28	3	—	1	1	—	1
BT-7	13	—	4	1	2	6
BT-5	120	5	40	19	28	28
BT-2	8	1	4	2	1	—
T-26	5	—	—	1	2	2
T-50	—	—	—	—	—	—
Flamethrower tanks	19	—	6	2	1	10
BA-10	30	—	7	4	1	18
BA-20	20	1	2	7	—	10
Total:	224	9	65	37	35	78

The use of units of the 24th Panzer Division in the first weeks of the war revealed a number of serious shortcomings in the organization of their use. So, for example, the tasks of the mechanized troops were set vaguely and purposefully, without taking into account the time, strengths and weaknesses of their own mechanized units and enemy units. Interaction with other branches of the military was practically not organized.

The 24th Panzer Division, like other tank units, was used in this direction in small groups, in different sectors, to contain the advancing enemy, and not to go to the rear and destroy him. At the same time, there were favorable conditions and opportunities for this, since the enemy moved only along certain sectors where there were good roads.

Each combined arms commander wanted to use tanks in his area to "push out" the enemy and to provide moral support to his infantry. As a result, the division was torn apart. In fact, it acted in five directions.

The first direction is a tank regiment in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Batlan, the second is a motorized rifle regiment in the Petrozavodsk direction under the command of Captain Zuev, the third is a group under the command of Major Lukashik near Sara Gora, Osmino, consisting of one rifle company, a tank company (6 tanks BT), a company of traffic controllers, a sapper platoon, an artillery battery. The fourth direction is in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Gorodishche, Plyussa and Milyutino, a mobile group under the command of Colonel Rodin (consisting of a tank, rifle battalion, artillery battery, sapper platoon. - Note. ed.). The fifth direction is Velikoye Selo, Yugostitsy, a group of one tank battalion and two artillery batteries under the command of Colonel Chesnokov.

Thus, parts of the division did not have a unified command, supply and recovery. The divisional headquarters was broken into pieces, as were the divisional units.

Orders were given by higher commanders, as a rule, orally with a personal visit to the troops or through the chief of staff. There was no written confirmation of verbal orders. The time for preparing and executing orders was always limited, which made them practically impossible to fulfill, not to mention the reserve of time. Often the orders were cancelled.

The tasks of a tank division were set, as for a rifle formation - to advance, to seize (frontal strike) and only one task was set to go behind enemy lines (to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Velikoye Selo). Despite the fragmentation of the parts of the division, all tasks were completed. The maneuver group of Colonel Rodin fought in a deep wedge forward, having bare flanks, since units of the 3rd and 483rd motorized regiments retreated on its flanks, and the enemy, sensing their instability, pressed them harder. Major Lukasik's group, having virtually no support on the flanks, held the enemy back to the last opportunity.

The task of encircling the enemy in the Velikoye Selo area was also completed, but due to the fact that only 11 tanks came out to the rear of the German troops without infantry and artillery support, the enemy broke through the ambush, set fire to the village with a strong artillery raid and escaped from the encirclement.

The experience of fighting maneuverable and mobile groups in this direction in the first weeks of the war showed that the enemy's motorized mechanized units included a large number of wheeled 8-ton vehicles for transporting infantry. In addition, the enemy was armed with a significant number of large-caliber mortars, a small number of medium tanks and several heavy ones. Most of the transporters were armored, on a combined course (rear wheels on a "cargo belt", front wheels steered). The transporters towed 75mm or 37mm guns. The presence of artillery of a caliber above 105 mm was not observed. A significant number of motorcycles with a BMW-type sidecar. The crew consisted of three people armed with machine guns and machine guns. Each formation or detachment had a Henschel-126 spotter aircraft as support for correcting mortar and artillery fire and for conducting nearby aviation reconnaissance.

On the march, the German units conducted active ground reconnaissance, mainly on motorcycles. Sometimes, as part of enemy reconnaissance groups, an anti-tank gun and tankettes were included. The side guard service was carried out mainly by motorcyclists.

The enemy motorized mechanized units operated only along the roads, boldly went deep into the rear and were located mainly in settlements. Cars on halts were disguised in sheds, barnyards, under sheds or located next to the house, disguised as buildings. Part of the German soldiers were in the houses, the rest immediately set about tearing cracks, adapting ditches or digging shelters near the walls of sheds and houses. For disguise, German soldiers even dressed in civilian uniforms of the local population.

In general, the German units were tied to roads, the quality of which depended on the speed of their advance. There was no continuous front, and the space between the roads was completely free from the actions of the advancing German troops. Motorized units, moving in separate directions, did not secure their rear. Patrol service on the roads was carried only by motorcyclists. At night, the German mechanized units did not conduct active hostilities, the battle was accepted only during the day in open areas, and then, based on this practice, settlements were planned for location for the night.

In firefights, German units used, as a rule, large-caliber mortars and artillery, firing at direct fire, sometimes using anti-aircraft artillery as anti-tank artillery. Machine-gun fire was used by the Germans very rarely. Long-range artillery fire was corrected by spotter planes, and these same planes carried out constant reconnaissance of the location of Soviet units. During the offensive, the Germans deployed artillery from the front, attacking with tanks from the flanks. With a forced withdrawal, the German units began to look for the weakest flanks of the counterattacks. In case of an unsuccessful attack for the Germans from the move, they immediately switched to artillery preparation, and when KB tanks appeared, the fire of all fire weapons was concentrated against them. Such tactics allowed the German troops to achieve the desired result with a minimum of expended forces and means, to push and surround the Soviet troops along the entire front, inflicting heavy losses on the defending Soviet units.

Counterattack near Soltsy. While the Soviet troops repulsed the attacks of the 41st motorized corps near Kingisepp and Luga, fierce battles unfolded with the 56th German motorized corps advancing on Novgorod. Moving along the left bank of the Shelon River, his troops captured the city of Soltsy on July 14 and the next day advanced to the Mshaga River in the Shimsk region.

Returning to the content of the previous chapter, it must be said that the successes of the German troops in the first 3 weeks of the war led their command to believe so much in the weak resistance of the Soviet troops that they hoped, starting the offensive on July 10, in 4 days to overcome the 300-kilometer distance to Leningrad. The 4th tank group of the enemy from the line of the Velikaya River and the Cherekha River resumed its offensive in the Luga and Novgorod directions. However, already on the second day of the offensive, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Gepner, realized that in the Luga, that is, the shortest direction to Leningrad, due to the stubborn resistance of the Russians, it would not be possible to break through without significant losses and in a short time.

Mobile formations of the 41st Motorized Corps were stopped on July 12 by the stubborn defense of the right-flank formations of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front and the forward detachments of the troops of the Luga Operational Group southwest of Luga. Unable to break through to Leningrad through Luga, the command of the 4th Panzer Group turned the main forces of the 41st Corps to the north with the task of breaking through to Leningrad through the forests west of Luga and the Koporskoe plateau. On July 14, the enemy reached the Luga River 20-35 km southeast of Kingisepp and captured the crossings at Ivanovsky and Sabek. Its further advance here was also stopped by counterattacks of the reserves of the Luga operational group, which had advanced from Leningrad by this time.

The 56th Motorized Corps of the 4th Panzer Group, which was operating against the left flank of the Luga Operational Group, also had a hard time. As already mentioned, in the Novgorod direction, the corps of General Manstein managed to break through along the left bank of the Shelon River and advance units to reach the Luga defense zone west of Shimsk.

Due to the fact that the 16th German army was advancing on Kholm and Staraya Russa, a 100-kilometer gap formed between its formations and the 56th motorized corps. The Soviet command decided to use this gap in order to disrupt the enemy’s attack on Novgorod and defeat the units of his 56th corps that had broken through to Shimsk.

In order to defeat the units of the 56th Motorized Corps, which broke through to the area southwest of Shimsk, the commander of the North-Western Front, with his directive No. 012 of July 13, 1941, ordered the troops of the 11th Army of General V. I. Morozov, reinforced by the formations of the Northern Front: The 21st Panzer Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps, the 70th Rifle Division from the Luga Operational Group and the 237th Rifle Division, deployed from the Gatchina region, to carry out a counterattack and restore the situation in the area of ​​the city of Soltsy.

To conduct a counterattack, the commander of the 11th Army decided to create two groups: the northern one, consisting of the 70th and 237th rifle divisions and the 21st tank divisions deployed here (120 T-26s, 28 flamethrower ones - a total of 148 tanks on July 8, 1941 ) and the south - as part of the 183rd Infantry Division. The troops were assigned the following tasks:

237th Infantry Division - strike from the Gorodishche area, St. Kamenka in the south-west towards Bolotsko (offensive front - 15 km);

183rd Infantry Division - go on the offensive from the Ilemno-Sukhlovo line (12 km front), striking in a north-western direction on Zamushki, and, in cooperation with the 237th division, encircle and destroy enemy units that have broken through to the Soltsy area and west of Shimsk (8th tank and part of the forces of the 3rd motorized divisions);

70th Rifle Division - strike from the area south of Lyubach to the south in the direction of the Soltsy settlement, cut through the encircled enemy grouping and, in cooperation with the 237th and 183rd Rifle Divisions, destroy it. The readiness of the troops was set for July 14.

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war. The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began - an aggressive war against the USSR. Its goal was to liquidate the Soviet state, exterminate millions of people, and turn the survivors into servants of the Reichskommissariat - the German province. Documents that have long since become known testify to the barbaric, merciless nature of Germany's war against the USSR, the essence of which can be described in two words: conquer and destroy.

In the plans for waging war against the Soviet Union, the German command assigned a special place to the capture of Leningrad. Already in the first drafts of the operational plans of the general states of the Wehrmacht and the ground forces, the capture of Leningrad and the capture of the coast of the Baltic Sea was considered as the first goal of the offensive. It was enshrined in the Barbarossa plan.

In accordance with the plan, the troops of the German army were concentrated in three groups: Army Group North, Army Group Center and Army Group South. Army Group North was supposed to, advancing from East Prussia, in cooperation with Army Group Center, destroy the Soviet troops fighting in the Baltic. “Only after ensuring this urgent task, which should end with the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt,” the directive says, “should offensive operations be continued to capture the most important center of communications and the defense industry, Moscow.”

We draw the reader's attention to three things. Firstly, the directive is not about coercion to surrender, not about the encirclement, not about the blockade, but I clearly and unequivocally speak about the capture of Leningrad. Secondly, the capture of Leningrad is defined as an urgent, that is, the first task, on the solution of which the course and outcome of the war against the USSR largely depends. And, thirdly, the Nazis intended to take Moscow only after Leningrad fell.

Based on the task and assessment of the forces of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, their troops, the German command concentrated in the grouping of its forces aimed at capturing Leningrad, forces that significantly exceeded the number and armament of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states. This was one of the main reasons, along with other objective and subjective factors, for the defeat of the Red Army in the North-West direction and the approach of Army Group North to Leningrad.

Considering the dangerous situation developing in the Leningrad direction, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 4 decided to involve the troops of the Northern Front for the defense of the southwestern approaches to Leningrad. The next day, July 5, signed by the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, the Military Council received a new directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters on the construction of defensive lines "to cover the city of Leningrad and the most important directions from the southwest and south: Gdov-Kingisepp-Leningrad, Luga-Leningrad, Novgorod-Leningrad, Vyshny Volochek-Leningrad". It was ordered to complete the construction of the defensive line by July 15.

But in fact, the command of the Northern Front already in the first days of the war began to prepare defensive lines.

On June 24, it was decided to build three defensive lines. The main one - along the Luga River to the lake. Ilmen (Luga border). The second - along the line Peterhof - Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina) - Kolpino. The third line along the Avtovo line - the district railway - st. Predportovaya - Middle Slingshot - st. Rybatskoe. The Directorate for the construction of rear defensive lines was created.

On June 27, 1941, the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council of Working People's Deputies adopted a resolution on the involvement of city residents in labor service. It was decided to stop the construction of a number of facilities in the city, and to direct the released labor force, mechanisms and vehicles to defensive work. In total, in July-August 1941, about 500 thousand people took part in the work. More than 133 thousand people were employed daily.

Great work on the construction of defensive structures was carried out by the working people of the Leningrad Region. Every day in July-August, 150 thousand people worked on the construction of these facilities, and in some periods, 250 thousand people who were not employed at defense industry enterprises. On July 12, 1941, the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the regional executive committee sent a telegram to the district party committees and district executive committees of the districts on whose territory the Luga defensive line was being built, in which they ordered the district committees and executive committees to “raise without exception the entire population of collective farms and other organizations for defensive installations” .

The work went on continuously. Machine operators in the depths of the defense tore off deep ditches, “arranged forest blockages. In the forefield and in front of the main strip, sappers set up minefields and barbed wire. At the Izhora, Kirov, Baltic, Metallic and other plants, long-term firing points were made - armored and reinforced concrete, as well as various anti-tank gouges.

The most difficult was the construction of the Luga defensive line with a length of about 250 km. It was created from the Narva Bay, passed along the banks of the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Shelon and ended at Lake Ilmen. Ditches and scarps, trenches, anti-tank ditches were built, command and observation posts were equipped. Special brigades prepared a double frame of logs, the space between the walls was filled with stones, and thick logs were laid on top in three rolls. The entire structure was covered with stones, earth and carefully covered with turf. Bunkers were built in this way. They did not stand out against the background of the surrounding area and withstood a direct hit by a large-caliber projectile.

The work went on day and night. Machine operators in the depths equipped tank traps. From the beginning of the delivery of concrete blocks, they began to build gun bunkers from them.

A significant number of engineering structures were built at the Luga line, including 517 anti-tank obstacles (201 km of anti-tank ditches, 241 km of scarps, 15 km of gouges, etc.), 826 firing structures.

The German three-volume book of documents and materials "The Second World War" tells how Army Group "North" ran into a defensive line that was erected at the turn of the Luga by the workers of Leningrad.

To defend the frontiers, the Military Council of the Northern Front on July 5 decided to create the Luga task force under the command of the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev, an experienced military leader who commanded a division back in the 1920s. By the beginning of hostilities, the group included two rifle divisions, two divisions of the people's militia, the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S.M. Kirov in full force, the rifle and machine gun school, the 41st rifle corps of the 11th army, the formations and units of which were significantly weakened in previous battles. In addition, the group included a regiment of artillery advanced training courses for commanders, a division of the 28th Corps Artillery Regiment and batteries of the 1st and 3rd Leningrad Artillery Schools, and an anti-aircraft division of the Leningrad School of Instrumental Reconnaissance of Antiaircraft Artillery. These artillery units and units were combined into a special artillery group under the command of Colonel G.F. Odintsov. Before the enemy approached, the group managed to occupy the eastern sector in the Luga area with the forces of rifle divisions. By June 10, troops had just begun to advance to the lower reaches of the river.

At the beginning of July 1941, fascist German troops crossed the Velikaya River, captured the city of Ostrov, and on July 9 captured Pskov, invaded the Leningrad Region. So, on July 10, the Battle of Leningrad began, military operations on the territory of the Leningrad Region.

An alarming time has come for Leningrad. The Luga defensive line was not yet completely ready. The divisions of the people's militia, intended for its defense, completed the formation.

The fighting on the Luga line began on July 12, 1941, when the formations of the 41st motorized corps of the Army Group "North", crowding the units of the Red Army retreating from Pskov, reached the front edge of the foreground of the Luga strip on the Plyussa River and entered into battle with the advanced units of the Luga operational group. On July 13, the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the supply zone, occupying the village and the Plyussa railway station. But the forward detachments of the 177th Infantry Division of Colonel A.F. Mashonin and parts of the 24th Panzer Division, Colonel A.G. Motherland, after two days of fighting, knocked the enemy out of the forefield and restored positions along the Plyussa River. An important role in repulsing the attacks of the 1st and 6th German tank divisions was played by the artillery group of Colonel G.F. Odintsova.

Already on the second day of the offensive, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Göpner, realized that on Luga, i.e. the shortest direction to Leningrad, due to the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, it will not be possible to advance without significant losses and in a short time. On July 12, he turned his 41st mechanized corps to the northwest to reach Leningrad through the Koporskoe plateau. The 6th and 1st Panzer divisions are being transferred covertly, by country and forest roads, to the Kingisepp area. On July 14, the forward detachments of the 6th Panzer Division crossed the Luga River and captured a bridgehead near the village of Ivanovskoye, 20-25 km southeast of Kingisepp. The 2nd division of the people's militia, the hero of the Soviet-Finnish war, Colonel N.S., arrived here in time. Ugryumova heroically attacked the enemy, whose offensive was stopped, but failed to knock him off the bridgehead and throw him across the river.

For several days, a fierce battle continued for cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School named after S.M. Kirov with units of the 1st Panzer Division, who crossed the Luga River and on July 15 captured a bridgehead in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Bolshoi Sabsk. The cadets steadfastly held on to every piece of land, to every trench, preventing the enemy from widening the gap. On July 17, the German command threw the main forces of the division into the positions of the cadets. As a result of a fierce battle, the Nazis lost at least 800 soldiers, but did not advance a single step. For the courage and stamina shown by the cadets in the battles near Bolshoi Sabsk, the school was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

By the stubborn defense of the Soviet troops, the advance of the enemy at the turn of the Luga River was stopped by July 19. The command of the Army Group "North" ordered to stop the attack on Leningrad. The plan of the German command to break through to Leningrad on the move through Luga and the Koporskoe plateau was thwarted. For the first time during the Second World War, the Wehrmacht was forced, albeit temporarily, to go on the defensive.

The time gained thanks to the steadfastness of the troops on the Luga line of defense was used to strengthen the construction of defensive lines around Leningrad. The military councils of the North-Western and Northern Fronts took measures to speed up defensive work in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad, to increase the combat capability of units and formations, and to intensively prepare to repel an attack on Leningrad.

On July 23, the Military Council of the Northern Front, in order to improve command and control of troops, divided the Luga operational group into three independent sectors (later - sections) - Kingisep, Luga and Vostochny, subordinating them directly to the front. The troops of the Kingisep sector under the command of Major General V.V. Semashko received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from the south along the Gdovskoye highway to Narva and through Kingisepp to Leningrad.

Connections of the Luga sector under the command of Major General A.N. Astana covered the roads to Leningrad from the southwest.

The troops of the Eastern Sector, commanded by Major General Starikov, defended the Novgorod direction.

All measures to strengthen the defense of Leningrad were carried out at a time when, in the second half of July - early August, hostilities were going on in various directions. The German command sought to break through to Luga before the start of the general offensive on Leningrad, defeat the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, and capture Estonia and the islands in the Baltic Sea.

On August 10, German troops launched an offensive in the Luga and Novgorod-Chudov directions. After a powerful artillery preparation, the 56th motorized corps attacked the troops of the Luga defense sector. But the Soviet troops operating under the overall command of General A.N. Astanin (commander of the Luga defense sector), with a strong defense, they prevented the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad through Luga. However, in the Novgorod direction, German troops broke through in the Shimsk area and began to develop an offensive against Novgorod. On the right flank of the Luga line, our troops left Kingisepp on August 16. On the same day, the enemy occupied Narva.

All available reserves were used to protect the approaches to Leningrad. On the Luga line, the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the people's militia, cadets of the Leningrad military schools, students of junior political instructors fought with the enemy. But these forces could not ensure the stability of the defense in order to contain the superior forces of the enemy. On August 23, Soviet troops began to withdraw from the positions of the Luga defensive line due to the threat of encirclement by the German troops that had broken through. On August 24, our defending units left the city of Luga. However, this decision was too late. The troops of the 4th Panzer Group cut the Vitebsk railroad south of Vyritsa and on August 28 united near the Sluditsy station with the troops of the 16th Army, advancing on Leningrad from the southeast.

The struggle of our troops in the encirclement was led by Major General A.N. Astanin, colonels A.F. Mashonin, G.F. Odintsov, S.V. Roginsky, A.G. Rodin. However, a significant part of the defending troops could not connect with the main forces of the Leningrad Front.

At the same time, the Luga frontier became one of those first frontiers where a serious failure of the "blitzkrieg" occurred. Later, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Erich Hoepner, wrote: "How difficult the battle was with a heavily fortified enemy, it can be seen from the fact that we had to take 1263 field fortifications and remove 26588 mines." German troops paid with great blood for every inch of the Leningrad land captured. One of the German staff tank officers then called the path of the German offensive through the Luga line "the road of death."

G.K. Zhukov, noting the importance of the heroic battles of the Soviet troops at the Luga defensive line, emphasized that here, as well as in the Dno region, at the Staraya Russa-Kholm line, in the Kingisepp-Siversky Army Group North, they met stubborn resistance, suffering heavy losses and " without additional reinforcement, she could no longer attack Leningrad.

The feat of the defenders of the Luga frontier was noted in 1977 by awarding the city of Luga with the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, and in 2009 by awarding it the title of "City of Military Glory". The defensive positions of our troops on the Luga frontier have truly become frontiers of heroism and glory.

Mikhail Ivanovich Frolov , Head of the Scientific and Educational Center for Historical Research and Analysis, Leningrad State University named after A.S. Pushkin,

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences

Defeat of German imperialism in World War II. Articles and documents. - M., 1961. S. 201.

The Northern Front was formed on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the command and control troops of the Leningrad Military District.

Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF). F.48-A, Op.1554. D.9. L.77.

Kovalchuk V.M. 900 days of blockade of Leningrad 1941-1944. - SPb., 2005. S.19-20.

History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. - M., 1974. - P.206.

History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. P.207.

Ibid S.215-216.

On the defense of the Neva stronghold. Leningrad party organization during the Great Patriotic War. - L., 1965. - P. 130.

Luga border

The fate of any city in the course of hostilities was already decided on the distant approaches to it. In itself, the transition to street fighting, to one degree or another, meant the failure of the defenders and the crisis of the defense. For the fate of Berlin, the decisive battles were on the so-called "Oder Front" - the defense system of the Army Group "Vistula" on the outskirts of the Soviet bridgeheads, on the Seelow Heights, at the turn of the Oder and Neisse rivers. For Stalingrad, such were the battles in the bend of the Don and the positional battle in the Kotluban region. For Moscow - fighting on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line and the Mozhaisk line of defense.

Commander of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov

With a favorable outcome for the defenders of the battles on the distant approaches to the city, even the enemy’s exit to the final stops of the city trams had already more psychological than military significance. The battles on the Luga line became decisive for the fate of Leningrad in 1941.

Without waiting for the results of the battles on the old border, the Soviet High Command took care of building a new defensive line on the distant approaches to Leningrad and filling it with troops. Already on July 4, 1941, G.K. Zhukov sent a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the Military Council of the Northern Front, which stated the following:

"In connection with the obvious threat of an enemy breakthrough in the Ostrov, Pskov area, immediately take up the line of defense on the front of Narva, Luga, Staraya Russa, Borovichi."

For anti-tank defense, it was allowed to remove guns from the air defense of the district, including from Vyborg and other objects. Zhukov was clearly aware that the troops near Pskov and Ostrov were not enough to deter the enemy for any length of time.

The next day, July 5, Zhukov set the task for the Leningrad District to build defensive lines with an emphasis on the directions of Gdov - Leningrad, Luga - Leningrad and Shimsk - Leningrad. Actually, the German offensive really developed in these areas in the future. Completion of construction was scheduled for July 15. The directive explicitly stated that "the frontier should consist of a forefield and divisional lanes."

However, one should not think that before receiving instructions from Moscow, Markian Popov and his staff were sitting idly by. The documents show that the above directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command actually consolidated the decisions already taken earlier. So, as early as July 3, 1941, the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District issued orders to form machine-gun and artillery battalions for the Krasnogvardeiskaya and Luga fortified positions. It was in this context that the words about the new line of defense, which later became known as the Luga line, were first heard.

By directives from Moscow, the troops of the Northern Front received the task of firmly covering the southwestern approaches to Leningrad and preventing the enemy from breaking through from this direction. Previously, the Northern Front was responsible for the defense of the city from the north, from Finland. The border with the North-Western Front was determined along the Pskov-Novgorod line. Also, the defense of Estonia was left behind the North-Western Front. This was somewhat illogical, since the headquarters of the North-Western Front was supposed to control the 8th Army, without having an elbow connection with it. However, this inconsistency was soon eliminated. On July 14, the 8th Army in Estonia was transferred to the Northern Front.

On July 6, the troops assigned to defend the new frontier were united under the control of the Luga Operational Group (LOG), which was headed by Lieutenant General K. P. Pyadyshev, Deputy Commander of the Northern Front. It included the 191st, 177th and 70th rifle divisions, a school and a separate mountain rifle brigade. Later, the arrival of three divisions of the people's militia was supposed. In front of the main position, a forefield strip was outlined, the defense and equipment of which were entrusted to specially created barrier detachments. It is interesting to note that the tasks of the barrier detachments were received from the headquarters of the Northern Front on the night of July 4th. The orders were written as if in carbon copy and prescribed "to prepare for mass destruction all roads, bridges, both on railways and dirt roads." It was also supposed to mine bridges, install roadblocks (mining, blockages, anti-tank ditches). The difference was only in the attire of forces for the formation of detachments of different formations. The construction of the forefield strip was supposed to be completed by July 8th. The barrier detachments were instructed: "In the event of an offensive by superior enemy forces, defending the lines of the barriers, withdraw." Their task was to buy time for the occupation and training of the main forces of the corresponding division.

It should be emphasized that at the time of signing the order to form the LOG, not all the troops formally subordinate to the group were already at the disposal of General Pyadyshev. The 70th rifle division and the 10th mechanized corps (without the 198th motorized division) were removed from the Karelian Isthmus and transferred to Luga.

One of the first orders of General Pyadyshev was the withdrawal of the battered formations of the North-Western Front, operating in front of the Luga border, to the rear for reorganization. On the evening of July 10, he orders:

“In order to ensure freedom of maneuver, to restore combat effectiveness and control in the units that fought with the enemy in the area of ​​​​Pskov and the north. - east. Pskov - 183rd, 118th and 111th rifle divisions are withdrawn by a forced march outside the main defensive position.

This decision is difficult to both criticize and unequivocally support. On the one hand, formations that still retained a certain non-zero combat potential were withdrawn from the battle. Considering that militias and schools were concentrated to replace them at the Luga line, Pyadyshev's decision looks too radical. On the other hand, the divisions that were defeated in the battles near Pskov experienced a decline in morale and could be completely dispersed by the enemy. Three divisions in single file, one by one, were withdrawn beyond the Luga line through Struga Krasnye and Plyussa.

Proximity to Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet immediately left its mark on the nature of the weapons and equipment of the Luga Operational Group. The main part of the naval railway gun mounts that participated in the Great Patriotic War was concentrated in the Leningrad direction. In the first weeks of the war, the main task of the command of the Baltic Fleet was to save railway batteries from being captured by the enemy. Now their time has come. The 11th battery of 356-mm gun mounts TM-I-14 (commander - Captain M.I. Mazanov), as well as the 12th and 18th batteries of TM-I-180 transporters with 180-mm tools. The 18th battery of Captain V.P. Lisetsky was successfully withdrawn from Liepaja. Now she took up positions on the right flank of the Luga line. The 12th battery was evacuated from Estonia, and on July 9 it was moved to the Novgorod region.

Organizational measures soon followed, affecting the entire system of command and control on the distant approaches to Leningrad. On July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed the High Commands of the North-Western, Western and South-Western directions for more efficient leadership of the fronts. Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the North-Western Direction, A.A. Zhdanov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Leningrad Regional Committee and the City Party Committee, A.A. Zhdanov, was appointed a member of the Military Council, General M.V. Zakharov was appointed Chief of Staff. The troops of the Northern and Northwestern Fronts and the forces of the Baltic and Northern Fleets were subordinated to the High Command of the North-Western Direction. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, of course, is considered to be an odious figure. However, one cannot fail to notice that M.V. Zakharov was one of the most experienced and intelligent Soviet staff officers of the Great Patriotic War.

"Bayonet if!" Combat training of the Leningrad militia

Over Leningrad at that time loomed, without any exaggeration, a mortal threat. In his diary, Halder described a meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters on July 8, 1941, at which he spoke bluntly: “The Fuhrer’s decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground is unshakable in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter." This was supposed to be done by aviation forces.

The cost of defeat in the battles on the Luga line for the Soviet troops would be prohibitive. However, the rapid development of events at the front, the rapid breakthrough of the 4th Panzer Group through the fortifications on the old border, prevented the normal deployment of Soviet troops in defensive positions near Luga. Already on July 12, German units reached the river. Plus.

The density of the construction of the Soviet troops by that time was extremely low and far behind the statutory norms. At the Luga line, by the time the enemy reached him, only three rifle divisions, one mountain rifle brigade and two military schools were defending on a front with a total length of 280 km. Accordingly, the 191st Rifle Division took up defensive positions along the eastern bank of the river. Narva on a monstrous front of 70 km. Leningrad Infantry School. Kirov (2000 people) occupied a front of 18 km, the Leningrad Rifle and Machine Gun School (1900 people) - 25 km, the 177th Rifle Division - 28 km, the 1st DNO (10,358 people) - 20 km, 1- I am a mountain rifle brigade (5800 people) - 32 km. Moreover, there were fairly extended uncovered sections between the joints.

The first enemy of the German mechanized formations were the detachments put forward in the foreground. Having thrown back the disorganized remnants of the 90th Infantry Division of the North-Western Front on the distant approaches to Luga, on July 12 the Germans came into combat contact with the covering units of the Northern Front. They were met by units of the 483rd regiment of the 177th rifle division, defending the forward edge of the foreground. As expected, under the attack of tanks and motorized infantry of the German elite division, the 483rd regiment, which appeared on the front for the first time, withdrew.

The reaction to the enemy's invasion of the forefield followed immediately. Already on July 13, M. Popov set the task of the 10th mechanized corps, which was in reserve north of Luga, to counterattack and push the enemy to the southern bank of the river. Plyussa and knock him out of Plyussa itself. In fact, it was a probing of the enemy invading the forefield. The commander of the mechanized corps, Major General Lazarev, created a maneuver group consisting of two motorized infantry battalions, a tank battalion (32 BT), a 4-gun battery of 122-mm howitzers and several smaller units. Colonel A. G. Rodin was appointed commander of the maneuver group. A cavalcade of tanks, trucks and tractors set off towards the unknown.

Group commander of the 24th Panzer Division A. G. Rodin (post-war photo)

Today we know that the Rodina group advanced straight into the mouth of the tiger, towards parts of the Reinhardt motorized corps, which had previously crushed much stronger units and formations. Late in the evening on July 13, the group concentrated in the area of ​​the village of Bor. Here Rodin tried to organize interaction with rifle units.

At 07:00 on July 14, Colonel Rodin's group went on the offensive. She advanced in two detachments, one attacked along the Luga-Pskov highway, the second - north of the highway. It was not in vain that Rodin negotiated with the commanders of rifle units on the evening of the previous day. The infantry of the 483rd Regiment advanced further north, closer to the railroad, in the direction of Plyussa. Thus, Rodin avoided the dispersion of the forces of his group between two directions - along the highway and to the city of Plyussa.

The enemy of the Soviet units in this battle was the Westhoven battle group from the 1st Panzer Division. The Germans noted that they were attacked with powerful artillery support. However, the forces were unequal. Three dozen BTs could not do what HF ​​could not. The first detachment of the Rodina group was not successful; it was met by fire from anti-tank guns and mortars from the village of Milyutino, which stood on the highway. On the contrary, the second detachment struck at the enemy column, consisting of 15 tanks, 160 covered trucks and 50 motorcycles. The column was partially destroyed, and partially withdrew to Plyussa and Milyutino. This episode is confirmed by the enemy, in the ZhBD of the 1st Panzer Division it was noted: "The advancing columns north of the bridge in Plyuss were unexpectedly fired upon by enemy tanks." Nevertheless, the Rodina group failed to complete the task. As noted in Soviet documents, "the further advance of the counterattack group was stopped by organized fire and opposition from tanks, which the enemy pulled up, trying to paralyze the actions of our units." Here the red commanders did not dissemble. The Germans really brought the entire tank regiment of the 1st Panzer Division into battle.

During the battle, the Rodina group lost 15 tanks and 2 armored vehicles, about half of its composition. If the battle had continued, then, most likely, it would have been defeated, just as parts of the 1st mechanized corps near Pskov and Ostrov were defeated. However, at that time, the Germans were not at all in the mood to fight on the outskirts of Aute. They were already heading in the other direction. Kampfgruppe Krueger of the same 1st Panzer Division was already quite far away. The ZhBD XXXXI corps noted with annoyance: "The 1st TD asks to quickly release the Westhoven battle group in order to send it after the Kruger group." The Westhoven group, as it approached from the march, was replaced by the infantry of the 269th Infantry Division. The Rodina detachment was for the Germans not an obstacle that needed to be crushed on the way to the next offensive goal, but an obstacle to regrouping. Actually, the group of tanks and trucks attacked by Soviet tankers was moving parallel to the line of contact between the troops of the parties. Apparently, the Germans neglected the protection of the march column this time.

Tanks 35(t) on the march. An important advantage of these machines was high mechanical reliability.

It is sometimes argued that it was the decisive actions of the Soviet units near Luga that forced the German command to deploy XXXXI Corps in a different direction. This version is voiced, for example, by the well-known Soviet historian of the initial period of the war, V. A. Anfilov: “Our retreating 24th tank and 177th rifle divisions, supported by active air operations, south of Luga, put up stubborn resistance to the 41st motorized corps, which was torn to Leningrad. As a result of this, General Göpner decided to abandon a direct breakthrough to Luga and turned the main forces of the corps to the north-west, so that, as he reported to the commander of Army Group North, to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops faster and more unexpectedly and strike at Leningrad.

An analysis of the situation based on German documents forces us to abandon this assumption. Anfilov refers without quoting to a certain solution of Goepner, perhaps this is just a turn of speech. However, at the moment there are enough facts to conclude that the turn began even before the meeting with the Rodin group. By the time the offensive of the Rodina group began, the decision to turn had already been taken for execution and did not depend on the results of the attack of the betas. As early as the morning of July 14, the Raus battle group was at Zaruchia, far north of the Pskov-Luga highway. Kruger's battle group from the 1st Panzer Division was already moving in the same direction. Long before the attack of the Rodina group, the route of movement of the German units was calculated to Lyada and to the north. Moreover, the German command thought out the issue of replacing moving parts on the outskirts of Luga with infantry. To this end, as near Ostrov, the 269th Infantry Division was again transported by road.

In the history of the 269th division, difficulties with transportation were noted: “The transportation of the division did not work out. Some of the vehicles supplied by the Panzer Division and the Panzer Group arrived very late. In addition, there was not enough transport.” Nevertheless, infantry units were on hand to relieve the 1st Panzer Division. That is, the decision on this was made in advance, before the tanks of the Rodina group appeared on the horizon.

What made the Germans abandon their habits and turn off the Pskov-Luga highway? The main ally of the Red Army in the battles on the Luga was the conditions of the terrain. Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Pavlov, chief of staff of the 177th Infantry Division, later recalled: “Those who have been near Luga know that the terrain there is very rugged, wooded and swampy. High-rises are interspersed with lowlands, small lakes, rivers and streams. Tactically competent use of it in combination with fire opened up great opportunities for creating a solid defense.

The difficulties in overcoming the Soviet defense in difficult terrain were not immediately recognized by the German command. Moreover, serious disagreements soon arose as to how to avoid unfortunate delays in the offensive due to the conditions of the terrain. At the same meeting on July 8, at which Hitler promised to raze Leningrad to the ground, he formulated his vision for the further advance of Army Group North. Halder noted in his diary that the Fuhrer had "emphasized the need to cut off Leningrad from the east and southeast by the strong right wing of Hoepner's Panzer Group." The chief of staff of the Ground Forces himself agreed with the Fuhrer, he further wrote: "This idea is correct."

However, if the “correct ideas” about the emphasis on the right wing were addressed to Goepner from the higher spheres, from below he received directly opposite proposals. In his report to Hoepner, General Reinhardt, as early as July 12, explicitly stated: "The enemy is fighting stubbornly and has all the advantages of the terrain on his side." In general, the picture that the commander of the XXXXI corps painted in his report to the commander of the tank group was filled with despondency:

“Even if the corps, thanks to the selflessness of the soldiers, has hitherto been able to overcome large spaces in one day and at the same time smash large enemy forces, now this can hardly be expected. Due to the terrain, the impossibility of achieving quick and decisive successes by concentrating superior forces, primarily tanks and artillery, leads to a difficult and long gnaw through the enemy defenses that arise again and again. The vanguards are forced to fight alone on the main road and on both sides of it, while large divisional forces are inactive behind the lines on the few roads, because bad roads and swamps do not allow them to deploy. Under these conditions, the impact of enemy air strikes increases, since the masses of vehicles accumulated in a limited space are tempting targets. From all these difficulties, I must conclude that the advance of the corps will be greatly slowed down, and the troops, which previously, thanks to the full use of their weapons, advanced 50 km or more per day, will be forced to make the same efforts to advance no more than 10 km - despite the fact that the obstacles to be overcome will gradually deplete their strength.

If we are to discuss the question of whose actions forced the Germans to decide to change the direction of the offensive, then the first candidate will be the remnants of the formations thrown back from Pskov, and not the units of the Luga operational group. At the time of writing Reinhardt's report (July 12), only parts of the cover of the Luga line had managed to enter the battle. As a way out of the impasse, Reinhardt delicately suggested: “It is not for me to assess whether the corps should be transferred under these conditions to where the best terrain conditions will allow it to move faster - I mean, first of all, the path through Estonia and the defile near Narva to Leningrad. However, I must at least request that the corps be allowed to turn to the left between the Pskov-Leningrad highway and Lake Peipus. This will allow you to move away from the main road that leads through bad terrain and attracts the enemy to an area that, judging by the map, is preparing less difficulties.

In practice, this meant an emphasis not on the right, but on the left wing of the 4th Panzer Group. Considerations regarding difficult terrain conditions were obvious enough to the command of Army Group North. Somewhat later, the chief of staff of the army group reported that “it was clear from the very beginning that after breaking through the Russian defensive lines on [the old. - A.I.] border, a decisive blow (along the road Pskov, Luga, Leningrad) will be delivered in a terrain that is not particularly favorable for tanks. Therefore, Göpner went to meet his subordinate, and the tank formations of the XXXXI Motorized Corps were deployed to the north. Thus, the direction of the offensive of the Reinhardt corps was transferred from the Luga-Leningrad line to the Gdov-Leningrad line. There was no organized resistance on the XXXXI Corps route. After turning to the north, he found himself in an 80-kilometer gap between the 118th and 90th rifle divisions. They departed in different directions: the first to the north to Gdov, the second to the northeast to Luga. Pyadyshev's plan for the organized withdrawal of the 118th division beyond the Luga line was thwarted. The road to its units was blocked by enemy motorized columns. Now it was possible to get to Luga by a circuitous route through Gdov and Kingisepp.

Aircraft could interfere with the maneuvering of the enemy in front of a new line of defense. She immediately got down to business. Aircraft of the 41st Air Division bombed the German motorized columns advancing to the lower reaches of the Luga River from a height of 400-1500 m under the cover of fighters. FAB-100, FAB-50, incendiary and rotary-scattering bombs were dropped.

It is interesting to compare the memoirs of E. Raus with a rich list of the nomenclature of the air bombs dropped on the heads of the Germans. He describes the collision with the “Stalinist falcons” when approaching Porechi in the following terms: “Suddenly there was a cry:“ Enemy planes! ”But the planes did not attack us, and the march continued. Then the planes flew in again, flashed their lamps at us and dropped the note. “Identify yourself or we will fire on you,” read my translator. The note was written in clear text. I gave the order to continue moving and not to pay attention to the scattered pieces of paper. As we can see, in reality, the crews of the SB bombers dispensed with such ceremonies and poured everything that industry supplied them with on the heads of the enemy.

However, aviation alone, even in conditions of relative freedom of action, could not stop the advance of German mobile formations to the lower reaches of the Luga. On July 14, 1941, the Raus combat group from the 6th Panzer Division reached the river. Meadows in the Porechye region. Designed for defense in this sector, the 2nd DNO was still being transported by rail, and its first echelons were just being unloaded at Weimari station. One of the most dramatic bridgehead battles in history began in 1941.

German-captured bridge in Porechye

The bridge across the Luga near the village of Porechye was defended by a unit of the 2nd division of the NKVD, numbering about fifty fighters. Senior Lieutenant N. Bogdanov, head of the construction site of the defensive line near Kingisepp, recalled that he dropped a pennant from the plane, warning of the approach of German tanks from Gdov. The headquarters of the construction site of Lieutenant Bogdanov was located in the village of Ivanovskoye, further along the highway from Porechie. About 10 thousand Leningraders were employed in the construction of the defensive line. To capture the bridge by the Germans, the Brandenburg unit was involved, this is mentioned by the historiographer of the Army Group North W. Haupt. The description of the events by Bogdanov confirms precisely this version:

“A frontier guard was running towards me. In a voice trembling with excitement, he told about what had happened. Their platoon guarded the bridge across the Luga. They saw how our ZIS truck drove up to the guard. Stopped. The guard asked something. Several soldiers in Red Army uniform jumped out of the body. Someone shot the sentry. Turning the barrier, the car moved forward. Then came the motorcyclists. The soldiers of the security platoon jumped out of the barracks. Who and where lay down, in the confusion they did not even have time to take the trenches and forgot a light machine gun in the barracks. They fired rifles. Another car with enemy submachine gunners approached. Well, ours and ran ... ".

The lieutenant immediately sent a messenger with an order for the unarmed builders to withdraw by scaffolding to the Weimari station. Bogdanov dates these events to July 13, but this is an obvious mistake - the bridgehead near Porechye was captured a day later, on July 14. Taking advantage of the lack of opposition, the Germans expanded the bridgehead to the villages of Ivanovskoye and Yurki. At first, aviation was the main threat to the German units that seized the bridgehead on Luga. Thanks to the energetic attacks of Soviet pilots, the situation was assessed by the German command as critical. The ZhBD XXXXI corps on July 14, 1941 stated:

“The threatening situation in which the weak forces of the 6th TD are located on the bridgehead due to the constant bombing of the enemy forces the corps commander to call the commander of the TGr. He emphasizes that if the enemy's air supremacy does not end by the end of the day, the corps will not be able to guarantee the holding of the bridgehead. The command of the TGr should ensure that the Luftwaffe moves forward and is temporarily content with field airfields. Our fighter bases are now too far in the rear for them to effectively support the actions of the ground forces. The losses of divisions in people and equipment from the bombing are growing and partially reduce the effect of surprise.

The situation as a whole was quite typical. Literally two weeks before the described events in Ukraine, the 11th Panzer Division of the XXXXVIII Kempf Corps, which had broken through to Ostrog, was seriously damaged by air strikes. The Soviet forward detachments on the approach to the Oder and on the Oder bridgeheads in January and the first days of February 1945 were also subjected to massive attacks by enemy aircraft. The Air Force simply did not have time to deploy airfields to effectively cover the units that had pulled ahead. It was a high point for attack aircraft. Despite the losses suffered in the first days of the war from attacks on airfields, the Soviet Air Force still retained its combat capability and sought to influence the situation on the ground to the maximum extent possible.

Despite justified complaints from the command of XXXXI Motorized Corps, it cannot be said that the 1st Air Fleet was generally inactive these days. German fighters, of course, could not effectively cover the forward units of tank formations. The main forces of the JG54 squadron were based at that moment in the Ostrov area. The response of the Luftwaffe to the ever-increasing activity of the "Stalin's falcons" was strikes on airfields by bombers. However, their effectiveness was already much lower than in the early days of the war. In the operational summary of the Air Force Headquarters of the Northern Front for July 13, it was indicated that as a result of attacks on airfields, "there are dead and wounded, the equipment of the aircraft was withdrawn from the strike of the project in a timely manner." Nevertheless, on the morning of the next day, at 5.15-6.30 on July 14, a large group of 15 Yu-88s attacked the Siverskaya airfield and burned 2 SBs and 2 Pe-2s on the ground.

LKBTKUKS tanks shot down in the Porechye area: T-34 and shielded KV

The advance detachment of the 1st Panzer Division moved to the lower reaches of the Luga on July 14 practically on the heels of the 6th Panzer Division - there was simply no other way. Making their way along bad roads, the detachment went to the lower reaches of the Luga, also "subjected to strong enemy attacks from the air." To move on a broken road, you have to lay hundreds of meters of gates and fill up funnels of aerial bombs. The Germans were driven forward by an aerial reconnaissance report that the bridge over the Luga at Sabsk was intact. However, near Sabsk, the infantry school named after Sabsky managed to take the defense. S. M. Kirov. When around 20.00 (Berlin time) a German detachment approaches the bridge, it takes off into the air right in front of the taken aback motorized riflemen. Captain V. Sergeev, the company commander of the school, recalled:

“I don’t know how many explosives the Rabbi planted, apparently with a “reserve”. The roar was incredible, even my ears were blocked. In the air, like matches, raised boards, logs, various fragments. The bridge vanished into smoke and dust. From the falling debris seethed, water rose in fountains.

Then everything was quiet. Luga calmed down. The bridge didn't exist. A few piles remained sticking out, debris floating downstream.

For some time the Germans were silent. We were also silent. And then something happened that is hard to describe. Artillery, mortars, machine guns, machine guns - everything that fired hit our front line.

The Germans have to ford the Luga under fire. As recorded in the ZhBD of the 1st Panzer Division, "after a hard battle, pushing a well-entrenched enemy," the detachment captures a small bridgehead in the Bol area. Sabsk. This bridgehead was higher up the Luga than the Raus bridgehead at Porechye. Soviet data deny the capture of the bridgehead near Sabsk the first time, it is believed that the cadets repulsed the first attack.

If at that moment the soldiers and officers of the 1st Panzer Division, blackened by road dust, had raised their heads, they would have been able to make out fighters with crosses on their wings in the sky. In response to the above-cited complaint of the German commanders to higher authorities, fighters from JG54 were sent to the area of ​​operations of the forward units of the Reinhardt corps on the evening of July 14. This immediately cost the 41st Air Division 3 SBs shot down and 1 SB that did not return from a combat mission in the Sabsk area. Pilots of the 4th, 8th and 9th detachments of JG54 can apply for these three aircraft. Soviet fighters claimed two downed Me-109s, but so far enemy data has not confirmed this claim. Also, a Pe-2 reconnaissance unit of a separate reconnaissance group in the Gdov region was attacked by fighters. However, this outbreak of Luftwaffe activity at a great distance from their airfields could not fundamentally change the situation.

On July 15, aircraft of the Baltic Fleet joined the attacks on the bridgeheads occupied by the Germans in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bIvanovsky and Sabsk. Fighters of the KBF Air Force flew on a mission with suspended eres. Above the bridgeheads and on the approaches to them, the skies opened up. Bombers of the Security Service of the 41st Air Division bombed and poured fire from machine gun turrets on the finally stopped German units. Apocalyptic notes appear in the 1st Panzer Division's railroad division: “After the [Kruger] battle group was subjected to several enemy bombings during the night and in the early morning hours, during the first half of the day the situation in the air becomes almost unbearable. The enemy is bombing every single vehicle, looking for the positions of artillery and anti-aircraft guns, destroying the road with funnels. The words that we are accustomed to hearing in relation to the Soviet units, aren't they? Already in the early morning, at 5.00, on July 15, the division commander, Lieutenant-General Friedrich Kirchner, was wounded by a fragment of an air bomb. The division is commanded by 49-year-old Major General Walter Krueger. Like many German tank commanders, he was from the cavalry. Kruger, however, met the Second World War as the commander of an infantry regiment. However, already in February 1940, he became commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, went through the French campaign with Kirchner, and in April 1941 received the rank of major general.

Contrary to the statements in Routh's memoirs about the effective fire of anti-aircraft guns, neither the 41st Air Division nor the KBF Air Force had any losses on July 15. According to German documents, the anti-aircraft division assigned to the air defense of the bridgeheads simply did not arrive due to traffic jams.

From the first hours after the Germans captured the bridgehead near Sabsk, fierce battles unfolded for it. According to German data, on the morning of July 15, cadets attacked them with the support of heavy tanks. In the afternoon, the Germans attack and expand the bridgehead. The ZhBD of the 1st Panzer Division notes: "The enemy fights exceptionally stubbornly, he is destroyed with the help of flamethrowers and in hand-to-hand combat." By evening, the motorcycle battalion of the division is being pulled up to the bridgehead near Sabsk, motorcycles overcome road conditions better than cars. The defense of the bridgehead is intensifying.

At the end of the day, the German command assessed the situation in the air as quite serious. The ZhBD XXXXI corps stated: "In a telephone conversation, the chief of staff of the corps requires the chief of staff of the TGr to organize sufficient air support as a prerequisite for the further offensive of the corps." The tankers were asked, like Munchausen, to pull themselves out of the swamp by the pigtail - to capture the airfield in Gdov for the Luftwaffe. The 36th motorized division was assigned to capture the city and the airfield. She went to Gdov on the morning of July 16. The fragmentation of the forces of the Reinhardt corps took on a finished look. Now his formations were scattered over a front of almost 150 km. In addition, all three divisions of the XXXXI Corps were supplied along one bad road, in places only one lane wide. The sparse formation of Soviet troops on the Luga line was to some extent compensated by the sparse battle formations of their enemy.

T-34 LKBTKUKS, shot down by units of the 6th Panzer Division

Aviation provides serious support to the troops on the Luga line. Despite bad weather conditions, the 41st Air Division, under the cover of fighters from the 39th Air Division, bombed the area of ​​Sabsk and Osmino. Only FAB-100 was dropped 156 pieces. The fighters flew to escort the SB with eres and hunted trucks on the roads. The ZhBD of the German 1st Panzer Division stated: “The enemy dominates the air. Anti-aircraft guns have problems with ammunition. Due to the overload, shells repeatedly burst in the bore. It should be noted that the heavy fire of anti-aircraft guns gave some, albeit rather modest, results: the 41st Air Division lost 2 SBs on July 16, the 39th Air Division - 1 I-16, shot down by fire from the ground.

Due to the activity of the Soviet Air Force, the German units on the bridgeheads were even without the usual Panzerwaffe lifesaver - "aunts-Yu" with fuel and ammunition. On July 16, the ZhBD XXXXI Corps noted: “Due to bad roads and the continuing threat to communications, the supply of bridgeheads is difficult. Air supply due to bad weather is only possible on a limited scale, since only Yu-88s can be used, the use of transport aircraft is impossible due to the activity of enemy fighters. This meant that supplies were dropped from the bombers in parachute containers. The most radical measures were taken to free the supply routes. All vehicles that interfered with traffic were simply thrown off the road into the swamp. The ZhBD XXXXI Corps explicitly states: "Our personal and material losses from enemy artillery and aircraft are growing at a worrying pace."

All this forced the Germans to rush to capture Gdov. In addition to motorized units, the advance detachment of the 58th Infantry Division (reinforced reconnaissance battalion) takes part in the battles for the city. However, on the evening of July 16, it became clear that these efforts were in vain. News came that near Soltsy they were surrounded by part of the LVI corps of Manstein. The main forces of the 1st Air Corps of the 1st Air Fleet were deployed there, including to supply the encircled group. It was too late to change decisions already made. Continuing to carry out the assigned task, already at dusk, units of the 36th motorized infantry division took the completely useless Gdov airfield with battle. As an airfield for the Luftwaffe, it was not claimed by the 1st Air Fleet. To create an "air umbrella" over the combat formations of the 4th tank group, I and II groups of the JG54 squadron (about 40 Bf 109F-2 aircraft) were relocated to the Zarudye airfield southeast of the city of Lyady on Plyuss on July 17. This allowed the Luftwaffe, at least, to try to sit on two chairs and cover both the lower reaches of the Luga and the Soltsy region. Nevertheless, fighter cover for raids on bridgeheads became vital both for the bombers of the KBF Air Force and for the 41st Air Division.

Another wrecked T-34 of the LKBTKUKS regiment

The senseless but merciless battle for Gdov, meanwhile, continued. The 118th Rifle Division already had an order to withdraw, and the airfield was no longer needed due to a change in the situation. By the evening of July 16, German units created a threat to intercept the railway and dirt tracks going from Gdov to the north. This forced the headquarters of M. Popov to authorize the withdrawal of the 118th Infantry Division. It started at 20.00, but by that time the encirclement was almost closed. Two rifle and both artillery regiments of the division were forced to fight their way out of the "cauldron". By July 17, their remnants numbering about 2 thousand people went to their own. The infantry regiment from the 58th Infantry Division, which arrived on the battlefield, actually arrives at the cap analysis and practically does not participate in the battle. In the ZhBD GA "Sever" the capture of Gdov was noted as a notable success: "On the site of the 18th Army on July 17, large forces of the 118th Infantry Division in the Gdov region were destroyed or captured. The chief of operas was taken prisoner. department and head of intelligence. department of this division.

The remaining units of the 118th division and its headquarters were taken to Narva along Lake Peipus by the forces of the Peipsi military flotilla. It was created just a few days before the events described. In Leningrad, 427 personnel, two 76-mm guns from the Aurora, several 45-mm guns were scraped together. Having overcome 250 km in 28 hours, literally in front of German tanks rushing to the lower reaches of the Luga, 13 vehicles arrived in Gdov and engaged in the rearmament of training ships. The core of the Chudskaya flotilla consisted of three training ships - Narva, Embakh and Issa with a displacement of 110-150 tons. They were armed with 76mm and 45mm guns and reclassified as gunboats. In addition, the flotilla included the Uku messenger ship, 7 lake and river steamers, 13 motor boats and several barges. On July 17 and 18, the freshly minted flotilla took part in the evacuation of encircled Soviet units from Gdov.

Despite the breakthrough and evacuation across the lake, the 118th Rifle Division was actually finished off in Gdov after its unsuccessful debut near Pskov and Ostrov. According to the report of the commander of the formation, Major General Glowatsky, on July 18, the division "was not combat-ready." The Germans announced the capture of 2000 prisoners and many trophies, it was also indicated that "the enemy lost more than 1000 people killed and part of the Lake Peipsi flotilla." The last statement, however, is an obvious exaggeration. The Chud flotilla suffered no losses near Gdov.

It is not possible to isolate the losses near Gdov from all the losses of the connection. Later, when the losses of the 118th Rifle Division were calculated from the moment it entered the battle until July 25, they amounted to an impressive figure of 7089 people, including 74 people killed and 6754 people missing. Calling a spade a spade, the compound was destroyed, smeared in a thin layer across the space from Ostrov to Gdov. Now her conclusion to the understaffing was more than justified.

Developing the offensive from Gdov, the Germans came into contact with the 191st Rifle Division of the Luga Operational Group. All units and formations of the LOG were gradually drawn into the battle. Now only they remained on the way of the German troops to Leningrad. The relative freedom of action in the air allowed the Soviet command on July 15-16 to effectively conduct reconnaissance and establish a regrouping of enemy forces from Luga to Kingisepp.

A typical solution in such a situation was a counterattack on the bridgehead captured by the enemy. The Soviet command acted in full accordance with the general canons. As the echelons arrived with units of the 2nd DNO, it was decided to attack the bridgehead in the area of ​​​​Ivanovsky and Porechye. The 2nd DNO was commanded by the 39-year-old Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel N. S. Ugryumov, who distinguished himself during the Soviet-Finnish war. Like many heroes of the "winter war" (Kirponos, Muzychenko), he quickly moved up the career ladder. The front commander M. Popov later wrote: “I understand how difficult it is for Ugryumov. In a year, he advanced from battalion commander to division commander.

Here is the time to say a few words about the Leningrad militia. On June 27, the formation of the Leningrad People's Militia Army (LANO) began in the city on a voluntary basis. On June 30, the army headquarters was created and the formation of the first three divisions began. Accordingly, the 1st DNO was considered formed already on July 9, and the 2nd and 3rd DNO - from July 10, 1941. The militia divisions were recruited from the reserve to the battalion, and from the battalion and above were provided from the resources of the Leningrad district. The 1st Infantry Regiment of the 2nd DNO consisted mainly of workers from the Elektrosila plant; 2nd - factories "Skorokhod", "Proletarian Victory" No. 1 and No. 2; 3rd - from the volunteers of the Leninsky, Kuibyshev and Moscow regions. Employees of the Lenmyasokombinat, as well as students of the institute and technical school of aircraft instrumentation, joined the artillery regiment.

As of the evening of July 11, the 2nd DNO consisted of 9210 people. The division of Colonel Ugryumov was fully provided with rifles. For 9210 people there were 7650 rifles and another 1000 carbines. However, there was a shortage of light machine guns, which gave only two light machine guns in a rifle platoon. As of July 12, there were 70 heavy machine guns out of 166 in the state. There were no anti-tank guns at all. At the same time, there was field artillery, up to 152-mm caliber inclusive, in total there were 35 guns in the artillery regiment of the 2nd DNO. The main problem of the militias was preparation. Up to 50% of the rank and file militia of the 2nd DNO (Moskovsky district) had no training. The positions of junior officers were replaced by privates. As it was directly stated in the report on the combat readiness of the division, "combat training carried out in the process of formation, due to the shortness of time, did not give significant results, the units failed to carry out combat knocking together."

In conclusion, the report on the combat readiness of the 2nd DNO stated: "The division is basically ready to solve the tasks of a defensive battle." It is impossible not to emphasize - "defensive". In the German army there was such a term as "combat capability" - Kampfwert. Its gradation included values ​​from I (readiness for any offensive tasks) to IV (readiness for limited defensive tasks). So, in German terminology, the 2nd DNO had Kampfwert III (defense only), not the highest, frankly. On July 13 and 14, the 2nd DNO went to the front in eight echelons, seven by rail from the Vitebsk railway station and one echelon by road. The anticipation of the 2nd DNO with access to the assigned positions meant the urgent need to use it for offensive tasks.

A logical question may arise: “Why offensive?” Here let me recall the words of Mellenthin:

“He is deeply mistaken who has a complacent attitude towards the existing bridgeheads and delays their liquidation. Russian bridgeheads, no matter how small and harmless they may seem, can in a short time become powerful and dangerous pockets of resistance, and then turn into impregnable fortified areas. Any Russian bridgehead captured in the evening by a company is necessarily held by at least a regiment in the morning, and the next night it turns into a formidable fortress, well-equipped with heavy weapons and everything necessary to make it almost impregnable. No artillery fire, even a hurricane, will force the Russians to leave the bridgehead created overnight. Only a well-prepared offensive can bring success. This principle of the Russians "to have footholds everywhere" is a very serious danger and should not be underestimated. And again, there is only one radical remedy against him, which must be used in all cases without fail: if the Russians create a bridgehead or equip an advanced position, it is necessary to attack, attack immediately and decisively. Lack of determination always affects in the most detrimental way. Being one hour late can cause any attack to fail, being a few hours late is sure to result in such a failure, being a day late can spell disaster. Even if you have only one platoon of infantry and one single tank, you still need to attack! Attack while the Russians are not yet buried in the ground, while they can still be seen, while they do not have time to organize their defense, while they do not have heavy weapons. In a few hours it will be too late. Delay leads to defeat, decisive and immediate action brings success.

Everything that Mellenthin said about the Soviet bridgeheads can be equally applied to the German bridgeheads: "it is necessary to attack, attack immediately and decisively." Both parties under similar conditions acted in a similar way. There are eternal values ​​in military affairs, and it would be strange to invent some special and original tactics and strategy for the Red Army.

The leadership of the front understood that the freshly minted militia division in itself did not have sufficient strike capabilities to inflict a serious defeat on the enemy. Colonel Ugryumov recalled: “The commander of the search for the front arrived in Veimari. He ordered to reinforce the division with two artillery battalions and a company of tanks from the Leningrad armored courses for the improvement of command personnel, and only after that to begin the offensive.

By order of Voroshilov, a consolidated tank regiment LKBTKUKS was formed. For this, the entire material part of the courses was transferred to the Weimari station. Already on July 15, the LKBTKUKS tank regiment was subordinated to Colonel Ugryumov, and on the same day the attack of the German bridgehead at Ivanovsky followed. Routh describes this attack as follows:

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	Luga, Shimsk, Kingisepp, Leningrad region, USSR
	the advance of the GA "Sever" was delayed for a month (in the Luga region for 45 days), the line was broken by German troops in the area of ​​Shimsk and Kingisepp, the Soviet troops were surrounded, left the line and retreated
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
K. E. Voroshilov	Wilhelm von Leeb
M. M. Popov	Georg von Küchler
K. P. Pyadyshev	Erich Hoepner
A. N. Astanin	Ernst Bush
F. N. Starikov	Erich von Manstein
S. D. Akimov
V. V. Semashko
Side forces
Luga operational group: more than 100 thousand people	GA "North"
55,535 people	unknown

(Luga fortified position) - a system of Soviet fortifications (defensive line) with a length of about 300 kilometers, built in June - August 1941 on the territory of the Leningrad Region, from the Narva Bay, along the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Shelon to Lake Ilmen in order to prevent the breakthrough of the troops of the German army group " North" to the northeast in the direction of Leningrad. On June 27, military builders began work. To defend the line on July 6, the Luga Operational Group was created, headed by Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev. 15 days after the start of construction, on July 12, the 4th German Panzer Group entered into battle with cover units of the Luga Operational Group in the area of ​​the Plyussa River. Although the work on the creation of the frontier was not completed, the stubborn defense of the Soviet troops forced the Wehrmacht command to stop the attack on Leningrad. The successful counterattack near Soltsy, the defense of Tallinn and the Battle of Smolensk had a serious impact on the course of hostilities on the Luga line, allowing the Soviet troops to hold back the advance of the German units for another month, strengthen the defense and form new formations.

In the period of August 8-13, the line was broken through along the flanks, in the region of Novgorod and Kingisepp. The counterattack near Staraya Russa and the defense of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area diverted the significant forces of Army Group North and slowed down the development of the offensive against Leningrad. On August 26, 43,000 Soviet soldiers defending the Luga sector were surrounded, but continued to fight until mid-September. Around 20,000 soldiers were taken prisoner.

background

The strategic importance of Leningrad

On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. This plan provided for an attack on the USSR by three army groups in three main directions: GA "North" on Leningrad, GA "Center" on Moscow and GA "South" on Kiev and Donbass. After the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, the GA "Sever" was to turn its armies to the east, surrounding Moscow from the north. In Directive No. 32 of June 11, 1941, Hitler determined the end of the "victorious campaign to the East" as the end of autumn.

Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, wrote in his diary on July 8, 1941:

By the beginning of World War II, Leningrad was the leading industrial and cultural center of the country, with a population of 3,191,300 people. In 1940, in terms of the value of the gross output of industrial products, it was in second place after Moscow, and was the flagship of shipbuilding. The port of Leningrad occupied an important place in the country's foreign trade. 30 percent of military production was concentrated in Leningrad. Having taken Leningrad, the Germans would have taken possession of the Baltic Fleet, which prevented the most important transportation of Germany from the Scandinavian countries, primarily iron ore from Sweden. The fall of the city on the Neva would allow the Wehrmacht troops to unite with the Finnish army and break out into the operational space east of Lake Ladoga. Such a breakthrough in the direction of Vologda could continue to disrupt the railway communication and block transportation from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. With the fall of Leningrad, German troops would have had unhindered access to the expanses of the north of the Soviet Union, and they could have been thrown at Moscow from the north, which would have changed the entire strategic situation on the Soviet-German front.

The approaches to the northern territories of the CCCP were covered by the Northern and Northwestern fronts.

• The Northern Front was created on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the Leningrad Military District and covered the territory of the Kola Peninsula, Karelia and the Leningrad Region, protecting Leningrad from the north. The front was commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, chief of staff - Major General D. N. Nikishev.
• The North-Western Front was created on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the Baltic Special Military District, with the outbreak of war, the troops of the front fought on the territory of the Baltic Soviet republics. Front Commander - Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov. The border battles and battles of the troops of the front, which began on June 22, 1941, were lost by the end of June 25. By the beginning of July, the troops of the Northwestern Front were unable to detain the enemy and retreated to a depth of up to 500 km in the northwestern regions of Russia, ending up in the south of the Leningrad Region. For inept command and control of the troops, the command of the North-Western Front in full force was removed from their posts. At the same time, the Wehrmacht command, although it achieved a significant advance of its troops, could not achieve the encirclement and defeat of the Soviet troops.

In the first days of July, due to the lack of forces and means on the North-Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command pointed out the need to involve the troops of the Northern Front in the defense of Leningrad from the south-west, which had previously been entrusted with the task of defending the city only from the north. The border between the fronts was established along the Pskov-Novgorod line, while the defense of the territory of the Estonian SSR was left to the troops of the North-Western Front.

On July 4, Lieutenant General P. P. Sobennikov took command of the front. Corps Commissar V.N. Bogatkin was appointed a member of the military council, and General N.F. Vatutin, deputy chief of the General Staff, who had been at the front since June 22, 1941, became chief of staff. Under these conditions, the main task of the Soviet troops in this theater of operations was to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad and Novgorod, and also to cover Tallinn, which was the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

On July 8, 1941, the main command of the German armed forces set the troops of Army Group North the following task: to cut off Leningrad from the east and southeast with the strong right wing of the tank group from the rest of the USSR. And on July 10, the troops of the Army Group "North" from the turn of the Velikaya River launched an offensive against Leningrad in the directions of Pskov - Luga and Ostrov - Novgorod. On the same day, formations of the Karelian Army of Finland launched an offensive against the positions of the 7th Army of the Northern Front in Karelia. The date of July 10, 1941 and the line of the Velikaya River are considered by most researchers to be the beginning of the battle for Leningrad and its starting point.

Location

The development of events on the North-Western Front before the start of the Battle for Leningrad.

The initial plan of fortifications, developed by a group of the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev, was a fortification strip from the Gulf of Finland along the banks of the Luga, Mshage, Shelon rivers to Lake Ilmen, almost 250 km.

The Luga defense zone looked on the map as one line from the western coast of the Narva Bay in the area of ​​st. Preobrazhenka along the Luga River, to Kingisepp, further to Porechye, Sabsk, Tolmachevo. Around the city of Luga, a detour was planned along lakes and swampy areas with an exit then again to the Luga River, southeast of the city. Then the line went to Peredolskaya, Mshaga, Shimsk to Lake Ilmen. In the center, Pyadyshev outlined the main defense center, which included the city of Luga, with the cut-off position of Luga - Tolmachevo. Another cutoff position was planned to the east and northeast of Tolmachevo. It crossed the main roads leading to Leningrad from Pskov, Porkhov, Novgorod, and the Oktyabrskaya railway. B. V. Bychevsky

On July 4, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff, General G.K. Zhukov, handed over to the Military Council of the Northern Front the directive of the Headquarters of the High Command on the preparation of defense on the outskirts of Leningrad No. 91 / NGSH. This directive ordered to occupy the line of defense of Narva, Luga, Staraya Russa, Borovichi, to create a foreground with a depth of 10-15 km. Thus, in fact, by its decision of July 4, the Headquarters retroactively approved the measures that had been proposed and were already being implemented by the command of the Northern Front.

July 5, 1941, signed by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov to the Military Council of the Leningrad Military District. A new directive from the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command on the preparation of a defensive line on the outskirts of Leningrad arrives. It ordered the construction of a defensive line on the front of Kingisepp, Tolmachevo, Ogoreli, Babino, Kirishi and further along the western bank of the Volkhov River. It was indicated to pay special attention to the strong cover of the Gdov-Leningrad, Luga-Leningrad and Shimsk-Leningrad directions. Start building the frontier immediately. Completion of construction - July 15, 1941.

As a result, the main line of defense and two cut-off positions were created in August. The main lane ran from the Gulf of Finland along the right bank of the Luga River to the Muraveino state farm, and then through the settlements of Krasnye Gory, Darino, Leskovo, Smerdi, Streshevo, Onezhitsa, along the right bank of the Luga River from Onezhitsa to Osvina, and then through the settlements of Ozhogin Volochek , Unomer, Bear along the Kiba River, from the village of Medved to Pegasino along the left bank of the Mshaga River, and then to Golino along the left bank of the Shelon River.

• The first cut-off position consisted of two bands. The first, 28 km long, ran from Malaya Rakovna to Vychelovki along the right bank of the Luga River, then along the right bank of the Udraika River to Dubtsev, then to Radoli along the Batetskaya River. The second lane, 20 km long, went from Kolodno, Chernaya to Zaklinye along the Chernaya River.
• The second cut-off position stretched from the Muraveino state farm to Ploskovo along the right bank of the Luga River, then along the Oredezh River, Khvoylo Lake, Antonovo Lake, Pristanskoye Lake, the Rydenko River and along the Ravan River to Fedorovka, further along the Tigoda and Volkhov rivers to Kirishi. The length along the front was 182 km.

Building

Organization of construction

As early as June 22, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. A. Meretskov, who urgently arrived in Leningrad, recommended to the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, to proceed with the selection and reconnaissance of possible defensive lines between Pskov and Leningrad, with immediate deployment on them defensive work with the involvement of free troops, and most importantly - the local population. This task was entrusted to Popov's deputy, Lieutenant General K. P. Pyadyshev, under his leadership a large group of specialists and military engineers worked on calculations for the construction of defensive structures.

On the morning of June 24, Pyadyshev reported on the composition, procedure and timing of the work of reconnaissance groups, on the approximate organization and sequence of defensive construction. The main boundary was the Luga River almost along its entire length and further Mshaga, Shimsk to Lake Ilmen, with a developed and fortified forefield, originating from the Plyussa River. On the near approaches to Leningrad, it was planned to create two more lines of defense. At the same time, the creation of the Luga defensive zone, which stretched for 250 km, was especially time-consuming and difficult. It was supposed to consist of two defensive lines and one cut-off position, which ran along the banks of numerous lakes and rivers.

On June 25, the Military Council of the Northern Front approved the basic concept of building defensive lines on the outskirts and in the city itself. The plan called for the construction of three lines:

• the first - from the Gulf of Finland along the Luga and Mshaga rivers to Shimsk to Lake Ilmen;
• the second was equipped along the outer ring of the district railway, along the Peterhof - Krasnogvardeisk - Kolpino line and was engaged in the troops of the second echelons of the armies;
• the third passed directly on the outskirts of the city.

At the same time, it was planned to create seven defense sectors in the city itself.

It immediately became clear that the amount of work on the Luga border was so great that it could not be completed by the army alone within the prescribed period, and on June 27 the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council of Workers' Deputies decided to involve the population of the city and a number of suburban areas in labor service.

The plan for the defense of Leningrad drawn up by the headquarters, which provided for the broad participation of the population in its implementation, was approved by the party and Soviet leaders of the city and region, and on June 27, the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city committee, who returned to Leningrad from Moscow party A. A. Zhdanov, who by telephone agreed on this plan with Stalin.

By decision of the Military Council, construction management No. 1 was formed to manage the construction of the Luga border by June 28. The task of the management was the construction of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as the bunker. The backbone of the administration was made up of officers and cadets of military engineering schools, as well as construction specialists from Leningrad. Construction management at work sites was carried out by the departments of construction supervisors and individual construction sites. They were created on the basis of the Higher Naval Engineering and Construction School, the Military Engineering School, as well as a number of construction organizations. At the end of July - August 1941, the Military Council of the Front takes measures to improve the management of construction at work sites, and systems of bodies for managing military engineering work are formed:

• The engineering department of the front was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel B.V. Bychevsky, he was entrusted with the management of the work of troops and sapper units that were in contact with the enemy.
• Directorate for the construction of rear defensive lines (USTOR). It was headed by the assistant commander of the district for fortified areas, Major General P. A. Zaitsev.

General management of the entire complex complex of defensive construction, coordination of the work of the Engineering and Construction Departments of the front, including the attraction of material and labor resources of Leningrad and the region, was carried out by a member of the Military Council of the front, secretary of the city party committee A. A. Kuznetsov. This achieved better interaction than at the first stage between the Engineering and Construction Departments of the Front. Troika became the working body of the Military Council of the Northern Front to speed up construction in the most dangerous areas.

From that time on, the division of defensive lines and the organization of construction was based on the sectoral principle. In total, 8 sectors of defensive work were created: 5 on the distant and 3 on the near southern and southwestern approaches to Leningrad. In each of the sectors, a headquarters for defensive construction was created, the list of engineering units, construction organizations and builders was determined. The procedure for resolving tactical issues between the chiefs of troops, commandants and heads of sectors of defensive work was established. Twenty days later, the military-engineering apparatus for directing defensive construction grew significantly and amounted to almost 700 people.

Use of the capacities of urban enterprises

On June 27, 1941, the Military Council of the front adopted a resolution to stop the construction of the Leningrad Metro, the Verkhnesvirskaya Hydroelectric Power Station, the Enso Hydroelectric Power Station, the Enso-Leningrad power transmission line and other facilities, which made it possible to send the most qualified personnel of military and civil builders to the construction of long-term firing points. By the beginning of the war in Leningrad there were 75 construction and installation organizations of union and republican subordination, in which over 97 thousand people worked. In total, more than 133 thousand builders worked with the workers of the capital construction departments of enterprises and repair and construction offices in Leningrad. They had at their disposal cars, machinery, cement, fittings and other building materials available at enterprises, institutions and households. The main personnel in the work that required the highest qualifications were 12 construction battalions numbering up to 7 thousand people, the Leningrad District Military Construction Directorate, construction trusts No. 16, 35, 38, 40, 53, 58, Soyuzekskavatsiya, construction No. , Trust No. 2 of the NKVD in the Leningrad Region. The most complex work was assigned to the Leningrad metro builders. However, the most difficult and time-consuming earthworks were carried out by mobilized workers and employees from among the civilian population. They provided 88% of all labor costs. The number of builders (excluding engineering and construction units and construction organizations) working on the outskirts of the city in mid-August was over 450,000 people. Despite the fact that the entire working population of the city on August 1 was 1,453,000 people.

The Military Council of the Northern Front also made a number of decisions on the material support of the engineering measures of the front, and through the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, orders were placed at factories for the manufacture of anti-tank mines, barbed wire, concrete blocks for firing points and other protective engineering equipment. Within a day or two, the Leningrad factories began to supply the troops with essential engineering equipment. Crowbars, shovels, axes, camp kitchens began to be mass-produced, which were immediately sent to the construction of defensive lines. At the Izhora, Kirov, Baltic, Metallic and other plants and workshops, prefabricated armored pillboxes, reinforced concrete gun and machine-gun armor caps, anti-tank gouges, and anti-tank hedgehogs were manufactured. At the factory. Avrov and in the workshops of Drevtrest, the first 100 thousand mines were made in wooden cases, since it was impossible to quickly establish the production of metal cases for mines. Leningrad scientists received an order from the engineering department of the Leningrad Front for the development of 25 special topics. Various types and types of electric barriers, first developed and used on the borders of the Leningrad Front, then became widespread on other fronts. Thus, 320 km of high-voltage lines were installed and 25 electrical substations were built to implement the project of the 40-kilometer section of electric barriers Luga - Kingisepp. Materials and equipment from 42 plants and enterprises of Leningrad were mobilized for this special construction. A group of specialists led by P. G. Kotov developed and manufactured bunkers from ship armor at ship repair enterprises in Leningrad. In total, 600 such bunkers were made for the defense of Leningrad in 1941. At the same time, on July 11, the GKO adopts a resolution on the mass evacuation of the Leningrad industry; 80 factories and 13 central design bureaus are to be relocated to the cities of the Urals and Siberia. The evacuation of the most important enterprises of Leningrad begins, primarily plants, factories and a number of important research institutes.

Construction conditions and life of builders

On June 27, labor service was introduced for residents of the city and suburban areas. All able-bodied citizens of both sexes were involved in the construction of defensive structures: men aged 16 to 50 years and women aged 16 to 45, with the exception of those working at defense industry enterprises. Working hours were set: for non-working able-bodied citizens - 8 hours a day; employees and workers - 3 hours a day after work, students of functioning educational institutions - 3 hours a day after study. The duration of continuous work of citizens involved in labor service was set no more than 7 days, with a break after that of at least 4 days. Despite this, many going to work participated in the construction for more than 7 days, until the entire scope of work on their site was completed.

Field baths and showers were organized by local enterprises and institutions for those working on the Luga border. Help also came from local residents. It was they who in the early days provided assistance with food, baked bread. Construction teams were subjected to daily bombing, German pilots fired machine guns at unarmed builders. In August, artillery shelling began. From bullets, bombs and shells, people took refuge in the trenches and trenches they had just dug. As soon as the planes left, construction work resumed.

There was such a practice when the construction of the first line of defense was carried out by military personnel, and the second and subsequent ones were built by mobilized workers, employees, students and high school students. By mid-July, over 200,000 people were already digging trenches, communication channels, rifle and machine-gun trenches, anti-tank ditches, building bunkers, bunkers, command, observation and sanitary posts, arranged forest blockages and anti-tank pits.

The main organizational form of sending Leningraders "to the trenches" was "echelons". They were formed by enterprises or groups of plants, factories, artels and workshops. Their leaders were entrusted with the main responsibility for equipping people, organizing work, providing inventory and overalls. At the head of the echelon were his chief and commissar. Upon arrival at their destination, the leaders of the echelon received from the military command a specific task for the construction of an appropriate fortification. In turn, the echelons were subdivided into hundreds, brigades and units. Each worker was assigned a daily work rate. At earthworks, it was 3 cubic meters. m.

At the Luga frontier, a special detachment was created, which consisted of volunteers - physically strong, experienced military builders. It was intended for the operational erection of firing structures in places of the construction zone being shot through by the enemy. In order to somehow protect themselves from fragments and bullets, they had to put up metal shields, create temporary piles of logs. The command transferred the detachment from one sector to another. Virtually none of the tasks did not do without losses. For heroic actions, six builders were awarded the Order of the Red Star, the rest of the detachment members were awarded combat medals.

On July 28, the daily newspaper "Leningradskaya Pravda at the Defense Construction Site" began to appear, which covered the life of the builders of defensive lines, and disseminated the valuable experience of individual brigades and sections.

Foreground

In addition to building a defensive line, engineering units and subunits acted in barrage detachments, which were created by the command of the Northern Front in order to gain time to prepare defenses at the Luga line and were directed mainly to the Luga-Pskov highway (now the Pskov highway). On June 25-27, barrier detachments from the 191st Infantry Division began work in the Gdov direction. At the turn of the Plyussa River, mining began on the foredfield of the Luga position by sappers of the 106th separate motor-engineering battalion, cadets of the Leningrad Engineering School and pontooners of the 42nd pontoon-bridge battalion. Since by this time the troops had not yet arrived in the foreground, mining, the destruction of roads and structures was carried out without taking into account the specific requirements of the troops and reference to the upcoming hostilities.

Side forces

Army Group North

On June 22, the Sever GA, opposing the Baltic Military District, consisted of three armies:

• 16th Army under the command of Colonel General Bush
• 18th Army under the command of Colonel General von Küchler
• 4th Panzer Group under the command of Colonel General Göpner

29 divisions, including 20 infantry, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 security, provided air support for the German 1st Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General Keller, which had 430 combat aircraft, including 270 bombers and 110 fighters. It included: 1st air corps (1st, 76th and 77th bomber squadrons, armed with Ju 87, Ju 88, He 111 aircraft); 54th Fighter Squadron (Bf 109, Bf 110); group of the 53rd fighter squadron; two reconnaissance squadrons (50 aircraft). To reinforce Army Group North, additional forces were allocated from the reserve of the Wehrmacht High Command, including: 5 batteries of self-propelled artillery mounts; 6 cannon divisions of 105-mm guns; 2 cannon divisions of 150 mm guns; 11 divisions of heavy field howitzers; 2 mixed artillery battalions; 4 mortar divisions of 210 mm guns; 7 anti-aircraft batteries; 2 railway batteries; 3 armored trains and other units and divisions. In total, the Sever GA included: 655,000 people, 7673 - guns and mortars, 679 - tanks and assault guns, 430 - combat aircraft.

The level of training of the German troops was very high. The headquarters of army groups, as well as divisions and corps, had good operational training, and were fully prepared to control units during the planned hostilities. The command of Army Group North, the 16th and 18th field armies, the 4th tank group, corps and divisions had rich combat experience gained on the battlefields of the First World War and in combat operations in Western Europe.

According to the German command, in three weeks of fighting, the total losses of the three formations amounted to about 30 thousand people. Losses of equipment were somewhat smaller and amounted to about 5%. Thus, by mid-July, the Wehrmacht managed to maintain the backbone of its combat units, with which they entered the war with the USSR.

Considering that the troops of the 8th Army that had retreated to Estonia were finally defeated and demoralized, the German command sent only 2 infantry divisions (61st and 217th), from the 18th Army of von Küchler, to capture Tallinn. However, the calculations of the German command to quickly break the resistance of the Soviet troops did not materialize. For the quick capture of Tallinn - the main naval base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - he did not have enough forces. In the battles, the German units suffered heavy losses, and their forces were constantly dwindling. So, for example, according to the testimony of prisoners, in the companies of the 217th Infantry Division by mid-July there were 15-20 people left. As a result, the German command was forced to urgently transfer 3 more infantry divisions to this line, intended for operations in the main Leningrad direction.

On July 30, 1941, Hitler signed OKW Directive No. 34, in which Army Group North was ordered to continue the attack on Leningrad, surround it and establish contact with the Finnish army. Army Group "Center" - go on the defensive. The tasks indicated above for Army Group North were also confirmed in the "additions to Directive No. 34 of August 12, 1941." Thus, a new moment was that, along with a direct attack on Leningrad, the troops of Army Group North were to surround the city from the southeast and east, occupying the passage between the lakes Ilmen and Ladoga. To accomplish the latter task, in August, the 39th motorized corps of Colonel General Schmidt was transferred from Army Group Center to the 16th Army.

Luga Task Force

The enemy of the Army Group "North" were the troops of the north-western direction of K. E. Voroshilov, united in the direction of the upcoming German offensive by the directorates of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov and the North-Western Front, Major General P. P. Sobennikov. Initially, the Northern Front was intended to control troops operating in the Arctic and Karelia. However, the development of the situation at the front forced the command to involve the Northern Front for the defense of Leningrad from the southwest, and also to begin the transfer from the Karelian Isthmus to the Luga direction of the 10th mechanized corps (without the 198th motorized division), the 237th and 70th rifle divisions. However, SGK Directive No. 00260 of 07/09/41 ordered the commander of the Northern Front to immediately transfer the 70th, 177th rifle divisions and one tank division (from the 10th mechanized corps) to the commander of the North-Western Front, which on July 14 were supposed to launch a counterattack against the 56th mechanized corps of Manstein advancing in the direction of Novgorod. As a result, only the 24th Panzer Division operated from the 10th Mechanized Corps at the Luga line, in which on July 10th there were 118 BT-2 and BT-5 tanks, 44 BA-10 and BA-20 armored vehicles, only on July 13, 3 KV tanks appeared in the 24th Panzer Division.

On July 5, to manage the preparation of the fleet for the defense of the city, the headquarters of the Naval Defense of Leningrad and the Lake District was formed, the commander was Rear Admiral F. I. Chelpanov. The Onega, Chudskaya, Ilmenskaya and Ladoga military flotillas, marine brigades, detachments of sailors began to form, and the construction of additional coastal batteries began. In addition, on July 6, to the south-west of Leningrad, the following were advanced by the Northern Front:

• the 191st Rifle Division, which deployed along the eastern bank of the Narva River;
• 177th Rifle Division, which took up defense in the area of ​​the city of Luga;
• Leningrad Infantry School. S. M. Kirov (2000 people), who occupied Kingisepp;
• Leningrad rifle and machine gun school (1900 people), concentrated in the city of Narva;
• The 1st separate mountain rifle brigade (5800 people), mobilized in Leningrad and also heading for Luga.
• in Leningrad, from June 29, 1941, 3 divisions of the people's militia were formed, each with 10 thousand people.

To control the troops on the Luga line, by order No. 26 of July 6, 1941, the Luga Operational Group (LOG) was formed by the headquarters of the Northern Front, which received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through in the northeast in the direction of Leningrad. The command of the group is entrusted to Lieutenant General Konstantin Pavlovich Pyadyshev.

fighting

On July 9, after the capture of Pskov, the tank and motorized formations of the German troops did not wait for the approach of the main forces of the 16th and 18th armies, but resumed the offensive: the 41st motorized corps of General Reinhardt on Luga, and the 56th motorized corps - General Manstein to Novgorod.

The 191st and 177th rifle divisions, the 1st division of the people's militia, the 1st separate mountain rifle brigade, cadets of the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov and the Leningrad rifle and machine gun school managed to take up the defense in the Luga position. The 24th tank division was in reserve, and the 2nd division of the people's militia was advancing to the front line. Formations and units defended on a wide front. Between them there were gaps of 20-25 km, not occupied by troops. Some important areas, such as Kingisepp, turned out to be undisguised. The 106th Engineer and 42nd Pontoon Battalions set up anti-tank minefields in the foredfield area. Intensive work was still underway at the Luga position, the construction of the line was still far from complete. Tens of thousands of Leningraders and the local population participated in the work.

Attempt to take Luga on the move

On July 10, two tank, motorized and infantry divisions of the 41st motorized corps, with air support, attacked parts of the 118th rifle division north of Pskov. Having forced her to retreat to Gdov, they rushed to Luga. The 90th and 111th rifle divisions, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, retreated with battles. A day later, the Germans reached the Plyussa River near the village of the same name and started a battle with the cover troops of the Luga task force. By this time, the 177th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel A.F. Mashoshin managed to take the line in the Luga region and in the foredfield. The German divisions ran into stubborn resistance. Important settlements and centers of resistance changed hands several times. On July 13, the enemy managed to penetrate into the supply zone, but on the morning of the next day, the forward detachments of the 177th Rifle and units of the 24th Panzer Division, supported by powerful artillery fire, knocked him out of the forefield and again took up positions along the Plyussa River. The artillery group of Colonel G. F. Odintsov played an important role in repelling the onslaught of enemy tanks. One howitzer battery of senior lieutenant A. V. Yakovlev destroyed 10 enemy tanks. German troops in the Luga direction were stopped.

On July 13, the High Command of the North-Western Direction decided to reorganize command and control of troops on the south-western approaches to Leningrad. The 8th Army and the 41st Rifle Corps of the 11th Army from the troops of the North-Western Front were transferred to the Northern Front, and received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad. This decision reflected the real state of affairs, since the 8th Army and the 41st Rifle Corps were actually already fighting in the Northern Front. The commander of the Northern Front included the 41st Rifle Corps (111th, 90th, 235th and 118th Rifle Divisions) in the Luga Operational Group. The remnants of the units of the 41st Rifle Corps were assembled, provided with uniforms, armed, brought into formations, and sent to reinforce the troops of the Luga Operational Group, the 111th Rifle Division occupied the defense zone on the right, and the 235th Rifle Division on the left flank of the 177th rifle division.

Capture of bridgeheads near the villages of Ivanovskoye and Bolshoy Sabsk

When General Reinhardt tried to move his tanks and battalions of armored personnel carriers away from the Pskov-Luga road in a detour, trying to hit the defending Soviet units from the rear, he was faced with the fact that the terrain to the right and left of the highway was practically not suitable for armored vehicles. Conducting large-scale operations became impossible. Tanks have lost their main advantage - speed and maneuverability. At the same time, ground and air reconnaissance of the 4th Panzer Group established that on the left flank, in the lower reaches of the Luga River, rather insignificant forces of Soviet troops were located. And Goepner deployed the 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions to the north, leaving the 269th Infantry Division in the Luga direction. On July 14, after a forced march of about 160 kilometers, the 6th Panzer Division, with the help of a special unit of the Brandenburg regiment, captured two bridges across the Luga near the village of Ivanovskoye intact.

The maneuver of the main forces of the 4th Panzer Group from the Luga to the Kingisepp direction was timely discovered by the reconnaissance of the Northern Front. At the same time, the reconnaissance group of V. D. Lebedev, which operated behind enemy lines, especially distinguished itself. She reported on the intensive movement of German tanks and motorized columns from Strug Krasny and Plyussa to Lyady and further to the Luga River. The regrouping of German troops was also monitored by air reconnaissance. The front command took urgent measures to cover the Kingisepp sector. The dispatch to this direction of the 2nd division of the people's militia, formed from the volunteers of the Moscow region of Leningrad and the tank battalion of the Leningrad Red Banner Armored Improvement Courses for commanders (LBTKUKS), was accelerated. The 2nd BOTTOM, which arrived in time here, attacked the enemy, but could not knock it off the bridgehead. The attack of the militia and tankers was observed by Popov and Voroshilov, who personally came to the place of the breakthrough. In the midst of the battle, in order to better assess the situation, Popov himself went on reconnaissance on the T-34 tank, the tank received three hits with armor-piercing shells in the turret, but the armor withstood and the tank left the battlefield.

On the same day, July 14, a reinforced motorized battalion from the 1st Panzer Division went to the Luga River near Bolshoi Sabsk, and by 22 o'clock created a bridgehead on the eastern bank. For several days, until July 17, a fierce battle continued between a detachment of cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov and units of the 1st Panzer Division of the enemy. The cadets held firm thanks to a timely prepared system of full-length zigzag trenches. Significant assistance was provided to the defending troops by coastal batteries, which with their fire destroyed concentrations of German infantry, destroyed crossings, and struck at tank and mechanized units and artillery batteries. Later, General Reinhardt, leaving barriers at Bolshoy Sabsk, began to concentrate the forces of the 41st Corps on the bridgehead near the village of Ivanovskoye in order to break through to the Kingisepp-Krasnoye Selo highway, and along it to Leningrad.

In order to defeat the units of the 56th motorized corps, which broke into the area southwest of Shimsk, the commander of the North-Western Front, with his directive No. 012 of July 13, 1941, ordered the troops of the 11th army of General V.I. near the city of Soltsy. On July 14, part of the formations of the North-Western Front (including three divisions transferred from the Northern Front) launch a counterattack on the 56th motorized corps of General Manstein from the north. Units of the 183rd Rifle Division of the 27th Army advanced on Sitnya from the south. From the air, the advancing formations were supported by four air divisions of the North-Western and Northern fronts. The plan of the commander of the 11th Army was to strike in converging directions on the flank and rear of the enemy to surround his troops, cut and destroy them. In four days of fighting, the 8th Panzer Division was defeated, although it managed to break out of the encirclement, but it took a whole month to restore its combat capability. Parts of the 56th motorized corps were thrown back 40 km to the west. The rear of the corps suffered heavy losses. The German command, frightened by the counterattack of the Soviet troops, on July 19 ordered to stop the attack on Leningrad and resume it only after the main forces of the 18th Army approached Luga. The counterattack of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front temporarily eliminated the threat of a German breakthrough to Novgorod. However, the Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on July 19, and by July 27, they fought back to the prepared positions of the Luga line. But the local victory also had a downside. Throwing fresh formations into battle, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov simultaneously deprived himself of the only combat-ready reserve.

Organizational and combat actions in late July - early August

On July 21, 1941, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev was issued a warrant for arrest. It said that he was suspected of criminal activity under Art. 58-10, part 1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. September 17 sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was found guilty of:

The Luga task force, gradually saturated with troops, was divided into the Kingisepp, Luga and Eastern sectors (since July 29 - sections) of defense by operational directive No. 3049 of the headquarters of the Northern Front of July 23, 1941, the headquarters of the Luga task force was disbanded, and its officers and generals were sent to staffing the headquarters of the sections, with their direct subordination to the headquarters of the Northern Front.

On July 31, the Eastern sector was transformed into the Novgorod Army Operational Group, which in early August was subordinate to the North-Western Front. By the directive of the General Staff of August 4, the Novgorod Army Operational Group was transformed into the 48th Army, headed by Lieutenant General S. D. Akimov.

To exclude the possibility of landing bypassing defensive positions, on July 28, the Ilmenskaya flotilla was created from the ships of the river shipping company on Lake Ilmen. Commander - captain of the 3rd rank V. M. Drevnitsky. By order of the front commander No. 0278, the flotilla was subordinated to the 48th Army. Her ships carried guard duty in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the Novgorod and Staraya Russian directions, and participated in the landing of tactical assault forces. From August 14, the flotilla covered the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of the population from Novgorod with artillery fire, and then acted on the Volkhov River.

Successful defensive battles in July 1941 in the Solets and Shimsky directions instilled some optimism in the command of the North-West direction. Near Staraya Russa, a counterattack was being prepared on the flank of the advancing Army Group North, and on the Luga defensive line, the entrenched units were to firmly hold their positions and prevent the Nazis from further advancing to Leningrad. Despite the significant strengthening of the Luga frontier by infantry and tank units, the density of Soviet troops remained quite low. For example, the 177th Rifle Division of the Luga sector of defense, covering the most important direction to the city of Luga and having three enemy divisions in front of it, took up defense on a front of 22 km. Exactly the same front was defended by the 111th Rifle Division of the same defense sector. Even the difficult terrain did not compensate for the stretching of the troops along the front and their one-echelon arrangement of formations.

At the end of July, a document was prepared at the headquarters of the 24th Panzer Division summarizing the experience of the first month of the war, including characterizing the actions of the German troops:

The enemy conducts military operations mainly during the day. Motorized parts are located mainly in settlements. The enemy conducts constant aerial reconnaissance. In case of an unsuccessful attempt to attack from the move, it immediately switches to artillery and mortar preparation in a narrow area, trying to take control of the road or retreats back to look for weak points. Where there is resistance, the enemy does not go there. The rear is not fixed. solid frontdoes not have, but is grouped according to directions. If a tank is hit, it immediately goes into a counterattack to capture. The enemy moves boldly (soldiers are drunk) as long as there is no organized fire and determination. He tries to influence morally on the troops, going deeper into the rear along the roads. Enemy aircraft mainly bomb roads and bridges, and use bombs from 5 to 500 kg. There is a great shortage of bread, German bread is baked from surrogates, soldiers are robbing the population. When withdrawing, it immediately mines the roads and the surrounding area.

The Smolensk defensive operation of the troops of the Western Front had a great influence on the outcome of the struggle of the Soviet troops in July in the Leningrad direction. Having stopped Army Group Center east of Smolensk at the end of July, the troops of the Western Front deprived the enemy of the opportunity to carry out the planned strike of the 3rd Panzer Group from the area north of Smolensk on the flank and rear of the troops of the North-Western Front.

The unexpectedly formed pause, each of the parties sought to use as much as possible. While the Germans were developing a plan to resume the attack on Leningrad, the Soviet command was strengthening the city's defenses. Of course, both at Hitler's headquarters and at the headquarters of Army Group North understood that the faster their troops resumed the offensive, the less time the Russians would have to strengthen their defenses. However, the start of the offensive was delayed six times, mainly due to difficulties in supply and regrouping, and also because of disagreements about how to proceed.

By August 8, the German command regrouped its troops and created three strike groups:

strike force	Commanding	Subdivisions	Impact direction
Northern ("North")	Erich Hoepner	41st Motorized Corps(1st, 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions, 36th Motorized Division, 1st Infantry Division) 38th Army Corps(58th Infantry Division) 1st Aviation Corps	from the Ivanovskoye and Sabsk bridgeheads across the Koporskoe plateau in the direction of Leningrad
Central ("Luga")	Erich von Manstein	56th Motorized Corps(3rd Motorized Division, 269th Infantry Division, SS Infantry Division "Policeman")	along the highway Luga - Leningrad in the direction of Leningrad
Southern ("Shimsk")	Ernst Bush	1st Army Corps(11th, 22nd Infantry Divisions and part of the 126th Infantry Division) 28th Army Corps((121st, 122nd Infantry Divisions, SS Motorized Division "Totenkopf" and 96th Infantry Division in reserve) 8th Aviation Corps	in the Novgorod-Chudovsk direction, bypass Leningrad from the east and connect with the Finnish troops

By the beginning of August, Army Group North had lost 42 thousand people, and only 14 thousand people received replenishment. Back in mid-July, the command of the Army Group North came to the conclusion that the resistance of the enemy and the lack of its own forces would not allow capturing Leningrad immediately. This task can be solved only by the consistent defeat of the Russian forces. OKW Directive No. 33 of July 19 stated:

The 16th Army would be able to cover the right flank of the 4th Panzer Group only after it had completed the defeat of the encircled Soviet formations near Nevel or had thrown them back to the east. According to Field Marshal von Leeb, the offensive should have been postponed until July 25th. This did not suit Hitler at all, who sought to put an end to Leningrad as soon as possible, and on July 21 the Fuhrer flew to Leeb's headquarters, the German general outlined his thoughts to Hitler: until sufficient infantry forces approached, Göpner's tank group could hardly count on success.

As a result, the German command decided to break into the Soviet defenses on the flanks, and a minimum of forces were left in the Luga direction to tie down the Soviet troops. The main idea of ​​the German attack on Leningrad was to encircle and destroy its defenders on the distant approaches to the city. Cutting off the Luga grouping of Soviet troops from the fortifications directly near Leningrad, Army Group North opened up the possibility of unhindered advancement, both to Leningrad itself and bypassing the city to join the Finnish army on the Svir River.

Breakthrough of the line near Kingisepp

The northern grouping of General Erich Göpner can be conditionally called "tank", since it was here that all the tank divisions of Army Group North were concentrated. These divisions were supposed to "open" bridgeheads on the Luga River, using primarily their shock, and not maneuvering qualities. Due to transport problems in the 16th Army, the time for the transition to the offensive of Army Group North was postponed five times from July 22 to August 6. When the last appointed date came - August 8, 1941 - the weather worsened, it began to rain, and not a single plane could take off. German troops were deprived of the planned powerful air support. However, Goepner vigorously objected to a further delay in the start of the operation, and the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group from the bridgeheads on the Luga River near the villages of Ivanovskoye and Bolshoi Sabsk began without air support. The attack ran into strong resistance from the Soviet troops, supported by artillery. For three days, units of the 90th Infantry Division, units of the 2nd People's Militia Division and the remnants of a detachment of cadets from the Leningrad Infantry School held back the onslaught of Göpner's 4th Panzer Group. Count Johann Adolf von Kielmansegg, head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 6th Panzer Division, named the following reasons for the unsuccessful offensive:

1. The strength of the newly equipped Russian positions, the scale of which turned out to be unexpected and unknown to us, and their main area lay in the offensive zone of the division. Several anti-tank ditches, barriers of all kinds, countless mines, pillboxes made of thick logs or concrete, often armed with small-caliber automatic cannons, connected to each other with barbed wire, turned this line in the swampy forest into a reinforced position like the so-called "Stalin Line". These positions were still created from the beginning of the war, as the locals later told us. 2. The enemy was fully aware of the significance of this fight. The divisions were opposed by troops made up partly of Leningrad civilians, who compensated for their lack of training with even greater bitterness. 3. The reason for the tactical failure of the division offensive on August 8 should be sought, first of all, in the fact that, as it was later established, the enemy intended to launch a powerful offensive on the division’s sector on that same day in the afternoon. On the night of August 7-8, the enemy was specially reinforced with artillery and infantry and undertook a regrouping, which the division command had not yet been able to find out about on the morning of August 8. Therefore, the combat use of the division no longer fully corresponded to the current state of affairs. The main blow came against the main blow. The shock from the received rebuff and from considerable losses was sensitive.

The offensive was carried out again on August 11, by 11 o'clock, in an area covered with forest and spruce, the German troops managed to find a weak spot in the Soviet defense, through which the tanks had already broken through. Under strong pressure from superior enemy forces, the defenders of this section of the Kingisepp sector began to retreat to the east and north. After breaking through in depth, the 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions stood with their front to the east to form an internal front for encircling Soviet troops near Luga, and the 1st Infantry and 36th Motorized Divisions - for an external encirclement front. Three days of fighting cost the advancing 1600 people killed. The 8th Panzer Division was also introduced into the battle from the bridgehead near Bolshoi Sabsk. On August 14, the divisions of the 41st Motorized Corps crossed the forest and reached the Krasnogvardeysk-Kingisepp road. Thus, by the end of August 14, the Luga line in the Kingisepp sector was broken through - according to both sides. On August 16, German units occupy Kingisepp and Narva; units of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army leave Estonia and cross to the right bank of the Narva River. The 11th, 12th, 18th and 19th separate railway batteries of 180-356 mm caliber operating in this area provided great assistance to the defending troops. On August 21, a 356-mm battery destroyed a German crossing over the Luga River in the Porechie region with its fire. On August 22, German troops reached the firing range of coastal batteries, and they opened fire, supporting the troops of the 8th Army. During the fierce battles for Kingisepp, the 8th Army lost all its regimental and battalion commanders, as well as their headquarters.

Fights near Luga

The front line on the outskirts of the city of Luga was shaped like a horseshoe - Soviet troops occupied an arched ledge with Luga in the center. The Luga group was the holding center of the German offensive. Here the 56th motorized corps (269th infantry division, the SS division "Policeman" and the 3rd motorized division) dealt a pinching blow, simulating a blow at the shortest distance to Leningrad and not allowing the Soviet command to withdraw troops to the rescue of the neighboring sectors of the defense of the Luga line . At the same time, the shackling by battles did not allow the troops near Luga to quickly break away from the enemy and break out of the emerging encirclement in time.

On August 10, units of the SS division "Policeman", as well as units of the 269th Infantry Division, launched an offensive to the west of the Pskov-Luga highway. The frontal offensive, at first, did not lead to success and was associated with huge casualties, the SS division alone lost 2000 people killed and wounded. The commander of the SS division “Policeman”, General Arthur Mülferstedt, trying to morally support his subordinates in the area of ​​emerging success, appeared on the battlefield and was killed by a mortar mine.

On August 11, SS units made their way to the settlement of Stoyanovshchina. Here they were met by counterattacks from the tanks of the 24th Panzer Division. Despite the presence in the ranks of the attacking KV tanks, the counterattack was repulsed by the Germans. The Luga grouping of Soviet troops had only three KV tanks, there were too few of them to be used as tank ambushes, since the German units could simply bypass the dug-in tanks from the rear. It was impossible to place all three KV tanks at the front, there would still be gaps between them that could not be shot through. Therefore, the only option remained counterattacks, in which KV somehow knocked out or got stuck. As a result of the battles from August 10 to 14, the Soviet troops lost 2 KV tanks and 27 BT tanks.

After successfully securing positions near Stoyanovshchina, an attack by SS "Police" units followed in the direction of the highway, in the rear of the units defending it. Thus, the Soviet defenses across the highway were rolled up and the breakthrough was expanded. These battles continued until 19 August. But even after that, the Germans did not dare to advance along the highway. On August 23-24, German troops broke through between the lakes Bolshoye Toloni and Cheremenetskoye (east of the highway) and reached the Luga River upstream of the city of Luga. This made it possible to attack the city from the east and capture it already on August 24th. The SS men announced the capture of 1937 prisoners, the destruction of 53 tanks, 28 guns, 13 anti-tank guns, the engineer battalion of the SS division “Policeman” removed or defused 6790 mines of all types containing 46 tons of explosives. German sappers noted with annoyance that many Soviet mines were in wooden cases, which excluded their detection by a standard mine detector.

Breakthrough of the line in the Novgorod region

The southern grouping of the German troops of General Bush can be conditionally considered "infantry." Unfavorable terrain conditions did not allow the use of tanks in this direction, and the main blow here was dealt by six infantry divisions. Air support was provided by Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, which included about 400 aircraft, in addition, the corps had a significant amount of anti-aircraft artillery, which was actively used in battles on the ground. The 1st Army Corps under the command of General of the Infantry Kuno-Hans von Both was supposed to attack Novgorod directly. The width of the offensive front of the corps was only 16 km. The corps was reinforced by the 659th and 666th assault gun batteries and several heavy artillery battalions.

Unlike Goepner, the commander of the 16th Army, General Bush, decided not to give up air support in the attack on Novgorod. When the weather deteriorated sharply on the evening of August 7, the offensive was abandoned the next morning, the units that had taken their original positions were withdrawn. When the weather did not change the next day, the start of the offensive was again postponed. Finally, on August 10, the weather improved and at 05:20, after air and artillery strikes, the infantry went on the offensive, as a result of the fighting on that day, the Germans managed to almost completely open the defense system of the 48th Army and determine its weak point - the positions of the mountain rifle brigade. The next morning, August 11, fighting resumed. The Germans again struck the main blow in the area of ​​​​the mountain rifle brigade. Due to the lack of anti-aircraft weapons and air cover among the Soviet troops, the pilots of the Richthofen corps destroyed equipment with impunity, shot the defenders from machine guns, operating freely along the entire front. The wire communication, the control system were completely disrupted and artillery positions were destroyed. The aviation of the North-Western Front was unable to provide assistance to its infantry, during the day the aircraft made only 44 sorties, 4 bombers and 40 fighters.

The breakthrough of the defense of the 48th Army in the Novgorod direction was completed on August 13. The decisive role that day was played by the fact that a detailed defense plan for the 128th Infantry Division fell into the hands of the Germans. It marked minefields, false positions, artillery and machine-gun nests, the main centers of resistance and the distribution of forces between different defense sectors. The division commanders actively used their sappers to eliminate vast minefields, the sappers were followed by the vanguards of the advancing regiments. 88-mm anti-aircraft guns were used to destroy pillboxes.

On August 14, the command of the 70th and 237th rifle divisions, taking into account the current difficult situation (semi-encirclement by the enemy, capture of passing roads and lack of fuel, ammunition, food), it was decided to withdraw and on the night of August 16-17, covertly, divisions began to withdraw in the direction of Leningrad. German intelligence managed to find the escape routes of the units. The persecution began, first of all, by aerial bombardment and shelling. On August 19, during shelling, the acting commander of the 237th division, Colonel V. I. Tishinsky. The commander of the 70th division, Major General A.E. Fedyunin, died of wounds (according to other sources, he shot himself) surrounded on August 21. The 70th division, which emerged from the encirclement in small groups, numbered 3197 people on August 25, and the 237th division on August 29, 2259 people.

On the morning of August 15, the Germans made an attempt to capture Novgorod on the move, but it failed. Dive-bombers of the 8th Air Corps attacked Novgorod. Later, in reporting documents, the German command recognized the key role of aviation in the assault on Novgorod. The next day, the German flag fluttered over the Novgorod Kremlin. However, the battle for the city did not end there, until August 19, the remnants of the 28th tank division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st mountain rifle brigade continued to fight for its eastern part.

While the battles for Novgorod were going on, the 1st Army Corps was advancing towards Chudovo. The 11th Infantry Division took up defensive positions on the Volkhov to protect the right flank of the corps, and the battle group of the 21st Infantry Division captured Chudovo on August 20, cutting the Oktyabrskaya railway. The next day, units of the 1st Army Corps repulsed several Soviet counterattacks. The first task of the German offensive in this direction was completed. Thus, on August 20-22, the enemy advance units reached the near approaches to Leningrad and came into combat contact with units of the Krasnogvardeisky UR. After that, the 1st and 28th Corps of the 16th Army advance on Leningrad, and the formations of the 39th Motorized Corps advance in the direction of Lake Ladoga in order to join the Finnish troops there. Moving rapidly along the Moscow-Leningrad highway, the enemy occupies the city of Lyuban on August 25, and on August 29 reaches the near approaches to Leningrad in the Slutsk-Kolpino region (26 kilometers from Leningrad). So the German troops approached the city from the direction from which they could least be expected.

These days, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in order to help the troops of the Northern Front, directively orders to launch an offensive in the direction of Morino (the railway station in the Staraya Russa-Dno section) with the forces of the 34th Army allocated from the reserve of the Headquarters and the left wing of the 11th Army. On August 12, these formations went on the offensive and pushed the enemy back 40 kilometers. On August 15, 3 German infantry divisions of the 10th Army Corps were surrounded near Staraya Russa. In order to stop the offensive of the North-Western Front and eliminate the results of their advance, the command of the Army Group "North" urgently removes two motorized divisions from the Luga direction from the 56th Corps, the 3rd motorized division and the motorized division of the SS "Totenkopf", as well as 8- th Air Corps and transfers them to the aid of the 10th Army Corps of the 16th Army. At the same time, the 8th Panzer Division remains part of the 41st Motorized Corps and participates in the offensive against the Kingisepp sector. By the end of August 20, the offensive was stopped, the 34th Army was pinned down on the entire front.

By August 25, the 34th and 11th armies were pushed back to the line of the Lovat River. The offensive is over. The Germans announced the capture of 18 thousand prisoners, the capture or destruction of 20 tanks, 300 guns and mortars, 36 anti-aircraft guns, 700 vehicles. Here, the Germans first captured the launcher RS ​​("Katyusha"). Despite the fact that the attackers suffered heavy losses and were eventually driven back to their original position, the German command changed its assessment of the Soviet troops south of Lake Ilmen. The counterattack of the 34th Army played a crucial role in the initial phase of the battle for Leningrad. With this blow, the mobile formations of the Wehrmacht tank groups were pulled away from the Luga line. Both the Luga group and the Shimsk group, aimed at the Luga line, were deprived of the success development echelon in the face of motorized divisions. In the conditions of extremely tight deadlines, within which it was possible to use mobile formations in Army Group North before their castling in September 1941 in the Moscow direction, even minimal delays gave a transition from quantity to quality. From this point of view, the role of the counterattack near Staraya Russa in the battle for Leningrad can hardly be overestimated.

Encirclement of the Luga Group of Forces

On August 24, the troops of the Luga Operational Group (since August 25, the Southern Operational Group) of General A. N. Astanin received combat order No. 102 of the headquarters of the Northern Front: leaving cover on the Luga River, regroup, and destroy the German units that had broken through south of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area. On the same day, Soviet troops left the city of Luga. On August 28, all supply routes were cut, the encircled units were in dire need of ammunition, fuel and food. Parts of the 41st Rifle Corps were in the "boiler": 70, 90, 111, 177th and 235th Rifle Divisions, 1st and 3rd DNO, 24th Panzer Division, about 43 thousand people in total . There were a large number of wounded in the troops: up to two thousand, of which about 500 were seriously wounded. Astanin received an order: to destroy or bury the material part, and the troops to leave the encirclement in small groups, in given directions. This order was carried out by Astanin. Attempts to break out of the encirclement in the northern direction did not bring success. On August 30, it was decided to split into several groups and go out to connect with the troops of the Northern Front near Leningrad in the Kirishi and Pogostye regions. The detachments were led by the commanders of formations and temporary associations - General A. N. Astanin, colonels: A. F. Mashoshin (commander of the 177th rifle division), A. G. Rodin (deputy commander of the 24th tank division, actually headed the 1st DNO), S. V. Roginsky (commander of the 11th Infantry Division) and G. F. Odintsov. The units that made their way from the "cauldron" gradually joined the defenders of Leningrad.

The front command made an attempt to organize the supply of the encircled grouping by air. According to the request of the headquarters of the Astanin group of September 4, 1941, 10 tons of crackers, 3 tons of concentrates, 20 tons of gasoline, 4 tons of diesel fuel, 1600 76-mm and 400 122-mm shells, as well as some other items - salt, autol and others. The transfer was carried out on the afternoon of September 5, 1941 by six P-5 aircraft and one Douglas. However, it quickly became clear that the enemy was patrolling the encirclement area with fighters. Of the seven aircraft, five did not return, including the Douglas. By September 11, hardly half of what was requested was delivered: 5.3 tons of crackers, 1 ton of concentrates, 5.2 tons of gasoline, 2.2 tons of diesel fuel, 450 rounds of 76 mm caliber. 122-mm shots were not delivered at all, medicines and trenching tools were delivered in addition to the application. The capabilities of the Soviet Air Force to supply the "boilers" by air in 1941 were quite modest, it should also be noted that since September 8, the connection between Leningrad and the mainland was interrupted, only communication over Lake Ladoga and by air remained. Transport aviation was involved in the supply of Leningrad itself, perhaps in other conditions the supply of the Astanin group would have become more effective.

The encircled Soviet troops continued to wage intense battles in the wooded and marshy area until September 1941, the release of the "cauldron" was finally abandoned only on September 14-15, when the fighting was already in full swing on the near approaches to Leningrad. The existence of a group of Soviet troops in the rear of Army Group North had a negative impact on the German offensive against Leningrad. The troops fighting near Luga, until August 31, fettered significant enemy forces, did not allow the German troops to use the shortest and most convenient communications - the railway and the Pskov-Leningrad highway. In addition, the troops of the Luga section, occupying central positions south of Leningrad, divided the enemy troops into three separate isolated groupings and prevented him from creating a single, continuous front.

About 13 thousand people were able to get out of the Luga "cauldron" to their own. According to published German data, 20 thousand people were taken prisoner. Most of the prisoners were captured by the 8th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht: 7083 prisoners were taken before September 11 (1100 of them on September 9), and 3500 people on September 14. About 10 thousand Soviet soldiers died in battles, trying to get out of the encirclement, small groups joined the partisans, or, having recovered from their wounds, left much later. Also known is a large group of fighters from the 24th Panzer Division, which headed towards Moscow.

For Soviet prisoners of war, the Germans set up a transit and filtering camp "Dulag-320". Basically, soldiers of the 41st Rifle Corps, which defended the Luga defensive line, were kept there. Among the prisoners of war, the Germans identified and shot the command staff, political workers and ordinary communists, representatives of the Soviet government, Jews, and gypsies. According to eyewitnesses, this camp was surrounded by barbed wire, guards stood on watchtowers. In 1941 there were not only barracks, but even sheds. The prisoners sat right on the ground, and then on the snow. Typhus and dysentery raged in the camp, up to two hundred people died from disease and hunger per day. Later, other camps arose, the prisoners held in them were driven out to build roads and dismantle the ruins.

Grade

It should be noted that there were significant shortcomings in the organization of defense at the Luga line: one-echelon formation of troops in armies, operational groups and fronts, weak reserves, insufficient density of troops, even distribution of forces and means along the entire front, and weak saturation of defense with engineering structures. Naturally, such a defense could not withstand the massive attacks of the tank troops, and the German troops managed to break through the Soviet defensive orders.

During the construction of the Luga defensive line, mistakes were also made, both tactical and technical. Tactical - low density of firing structures, insufficient depth of separation, embrasures of predominantly frontal action, insufficient camouflage of structures. Technical - insufficient wall thickness; the dimensions of the casemates, which do not always provide normal working conditions for the gun crew, lack of ventilation; lack of lighting; lack of communication and the ability to monitor the battlefield. All these mistakes made the defense system in a number of areas unstable.

There were many shortcomings at all levels and sections from the first to the last day of work, starting with reconnaissance and ending with the installation of weapons at firing points, and the shortcomings that occurred in the first days of work were noted a month later; as a result, far from everything was built. Even the provision of information on the progress of work to higher headquarters was badly done. The lack of a general developed tactical task caused conflicting requirements in the military units for the construction of firing points. Sometimes, the lack of tools reached the point of absurdity - for example, on August 2 in the village of Glubokaya (Kingisepp sector) there were 2 axes for 2,500 workers, but in general, the workers were provided with a sufficient amount of tools. There are cases when instructions were received from Leningrad on construction on territory already occupied by the enemy. Calculations for the use of the local population were not always justified, since sometimes the population was evacuated even before the start of work. Due to the hot summer, many wetlands dried up, and the line in these places required additional reinforcement, which was not foreseen in the plans. Reconnaissance and construction planning was carried out more slowly than reinforced concrete and armored prefabricated firing points and gouges arrived at the railway stations.

Some of the buildings that were built were never used. For example, defensive structures were built along the western bank of the Volkhov from Lake Ladoga to Gostinopolye, directed by the front to the east. It was impossible to use these structures for defense against the enemy advancing from the west, on the contrary, they could be used by the enemy when reaching the Volkhov line, so they were destroyed by order of Major General A. M. Vasilevsky.

The directive of the Military Council of the North-Western Direction dated July 29, 1941 No. 013 / op also stated that the positions of troops on the front line were not equipped with trenches of the proper depth, dugouts, communication lines, barbed wire. Artillery, mortar and machine-gun positions were poorly chosen and camouflaged. The minefield is random and ill-conceived. The issues of ensuring the maneuver of troops, both along the front and in the depth of their location, have not been thought out.

Nevertheless, with all the shortcomings, the fortifications of the Luga line were highly appreciated by the enemy. During the battles near Luga, the German troops had to move from an offensive march directly to severe military operations, which were affected not only by the terrain and weather conditions, but also by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops. German soldiers noted skillful camouflage and skill in using terrain features, numerous and varied fortifications. Considering that the Luga defensive structures were being built for many months, they were forced to use all their skills, abilities and technical means to overcome them. The defense of Luga was also assessed by German fortification specialists. On September 23, 1941, “about the experience of the Russians in the accelerated construction of fortifications in the Luga region,” Inspector General of the sapper and fortress troops of the Wehrmacht, Alfred Jacob, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder.

Information about Soviet fortifications and how to deal with them was distributed in the German army; in early September, the troops received a document about the fortifications near Luga. It examined in detail all types of defensive structures used at the Luga line. Separately, such an innovation as prefabricated pillboxes, built from large concrete blocks, was noted, which made it possible to build them in a short time.

Results

From July 10, when the offensive began in the Luga direction, and until August 24, when the German troops captured Luga, 45 days passed. Until July 10, that is, before approaching the Luga defensive line, the average daily rate of advance of the Germans was 26 kilometers per day; then it fell to 5 kilometers per day, and in August to 2.2 kilometers per day. The delay of the German troops allowed the leadership of the defense of Leningrad to solve a number of priority tasks:

1. formation of new military formations, their training. The 272nd, 281st rifle and 25th cavalry divisions were formed.
2. Starting from June 29, a mass militia is being created. In a short time in Leningrad, 160 thousand people signed up for the people's militia. 10 divisions, 16 separate machine-gun and artillery battalions, 7 partisan regiments were formed. Part of the militias replenished the thinned ranks of units and formations. To carry out this complex and important work, the administration of the Leningrad People's Militia Army was created under the command of Major General A. I. Subbotin. Already in the second decade of July, two divisions of the people's militia joined the ranks of the defenders of the Luga line.
3. to defend Leningrad from the south, two new armies are being formed - the 42nd and 55th. The management of the 42nd Army was created by August 3 on the basis of the abolished 50th Rifle Corps of the 23rd Army. Major General V. I. Shcherbakov was appointed commander of the army. On the basis of the also abolished directorate of the 10th mechanized corps, the directorate of the Slutsk-Kolpino operational group was first created, which on September 2 was transformed into the directorate of the 55th army. Major General of the Tank Forces I. G. Lazarev was appointed its commander.
4. Simultaneously with the improvement of the fortifications of the Luga line, by decision of the Military Councils of the North-Western Direction and the Northern Front, defensive lines are being built in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad. In July, the construction of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area began. For this, the population of Leningrad and the region is again mobilized - up to 500 thousand people.
5. for the period from June 29 to August 27, 1941, 488,703 people were evacuated from Leningrad; in addition, during this period, the population of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Karelian-Finnish SSR was evacuated to Leningrad - 147,500 people.

In general, the protracted nature of the struggle for Leningrad, unexpected for the German command, had a significant impact on the entire further course of the Great Patriotic War.

Memory

On April 30, 1944, the Heroic Defense of Leningrad exhibition opened in Leningrad. The exhibition was very popular among Leningraders and guests of the city. Only in the first three months after the opening, the exhibition was visited by more than 150 thousand people. The exhibition covered in detail, including the battles on the Luga frontier. On October 5, 1945, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to transform the exhibition into a museum of republican significance - the Leningrad Defense Museum. In terms of attendance, the museum ranked second after the Hermitage. More than 37 thousand exhibits illustrating the course of the battle for Leningrad and the life of the besieged city were placed in 37 halls on 40 thousand m². The 4th hall was dedicated to the struggle on the distant approaches to Leningrad, it housed photographs, maps and illustrations depicting individual moments and scales of defense construction. Including, the panel of the artist V. A. Serov "Construction of defensive structures" was placed. On the central wall - a panel by the artist Rosenblum and A.S. Bantikov "Seeing the militia", here is the banner of the Sverdlovsk division, portraits, maps, combat schemes and weapons of the militia. The exhibition was complemented by an electrified model of the Luga fortified area.

However, in 1949 the museum was closed due to the growing “Leningrad case”, and by March 1953 the Leningrad Defense Museum was gone. Funds, scientific and auxiliary materials, scientific archive and household property were transferred to the State Museum of the History of Leningrad, part of the exhibits and the library - to the Museum of the October Revolution, the other part - to various military units and museums. Some manuscripts from the museum were also transferred to the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. At the same time, some of the exhibits turned out to be damaged, some were lost.

As of the mid-2010s, there are several museums presenting the battles on the Luga frontier: the Luga and Kingisepp local history museums, the revived Leningrad Defense Museum, the exposition "Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War" of the Museum of the History of St. Luga line, a separate section of the exposition in the department of the history of the engineering troops of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineer Troops and Signal Corps. It should also be noted the section of the museum of the Leningrad Higher All-Arms Red Banner School named after S. M. Kirov dedicated to the battles at the Luga line and the folk museum in the House of Culture of the village of Bolshoy Sabsk.

There are many monuments, memorials, commemorative signs on the battlefields:

In Novgorod, one of the sculptural bas-reliefs of the monument-stele "City of Military Glory" is dedicated to an episode of the defense of the city, when during the counterattack, on August 24, 1941, A.K. Pankratov was the first in history to cover an enemy machine gun with his body.

At the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, the Germans used the same blitzkrieg tactics on the Eastern Front as in Europe. In frontier battles, our panzer divisions tried to stop the German armored columns with counterattacks, but this led to disaster. The Germans were better prepared, the Wehrmacht had an ideally debugged interaction between the military branches. Gradually, from the tactics of counterattacks, Soviet tankers began to move on to the very effective tactics of tank ambushes, and it was she who became a kind of "antidote" to Blitzkrieg.

August 1941 was truly the time of tank ambushes. It was during this month that the Soviet tankers of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division on the distant approaches to Leningrad began to massively use this new tactic. The German 4th Panzer Group unexpectedly ran into a system of tank ambushes in depth, and this was a very unpleasant surprise for the Panzerwaffe.

On August 20, 1941, the crew of the KV-1 heavy tank, senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, held one of the most successful tank battles in world history. On the distant approaches to Leningrad, while defending the forefield of the Krasnogvardeysky fortified area, our tankers destroyed 22 enemy tanks from an ambush, and the entire Kolobanov company, consisting of 5 KV tanks, destroyed 43 tanks that day. The tank pogrom that the tankers of Zinovy ​​Kolobanov perpetrated on the Panzerwaffe is the peak of the development of this tactic, a kind of ideally carried out tank ambush.

For many years now, fierce disputes have not ceased among historians.

Do the German documents confirm the phenomenally high result of the Soviet tankers? The equipment of which German division was destroyed by our soldiers? How did the battle of Kolobanov affect the situation near Leningrad in general?

Battles for the Luga defensive line

In the summer of 1941, Army Group North was rapidly approaching Leningrad. To protect the city, the Military Council of the Northern Front decides to build two lines of defense: along the banks of the Luga River - the Luga defensive line, and along the line of the nearest suburbs - the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area (UR). The center of the fortified area was the city of Krasnogvardeysk (now Gatchina).

The Krasnogvardeisky UR, despite the rapid pace of its construction, was a serious obstacle in the way of the German troops. The Luga line, unlike the fortified area, had a smaller depth of defense, but it was strengthened by a natural water barrier - the Luga River. Thousands of Leningraders and residents of the region built numerous fortifications. There was a direct connection between the Luga border and the Krasnogvardeisky UR. The longer the frontier held, the more they managed to strengthen the UR.

On July 10, 1941, the 4th German Panzer Group of Colonel General Erich Hoepner struck at the shortest route to Leningrad through the city of Luga. But the further the German divisions advanced, the more fierce the resistance of the Soviet troops became. Here the 41st Rifle Corps of A.N. Astanin fought bravely, supported by the 24th Panzer Division.

The latter consisted mainly of BT-5 tanks, as well as a few KV and T-28s. A significant part of the BT was badly worn out.

The city of Luga was a key and well-fortified defense center of the Luga line, and the Germans quickly realized that they could not take it on the move. In addition, immediately outside the city for 60 kilometers there were forests and swamps with a few roads. Even if the enemy managed to capture Luga, it would not have been possible to enter the operational space. After analyzing the situation, the German command decided to break through the Luga line in another place, on the Kingisepp sector of defense. Here, the strip of forests and swamps behind the Soviet defense was noticeably smaller, from 14 to 30 km, and after breaking through the main line of the Soviet defense, it was possible to reach the Kapor plateau, an area suitable for maneuvering tank units.

After breaking through the defense, the enemy planned to go deep in the rear and inflict a "stab in the back" of Major General Astanin's 41st Corps. In this situation, the defenders of the city of Luga find themselves "in a mousetrap", despite the fact that the walls of the mousetrap formed the very forests and swamps. Most likely, the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal von Leeb, planned this maneuver in advance, it was hardly an "improvisation". In his notes for August 15, 1941, Gepner indicates that he informed his military leadership of this decision, and the turn to the south was carried out on August 20.

To accomplish this task, part of the divisions of the 4th Gepner Panzer Group remained near Luga, and the tank columns maneuvered along the front and attacked the right flank of the Luga line. Under the blow of German tankers was the Kingisepp defense sector. Most of the infantry units were left under the city of Luga.

The appearance of German troops in the Kingisepp area was a complete surprise. The distance from Luga to Kingisepp is about 100 kilometers. German tankers made a dash along the front along forest roads, which were considered impassable for vehicles. But here the skill of the German sapper units and crews of combat vehicles affected.

As a result, on July 14, 1941, the Germans were able to occupy two bridgeheads on the banks of the Luga River. So the 6th Panzer Division captured the bridge in the Ivanovsky area and the bridgehead near it. It was an exceptionally important foothold. Here, behind the Soviet defenses, there was a section of forest only 14 km wide, beyond the fields and the strategic Tallinn Highway, which connected Leningrad with the Baltic.

Success accompanied the 1st German Panzer Division. Although she was unable to capture the bridge across the Luga in the Sabsk region (they managed to blow it up), she was able to force the river and capture the second bridgehead, pushing the cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov (LPU) from the river. Here, behind the Soviet defenses, there was a strip of forest about 30 kilometers wide, behind it was the Moloskovitsy railway station, fields, a developed road network and access to the Tallinn Highway. Of the two bridgeheads, the Ivanovo bridgehead was the most dangerous, it was for him that the most fierce battles unfolded.

Despite initial success, the further advance of the Germans was stopped by decisive counterattacks by the Soviet reserve units. The fighters of the 2nd Leningrad Rifle Division of the People's Militia of the Moscow Region (DNO), tankers of the combined training regiment of the Leningrad Red Banner Armored Advanced Training Courses (LKBTKUKS) and cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School went into battle.

After heavy fighting on the bridgeheads, there was a balance of power. The Germans were able to penetrate our defenses, but could not break through the positions. With stubborn counterattacks and air strikes, the Soviet troops reduced the size of the Sabsky (the most dangerous for us) bridgehead, inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, but could not throw the enemy into the Luga River.

By July 21, 1941, the forces of the opposing sides had dried up and active fighting had ceased. The Germans began to urgently pull up reserves to the front line and prepare a new offensive. Despite all the haste, due to extended communications, they spent three whole weeks on this. Such a long delay called into question the entire further plan of attack on Leningrad. If in the Baltic States the Germans managed to maintain a high rate of advance using the Blitzkig tactics, then on the distant approaches to Leningrad, the German troops significantly reduced the rate of advance and were more and more drawn into the "positional slaughter".

During the time that the Germans were pulling up reserves, our troops managed to create a new defense in depth at the Sabsky and Ivanovsky bridgeheads. The Soviet defense was also improved in the area of ​​​​the city of Luga. The enemy was also concentrating his forces on this sector. The Germans were gathering troops and preparing to break through the Luga line in two main areas: in the zone of the Kingisepp sector (from the Ivanovsky and Sabsky bridgeheads) and in the zone of the Luga sector near the city of Luga. If successful, the Germans approached Krasnogvardeysk from two directions. The Krasnogvardeisky UR was not yet completely occupied by our troops, and the Germans could break through it on the move. But, as mentioned above, von Leeb did not particularly count on the success of the offensive by the weak forces of the infantry divisions near Luga. With their attacks, they were supposed to "fetter" the 41st Corps of Astanin and "keep in suspense" the Soviet command. The enemy was also preparing a strike in the third direction - to Novgorod.

Thus, of the three corps of the 4th Panzer Group (38th, 41st, 56th) on Leningrad, two (41st, 56th) advanced along the shortest. The 41st motorized corps, advancing from the Sabsky and Ivanovsky bridgeheads, had to bear the brunt of the fighting to break through the Luga line. Having broken through the Soviet defenses and entered the operational space, he needed to turn part of the units 180 degrees to the south and strike at the rear of the 41st Corps of Astanin near the city of Luga, with the task of encircling the divisions of this corps and subsequently defeat them.

It should be noted that the Soviet command was not able to unravel the enemy’s plan in time, it perceived the decisive offensive of the 41st Corps of the 4th German Panzer Group as an attempt to break through the enemy with one throw from the Luga line to Leningrad through Krasnogvardeisk.

By the beginning of the general offensive on August 8, 1941, the 4th Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Erich Hoepner, included: the 38th Army Corps, the 56th Motorized Corps and the 41st Motorized Corps. The strongest of them was the 41st, which had five divisions: the 1st, 6th and 8th tank, 36th motorized and 1st infantry divisions. These formations were supposed to break through the Luga line in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Ivanovsky and Sabsky bridgeheads.

56th Motorized Corps: 3rd SS Motorized Infantry Division "Dead Head", 269th Infantry Division, SS Police Division. The corps was concentrated under the city of Luga.

Until August 15, the 3rd SS Motorized Infantry Division "Dead Head" operated as part of the 56th Corps. Then she was transferred to repel the Soviet counteroffensive in the area of ​​Staraya Russa. After that, the 269th SS infantry and police division became part of the 50th motorized corps, and now near the city of Luga, German documents indicate the action of the 50th corps, and not the 56th. This introduces some confusion in understanding the reports of the Wehrmacht.

As a result, for a decisive breakthrough of the Luga line, the enemy concentrated very powerful shock groups. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Leningrad Front did not have large reserves. In the event of a German breakthrough, the Soviet command could throw into battle the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, the 1st DNO and the 281st Rifle Division. But it was impossible to call our three divisions fully-fledged combat units.

The 1st Red Banner Tank Division was not at full strength, it had recently been transferred by rail from Kandalaksha near Leningrad, but some of the units remained in their old place. As a result, she had two tank, artillery regiments and a reconnaissance battalion.

1st Tank Regiment.

2nd tank battalion - 29 BT-7 tanks;

flamethrower company - 4 T-26 tanks and 8 flamethrower tanks;

reconnaissance - 5 armored vehicles BA-10.

2nd Tank Regiment.

1st tank battalion - 11 KV tanks, 7 T-28 tanks;

2nd tank battalion - 19 BT-7 tanks, 7 T-50 tanks;

reconnaissance - 5 armored vehicles BA-10. Reconnaissance battalion - 10 armored vehicles BA-10, 2 BA-6, 9 BA-20.

1st Artillery Regiment - 12 152 mm howitzers, presumably M-10 mod. 1938 and 18 STZ-5 NATI tractors.

It is clearly seen that the 2nd battalions of two tank regiments have only half of the tanks laid down according to the state, and which were with the division before the war. This is a consequence of the heavy losses in the Battle of Sully. I would like to note that the repair teams managed to restore part of the tanks knocked out near Kandalaksha, but remained to fight in the same place, at a great distance from the main forces of the tank division.

But the 1st Red Banner Tank Division received reinforcements before the decisive battle. 22 shielded KV-1 tanks arrived in the division, which fully compensated for the losses in the battle of Sally and made the division a dangerous enemy for any Wehrmacht tank division, especially since the crews for heavy tanks were selected from the most experienced tankers.

Together with the 1st Panzer, the Soviet command planned to throw into battle the 1st Guards Leningrad Rifle Division of the Volodarsky District People's Militia (1st Guards DNO). But this division was formed from newly recruited poorly trained and poorly armed militia and was not suitable for interaction with a regular tank division.

The 281st rifle division, which was also recently formed, was also preparing for battle, and the fighters had no combat experience. The 281st Rifle in terms of personnel training did not differ much from the 1st Guards. BOTTOM.

In August 1941, Leningrad found itself in a very difficult situation. The Red Army had to simultaneously repel the German offensive from the south and the Finnish offensive from the north. Moreover, both the Germans and the Finns impeccably coordinated their actions.

So on July 31, 1941, the Finns went on the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, and on August 10 in Karelia. For this reason, the difficult situation at the front did not allow keeping a large number of divisions in reserve, and it was very risky to transfer divisions from one sector of the front to another, under these conditions. The Soviet command knew that the enemy was accumulating forces in front of the Kingisepp sector and in front of the Luga sector, and in the region of Novgorod. Where the blow would be stronger, and where the Germans would break through the Luga line, was unknown.

For this reason, the reserve 1st Red Banner Tank Division was concentrated in the area of ​​Voiskovitsy, Malye Paritsy, and Skvoritsy. From this crossroads, it was possible to quickly bring it into battle both near Kingisepp and near Luga. At this time, the 1st Guards. DNO hastily completed the formation and prepared to be sent to the front. But, despite all the efforts, the division was understaffed, there was not enough small arms. And the 281st division by this time was not subordinate to the Kingisepp defense sector. On August 8, 1941, the Germans began a well-prepared general assault on the Luga line. The enemy attacked the Kingisepp sector from the Ivanovsky and Sabsky bridgeheads with the forces of the 41st Corps of the 4th Panzer Group of General Gepner.

The strongest enemy strike force was concentrated at the Sabsky bridgehead. Here, in front of the front of the 90th Rifle Division, the enemy concentrated the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions. The enemy correctly took into account that the Soviet command would focus on preparing for the defense of the Ivanovsky bridgehead, and not Sabsky, because behind the Sabsky bridgehead the forest strip was twice as large as behind Ivanovsky.

On the Ivanovsky bridgehead, the 6th German tank and 1st infantry divisions were preparing for an attack, they were opposed by militias from the 2nd DNO. Here, Soviet troops erected a powerful line of fortifications in depth, turning the defense sector near Ivanovsky into a powerful fortified area.

The Ivanovo and Sabsky bridgeheads were nearby, and the Germans planned to establish close cooperation between the advancing troops. If successful, the enemy troops entered the operational space on the Koporsky plateau and could advance both along the Tallinn highway and along the Moloskovitsy-Volosovo-Krasnogvardeysk highway. But the 41st Corps of the 4th Panzer Group did not receive an order to attack Leningrad, since von Leeb had a different plan.

In the 1st, 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions, the types of tanks differed greatly. The main combat vehicle of the 1st Panzer was the Pz.III tank, the 6th Division was dominated by light Czechoslovak-made Pz.35(t) tanks, and the 8th Panzer had more light Czechoslovak Pz.38(t) tanks. In the 1st Panzer Division, the tank regiment was of two battalions, in the 6th and 8th divisions - of three battalions. But in all three divisions, it was common that, in each battalion, one of the four companies was armed with medium Pz.IV.

Of the three German Panzer divisions, the 1st Panzer was the most powerful. It was armed with the most modern German tanks Pz.III and Pz.IV, and Pz.III were with 50-mm guns. The 6th and 8th were much inferior to it in terms of the quality of tanks, but this was partly offset by the presence of "additional" third tank battalions.

Before the start of the offensive, according to reports for August 3, 1941, these three tank divisions were combat-ready: in the 1st German tank division: 5 Pz.I Ausf.B tanks, 30 Pz.II tanks, 57 Pz.III tanks, 11 tanks Pz.IV, 2 command tanks Sd.Kfz. 265 based on the Pz.I tank, 9 command tanks Sd.Kfz. 266–268 based on the Pz.III tank.

In the 6th German Panzer Division: 9 Pz.I Ausf.B tanks, 36 Pz.II tanks, 112 Pz.35(t) tanks, 26 Pz.IV tanks, 7 Sd.Kfz command tanks. 266 based on the Pz.III tank, 11 Pz. bf. Wg.35(t) based on the Pz.35(t) tank.

In the 8th German Panzer Division: 10 Pz.I Ausf.B tanks, 41 Pz.II tanks, 86 Pz.38(t) tanks, 17 Pz.IV tanks, 7 Sd.Kfz command tanks. 266 based on the Pz.III tank, 7 command tanks Pz. bf. Wg.38(t) based on the Pz.38(t) tank.

The Germans inflicted another powerful blow on the Luga sector of defense, where the enemy set himself the goal of taking the city of Luga by storm and advancing on Leningrad along the shortest path - along the Luga road (aka the Kiev highway).

This sector of defense was located at a distance of 80 kilometers from Sabsk and Ivanovskoye, and a separate battle unfolded here. On this sector of the front, the Soviet command concentrated strong personnel units. The section of the Luga line was defended by the 41st Corps of Major General Astanin, who had a very powerful artillery group, numbering three excellently trained and armed artillery regiments. The 56th motorized corps of the 4th tank group was preparing to break through the Soviet defenses near Luga. For a decisive thrust forward, the 4th SS division “Policeman” and the 269th infantry division concentrated, the 3rd SS motorized division “Totenkopf” operated nearby. Another large grouping of the enemy attacked our positions in the Novgorod region. In fact, the Germans wanted to pierce our defenses with a powerful "trident".

During the preparation of the offensive, according to the daily reports of the 4th German Panzer Group during this period, the Wehrmacht's losses in equipment were as follows (according to the preliminary report):

August 5, 1941 - lost (seriously damaged or burned down) armored car Sd.Kfz. 222. Such light armored vehicles with machine-gun and cannon weapons in the German army were used for reconnaissance by infantry, motorized, and tank divisions, in other words, it is impossible to understand which enemy division lost it.

August 6, 1941 - lost (seriously damaged or burned down) light tank Pz.II. But Pz.II were in all three tank divisions, and it is impossible to establish which division the tank belonged to at the moment.

Analyzing the German losses, we can conclude that the enemy was conducting active reconnaissance in front of the front these days on the eve of the decisive offensive, since these days only light armored vehicles, which are most often used in reconnaissance, have been lost.